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Chair

Mr. Bernard Patry

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● (0905)

[*English*]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Order.

[*Translation*]

Good morning everyone. This is the 43rd meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

[*English*]

For the international policy review, under our orders of the day, it is our pleasure to welcome, from the University of Ottawa, Mr. Craig Forcese, an assistant professor with the law faculty, and Amy Awad, Nadia Campion, Amy Groothuis, Rachel Hird, Maya Khakhamovitch, Margot MacPherson Brewer, and Heather Watts.

[*Translation*]

With us as well from Canada25 is David Eaves, the lead author, and Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska, the Delegate Coordinator.

[*English*]

Mr. Forcese will speak first, and after that Mr. Eaves.

Mr. Forcese, the floor is yours.

Mr. Craig Forcese (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thanks very much.

On behalf of the University of Ottawa's Faculty of Law foreign policy practicum, I'd like to extend our thanks to this committee for inviting us to present our views on Canadian foreign policy and the government's recent international policy statement.

In the foreign policy practicum, a team of law students completes a comprehensive review of a topic in Canadian foreign policy, with a focus on international legal issues. The finished product is a detailed policy brief, submitted and presented to governmental and non-governmental groups.

In 2004-05 the practicum produced the brief submitted to this committee in December 2004 in anticipation of the government's IPS. The views reflected in that brief are the work product of the practicum. The product reflects the view of its members.

In the few moments we have here today, each member of the practicum will reflect briefly, for a minute or so, on the substantive issues they were charged with in the brief, and will comment on the government's position in this area.

The Chair: Ms. Groothuis.

Ms. Amy Groothuis (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thank you very much.

Good morning, everyone. My name is Amy Groothuis, and I'm originally from Kitchener, Ontario.

My contribution to the brief is contained in chapter 1, entitled "Strengthening Human Security and Canada's Armed Forces".

I would like to make two associated points regarding the IPS. First, the continued adherence to the responsibility to protect doctrine is repeated throughout, which I was pleased to see. I wish only to point out that this doctrine will not be fully achieved without an adequate rapid deployment force. As noted in the policy statement, there must be an integrated approach to conflicts in order to possess a coherent operational plan.

Secondly, and for exactly this reason, I applaud the government's repeated emphasis on achieving rapid deployment capabilities for the Canadian Forces during conflict situations.

While my brief discusses the UN's rapid deployment level program, I know that the government is focused on establishing a stabilization and reconstruction task force, START. This a laudable undertaking, though I would question whether it will be linked at any point to the UN program, which I believe will be more effective for the goals sought. I'm hopeful that START will be a model that other countries can follow, in keeping with the government's increased emphasis on governance assistance through such groups as Canada Corps.

As noted, Canada cannot solve all of the world's problems. Therefore, the Government of Canada must go further than solely establishing a rapid deployment force. It is incumbent on Canada to ensure that other countries are also taking such steps. The alternative is that situations that require swift action will remain largely unassisted. START must be strongly tied to diplomatic measures, convincing other countries to establish and maintain a rapid deployment level force. I see no reason why Canada should not be a leader in ensuring that other countries reach rapid deployment level capabilities.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Rachel, you're next, please.

Ms. Rachel Hird (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Good morning, everyone.

My contribution to the brief is contained in chapter 2, on weapons proliferation, and I would like to address a number of points in relation to that today.

First, I would like to commend the government for its attention to the problems caused by weapons of mass destruction and the roles of state and non-state actors in smuggling and proliferating WMD.

Second, the government's participation in the proliferation security initiative and the G-8 global partnership program are key in reducing existing WMD stockpiles and their movement. Specific initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space are also important when looking to the future.

Third, this year's nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference along with Canada's position within the International Atomic Energy Agency are important opportunities to bring new nations into monitoring regimes. Canada needs to utilize its diplomatic efforts to the fullest extent to ensure that there can be substantive progress in the NPT following this conference.

Fourth, not all threats currently come from weapons of mass destruction. In order to secure areas of the world, in particular Africa, more attention needs to be given to the proliferation of small and light weapons. SALW are the driving force in the use of child soldiers. They are the weapons of choice for guerilla attacks, and they are the armaments most commonly used in war crimes.

The security of poorer nations can be bolstered by the promotion of, and support for, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, or the PoA. Alternatively, incorporating PoA goals into other existing or new multilateral regimes would also help curb SALW proliferation.

Thank you.

● (0910)

The Chair: Thank you, Rachel.

Amy Awad, please.

Ms. Amy Awad (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thank you.

My contribution to the brief is contained in chapter 3, entitled “Trade Policy Reform - Thinking Outside the 'Trade Box'”. I suggested three policy directions, addressing three areas where international trade policy can help achieve Canada's broader normative objectives: international governance, development, and the environment.

Most disappointing about Canada's international policy statement was the lack of concrete plans to tailor its commerce strategy to achieving its goals in those areas. This was especially true in the area of development. In both the commerce and development sections of the IPS, the government acknowledges that the connections between our commercial strategy and international development are many and that Canada has a responsibility to help to expand economic opportunities for developing countries and to spread opportunities offered by a global marketplace. Unfortunately, the government seems content to rely on existing market access programs for least developed countries and insists on defending Canada's agricultural supply management programs.

I know this issue has been raised before this committee in the past, but it is certainly worth repeating. The global trading system continues to be threatened by the discrepancies and trade barriers between developed and developing countries. Developing countries cannot benefit from the liberalization of trade if faced with persistently high tariffs on labour-intensive products, including textiles, clothing, food products, and footwear. While Canada cannot by itself solve the problem of unfair trade liberalization, its policy should include both short- and long-term plans to alleviate it. These should include at the very least an expansion of its current market access programs and an approach to WTO negotiations reflective of the needs of the developing world.

On that final point, the IPS offers both promise and cause for concern. On the one hand, the government tells us its development cooperation plans include ensuring global poverty reduction is factored into decision-making across government. On the other hand, there is a strong suggestion that any such altruistic pursuits will always be heavily weighed against Canada's vigorous pursuit of its stakeholders' interests.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Amy.

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer, please.

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thank you.

Good morning.

My name is Margot Macpherson Brewer. My contribution to the brief is chapter 4, and it addresses aid and development.

My key criticism of the international policy strategy concerns Canada's ongoing reluctance to share the wealth. Canada continues to resist making a commitment to the benchmark goal of 0.7% of GDP towards international assistance by the year 2015, as recommended in the United Nations millennium development goals. Frankly, this shortfall will not elevate Canada's international stature among its G-8 peers who have committed to meeting that target.

In my chapter I quote John Manley, former Deputy Prime Minister, who perhaps said it best when he said you can't just sit at the G-8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there's a cost to doing that.

