EVIDENCE
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Thursday, February 4, 1999
[English]
• 0938
The Chair (Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.)): I'd like to welcome this morning, from the Traffic Injury Research Foundation, Dr. Herb Simpson, Mr. Daniel Mayhew, and Dr. Doug Beirness; and, from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Mr. Robert Mann. Welcome, gentlemen. Would you like to make a presentation to our committee this morning? Following that we will ask you some probing questions. Which one of you would like to start?
Dr. Herb M. Simpson (President and CEO, Traffic Injury Research Foundation): Thank you. I'd be honoured to begin.
We distributed a chart this morning to the clerk. I assume this has been distributed to the members.
The Chair: Yes, it has.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Thank you. I believe the interpreters have a copy of my speaking notes.
It's a pleasure to have this opportunity to appear before the committee. Let me once again just introduce my colleagues who are here with me who will be serving as an additional resource during the discussion period. Mr. Daniel Mayhew is senior vice-president at our foundation. Dr. Douglas Beirness is vice-president for research. Collectively, these two gentlemen have over 30 years of experience in traffic safety and are internationally recognized for their expertise. If you add me to the group, we have some 55 years of experience in this area.
Our agency, the Traffic Injury Research Foundation of Canada, TIRF, was established by the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in 1964 as a national registered charity. For over three decades, TIRF staff have been international leaders in road safety research and evaluation, as well as program and policy development, and have numerous awards for their contribution to understanding and control of impaired driving.
• 0940
To set the context for our recommendations, I'd
like to begin with a snapshot of what has happened in
the area of drinking and driving over the past three
decades, and that's contained in the graph I just
distributed, which shows changes in
the problem since 1973. In the 1970s the problem was
substantial and, if anything, getting worse. By the
end of that decade, nearly 60% of fatally injured
drivers had been drinking.
The 1980s stand in marked contrast. They were characterized by a precipitous decrease in the problem. During that decade, public and political concern and action reached unprecedented levels, and major changes occurred. Attitudes changed, behaviour changed, and, as shown in the chart, the bottom line changed. Studies have shown that most of the gains in the 1980s can be attributed to changes in the behaviour of responsible social drinkers. So the problem we were left with in the 1990s was decidedly different.
As we have demonstrated in a series of studies, a major part of the problem that faces us today is caused by what we called hard-core drinking drivers. They repeatedly drive after drinking large amounts of alcohol, putting themselves and others at very great risk. As the name implies, hard-core offenders often have a history of impaired driving convictions, which speaks volumes about the failures of the present system, since these individuals are processed through it, emerging unchanged.
Recognizing what the problem is like today should also help us appreciate what the potential is for further progress. Simply stated, because we face a more challenging problem, the improvements in the next decade are unlikely to parallel those we saw during the 1980s. To be more specific, in the 1980s the annual savings in lives ranged from 35 to a high of 195, and that's on an annual basis. These are the most profound decreases ever recorded in alcohol-related crashes in Canada, and they occurred during a time of unprecedented effort. Most importantly, they occurred at a time when relatively easy gains were possible, that is, impacting social drinkers.
The point is that the changes observed in the 1980s arose from the convergence of many ideal conditions, some of which no longer exist. As a result, progress in the next decade will almost certainly not rival that in the 1980s. We would therefore urge the committee to adopt a healthy skepticism toward claims about the impact of programs and policies that exceed what have been achieved even under rather ideal conditions. Let me hasten to add, however, that further improvements can most certainly be made. There are many meaningful things that can be done to address the drinking and driving problem, and collectively these can be expected to produce positive results. We are optimistic that a difference can be made, but we're also realistic about how large it can be.
Let me now turn to a brief review of our recommendations, which are contained in detail in the brief. We have divided those for convenience into recommendations relating to increasing the general deterrent effect of the law and those related more to its specific deterrent effects.
General deterrence is based on the assumption that the threat of being punished deters most people. Changes in the 1980s reflect a major impact of general deterrence. Given that socially responsible individuals have already shown considerable change in their behaviour, the need for enhanced general deterrents can certainly be questioned. However, we believe there is still much that can be achieved through general deterrents.
In this context, the results of our national opinion poll on drinking and driving, which was released yesterday, are very relevant. It revealed that many Canadians still drink and drive. Nearly four million drove after drinking last year. More than half of these drove when they thought they had too much to drink. This is compelling evidence of the need to enhance the general deterrent effect of the law. There are several ways this can be achieved, and we have offered four recommendations.
The first relates to increasing and improving knowledge about the law. The law can have its full deterrent effect only if the public is aware of its provisions. Historically this has been a major problem. To illustrate, our study of the impact of the 1985 amendments to the Criminal Code found that changes to the law were not associated with any changes in the prevalence of drinking and driving or in alcohol-related crashes. This rather disappointing finding was explained in part by the fact that very few members of the public were aware of the changes, even the most basic ones.
Our recent national opinion poll on drinking and driving found that this lack of awareness about the law persists today. If the law is to have a significant general deterrent effect, the public must be aware of the sanctions they face.
• 0945
Thus, our first recommendation is to encourage efforts
that will increase the level of knowledge about the law
and the serious consequences of a conviction for
impaired driving as a means to enhancing the potential
deterrent effect, not only of the existing law but of
any changes made to it.
Our second recommendation relates to enhancing confidence in the legal system. Not only does the public need to be aware of the law and its consequences, but they must believe that impaired drivers have a reasonable chance of getting caught. Fortunately, Canadians do believe the chances of getting caught by the police are relatively high, again as revealed by the results of our national opinion poll. But for the law to have its full deterrent effect, the public must also be convinced that impaired drivers who get caught will be sanctioned. Here is where the public believes the system breaks down.
They think a charge of impaired driving has a relatively low chance of resulting in a conviction and punishment. Furthermore, even if a conviction occurs and the driver is sanctioned, the public believes most will repeat the offence. Public confidence in the legal system dealing with impaired driving is lacking, so our second recommendation is that steps need to be taken to restore public confidence in the adjudication and sanctioning process.
Our third recommendation relates to the BAC limit. A recent survey of police practices in Canada revealed that very few drivers are charged if the BAC is between 80 milligrams percent and 100 milligrams percent. This practice is, of course, inconsistent with the intentions of the law, and if it became widely known, it could erode the general deterrent effect of the law. There is, therefore, a need to enforce the current BAC limit.
To achieve this, the legal, technical, and administrative problems that are causing police not to lay charges if the BAC is between 80 milligrams percent and 100 milligrams percent will need to be identified and remedied. We're saying make the existing system work. This is far more important, in our view, than changing the current system by such tactics as lowering the BAC limit.
Our position on this issue is fully amplified in our brief, but the crux of it is that we do not see any convincing evidence that simply lowering the BAC limit will produce any benefits. We reached this conclusion over a decade and a half ago in a report commissioned by the Department of Justice. The same conclusion was reached a decade later in a study we did for Transport Canada.