The international policy strategy contextualizes our changing global reality but does little to elucidate the role of poverty as a key factor in perpetuating global inequality, nor does it fully address poverty's role in creating breeding grounds for terrorism or the fundamental ethical issue that failure to reduce poverty undermines our international human rights obligations. I find this a significant and ironic shortcoming, given the emphasis in the strategy on the priority to establish governance and strong domestic legal frameworks in developing countries.

While the IPS raises the necessity of networking with internationally focused Canadian organizations, little to nothing was said, nor was a strategy proposed, about networking among international programs within the government of Canada itself. It is clear that a bottom-to-top reform is required within CIDA, where the existing model is outdated and not configured to meet current and future development challenges. Review and coordination among disparate international programs within more than seventy government departments are required to achieve greater efficiencies and impact for Canada's international outreach from within the GOC.

While I applaud the thinking behind the Canada Corps model, I am moved to raise an issue expressed by development expert Ian Smillie. Why was it necessary to create yet another volunteer-sending program when an established network of international NGOs that already send professional Canadian volunteers overseas exists within civil society?

Finally, let me say a word about reinforcing the importance of public engagement, or communicating to Canadians about Canada's role in the world. Technology in an ever-expanding multicultural society is preparing Canadians and especially youth for an increasing presence on and interaction within the world stage. A public engagement strategy has been a point of discussion for some time within CIDA and should be stepped up. Only by communicating and sharing stories with Canadians about Canadians and their role overseas will Canada create a population ready, willing, and able to step up to the international challenges ahead.

Thank you.

● (0915)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Ms. Heather Watts, go ahead, please.

Ms. Heather Watts (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Good morning.

My name is Heather Watts, and I'm here to talk about corporate social responsibility. It's covered in more detail in chapter 5 of the brief that we've submitted to the committee.

The international policy statement contains one short reference to public social responsibility. The statements says: “Canada's Trade Commissioners are actively engaged with Canadian companies in promoting corporate social responsibility around the world.” This statement contains no specifics as to how and if Canada will work with the international community in organizations such as the OECD and the UN in implementing international norms of corporate behaviour. Given the importance of international trade to Canada, our foreign policy statement needs to say something further. Trade and human rights are linked, and Canada's human security agenda demands respect for human rights. In the past, Canada has participated in processes to regulate corporate behaviour overseas when that has had an adverse impact on human rights—for example, in our participation in the Kimberley process for the regulation of conflict diamonds. It is time for Canada to do more.

When a Canadian corporation operates abroad, it presents an extension and reflection of our values. When a corporation flies the Canadian flag above its operations, it is Canada that people see and relate to. It is in our national interest to ensure that Canadian corporations respect human rights. This could easily be done by enacting domestic legislation, such as a corporate code of conduct for Canadian organizations operating overseas or by making the proposed UN norms a binding legal instrument. If a Canadian citizen commits a crime abroad, there is domestic legislation to deal with that individual. Arguably, a multinational corporation can do worse damage to the environment or human rights. It should not operate with impunity.

The international policy statement speaks of the responsibility to respect and to build lives of freedom for all people, based on fundamental human rights. Human rights should not come second to trade interests. We must be consistent in our approach to human rights. Our foreign policy must reflect Canadian values in everything we do, from trade to diplomacy. The current voluntary approach has proved insufficient because voluntary codes are inconsistent and lack implementation and accountability standards. It is time for Canada to be a true role model in the area of corporate social responsibility.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Watts.

Ms. Maya Khakhamovitch, please go ahead.

Ms. Maya Khakhamovitch (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Thank you.

Good morning. My name is Maya Khakhamovitch. Today I will be speaking on chapter 6 of the brief before you, and I'll be addressing Canada's multilateral policy.

Canada's continuous commitment to multilateral diplomacy has been laudable. The 2004 UN high-level panel report reflects this commitment by incorporating a number of Canadian recommendations, such as the responsibility for protection and the reform of the UN Human Rights Commission.

The IPS makes a commitment to streamlining and modernizing Canada's multilateral diplomacy, but in order to do that Canada needs to focus on a two-tier strategy to multilateralism. First, we need to make the UN a more effective organization; and second, we need to focus on developing rules-based representative and effective multilateral corporations through existing and new organizations.

The United Nations executive bodies need to be representative of the international community and effective in their decision-making and administrative powers. Reform of the UN Security Council is necessary, but it alone is not sufficient. The General Assembly is the only true representative body of the UN. Canada should pursue UN reform that expands the decision-making authority of the GA. In addition, ECOSOC is an ideal UN governing body to pursue issues of economic development. Its powers at the present time, however, are limited by the UN charter to those of an advisory body. Canada should pursue ECOSOC reform by promoting reform of the charter, to empower ECOSOC with authority similar to that of the Security Council for issues of economic development.

Beyond the UN reform, Canada needs to pursue multilateral incorporation with like-minded countries that is representative of the international community and effective in achieving Canada's international objectives. The proposed G-20 leaders goup can bring together heads of state from developed, developing, and middle-income nations to address global issues. Such forums can give developing countries real power and dialogue. To be effective, however, this government needs to ensure that the membership of this group provides effective representation to states in all stages of economic and social development. Only then can the G-20 leaders have legitimacy as an international organization.

Thank you.

● (0920)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Madam Nadia Campion, go ahead, please.

Ms. Nadia Campion (Foreign Policy Practicum, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa): Good morning.

This morning I will be making remarks pertaining to the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship. This topic is covered in more detail in chapter 7 of our brief.

The Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship represents one of the most important relationships in Canadian foreign policy. However, as a result of the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks, differences in national policies between these two countries have resulted in tensions in this relationship. While Canada is more concerned about the free movement of goods and services in North America, the United States is more focused on national security and consequently has resumed a policy of protectionism and self-containment.

In light of this, Canadian foreign policy makers are faced with the challenge of reconciling these differing national policies and priorities. The solution to this challenge will be to create a foreign policy initiative whereby Canada will leverage its sovereignty, international reputation, and geographical proximity to the United States in order to obtain a commitment from the Government of the U.S. that Canada's economic interest will not be undermined by U.S. security undertakings, as is exemplified by the continued border closings.

Such a foreign policy initiative should be comprised of three basic initiatives. First, we need to alter the U.S. perception of Canada as an entryway for security risks into the United States; second, we need to rebuild a mutual zone of confidence between the two countries; and third, we need to collaborate with the United States on security issues in return for favourable treatment in the economic arena. At this time we are already witnessing intergovernmental collaboration on security issues and economic issues, including the action plan implemented under the Smart Border Declaration, the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which is linked to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the creation of a binational planning group under the auspices of NORAD.

This is a good start, but Canada must continue to be proactive in finding solutions to the tensions in these bilateral relationships rather than simply reacting to U.S. policy initiatives. The interconnectedness of Canada's national security, political stability, and economic development with those of the United States not only makes it incumbent on Canada to maintain good relations with our neighbour to the south but also places Canada in a strategic position to obtain favourable economic treatment from the U.S.

Those are my remarks. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, and thank you to your group.

Now we will go to Canada25, with Mr. David Eaves and Madam Alexandra Tcheremenska.

[*Translation*]

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska (Delegate Coordinator, Canada25): Thank you for giving us an opportunity to present the views of our relatively new Canadian organization, Canada25. We have published a report entitled "From Middle to Model Power: Recharging Canada's role in the world". We are both here to present the opinions of our group as a whole, not individual opinions.

I will start by giving you a quick description of Canada25. It is an apolitical, Canada-wide organization for Canadians between ages 20 and 35 who work in such varied fields as education, engineering, law and medicine. This group has been meeting since 2001 and at the moment has chapters in 11 cities in Canada and throughout the world. Its objective is to meet and discuss matters of ongoing concern to us, but also to discuss each year certain important topical issues. In the past, the organization has studied three important issues and has produced three reports, which are available in French and English. It has put forward some new ideas on the circulation of talent, the development of Canadian cities and the role of Canada in the world.

In each case, we think that the strength of our recommendations lies in the process we followed. We start by holding consultations in each city, then in each region, and finally in cities in other countries in which Canadians live. This year, we held consultations in London, San Francisco, Boston, Washington and New York. Each of these cities then sends one or two delegates, chosen on a basis of the strength of their ideas, to a national forum. These delegates undertake to carry out research and conduct interviews with all sorts of Canadians, such as academics or people who work for the government or for national or international institutions, to test whether their ideas have any resonance or credibility among these individuals.

My colleague, David Eaves, will outline the main ideas. The rest of our findings is available in the report.

● (0925)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Eaves.

[*English*]

Mr. David Eaves (Lead Author, Canada25): Merci.

Thank you, Alex.

I'm very excited to be here, because I actually think we're at a critical moment, with the release of the international policy statement. I have this enormous fear that now that the IPS has been released, foreign policy in this country is going to begin to drift off the agenda. I really see in this room the leaders who are going to make it possible to have a real, significant, and substantive debate on Canadian foreign policy, not just in this room but hopefully on the Hill, in newspapers across the country, in classrooms, in business offices, everywhere.

I'm very excited to be here to share our ideas with you but also to implore you to take your own ideas, our ideas—everyone's ideas—and ensure that they get presented to the population and actually are significantly debated so that this issue does not slide off the agenda.

What I want to do today is present an agenda of four items. First, I want to briefly talk about why one should listen to young people. Second, I want to talk about the overall themes found in the report. Third, I want to talk about three specific recommendations that relate to issues we talked about. And the final one is that I want to talk about how these relate back to the IPS and where I see things moving forward from here.

So the first item is, why listen to young people? I actually think this is a fairly significant question. A lot of people believe you should listen to young people simply because we're a constituency that's out there, and therefore you should listen to us. I've not necessarily bought into that. I actually believe that young people need to say something intelligent in order to be listened to.

The reason I believe we should be listening to young people is that if one wants to see the direction of society, what the norms and the values are that are going to be shaping that society in 20 or 30 years, one needs to look at young people. My generation is the first to have grown up with the Internet. It's the first to have grown up with the free trade agreement. We're also the first generation to have never known Lester B. Pearson in person. We also didn't grow up with the Cold War.

So these global issues and these national issues shape who we are, and they're going to shape how we think over the next 20 years. Given that the IPS really is a 20-year project—we're not going to build Rome in a day—we're the clients who are going to have to live with the product of the IPS. I believe policy-makers and wise politicians look to youth not because we have experience—I'm the first to admit that we don't—but because we're an indication of where society is moving.

If we accept that as the premise for why one should want to read and listen to the ideas that are found in this report, what would I say is the dominant theme? I think the most interesting thing that has happened in every single*Canada25* report is that the dominant form of organization that people are using is beginning to shift from hierarchical structures to network structures.

When I look at my parents or my grandparents, they grew up in a society where the family was fairly hierarchical. You had your father, your mother, children, usually in the order that they were born. You went to a job, which was in a large organization that was fairly hierarchical. You probably only talked to your superior; you never talked to the person above them. You probably never talked to people who were two or three ranks below you. Your government was a fairly large hierarchical organization. And you even lived in a world that had a hierarchy. You lived with a Cold War that, at its apex, had the U.S.S.R. on one side and the United States on the other side, and everybody was underneath them; everybody knew their place. So it was easy to talk about ourselves as a model power because we knew who was above us and who was below us.

My colleagues and I—and those who are younger still than us—have grown up in a world that I think is vastly different. I have a sibling who has four parents. I don't know where the locus of power is in that family structure any more. It's very different from when you had two parents, and it was very clear, often, who the boss was. I've worked in two or three jobs now, and in every one of those I was allowed to go talk to the most senior person. The jobs I've had have actually been about creating and destroying teams on a continuous basis—not about the hierarchy, but about the network.

Finally, in the international system, I don't believe we have an international hierarchy any more. I'm the first to admit that the United States sits at the top of whatever totem pole possibly exists, but after that things become quite confusing to me. Are we above or below China? Are we above or below Mexico? Are we above or below Spain? Where does the EU fit in all this, and where does NAFTA fit in all this? Using the term “hierarchy” when talking about an international system is not all that helpful. So I really don't understand how we can talk about ourselves as a “middle power”; where does the middle power fit if there's no more hierarchy?

If that is the dominant theme that can be found in our report, I want to talk about three things that relate to it. What I want to do is talk about something at the individual level, I want to talk about something at the national level, and then I want to talk about the new terms of leadership that I think are evolving in this new system.

One of the interesting conclusions we had in our report was that everybody is involved in foreign policy now: the decisions we make when we buy things, the jobs we take, even where we go on vacation and the news that we consume—all of this has an impact on Canadian foreign policy. In fact, if Canada's role in the world has waned in the last 10, 15, 20 years, the irony is that individual Canadians actually have more influence than possibly at any time in history.

● (0930)

I believe people who are my age understand. They see the role models that are out there, the Canadians who are doing amazing things, and they understand the importance of the network and a global perspective.

In our report, one of the big recommendations we talk about is that 25% of university students should go on international exchange, and that perhaps every Canadian should be bilingual—maybe not in English and French, but in one of the official national languages and in a second language.

I think Canada has an enormous advantage because of the immigrant population we have. There are many people who already speak a second language, who are familiar with a second culture and are comfortable with it. It's one of the beauties of Canada. We as a community recognize that when people get together with different perspectives, there is a need to reconcile; there's a need to learn about the other.

I look at my peer group. People went off and taught English in Japan; people went off and studied in the U.K. and South America; people went off and travelled. There's an understanding in our age bracket that one needs to go abroad.