Even more recently, we undertook both a comprehensive review of the contemporary literature and a re-analysis of data from jurisdictions that have recently changed their limits. That forthcoming study found no compelling evidence that lowering the statutory limit, in and of itself, will have a measurable impact on safety.
Studies that claim to show beneficial effects contain numerous methodological weaknesses that undermine the validity of the conclusions. The more scientifically rigorous studies that take into consideration the influence of other potentially confounding factors have failed to find any significant benefits.
In addition to the lack of convincing scientific evidence about the effectiveness of lowering the limit, there are numerous other factors that make the wisdom of such a move questionable. Seven such reasons are outlined in our brief, and we would be pleased to address these in the discussion period.
For these reasons, our third recommendation is that the current limit of 80 milligrams percent be retained. What is needed is not a lower limit, but more rigorous enforcement of the one we have.
Finally on the matter of general deterrence is the issue of passive alcohol sensors. Many drivers who avoid detection by the police are those at greatest risk of causing a serious collision. Research has shown that even when the police conduct a spot-check, half of the legally intoxicated drivers escape detection.
The passive alcohol sensor is a device that enhances the ability of the officer to detect alcohol by sampling the air near the driver's face. It can provide the police officer with a reasonable suspicion that alcohol has been consumed, allowing a demand for an actual breath test using an approved screening device. The use of passive sensors would virtually eliminate the possibility of an impaired driver escaping detection when stopped by the police. Field tests with passive sensors have shown them to be effective.
Our fourth recommendation is therefore to amend the Criminal Code to authorize police to use passive sensors to improve the detection and apprehension of impaired drivers, thereby enhancing the deterrent effects of the law.
Our remaining recommendations relate to specific deterrents. In addition to general deterrents, it's obvious that the specific deterrent effects of the law need to be enhanced. Hard-core repeat offenders, who comprise the majority of the problem today, are not easily affected by general deterrents, and their high rates of recidivism show that even many specific deterrent measures do not work with them. New measures for dealing efficiently and effectively with this group, or a more effective application of the measures we have, are needed.
• 0950
We have three recommendations related to specific
deterrents. The first is the use of a tiered BAC
system. At present, drivers with a BAC just over the
legal limit are treated in the same manner as drivers
with BACs in excess of 200 milligrams percent, even though in the
latter case the risk posed to society is as
much as 400 times greater. An alternative approach
involves a system that links the level and the type of
sanction to the severity of the offence, as determined
by the driver's BAC. Higher BACs at the time of arrest
result in more severe sanctions. Higher BACs can also
be used as a means to facilitate automatic entry into
certain rehabilitation programs. An important feature
of a graded BAC system is that refusal to provide a
breath sample should carry with it the same sanctions
as having a BAC above the highest tier.
Just as an aside, I've been involved with several U.S. states, most recently Arizona, in setting up a tiered BAC system. One of the most severe problems they have is ensuring that a refusal carries with it the same sanctions as a high BAC limit.
The link between BAC level and the severity of the sanction is supported both empirically and rationally, and the evidence is outlined in our brief. We recommend the implementation of a system of tiered or graded BAC limits that tie the type and severity of sanction to the gravity of the offence.
Our next recommendation on specific deterrents is the use of alcohol ignition interlocks. An alcohol ignition interlock is a small breath test device installed in a vehicle that requires the driver to provide a zero or low BAC breath sample in order to start the vehicle. Current interlock technology is very reliable, even under extreme temperature conditions. Interlocks are usually installed after a period of licence suspension, as a way to introduce the offender to the licensed driver population. At the same time, interlocks provide society with protection.
Evaluation studies over the past 10 years have consistently demonstrated that interlocks are effective. Reconviction rates among offenders who participate in the program are as much as 65% lower than those who do not participate. We have also just completed the most comprehensive evaluation ever of the effectiveness of this device in a five-year study in Alberta.
Our sixth recommendation is that the Criminal Code be amended to allow judges to order an offender to install an alcohol ignition interlock in their vehicle as a condition of probation. If legal and administrative obstacles make this approach untenable, as an alternative Parliament should encourage the provinces to make interlocks a mandatory condition for licence reinstatement.
Finally is our recommendation regarding assessment and rehabilitation. As many as three-quarters of repeat offenders are either alcohol abusers or alcohol dependent. Many first-time offenders are as well. However, the nature and severity of the problems within these groups are also quite diverse. To determine what these problems are and to facilitate assignment to the most appropriate rehabilitation program, offenders should undergo a comprehensive assessment. This should be done as soon as possible after arrest and conviction. On the basis of an assessment, a recommendation can be made as to the most appropriate rehabilitation program, and completion of that program would be required prior to licence reinstatement.
We believe the assessment and rehabilitation of offenders would be most effectively and efficiently administered by the provinces through their driver licensing systems. Several already have some type of assessment or rehabilitation program for offenders. The federal government could play a role by encouraging other jurisdictions to implement such programs by developing standards for the programs and assisting provinces in the implementation of programs that meet these standards.
That concludes our verbal presentation. I would also like to add that for the clerk we have brought copies of our research in the past six years that pertains directly to the recommendations we are making, and we will leave these for you as a resource.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Simpson. Is there anyone else there who has a presentation, or have you made your presentation on behalf of all?
Dr. Herb Simpson: I have made it on behalf of my staff.
The Chair: Thank you.
Dr. Mann.
Dr. Robert Mann (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health): If I may, I have copies of my brief here that can be distributed. Also, is it possible to use an overhead projector for this?
The Chair: We haven't made arrangements, Dr. Mann. Have you made arrangements for the overhead projector?
• 0955
Dr. Robert Mann: That's all right. I've brought overheads, but I can speak from them. Although you will unfortunately not be able to see some of the things I'm referring to, I think I can....
The Chair: Okay. Had we been advised, perhaps we could have accommodated you. I apologize for that, then.
Dr. Robert Mann: That's all right.
A voice: I do see a projector back here.
The Chair: All right. Would you prefer to use the overheads?
Dr. Robert Mann: Well, there are some visual things that I think may be of interest.
The Chair: Can we adjourn for two or three minutes to try to get you set up?
Dr. Robert Mann: Certainly.
• 0956
• 0959
The Chair: Perhaps we could reconvene.
Dr. Robert Mann: I do apologize for this. Let me say I'm very pleased to be here with you this morning. I'll introduce myself again.
My name is Bob Mann. I'm a researcher with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto, formerly the Addiction Research Foundation, the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, the Queen Street Mental Health Centre, and the Donwood Institute—we've been amalgamated—and also with the Department of Public Health Sciences in the faculty of medicine at the University of Toronto.
• 1000
First of all, I want to note that you're embarking
on a very important task. Impaired driving has been and
remains a very serious problem in Canada. I think my
colleagues from the Traffic Injury Research Foundation
did an excellent job of pointing out the magnitude of
the problems we experience, and, if I could, I would like
to supplement that with some data that was
obtained from the Transport Canada web site.
They summarize the collisions experienced in Canada between 1977 and 1996. We can estimate that approximately 40% of fatalities involve a drinking driver and about 30% of injuries involve a drinking driver. If we do that, we can estimate that in the 20-year period, 1977 to 1996, approximately 35,000 people were killed in an impaired driving collision. We can cost that, and it runs to a figure of about $52.1 billion in 1996 terms. We can estimate that about 1,505,035 people were injured in drinking and driving related collisions in that 20-year period, and it runs to a figure of about $42.1 billion. So it's a serious problem, personally, economically, and on all counts.
I would like to address the specific questions that were outlined in the discussion document that was circulated. I'm not here to make policy recommendations, but I'd like to focus on the potential for influencing drinking and driving collisions, and injuries and fatalities, in the various measures that were in the discussion document. Let me address the six questions.
The first one is, do current Criminal Code penalties adequately reflect the seriousness of the various offences, especially in the case of repeat offenders and those who cause injury or death? Is there an argument for lifetime licence suspension, and in what circumstances should it apply? Here we're interested in what we know about the impact of various penalties on convicted impaired drivers. Let me note that licence suspensions, of all penalties that are applied, appear to be the most effective in reducing collisions and recidivism rates. I would note that in one study we carried out in Toronto with 2,739 first and multiple offenders, we found that of all sanctions, including fines, jail, probations, and suspensions, licence suspension was the only one that was consistently associated with traffic safety benefits, that is, significant reductions in alcohol-related and total collisions. Ray Peck, who was the head of research for the California motor vehicles department, in 1991 concluded that suspensions reduced drinking and driving offences and collisions by 30% to 50% while they were in place.
Right now, research does not yet tell us at what point these benefits may disappear, so I really can't comment on what the effect is of a much longer versus a much shorter suspension. I would just note that Ontario has recently implemented lifetime suspensions for third and fourth offenders, and this experience should be monitored.
The second question is, should the Criminal Code mandate assessment for all impaired drivers in order to identify so-called hard-core drinking drivers? Should hard-core drinking drivers be required to undergo treatment in addition to normal penalties? I'll note here generally that rehabilitative measures, and that includes assessment, education and/or treatment programs, are one of the two measures that are now widely considered to reduce drinking and driving and associated traffic safety problems in convicted offenders.
• 1005
I'll point to some studies that have been done. In
one that we did we followed up 614 male second
offenders who had been assigned to a rehabilitation
program or a control condition for an average of 10
years, and we looked at mortality or deaths in these
offenders. We found that those in the rehabilitation
group had a 30% lower death rate than those in the
untreated group.
In a meta-analysis, Beth Wells-Parker from Mississippi State University evaluated 315 studies that looked at the effects of rehabilitation, and she found that rehabilitation reduced drinking and driving recidivism and alcohol-related collisions by 7% to 9% on average. We have reason to believe that this is a low estimate. In his study, Dave DeYoung from California looked at the effects of varying combinations of sanctions on 148,632 convicted offenders there, and he concluded that combining licensing actions with alcohol treatment represents the most effective sanction combination for combating DUI recidivism.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Ahuntsic, Lib.): Can I ask you what a meta-analysis is.
Dr. Robert Mann: Sure. It's a way to put studies together and examine them statistically.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: So it's different studies, 215 of them.
Dr. Robert Mann: That's right.
The next question is, should the legal BAC limit be lowered from .08? Do you see any merit in graduated penalties that depend upon the driver's level of impairment or BAC? I'd like to note that my colleagues and I recently completed a report for Transport Canada where we looked at the potential impact of lowering the limits in Canada to 50 milligrams percent, and I'll summarize that briefly for you here.
First, let me note that a 50-milligram limit is not an unusual policy. Most jurisdictions have a limit of 50 or 80 milligrams percent. Australia, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, and some others have a criminal limit of 50 milligrams percent. Of course, in Canada the provinces have the option of introducing an administrative limit below 80, and most have done so. For example, in Ontario we have a 12-hour suspension, a minor sanction, that applies at 50 milligrams percent. The first BAC limit introduced was a 50-milligram percent limit introduced in Norway in the 1930s.
Most of these countries have lowered the limit to 50, so that gives us an opportunity to examine what has happened when they've lowered these limits. I apologize for these tables—they're terribly complex—but I feel it's difficult to summarize these data adequately.
Mr. Dick Harris (Prince George—Bulkley Valley, Ref.): Can we have hard copies of those tables sometime within a few days?
Dr. Robert Mann: Certainly.
So here there have been a number of studies that have looked at what's happened when a 50-milligram limit is introduced and we note a couple of things. First of all, the studies vary widely in the quality with which they're done. Some of them are, for example, simply looking at numbers of accidents before and after a limit is introduced. Of course, you wouldn't have too much faith in results of this kind. However, some of them are quite sophisticated analytically and I would consider them to be quite strong.
I'd like to point out two of them, one by Henstridge, Homel, and McKay, who examined the experience in Australia of reducing the limit to 50 milligrams percent and another one by Thor Norstrom and Hans Laurell, who examined the effects in Sweden of actually reducing a limit from 50 to 20 milligrams percent. These people used sophisticated analytical strategies, which were able to control for things like miles driven, alcohol consumption, and so on.
• 1010
Let me also note that in every case in which these
limits have been lowered, there have been reports of
beneficial effects in terms of reduced collisions and
reduced injuries and fatalities. Sometimes these
impacts appear to be temporary; that is, they decrease
over time. But in every jurisdiction there has been at
least some reporting of a beneficial impact.
Let me also note that what I consider to be the two strongest studies, those by Henstridge and by Norstrom and Laurell, report a lasting benefit.
One question I think that's important here is if there's a beneficial impact to lowering the limit, is it restricted to those people in the 50 to 80 range where the risks of collision, of course, are not as high as they are for people at higher BACs? Are we just simply influencing people at these lower BACs? That does not appear to be the case. In places where they have analysed the experience, it appears that any beneficial impact is most pronounced on drivers at higher BAC levels for some reason. It appears that we're seeing a pronounced general deterrent effect. So it's not just people in that 50 to 80 range who would be influenced by a lower BAC, but it's a general deterrent impact, which shows up most at the highest BAC ranges. There are several studies that suggest this.
Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): Could you please elaborate on that?
Dr. Robert Mann: Sure. In this case in Sweden, what they found was a reduction in alcohol-related collisions and fatalities. In this particular instance they're looking at the percentage of convicted drinking drivers at various BAC levels. What they found was that there is in fact a reduction, a substantial and significant reduction, in drivers at the highest BAC levels. In other words, this lowering of the legal limit seems to have the effect, at least in terms of the distribution of drinking drivers, on the highest-level BACs.