My desire, and I think it's reflected by the delegates and in the report, is that we institutionalize this further. The real concern I have is that these opportunities to globalize oneself, to be able to step into the shoes of others, to have a real global perspective, be distributed equitably across our society; that it not be simply the wealthy or the elite who have the opportunities to go to Europe and Latin America and Asia and to develop what I think are now the critical skills to operate in a global economy, but that all of our members have that opportunity.

The second recommendation I want to focus on concerns the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

It's interesting to me when I look around the city that there are now 32 agencies, I believe, in different line departments that are focused on international affairs. It seems to me there has been a breakdown in the general consensus on what is an international issue versus what is a domestic issue. We don't have a department of domestic affairs. We have the Privy Council Office, which coordinates across. But we're still going to have a department of foreign affairs.

One of the goals, I hope, of this committee is to really examine what the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs in this new era is, because I'm not sure there are clear international issues. Is BSE an international issue? Is softwood lumber an international issue? Is Kyoto an international issue? What are the international issues anymore, and what's the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs in this?

In our report, we talk about the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs maybe being that of a consultant, a coordinator, and an educator. In this capacity, what I think is most exciting is that there's a phenomenal amount of foreign policy being done in line departments across the city. I'm not sure how involved the Department of Foreign Affairs really always is in all of this, and I think they have enormous expertise to bring to the table. I've been telling people that if the mountain won't come to Mohammed, maybe Mohammed has to go to the mountain. Maybe we need to think about deploying our foreign service officers not just internationally abroad, but actually into line departments across this city, so they develop the networks with the people who are working on these issues domestically and also internationally now, so that they can apply their expertise to help this country advocate and articulate its interests more effectively.

For those who are interested in this issue, I would highly recommend Anne-Marie Slaughter's book called *A New World Order* , in which she talks about the disaggregation of sovereignty. She talks about how it used to be that there was a central actor who dealt with all issues that are foreign, but increasingly bureaucrats, regulators, business people are now all forming networks internationally to create regulations and rules that govern our society.

I think she is right. There is no longer a central actor. So we need to think of the Department of Foreign Affairs as a network that's capable of moving in and out of every aspect of this town to help and advise people and to bring the expertise they're learning outside of this country in and take it from the inside out.

The final piece I'd like to talk about is the new leadership.

In a networked environment, I think there are two skills that are critical. The first is that one needs to be able to actually put forward new creative and innovative ideas. The second is, one needs to be able to partner effectively with virtually anybody else who is in the network. There's no more hierarchy, so there is no longer somebody saying, “You're in the middle, so you're valuable.” Your value literally is based on your track record; it's how effectively you solved problems in the past. If you haven't demonstrated a capacity to bring something to the table that's of value to people, people are probably not going to listen to you, and if you can't partner effectively with others and learn from them, they're not going to want to come to you. I think this totally changes the style of leadership that's required from Canada in the area of foreign affairs.

● (0935)

For me, the great example of this is in the environment. Canada's environmental policy—or her track record, if you will—is abysmal. Based on 25 environmental indicators in the OECD, we rank 28th out of 29 countries, and I think we rank in the bottom three in most areas. We never rank in the top three; that's absolutely certain.

So we have an appalling environmental track record, yet in the IPS we talk about how we're going to implement Kyoto, there's going to be a plan, and we're going to be environmental leaders. I think this is exactly the type of thing that erodes Canada's credibility abroad and also generates a certain amount of pessimism among young people in that our track record is to be based on what we are going to do, not on what we have done.

In the report we recommend something called the E-8, which I believe to be incredibly powerful because it actually turns what could be an enormous weakness into an enormous strength. It's up to Canada to open to the world and say, frankly, we have an appalling environmental record, we acknowledge that, and we're looking for partners to help us. We have to reach out to those countries that have perhaps performed a little bit more effectively than we have and say we want to form an E-8 so we can have an exchange of ideas and policies in order to learn what works and to develop new ideas that will work better still.

What I really like about this idea is that if you say that and we get, let's say, three other countries that are more experienced, we can then open up the door and say if Canada improves itself by 400%.... Actually, on a global level, the impacts will be fairly insignificant. Why don't we bring in some people who really are going to matter, a China, a Brazil, or a Russia, and say we also want you to come to the table? What I really like about this is, one, there's an incredible amount of honesty here, and two, it completely destroys traditional north-south divides. It completely destroys the traditional notion that the north knows something and needs to teach the south. Instead, what we're saying is that we need to learn and we believe you might want to learn as well, so why don't you come and join us in this learning exercise?

That's the type of leadership I think we're going to be looking for in the 21st century. It's no longer the self-proclaimed expert who's going to have impact on the world. It's going to be those who can bring new ideas to the table or who are willing to be open and honest and create processes that work to enable others to contribute their ideas and make the world a better place.

Very quickly, I'd like to end on what I think is the future of the IPS. The IPS is an interesting document; I think there are a lot of good ideas in there. What I think distinguishes it, certainly, from our own report is the lack of very concrete things that need to be done.

What I like about what the United States does is that every year they release, I think, their national security policy, where they actually lay out in somewhat more concrete detail what they're going to accomplish over the next year. What I'd like to see from Canada is perhaps not a yearly document but a document that actually outlines the 40 things this country is going to do to improve its place in the world and to make Canada's contribution more significant.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, David.

We're going to start the question and answer part, but first we'll ask the other members of the practicum if they want to sit at the table. They're most welcome.

There will be ten minutes of Q and A, and we'll start with Mr. Day, please.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thanks, Mr. Chairman

Thank you to everyone who presented. They were very insightful presentations, thought-provoking, and they will be helpful to us as we work our way through this policy statement.

The way this works is that for the first allotment of questions we have ten minutes; that includes questions and answers. If I can, I'll just toss off some quick questions to people who raised issues. If I don't have a question for you in particular, it doesn't diminish your individual presentation in any way, shape, or form.

Thank you again for your very thoughtful analysis.

Mr. Eaves, it was a good, thought-provoking presentation. I just have a comment about reaching out to youth.

Yes, this will sound partisan, but we're happy to report that the Conservative Party, in terms of MP representation, is by far the youngest in the House of Commons. We're quite excited about that. At our convention we saw interesting debate at the microphone from young professionals and university students who said not to treat them like a token group or an interest group; they wanted to be part of the main flow. That manifests itself across the country as they have the honour to speak at a number of campuses on a regular basis. It does seem to be the Conservative groups who are very active and robust, so I appreciate your sense of that.

I'll just give the question—

● (0940)

The Chair: Do you have a question, now that you've made your point?

Mr. Stockwell Day: You see how politics works here; politicians never just ask questions, except in question period. And we never get answers there, so....

Mr. David Eaves: I wish it were a question, because I have thoughts on that.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Good. I'm hoping the Liberals are listening as we get answers today in our question period.

The Chair: We'll listen to the answers.

Go ahead.

Mr. Stockwell Day: First of all, to Ms. Groothuis, you commented on the UN being more effective. The UN failed hopelessly to answer the problems related to Rwanda, Bosnia, and now Darfur. So any suggestions you have on how they could be more effective would really be helpful.

Ms. Awad, you talked about tariffs and global trade. I agree 100%; in meetings with third world countries they often say they're even willing to go toe to toe in trade with the United States, but they can't compete against the U.S. treasury. How do we impress on the United States that if they believe in free trade, they've got to drop the tariffs?

To Ms. Watts, you talked about trade not trumping human rights. I agree with that. Why do you think the present government doesn't speak out more on human rights issues? Especially when dealing with China, they are almost mute.

On the issue of UN reform, Ms. Khakhamovitch.... And excuse me if I didn't pronounce your name correctly. Everyone gets my name wrong too. I have a very different name, and everybody gets it wrong. So I sympathize with you.

Do you have any suggestions on UN reform, especially with regard to the tendency at the UN for voting blocks, largely controlled by non-democratic countries, to continue to vote against the democratic impulse that would otherwise exist there?

You raised a pile of other good questions. You made good presentations. Perhaps you would fire away quickly and help us on any of these questions.

The Chair: We'll start with Amy Groothuis, please.

Ms. Amy Groothuis: Thank you very much.

That's an interesting question, and definitely one I've thought quite a bit about as well. In my brief, I was really trying to focus more on the military capability. I recognize that there are problems with political will at the UN level, which in the past has resulted in, as you mentioned, catastrophes in Rwanda, Bosnia, and now in Darfur.

The point I was trying to make was that it takes long enough to make any sort of political decision, and that's accepted. I think Maya touched on some of that in her brief as well, and maybe she could speak to it a little bit more. My point was that once a decision has been made at the UN level, I see no reason why it should take another six months to be able to get 10 to 15 countries together to say yes, we will provide troops. If you look at the UN rapid deployment program—and I recognize that this as well has been stalled—I think this is a good place for countries to come together. They have the system there that, if it actually is implemented, would be able to say, for instance, this is a list of countries with these capabilities, they have this number of troops on standby, and they have heavy-lift capabilities, or whatever it is.

If a large enough number of countries can figure out how they could contribute to whatever political decision has been made, I think that would solve a lot of time. I recognize that the two aspects, the military and the political decision, are connected. Because I was looking more at the military capabilities, I did approach them somewhat separately. I just think it's inexcusable, once a decision has been made, to still not see any concrete action on the ground. That's where I was coming from.

Just to reiterate my presentation a little bit, if Canada has any sort of rapid reaction force, whatever it may be, I don't think that's going to solve the problem. We have to be doing this with other countries. Whatever capabilities we do have, whatever we can offer, it's not going to be enough on its own.

I hope that answers your question.

The Chair: Thank you. We'll go to Ms. Awad.

Ms. Amy Awad: Thank you.

You had asked me how to impress on other countries or on other powers the importance of opening their markets to the developing world. I'm going to answer that in two parts.

My first answer I think is a little expected, but it's important, and that's to lead by example. Canada needs to be at the forefront of offering access to its market and showing other countries that it's possible to do this without resulting in economic collapse or problems. For example, we can look at the example of New Zealand and how they opened their agriculture industry, or removed the subsidies in their industries. They were able to do this without significant economic impact on their market. So the first answer, I would say, is to lead by example.

The second one is to make this a priority. Our WTO negotiating position can't be “We're going to look for access in other people's markets in areas that are of interest to us, and trade on that”, and also say, “Well, maybe agriculture, maybe textiles; if everyone else agrees, we'll do that as well.”

For countries like the United States and the European Union, if they want access to our markets or to markets of the world, they have to be prepared to make concessions in the areas of agriculture and textiles, and that has to be at the top of our negotiating position. We're not going to agree to deals unless they make poverty reduction a priority.

Thank you.

● (0945)

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Watts.

Ms. Heather Watts: Thanks.

In response to your question, I think the question specifically asked why this government doesn't speak out more on human rights. I'm clearly not in a position to comment on that, but I think, in general—

The Chair: You're a good politician, very good. I fully agree.

Ms. Heather Watts: I can't speak to why, in particular, they don't speak out. I think that in general government faces the same issues that a business operating overseas faces. They feel there is competition between trade and human rights. If they put human rights first, and the other guy doesn't, then they're going to lose out. I think it's the kind of catch-22 that people are in.

Other countries do a lot more than Canada does in this area. For example, France, Denmark, and Holland all have regulations that require companies to report on the human rights and environmental impacts of overseas operations. So it's not as if Canada would be at a disadvantage if we suddenly asked companies to start regulating their behaviour and reporting on that.

This is clearly an issue where Canadian companies and the government are going to feel there is a disadvantage if we start prioritizing human rights over trade interests. That's why I think it's important to work at an international level.

It's why things such as the UN norms are really important. They can work to build consensus among nations and among corporations on what the standards should be so that the playing field is levelled and everybody is playing by the same rules and knows what's expected of them.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Khakhamovitch, please.

Ms. Maya Khakhamovitch: Thank you.

I'm actually going to combine my answer in order to answer both your question towards me and your question towards Amy.

The decision-making body of the United Nations, particularly when dealing with decisions of action on gross human rights abuse and human rights interventions, is unfortunately a little ineffective at this point in time. As you all know, the P-5 members have a veto, and as such, it makes it very difficult to issue any action without going through the Security Council. I have dealt with how to get around that problem in my report and in the brief, and I know the UN panel on reform addresses that as well.

At this point in time, the reality is that we're going to have a veto. We need to look at UN reform that will get around the veto and still make the UN an effective body and grant decision-making authorities to other bodies. It means that we need to utilize other bodies within the UN, other executive boards, the General Assembly, and the ECOSOC.

We're looking now at Security Council reform. The IPS deals with it a little bit. Canada promotes its stand that we need to oppose any reform that promotes an increase in the number of permanent members. That is true. We do not need more permanent members or more decision-making bodies on the Security Council that will have higher authority than other countries. We need to promote Security Council reform that allows for a rotation, allows for semi-permanent membership, and gives longer terms in the Security Council to countries to actually make a difference.

In addition, we need to move away from the Security Council. When the Security Council is not effective in rendering decisions, particularly in cases of human rights abuses such as Darfur, Sudan, we need to look to other bodies. As I mentioned in the brief, and as the IPS mentions in their report, there is the General Assembly, which is the most representative body of the UN. In cases where the Security Council is ineffective in making its decision or is stalled due to political or social inconsistencies, we need to utilize UN General Assembly resolutions and push the UN to make the decisions to enter into political interventions or social interventions.