Mr. Dick Harris: So it provides the biggest deterrence in that group. Is that what you're saying?
Dr. Robert Mann: It's a bit unclear just what is happening. I think the simplest interpretation might be that everyone is drinking and driving a bit less, including the heaviest drivers, and it's showing up here in that perhaps everybody is shifting downwards.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: So there are fewer drinkers driving at a higher level?
Dr. Robert Mann: Yes.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Those statistics then take that into account?
Dr. Robert Mann: Yes, it would appear to be so.
Is that clear?
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: No, it's not clear. Maybe it's only me.
Dr. Robert Mann: I think the point is that if you look at drinking drivers on the road, the impact of lowering a limit from 80 to 50 is not just on those drivers who are driving in the 80 to 50 range. It's on all drivers who are driving with a positive BAC.
Mr. Dick Harris: But your numbers indicate that it had the most effective deterrent on drivers in the higher BAC levels?
Dr. Robert Mann: These data suggest that's the case.
Mr. Dick Harris: Okay.
Dr. Robert Mann: Other data suggest that's the case too. But again, we're looking at the distribution of all drivers. There are probably lots of people who might have been driving from 50 to 80 who are now driving at a BAC under that. So the whole range of BACs has shifted downwards. I think that's what's probably happened.
• 1015
How would this translate into road safety terms?
Again, the two studies, Norstrom and Laurell, and
Henstridge et al., in their analytical procedures
allowed an estimate of the percentage impact on fatal
collisions. Norstrom and Laurell reported an impact of
reducing the limit to 20 milligrams percent to be a 9%
reduction on all collisions. They weren't able to
separate out just the alcohol-involved collisions, so
they looked at total collisions, and they report a
reduction of 9%. They estimated that 3% of that might
be due to a changed age breakdown of the driving
population, and so that leaves a potential 6% reduction
due to an introduction of the 20 milligrams percent
law. That's our lower range. For the upper range we
can look to the Henstridge study, and they found that
in Queensland a reduction of the legal limit to 50
milligrams percent resulted in an 18% reduction in
collisions. So the potential range of impact in Canada
could be a 6% to 18% reduction in fatalities.
In 1996 there were 3,082 fatalities from motor vehicle collisions in Canada. So we could estimate that this number would be reduced by 6% to 18%, for a potential reduction of 185 to 555 deaths per year. For several reasons I would suggest that this is an upper limit to what kind of range we might expect in Canada.
Mr. Jacques Saada: I'm sorry to interrupt, but we won't have these charts when we ask you questions later, so I'm kind of concerned.
Apart from the reduction of the limit, are there any other measures that were taken in Sweden or Queensland or wherever that could also enter into the factoring of these results and that would not be directly attributable to the lowering of the limit but to the entire package of actions?
Dr. Robert Mann: Yes, there were a number of things that happened. In Sweden, for example, they made some of the jail sentences not mandatory at the time. So they reduced the limit to 20 milligrams percent, but they said there's no longer the mandatory jail term for some of the offences. In Australia they introduced in some of the states what's called random breath testing. So, for example, it imagined an increase in high visibility enforcement of the BAC laws, such as the RIDE programs we have in Ontario, more of those kinds of programs.
Henstridge et al. indicate in their analytical procedures that they're able to take that effect out, so that these effects that Henstridge et al. were talking about they suggest are at least statistically controlled—I apologize for using that term—for those effects.
So, yes, there are other things going on. There are changes in driving behaviour and perhaps other legal changes. These analyses attempt to control for those factors.
There are costs associated with such a move that need to be taken into consideration. Possible economic consequences with regard to the loss of revenue from alcohol sales is a valid and important concern to many people. There would be increased enforcement, court and corrections costs to be taken into consideration, and potential negative consequences that could result if the measure is implemented without the support of the general public and the key groups, such as the police, the judiciary, and the provinces.
As well, I noted that the range of impact would likely be an upper range. We know that a variety of factors influence the deterrent impact of a new measure. For such a measure to work effectively, for example, the police must have the resources to carry out high-visibility enforcement campaigns, the courts must deal efficiently with offenders, and the provinces must provide the resources to support the implementation of the law. These would all be necessary, and other things too.
• 1020
The fourth question is, should the police have greater
powers to demand breath, blood, or saliva samples for
alcohol or drug testing? While little or no research is
available that examines the impact of these measures on
road safety directly, they may have the effect of
increasing the certainty of punishment, which would
have the effect of increasing general deterrence.
The fifth question is, should impaired driving offences be brought under the absolute jurisdiction of a provincial or territorial court judge in order to eliminate an accused person's right to elect a preliminary inquiry or trial by jury? Here I'll note that there is little or no direct evidence on what the impact of such a change would be on collisions or fatalities. Generally, measures that increase or decrease the public's perception of the seriousness of an offence may influence rates of impaired driving in the community. As well, measures that influence the swiftness and certainty of punishment also may influence impaired driving rates.
The final point and my final comment here is that the Criminal Code currently allows the courts to discharge an impaired driver who is in need of curative treatment by placing that person on probation with a condition that he or she attend such treatment. Is this appropriate? Are there other sentencing options that should be made available to courts?
Let me note that it's widely recognized that treatment should supplement and not replace sanctions, in particular licence suspensions. The most effective means to reduce recidivism and collisions is a combination of rehabilitative and licensing actions. By substituting one for the other, you're decreasing their effectiveness.
With regard to other sentencing options, there are a number of promising alternatives, such as the use of ignition interlock devices. However, there is much that is not known about how best to use these measures, and I would recommend further evaluation here.
Thank you very much, and I apologize for the overheads.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Mann.
Would it be possible to leave those with us so that we could have copies made, and we could send them to you with your presentation?
Dr. Robert Mann: Yes.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Harris.
Mr. Dick Harris: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your presentation.
First, I want to ask about the deterrence factor. I noticed that in the chart that was supplied by Dr. Simpson's group there was a marked decrease beginning in 1981 up to 1989. During that period of time was there any significant increase in penalty deterrent measures that would persuade people not to drive after they'd been drinking?
Dr. Herb Simpson: Yes, I think there are really two forms of deterrence that were occurring at that time. One is the deterrence that arises as a result of awareness about the fact that this is a criminal offence. Of course, in 1985 there were changes to the Criminal Code, and although most people weren't aware of what the provisions were, there was at least some measure of discussion surrounding them.
But the strongest effects, I believe, were as a result of a lot of the action taken at the provincial level during that time, for example, the addition of a licence suspension, which was in addition to the three months mandatory driving prohibition, and people became aware of that.
But there's another form of deterrence, and that occurs as a result of the social stigma associated with drinking and driving, which I think was the most profound impact at that time. This issue vaulted into public prominence at the beginning of the 1980s, largely as a result of the efforts of victim groups, not scientists. The victim groups put this on the public and political agenda and changed the face of the issue. More and more people began to realize that this was socially unacceptable behaviour, and I think everyone in the room can cite personal illustrations of how that happened. So the social deterrent effect and the legal deterrent effect were both operative.
• 1025
Mr. Dick Harris: Has there ever been a study to determine whether people who are convicted of impaired driving actually believe they have committed a criminal act?
Dr. Herb Simpson: I don't know all the literature on that. There are a number of casual studies that have examined, essentially, the sense of remorse and so forth.
My understanding, and I'll ask my colleagues to amplify, is that there are certainly some individuals who do feel remorse, who realize this is something they won't do again. I think we've found that some of those individuals who were apprehended in the 1980s and became aware of the stigma surrounding this did not repeat the offence. However, of the group that we labelled back in 1991 “hard-core drinking drivers”, many of them don't see any reason that they're being punished or that they're being mistreated. The only effect I have seen on that has been when they have had to be confronted with the victims themselves, and that does influence some of them in terms of victim impact kinds of opportunities. But they are a group that is extremely difficult to deal with from the point of view of changing their sense of morality and their sense of individual responsibility.
Mr. Dick Harris: How long do we each have?
The Chair: I think we'll go with 10-minute rounds, Mr. Harris.
Mr. Dick Harris: There seems to be a difference of opinion between Mr. Mann's group and your group regarding the lowering of the BAC. Mr. Mann has shown us studies that perhaps the saving of lives could be anywhere from 185 to 500 some-odd lives if we lowered the BAC to .05.
In your studies, is the concern based more on the margin error on the screening devices? With .08, we know pretty well that unless you're 1.0 or 1.1, you very seldom get more than a roadside suspension because of the margin of error on the devices. Is it your opinion that lowering it to .05 would increase, say, the contrary evidence availability? Is it based more on that, or is it based more on other reasons?
Dr. Herb Simpson: It's a combination of reasons. Let's try to divide them into two sectors.
Sector one speaks to whether or not there is solid scientific evidence that this particular move, in and of itself, will have the sort of impact that would make it justifiable relative to the costs associated with doing it.
The second issue is whether or not it makes sense, given the current climate in which we find ourselves in Canada—for example, already having provincial limits of 50 and 40 milligrams; whether or not this is a move that is going to be at all enforceable by the police, whether or not it's going to be something that will generate a lot of public support, whether it's going to produce a criminal population of so many drivers that are in the 50- to 80-milligram range that we'll be unable to handle it in the courts, and so forth. So there are a lot of ancillary issues that relate more to the pragmatics of it as to whether it's justifiable.
On the issue of the solidity of the evidence—that is, does this measure work?—there's clearly a difference of opinion that is generated primarily by reading the literature. Dr. Mann's position is that in his evaluation of the literature, he is convinced that what the authors have said is in fact correct, that the authors have concluded that they have found these effects. He said he has confidence in several of the studies.
Our read of the literature is that those studies have not taken into consideration other confounding factors that were alluded to in some of the questions, and therefore in our read of the literature, the evidence is less compelling than in Dr. Mann's. This is not unusual. Scientists often disagree over the interpretation of what appear to be facts, and I think that will remain.
• 1030
The field itself is not entirely solid on this
particular point. There is difference of opinion.
There is some contrary evidence. One of the best
controlled studies that was just released back in the
fall, the evaluation of the North Carolina experience,
failed to find any difference as a result of lowering
the BAC limit. It's a highly controversial issue.
But more importantly, it's a highly emotional issue, and it's an emotional issue because most people ask the question, well, why not, can't hurt, might help. It falls into that category of things.
To just crystallize what I'm trying to say, there is a difference of opinion in terms of the read of the scientific literature, and that will take a long time for us to debate at this point.
Mr. Dick Harris: So you're basically saying, don't lower the limit, but enforce .08?
Dr. Herb Simpson: That is exactly it.
Mr. Dick Harris: Okay. Mr. Mann is saying evidence shows that lowering the limit to .05 could be effective. The scientists we had before us yesterday said there is a margin of error in the screening devices that they've been unable to make perfect yet, as I understand what they said yesterday, so that defence lawyers can very easily use that 10%, 20% margin to get their clients off, and therefore police officers don't generally do any more than a roadside suspension unless it's below .01 or better.
If you're saying enforce .08, that means we would have to have some very near-perfect instruments for screening. How about a compromise? If the margin of error cannot be corrected, how about lowering it to .06, for example, allowing for that margin of error that presently exists, and then you would be able to get your convictions at .08?
Dr. Herb Simpson: This is, of course, a proposal that is being put forward by MADD, to lower it to .06, but if and only if we are unable to rectify the problems associated with enforcing what we have at .08.
Mr. Dick Harris: Yes, that's fine.
Dr. Herb Simpson: I think that's our first push. Our first push has to be there because we have to also realize that the average blood alcohol level among arrested drivers in Canada is between .17 and .18. They do not normally catch people at .08 or .09 because most people who are caught are caught as a result of their being involved in a collision or as a result of the normal apprehension methods, so people with high BACs come to the attention of the police.
I'm not sure that would necessarily change the situation we have today. Symbolically it might carry some weight, but I'm not sure if practically it would have any effect.
Mr. Dick Harris: I'm thinking of the deterrence factor, with the adequate public education going along with it.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Could I just add one quick comment to that? If we want to educate people about a lower limit, they ought to be educated about the existing lower limits in their provinces. The national opinion poll we just completed found that very, very few people are even aware there's a lower limit in their province. That's something I have spoken to provinces about time and again. I have spoken even at informed sessions and many of the people who are the knowledgeable experts aren't even aware of it. That's something the provinces should be encouraged to do.
Mr. Dick Harris: Mr. Mann, I wasn't excluding you. Join in here.
Dr. Robert Mann: I'd just like to note it's probably the case that we would agree on much more than we would disagree upon, and I would agree with what Dr. Simpson has said, that there are many other important things that need to be in place for general deterrence to occur. Simply changing the law without addressing the public education components, the capacity for enforcement, the visibility of enforcement and so on, would put you at the low end or below the potential effects that I was describing there. Those things need to be in place. General deterrence is a process that has a number of steps that need to be in place for it to work.
I think we would all agree that it's important that these steps be in place as well.
Mr. Dick Harris: Okay. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Harris.
• 1035
Mr. Brien.
[Translation]
Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): Mr. Simpson, you seem to be basing a major part of your recommendations on the fact that quite a few of the present problems are caused by repeat offenders. People who have already been arrested once or who are regular alcohol consumers who drive frequently. I know that you have tabled many studies, but would you happen to have available any statistics on the number of repeat offenders committing new drunk driving offenses?
[English]
Dr. Herb Simpson: The answer is yes. Several of the reports we have submitted contain the exact statistics. I think it's important to note that about 70% of offenders are repeat offenders. The other interesting point is that if you look at this hard-core group and how many of them are on the road, they constitute a very small portion of the population that is out there, let's say, at night. They constitute less than 1% of the night-time drivers on the road, but they account for about 65% of the serious collisions that occur at that time.