In addition, for issues of economic and social development, we need to create UN reform that grants ECOSOC the same decision-making authority that the Security Council has. In that way, we can have two bodies split their decision-making powers and have a more effective United Nations that deals with security issues, as well as economic and social development issues.

● (0950)

The Chair: Thank you.

[*Translation*]

Thank you very much.

We will now go to Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank all our witnesses for the extremely stimulating presentations, which could give rise to some very interesting debates. You talked about networking. I fully agree with you that interdependence is increasingly important throughout the world. However, the fact remains that in political terms, there is only one superpower. When it makes unilateral decisions, it cares very little about networks. I am not convinced that at the moment the Iraqis all feel like they are members of a world network. Clearly, the unilateral decision made by the Americans has an impact on our relations with the Muslim world. However, I do think there are some aspects in terms of the balance of power that will have an impact on Canada's future international relations, whether we like it or not. I think you should incorporate your idea about networks into this reality and try to see where that will take us. However, that is not the question I want to ask you.

Canada25 has called into question the concept of Canada as a middle power and suggests that Canada become a model power, rather than a middle power. In its report, the University of Ottawa group starts by saying that Canada should stop seeing its international policy as one of peacekeeping. I would like you to tell me what you mean by that. It is not very clear.

I would like to ask the two groups which three or four principles should guide Canada's foreign policy, if we do question Canada's traditional role. The University of Ottawa group has said that at the moment peacekeeping is the key component of Canada's international identity, while Canada25 maintains that Canada sees itself as a middle power. What principles should underlie Canada's foreign policy?

Mr. David Eaves: Thank you very much for your question. I would like to answer it in French, but I am from Vancouver and my French is not very good. I know time is limited. It will be faster if I answer in English. So with your permission, I will continue in English.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: You were talking about bilingual people. In English Canada, there are definitely more people who speak Spanish than French.

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Scarborough East, Lib.): Not at all.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: In September, there was a meeting here of members of Parliament from Canada and Quebec and their counterparts from the U.S. and Mexico. The meeting took place in Spanish. That was here, in Ottawa. Your anecdote is true.

[*English*]

Mr. David Eaves: You asked for the two ideas that should guide Canadian foreign policy. I think the first, clearly, is to lead by example. We live in a world now where the clothes are off. We're all naked. Everybody can see what everybody else is doing. There's no longer a world where we can go abroad and say we believe in A, B, and C, and meanwhile we're conducting X, Y, and Z at home. We can't do it any more, so our influence in the world is going to depend on, ironically, our domestic policies.

One of the interesting things that happened in the writing of the report is that a lot of delegates came up to me and said, well, what we really think we should write a policy on is actually domestic affairs, because we need to do this. Now, the group had decided no, this needs to be an externally focused document, so we can't do that. What is interesting to me is that every single person felt our credibility internationally rested almost exclusively on our domestic policies. If we don't have our own house in order, we have no business going out in the world and saying you should be doing this or you should be doing that. Our credibility depends entirely on this, so I think the first guiding principle is to lead by example.

The second, for me, has to do with the empowerment of individuals. Members have told me the individual is now a fundamental unit in international affairs. I think that was the great legacy of Axworthy, that he showed us how the individual not only plays an important role but needs to be protected and needs to have rights that are guaranteed not just at the national level but at an international level.

I see us as a country trying to do two things. One is that we need to create networks that enable young people and all Canadians to connect with those who are abroad who are doing similar things, who are doing different things to exchange ideas, so they can learn different perspectives, can learn how to step into the shoes of others, and can begin to synthesize ideas and bring people together to create new and better ideas. Two, we need to have policies that allow young people to get the best possible education, because it's people who will generate the ideas. It's not an institution, it's not a university, and it's not the government; it's ultimately a person who is going to come up with the idea. It's the investment in individuals that I think is—again, ironically—going to lead to a better Canadian foreign policy.

I think Alex may have something else she wants to add.

● (0955)

[*Translation*]

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: I think the example of the United States is the exception that confirms the rule. That is the only place where we are at a disadvantage. Other countries work much more co-operatively.

In response to your second question,

[*English*]

I think Canada has always tried to be a type E—everything to everybody. Sometimes we have actually chosen a couple of things that we stand for, and we now report we have actually talked about maintaining peace and about the importance of maybe creating an international police force, where we would lead on the idea and get other countries involved, because sending police over to build a society after a conflict is sometimes less expensive than sending military, but it's also more effective, because that's what they are actually trained to do; that is, maintain peace.

Mr. David Eaves: To wind up, I would encourage you to look through the report. There's a lot in the report on the military, on the idea that the use of force is not leaving the world in which we live, and so I don't think that runs counter to the ideas in the report. Also, on your example of the United States and Iraq, I think Iraq actually shows the limits of American power: that even when the United States decides to act unilaterally, it actually cannot get its own way. So while I think it is an example of the extent of American power, it in many ways shows the limits.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC)): I shouldn't interject on Mr. Paquette's time, but you have made reference a number of times to your report. We have the executive summary of that report, but could we have access as a committee?

Mr. David Eaves: I thought the committee already had the whole thing.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): I'm informed it will be translated and sent out. All right, thank you.

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: We can make sure you get a copy of the full report.

Mr. David Eaves: It's my understanding that you already did, but if you don't, then—

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: Then we apologize for that.

A voice: It's a brick to be translated.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Oh, I see; translation is the problem.

Continue.

Ms. Amy Groothuis: Thank you very much.

I believe the question was related to Canada's peacekeeping abilities, and whether or not we can still be—

[*Translation*]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: One of your first recommendations is that Canada should abandon its vision as a peacekeeper. Why should it do so? That is not clear.

[*English*]

Ms. Amy Groothuis: Okay. Thank you very much.

I think probably everybody at this table has some understanding of the state of our military right now and what's happened to it in the last decade or fifteen years. The point I was trying to make is that I don't feel Canada is the peacekeeper it was, especially during the Cold War. I don't have all the figures in front of me right now, but I know the numbert of missions we were going on during the Cold War and in the early 1990s was much higher, and the number of troops was much higher, than it has been in the last five or ten years.

The point I was trying to make is that if our military is in the state it currently is, and if we have less capability than we have had previously, I don't think we should still be calling ourselves the world's peacekeepers. I think we should be looking at other options and how else we might be able to contribute in a meaningful way, without necessarily sending the same number of troops overseas to conflict situations that we have in the past. I think there's a disconnect, in some of the research I did for the brief, between what the Canadian populace still believes and what the actual situation is.

That is the point I was trying to make. Since you've read the brief, you'll see that it goes on to point out that instead of considering ourselves the world's peacekeepers, we should perhaps be looking at niche peacekeeping or rapid deployment level—various other ways we could contribute meaningfully without necessarily having to have the military size or power we perhaps had in the 1960s or the 1970s.