Our national opinion poll also showed that although there are a lot of impaired driving trips being taken in Canada—there are about 12 million impaired driving trips taken each year in Canada—over 80% of them are accounted for by less than 3% of the driving population. These are people who do it again and again. So the repeat offender problem is a real one and a large one, and there's good evidence to support that.
[Translation]
Mr. Pierre Brien: My second question has to do with your fifth recommendation where you're suggesting progressive penalties based on the blood alcohol content. Without going into the detail of the different levels of penalties, could you tell us what you have in mind when you talk about harsher penalties?
[English]
Dr. Herb Simpson: We have not recommended what those levels should be. There are existing systems from which one can draw, and there are certain points that make good sense. The levels most commonly cited as those around which the gradation should occur are .20 and 1.5, which is virtually double the legal limit. Many states in the United States have selected a compromise and used .17 and .18 as the levels for setting what they call their extreme DUI bills. At that point they simply take the penalties that are associated with the lower limit and increase them in some reasonable way, which is always a political compromise regarding just how severe they can be. But essentially they increase the fines, the jail time, and the length of licence suspension, so all of the normal penalties are simply increased for people at that higher limit.
The other key point is that people who automatically come in at that level are referred for clinical assessment and mandatory treatment for their alcohol-related problems. So it serves as more than just an opportunity to punish the person; it serves as an opportunity to get at the root causes of the problem.
There are many European countries that have tiered BAC systems. There are some in Australia, and some of them are extremely complex. I think the Danish system has five tiers, which is an administrative nightmare. But the concept is what we're talking about. We're not recommending what the specific levels would be but rather the spirit of the notion to basically say that the gravity of the offence should carry with it more severe sanctions.
• 1040
[Translation]
Mr. Pierre Brien: Recently, particularly in Quebec, we've seen accidents where the drivers were presumed to be driving under the influence but where it was difficult to prove it because they were involved in hit-and-runs. Have you looked at that problem? The number of hit-and-runs seems to have increased dramatically during the past years.
[English]
Dr. Herb Simpson: That's an excellent point, and it was of concern to us. We recently completed a study evaluating the effects of administrative licence suspension and vehicle impoundment in the province of Manitoba. One of the issues we were concerned about was that as penalties get tougher, people will try to avoid them. One way to avoid them is to run away.
I'll have to ask Doug if he remembers the statistics because there certainly is some evidence.
Dr. Douglas Beirness (Vice-President, Research Branch, Traffic Injury Research Foundation): Unfortunately, I don't remember the exact statistics. I remember that the number of people you're able to identify as hit-and-run offenders is a result of the police charging people with hit-and-run offences. It's very rare, statistically, when you look at the driver record database. There simply were not enough numbers in the Manitoba system to allow us to determine that.
From the numbers we had available to us, it was quite obvious there appeared to be an increase in the number of hit-and-run crashes, following the introduction of their more severe sanctions.
Dr. Robert Mann: May I comment on that too?
In Ontario, we noted that the large majority of Criminal Code driving offences involved alcohol. When we introduced a mandatory rehabilitative program for all offenders, we saw fit to extend that to include all Criminal Code driving offenders who had alcohol-related charges on their records. If you're charged in Ontario with a fail-to-remain type of offence and you have a previous drinking and driving conviction, you have to turn up at the rehabilitation program.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Brien.
Ms. Bakopanos.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Thank you very much for an excellent presentation.
I'll address my first question to Mr. Mann. I'm wondering if you have any statistics in terms of drinking and driving at a younger age. Are young people drinking and driving, and are their blood alcohol levels a lot higher when they're involved in fatal accidents? Do we have any statistics along those lines?
Dr. Robert Mann: We have some very good data, and I will pass this question on to TIRF too. Yes, there is a problem with young people drinking and driving, and I'll just note some research carried out by the Traffic Injury Research Foundation documenting that. Perhaps they might like to describe some of it.
Dr. Herb Simpson: The good news is that the least likely to drink and drive are young people, and young people account for the smallest proportion of alcohol-related crashes. The very good news is there have also been more significant declines in their rates of drinking and driving over the past 15 years than most other age groups.
The bad news remains that some still drink and drive, some still crash, and young drivers are at much higher risk of being involved in a collision at lower blood alcohol concentrations. It's for that reason that many of the provinces that are introducing graduated licensing have a provision for zero tolerance for young drivers. This is an approach that is basically sweeping North America. There's a very good justifiable reason for applying this requirement to them because there's strong evidence that they are impaired at lower levels.
Dr. Robert Mann: We've been looking at what has happened with the zero tolerance law in Ontario. We have studies on young people in high schools—under-age drinkers—and the proportion of males who report driving after drinking is down by 25% since the introduction of these laws, and the proportion of alcohol-related fatalities in the 16-year-old age group is down significantly as well.
• 1045
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Therefore, we could take the argument further. If we do lower the level, it is probably more of a deterrent for the younger age group than for the hard-core offenders.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Yes, and we already have lowered the limit for young people by making it zero—
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Zero tolerance. So you all support that for young people?
Dr. Herb Simpson: Right.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: I don't know who can answer it, but my second question has to do with privacy and the charter. It's been a big question in the House of Commons. Neither Dr. Mann nor Dr. Simpson mentioned anything. I read it quickly, I must say, but there was no question about the other side of that issue, which may or may not be brought up while we are dealing with this issue. Do you have any comments? Dr. Simpson already answered the question, I think.
Dr. Robert Mann: How the drinking and driving provisions relate to the charter is an ongoing issue. I recognize it's a concern and an issue. I can't provide an answer—I'm certainly not trained in law. I know they are serious and important issues, but I can't provide an answer.
Ms. Eleni Bakopanos: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Cadman or Mr. Harris.
Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Ref.): I just have one quick one. I was interested, Dr. Simpson, in your comment earlier about the hard-core drinkers really not owning up to it until they are actually faced with a victim. In the same sort of vein as deterrence, there's a program, I believe in L.A., that I heard about where they are taking young people—I'm not sure whether it's on charge or conviction—on trips through a morgue and having them be party to autopsies of victims of impaired crashes. It's a pretty harsh measure. I have to agree, I think it is a good idea, especially for young people, to get the message through. But there certainly are some people who take the position that it's “cruel and unusual punishment”. I'd like to get your thoughts on those kinds of measures.
Dr. Herb Simpson: With respect to young people, it's been the most popular approach, and there are similar programs in Canada. For example, the PARTY program that ran out of Sunnybrook had that sort of approach associated with it: take young people to a trauma ward and show them not the deaths, but the disabilities. Young people have less fear of dying than they have of being injured or maimed or something of that sort.
There have not been very good evaluations of these programs. Most show there is a short-term effect of what are essentially called scare tactics. We know that dating back to the first work done in the tobacco field. The tactic itself merely gets your attention. If there's nothing to follow that up, the effects are short-lived. There's a halo effect for a few moments and nothing afterwards.
Mr. Chuck Cadman: That's precisely what I was thinking. In other words, the shock value itself is valid, as long as it is followed up with something significant.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Yes.
The Chair: Do you have any questions, Mr. Harris?
Mr. Dick Harris: Yes, I have a quick one. My understanding of what has been presented today is you would probably all be in agreement that if we could have the convictable level at .08 and dramatically increase the opportunity for conviction at that level, it could be a major step forward in fighting impaired driving.
Dr. Herb Simpson: I would agree with that.
Mr. Dick Harris: Thank you very much.
The Chair: Mr. Saada.
Mr. Jacques Saada: Thank you very much. I understand from the presentation you made, Dr. Simpson—and if my math is not too bad—you have 25 years of experience in this field.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Yes.
Mr. Jacques Saada: Fifty-five minus thirty is twenty-five.
Dr. Herb Simpson: That's correct.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacques Saada: My question is far more down to earth and very practical. Before getting to the substance of it, I'd like you to tell me if a substantial suspension of the driver's license is a decision that is handed down by the courts or if the police has the right to make that decision in the field.
[English]
Dr. Douglas Beirness: There are two types of suspensions that actually come into play. In many provinces, we now have what's known as administrative licence suspension. That is, as soon as you blow over 80 or you refuse to provide a sample, the police, acting on behalf of the registrar of motor vehicles, can take your licence for a period of up to 90 days. That's on the spot.
• 1050
The other
suspensions don't come into play until after
conviction, which, as you probably know, can take place
many, many months after the actual date of
the offence. Upon conviction, the judge can prohibit
you from driving on a first offence for anywhere from
three to six months. When the province, the motor
vehicle department, gets word of that conviction,
they'll send you a little letter saying your
licence is suspended for a period of a further 12
months, which runs in parallel with the prohibition from
driving. You must serve that suspension in order to
get your licence back. So essentially there are two
suspensions, one at the time of the offence and one that
follows conviction.
[Translation]
Mr. Jacques Saada: The figures you gave before, during your presentation, don't make any distinction as to short term and long term suspensions. You only spoke about suspensions in general.
[English]
Dr. Herb Simpson: We weren't speaking to the suspension issue; Dr. Mann was.
Dr. Robert Mann: Right.
Mr. Jacques Saada: You did mention that suspensions had the most impact, and I think you quoted something like 30% to 50%. Or was it you, Dr. Mann?
Dr. Robert Mann: Yes.
Mr. Jacques Saada: I'm sorry.
Dr. Robert Mann: That's all right. Yes, that's a figure that was provided by Ray Peck, who's the head of motor vehicle research in California. At that point, and I think it's still the case, there is no hard evidence on how long that lasts, whether that effect wears off with time or not. So we don't know for sure.
Mr. Jacques Saada: Let me ask you my substantial question here, what I was driving at.
Yesterday we heard a presentation in which it was agreed that if you have a lower limit, the error margin of the assessment of the taux d'alcoolémie has more impact toward the high limits, and therefore the likelihood of a judge finding anyone guilty is less probable at lower limits than higher limits. I would like to combine that with the statement that was made—and I don't know who made them any more, but I think, Dr. Simpson, it was you, when you talked about the hard-core versus non-hard-core—that we know the non-hard-core impaired drivers are likely to be impressed by the process they go through. Even though they are not found guilty, just a simple process of going through the stages of being arrested and a trial, and so on and so forth, they are likely to be deterred at this point, whereas non-hard-core drivers are not deterred by the process. All these things combined seem to preach in favour of not reducing the limit.
I would like to have your input. And I understand, Dr. Mann, that you approach it from a scientific point of view that is slightly different from Dr. Simpson's. I'm eager to see these things, and analyse them, and look at them precisely and ask you questions further to determine what other factors were taken into account and what other factors were not taken into account or are impossible to take into account. What's your position on this statement that lowering the limits makes it even harder to tackle the hard-core drivers?
Dr. Herb Simpson: Our position, first, would be that that is quite true, particularly if what occurs is that the lower limit becomes even more unenforceable than the limit we have now. What that does is it erodes confidence in the system. People can only be deterred if (a), they think they'll get caught and (b), having been caught, something will happen to them. If what happens is it gets thrown out on a technicality about the instrumentation, people say the law is a joke. The people who know the technicalities and know the problems are the hard-core. They've been through the system. They know the system better than we will ever know the system, so I don't think adding further opportunities for them to see that it's a joke is particularly sensible.
• 1055
So I would agree with your conclusion that this would
not necessarily be beneficial if it worked that way.
Dr. Robert Mann: I would agree with that conclusion too. If you, in a sense, make the system not work, then you're not achieving what you want to achieve. That's clearly the case.
Let me address some of the specific points. My understanding is that the margin of error at, say, .05 is not terribly different from what you see at .08. At very low levels, that may be the case, but I'm not sure that's the case at the range that's being talked about here.
The other thing I would simply point to is the evidence from countries that have implemented a lower limit and have looked at the BAC distributions of people killed on the roads and in fact find that the higher BACs are the ones that are reduced the most. So I think that could point to an opposite conclusion.
I certainly agree with you that the system needs to work and to be efficient and effective, but I would point out that when it doesn't, and presumably it did in Sweden and Australia and places like that, the impact of this particular measure may even arguably be most pronounced at the level of the hard-core offender in terms of reducing collisions and fatalities and drunk driving.
The Chair: Mr. Grose.
Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I know we were all surprised when we saw the chart where you lowered the BAC level and the top drinker, who's had a lot of drinks, goes down.
Being a fully qualified drinker—you might even say a professional drinker, and I can say that in the past tense, fortunately—one often hears the expression “We'll go for a drink”. A drink is fine. You're under .08 in many cases, unless you drink doubles. So you go for “a” drink. I can count on the fingers of one hand the times it was a drink. You progress. The conversation goes on and you keep ordering drinks, and eventually you get into that top level.
For the reasonably sensible person, as opposed to an alcoholic, if the level is low enough that a drink is going to make him liable for prosecution, he doesn't have a drink until he gets finished driving, and that's why I think you can account for the whole thing coming down, including the top figure.
Alcoholics, of course, are set off to the side. I've known many of them, and it doesn't matter what you do to them. You can put a lock on their car that they have to breathe into, whatever you call that thing, and they'll get another car. They'll borrow a car; they'll steal a car. It doesn't make any difference to them. You have to set them off to the side. These people are sick, and they have to be treated that way.
The other thing is, I have been driving for over fifty years, and many, many times I should not have driven. I have never been apprehended. Any minor accidents I did have were fortunately when I had not been drinking. I hate to think the conclusion you can draw from that, but people can drink all their lives and never get caught unless they have an accident. Unfortunately, the accident is usually a horrendous one.