● (1000)

[*Translation*]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: Thank you.

In your report, you talk about the role of parliamentarians in the World Trade Organization. I am in full agreement with your proposal. However, I am somewhat surprised that you did not make any recommendations regarding... I agree with you that we must preach by example. In Canada, parliamentarians play a very weak role with respect to foreign policy. This committee has less influence than a committee in the U.S. Treaties are signed without Parliament having to vote on them. Kyoto was the exception to the rule, but that was because Mr. Chrétien wanted that done. NAFTA was never passed by the Parliament of Canada. We pass implementing legislation, but we cannot change anything in the agreements.

If we want to give parliamentarians a more important role at the WTO, would it not be logical and reasonable to review the relationship between the executive and the Parliament of Canada with respect to negotiating and signing major international treaties?

Ms. Amy Awad: I am in complete agreement with your suggestion. We did not discuss this matter in our report, because this type of change would require some amendments to the Constitution. We know what type of political problems that involves. It is true that parliamentarians should be playing a role internationally and domestically as regards foreign affairs.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I am not sure that would require an amendment to the Constitution. In fact, Ms. Lalonde has tabled a bill on this matter. I am eager to see how our liberal minority will react.

I would like to ask a question about NAFTA now. If Canada25 wishes to answer as well, it may do so. You made no reference to Mexico, even though it is a major partner in the North American economic context. That did surprise me. In addition, when you talk about trade disputes, particularly involving softwood lumber, you did not talk about the mechanism that exist in NAFTA and that could be strengthened. You also know that on the American side, there is virtually a strategy in place to weaken the NAFTA institutions. As a result, I was expecting a recommendation that would seek to strengthen the NAFTA institutions, such as the secretariat and the commission, and to make the decision-making process more democratic. Did you think about the changes that should be made to the North American Free Trade Agreement in the context of our relations with the United States, but also in the context of our relations with Mexico?

[*English*]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): Who would like to take that? I know it falls a bit on the trade side.

Ms. Amy Awad: Nadia is supposed to sit with me through the softwood lumber dispute.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: All right, yes, Nadia.

Ms. Nadia Campion: In terms of our relationship with the United States, yesterday I was reading an interesting article in the *Globe and Mail* by Roy MacLaren, who made a commentary on what we ought to do to strengthen our bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. He points to the fact that we need to beef up our multilateral relationships with other countries because there's more force in numbers. Unfortunately, however, I think a better approach would be to ensure that we essentially engage in a public relations campaign in the United States to convince them that Canada is an asset. The problem we have right now is that the United States takes Canada for granted and they don't view Canada as an asset. We have natural resources. A secure America is unworkable without Canadian support.

I think in light of those assets that we do have what we need to do, as Canadian policy-makers. We ought to be trying to convince the United States and persuade them that we ought to receive favourable economic treatment and that they ought to abide by a rules-based system when it comes to the softwood lumber dispute, for instance. Right now what we have is essentially a reversion to the old quota system, and this is something that is detrimental to Canadian interests. In the research I've done on the matter, I found that there are hundreds of thousands of job losses that are resulting from the softwood lumber dispute. The thing we need to do is cooperate with the U.S. on security initiatives and especially do a linkage of issues—what I would call a quid pro quo.

The multilateralist approach that Mr. MacLaren took was tried already. Diefenbaker tried it with Europe and it didn't work, and Trudeau tried it with South America, and again it didn't work. The reason the multilateralism approach does not work is because we're right beside the United States. In a sense, it's our cheapest trading partner. There are not as many transportation costs as there would be to other areas. That's why this approach failed. What we need to do is take a different approach. We need to convince the United States that we are an asset to them and that we ought to be treated favourably on economic terms. And that would be related back to the border closings as well as the softwood lumber dispute and many other disputes that are ongoing that fall outside the NAFTA rules.

● (1005)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson): All right, thank you very much.

We're four minutes over already. We will go to Mr. Bevilacqua, please.

Mr. Maurizio Bevilacqua (Vaughan, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first of all want to congratulate you on an excellent presentation. It was very insightful. I like the part about the fact that there was no hierarchy. You should speak to some people around here.

Mr. David Eaves: Government is the last great bastion.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: But it—

[*Translation*]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): We are going to talk about the Liberal Party.

[*English*]

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: One of the areas I'm really interested in or intrigued by is the whole issue of North America. Nadia, perhaps I can direct the question to you.

I often read recommendations that deal with a number of issues. You know that we've gone through the smart border initiative, the aftermath of September 11, and all of these changes that have occurred. Ultimately, one of the most important things that Canadians want—and I think you probably reflect this—is the free movement of goods and services. It's very much an economic approach. But what are we really trying to achieve? What is the point? For example, we have free clearance now in the plants, and we try to do all of of these things before people get to the border.

I've come to the conclusion that although we've taken all of these measures, the root cause is really the actual border; that's the real issue. I'm wondering whether you agree with that, and whether or not we should be initiating a dialogue that speaks to a seamless border between Canada and the United States.

Ms. Nadia Campion: I would agree with that. There's a lot of criticism out there of the seamless border, a customs union, or anything like that. However, I think a lot of criticism is misplaced, in my opinion.

I think that a customs union would be beneficial to Canada in ensuring that we operate essentially on a level playing field, because we aren't right now, as the United States does take advantage of Canada. I think a reason for that is that they seem to be able to manipulate the NAFTA agreements and get around the rules that are established. And even when decisions are made, for instance in the softwood lumber dispute, they end up appealing the decision as being outside the scope of the authority of the tribunal.

In that sense, I think that a seamless border would be more beneficial, because it would essentially initiate a dialogue between the two countries, as you mentioned, and it would prompt the two countries to come to an agreement that there are going to be certain rules that will apply to both without exception.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: What are your thoughts on the issue of Canadian economic nationalism as it relates to the seamless border?

Ms. Nadia Campion: Could you be more specific?

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: People feel they would lose sovereignty if there were a seamless border, that if you harmonize or you have mutual recognition of, let's say, immigration laws with the United States, you're in fact giving something up. What does your generation think about that?

Ms. Nadia Campion: I guess I'll start by saying that I know where that comes from, and that one of its originators is former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. He was adamantly against expanding the NAFTA agreement, because he was afraid it would undermine Canadian sovereignty. But what I tried to draw attention to in our brief is the fact that we can establish a deepened NAFTA without having to lose our sovereignty. What we need to do is essentially leverage our geographical proximity to the United States, as well as our natural resources and the fact that the United States is currently paranoid about security threats.

I know this is a catchphrase, but a secure America is unworkable without Canadian support, so I think that if we leverage those kinds of interests, it will level the playing field and we won't be compromising any of our sovereign identities.