We had one in my hometown of Oshawa the other night caused entirely by alcohol—no question about it. The person, who was already being tailed by another car because he had run three red lights, ran another one and killed someone...twenty-three years old.
I don't know what the answer is to that. You people are still researching. I know I'm not asking a question, but I have tried to contribute to this thing because I have some qualifications, and very few people will admit that. So I will give you my input as I see it.
It's a problem that we have to do something about. I don't know what that something is. Please, give us an answer.
Dr. Herb Simpson: You are showing the frustration that people who have dealt with this problem for years have felt. In the 1970s the level of frustration had reached an all-time high. People believed firmly that, one, it wasn't an important problem, and two, if it was, there wasn't anything we could do about it, that it was basically intractable.
• 1100
Well, history has rewritten that, because there were
such profound gains in the 1980s, and I think that has
energized people to recognize some important points as
we move forward. One, it is a complex problem, and
therefore there are no silver bullets, there's no magic
elixir, there is no panacea. It's going to require a
portfolio of measures to deal with the very complex
nature of the problem. Not everybody drinks and drives
for the same reason. Not everybody is at the same risk
when they do drink and drive. Not everybody responds
to the same sorts of sanctions. So we do have to have
a diversity of measures and they have to be, to the
extent possible, strategically applied.
When Dr. Mann talked about licence suspension as being something that's important to do, he said treatment is important to do, but don't forsake one for the other. Therefore, when you are looking at your measures, I think the best advice is to think realistically. We're going to make small wins in this fight, and that's good, but we will only make those small wins if we apply a diversity of measures as strategically as possible.
Our optimism, even after 25 years in the field, is still there, but our optimism is tempered by the reality of the fact that the gains we make will be very measured but very significant to the people whose lives are saved.
The Chair: Mr. DeVillers.
Mr. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.): In the research, Dr. Simpson, that you've just completed, is there anything that addresses this? I think it has come out on several occasions here in our discussions today that people just aren't convinced they're going to get caught. When they make that decision to drink and drive, they're usually not thinking properly, but they just figure, well, I won't get caught, I'll take the risk. The risk-taking part of it—does any of your research, your public opinion, try to deal with that question, why do people take that risk, what are the factors that lead them to that?
Dr. Herb Simpson: Yes, the public opinion poll, and there's also some other more substantive quantitative research that has looked at what is called the perceived likelihood of arrest.
It's well known that the perceived likelihood of arrest affects deterrence, because the more you think the chances are you'll get caught, the less likely you're going to do it. There's good evidence from places that use random breath testing, like Australia and Sweden, where the chances are pretty good that if you're even stopped, you'll get tested and therefore caught.
In Canada, the chances of getting caught have probably not changed dramatically over the past decade. Am I correct? The chances are still about 1 in 200. So, in other words, a rational person would say 199 times out of 200, I won't get caught, so I'll drink and drive; that's the sane thing to do. Fortunately, most people don't use that kind of math.
But what we found interesting in the poll was that the public overwhelmingly believes there's a good chance of getting caught. The attention that has been put to this particular problem has elevated the perception. It's not the reality of running into police officers; it's the sense that the stories they hear in the media lead them to believe there's a good chance of getting caught. So they do think drunk drivers will get caught.
Now the critical question is whether the really drunk drivers think they'll get caught, and they don't believe it as much as the general public. So it's important that the general public continues to believe that. I don't know that we will ever change that perception among the harder core, unless we have some fairly draconian and extensive measures, but it remains a problem.
Dr. Robert Mann: If I could just make a comment here, public education and high visibility enforcement efforts are effective in raising your perception in the general public of being caught, and I believe that includes the hard core, the heavier drinkers, too. Certainly, if you're driving in to work and you see a spot-check, that's going to influence your likelihood of drinking on your way home from work. I think these efforts are effective and should be maintained.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Could I just add as a follow-up to that that the survey also showed that the majority of people who had been stopped, or the majority of occurrences with police spot-checks, are accounted for by a smaller number of people. That means that there are some areas where spot-checks, or check-stops, are very common. There are many, many areas where they never occur. So some police use these more frequently. So I think there can be a wider application that will have beneficial effects. There's a lot that can be gained.
• 1105
Mr. Paul DeVillers: And it's not within the jurisdiction of the federal government in amending the Criminal Code.
Dr. Herb Simpson: Absolutely.
Mr. Jacques Saada: If I may say just one quick thing on what you are raising, Paul, I fail to understand the logic here. I have just had a drink and I'm going to get into my car. If I'm impaired to the point that I'm going to score very high on this level, how could you deter me if I'm not in a position to have the judgment to think about all the risks and the consequences?
Dr. Herb Simpson: I am not as convinced. I tend to be on your side on this one. I tend not to think that the hard-core, heavy drinkers are as deterred as the general public. Certainly, if they do get drinking, the deterrent effect is going to be very nominal. But there are some of these individuals for whom the deterrent effect will be simply not to go beyond that one drink, or simply to arrange for a designated driver or alternative modes of transportation. If the deterrent effect encourages them not to drink or to drink but take safe transportation, then it can have an effect.
The Chair: I have a question of Dr. Mann.
In your presentation, you made reference to the economic consequences of reducing the BAC limit on, supposedly, the hospitality industry, the breweries and the distillers, and on increased costs for police enforcement and increased court costs. Do you have a rough idea of what the economic consequences would be? Would it be a 10% reduction in hospitality, or would it be a 25% increase in police enforcement?
Dr. Robert Mann: The potential impact on alcohol sales is a concern, but I'm not sure just what it would be. I would just like to point out that we introduced the per se law that made 80 milligrams an offence in Canada in 1969. Our per capita or average consumption continued to rise after that.
I believe there are other investigations of what's happened in the U.S., in American states where they have lowered the limit from 100 to 80 milligrams. At least, NHTSA claims there has been no particularly large effect on sales and on alcohol use. So while I recognize that it's a concern—that's why I identified it that way—I'm not aware of any solid data that indicate that there is a serious economic consequence. I'll just note that.
In terms of policing costs, court costs and so on, again it's how much you put into it. One figure that I saw coming out of the British Columbia experience was that lowering the limit would increase the court costs alone by about $40 million per year across Canada. There was no estimate on what the policing costs or other kinds of associated justice system costs would be.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Harris, did you have anything further?
Mr. Dick Harris: I have a bunch of questions, but I know we've come to the end. I just want to thank the panel for their presentations, and I encourage them to send us as much information in hard copy as they possibly can. I appreciate what we got from TIRF today, and I'll expect hard copies of Dr. Mann's overheads.
The Chair: I would echo Mr. Harris' comments. Thank you very much. We found your presentation very informative, and it will be very beneficial in our considerations. Thank you very much for coming.
The meeting is adjourned.