● (1010)

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: David, do you want to make a comment?

Mr. David Eaves: I have a number of thoughts on this.

First, in the group that we had, I think there was a definite recognition that the economic future of Canada is tied to the United States, at least for the medium term, and that the border poses a tremendous economic risk, despite the existence of NAFTA. September 11 shows that, and even more than that, on a day-to-day basis.

If you are working in Canada and trying to ship things to the United States, every product that you try to ship over the border ultimately has to be cleared through customs. For instance, if you're going to set up shop in Vancouver or across the border in the United States, in Seattle, you might be very inclined to move and simply do it in Seattle. I actually think the border still presents an enormous amount of business risk, more so than people think.

On the flip side, though, I'm not sure whether I buy into some of the arguments that are being presented. There are two or three reasons.

One, if we take as an assumption that American security is only workable with Canada, I don't know if one cannot also say that a workable American security solution has to involve Mexico. The United States seems to have a very interesting solution on how to deal with Mexico. If we open up the debate, they may come to the conclusion that they can do the same thing with Canada. I'm not sure. I don't think they will, but it's not a foregone conclusion.

Two, I am somewhat disturbed by the notion of quid pro quo. I don't think this country wants to engage the United States in a quid pro quo dialogue. When it comes to trading chips, we're going to run out of chips much sooner than the United States is going to run out of chips. I am the first to say that I think we have an incredible amount of bargaining room. There are 33 states in the United States that have us as their major trading partner and are deeply involved in trading with us. It's going to hurt them if trade with us suffers, but ultimately, we're going to hurt much more, and they know that. I don't know that we want to end up in a quid pro quo argument with them.

On any issue, I wouldn't want to trade security for resources or resources for access. Instead, I think it's very much in this country's interest to have a rule-based approach in which the best possible idea rises to the top.

I think there is hope for us when I look at how Canada has conducted relationships with the United States. We are most successful when we come up with the idea, package it, and take it to the United States, saying this is what we think they should do.

When you look at smart borders, smart borders didn't originate in the United States. It originated in the Department of Foreign Affairs or the PCO, depending on who you ask. We tied it up in a nice little bow, took it down to the United States, and said this was what we thought we should do. They said that they loved it, let's do it, let's roll, and that was it.

The free trade agreement is another fantastic example of this. We initiated it. We initially came up with the broad agreement and took it to the United States.

I think that when we have concerns about the United States, whether it's the border or whether it's something else, the onus is really on us to create a workable solution. It involves stepping into the shoes of the Americans and imagining what their concerns are, while being aware of our own concerns, of course, and constructing a package to address that specific issue.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: Is continental security a precondition for economic growth in the future?

The Chair: Ms. Campion, it's your field. Go ahead.

Ms. Nadia Campion: I think that it is a precondition. The problem we have right now is that the United States looks at Canada as an entryway for security risks. You have continued border closings, airport restrictions, security checks, and all the stuff that really hampers free trade between the two countries.

I agree with Mr. Eaves that, yes, of course, Mexico needs to play a role in all of this. It's true that it wasn't touched on in my paper. I was focusing simply on U.S. and Canada relationships. How it works out down the road with Mexico is another issue.

I think that continental security is a precondition to economic prosperity. Otherwise, if you have one country that feels it's at risk in national security, it essentially adopts policies of self-containment. It's what is happening with the U.S. right now. In that sense, we need to rebuild a mutual zone of confidence between the two countries. That's not happening right now.

There is a linkage of the issues. Security issues and economic issues are linked. If you look at the joint statement by Canada and the United States on common security and common prosperity, the issues are linked. There is room for a quid pro quo in that sense, because if Canada can't convince the U.S. that it can protect its own borders, the U.S. isn't going to open its borders to free trade.

● (1015)

Mr. David Eaves: I think there's a difference among the issues.

The Chair: Alexandra, do you want to add something?

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: It's very interesting to view security because for some people security means arming your house, making sure the alarms work and that there are guard dogs and guards at the door. That's very much the view the Americans seem to have taken now that they've been attacked where their heart was. New York was the apple of their eye.

What we came across while working on the report is that, while a certain amount of security is necessary and desirable for economic growth, the Canadian view of security very much has to do with the social network, with the fact that we have certain values as a society. We believe in the free circulation of ideas and that ideas are not dangerous in themselves. It's the whole value system that Canadians have. This ties in to your question about sovereignty and the threat of losing it.

There was a very strong identity that we, as Canadians, are different. When Canadians go abroad—and this is what our members from outside of Canada told us—everybody knows what we are. Canadians are different from the Americans one encounters because of certain values or the way they approach the world, which is unique.

We, as a society, haven't discussed these values and haven't made them very specific, but they include openness to new ideas. It's not the melting pot, but it's respect for diversity. That is one of the ways we can ensure that our country remains safe—beyond just making sure of the physical safety—making sure our social society remains open despite the risks.

The Chair: Merci.

Mr. Bevilacqua, you have time for a very short question.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: You remembered. Thank you.

The Chair: Very short.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: Alexandra, the one question I would have is in relation to security as a function of economic growth. Are Canadians' values tied to the fact that you need to grow the economy in order to have those? In other words, if you want medicare, if you want all those things that we call Canadian, usually somebody pays for it, right? So I take you back to continental security as a precondition for economic growth so that we can espouse our Canadian values. What do you think of that?

The Chair: Keep your answer very short, please.

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: My personal opinion matters less than what we've discussed. What we discussed during the process was that there is a recognition of the importance of security for economic growth, and that's an absolute. But we don't want Canada to turn into a version of the United States that views anybody with an Arab name as a suspicious terrorist.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. McDonough, it's your turn.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a wonderful opportunity for ten parliamentarians of four different political stripes; we have vastly divergent views, but here we are trying to look at Canada's common challenges.

I know you've all done a lot of research, and for you it must be frustrating for us not to get into more depth here, so let me quickly try to move. I'd first like to pick up on the issue of values.

Specifically, Mr. Eaves, you started out by saying we're a generation that never knew Pearson in person. But if Pearson stands for something in Canadian identity, it's the notion that we should build our place in the world based on some fairly distinct values. It seems to me that in the international policy statement, what we now have is something of a shift from that. This has been true of many of the presentations we've been hearing, the sort of notion of let's forget the values part, let's just think more clearly about self-interest, let's be more open about it, and let's just go for it. Now, that's an exaggeration, but I'd just like to ask if you could comment further on that.

Secondly, you spoke about recognizing that there are, right across government—you described it as across Ottawa, but I think we all knew what you meant—foreign policy implications. You suggested that really there needs to be an infusion of foreign service officers across the piece, and then somehow we'll put it all together. I guess I find that a little bit of an alarming idea, for two reasons. There's a real concern that we actually don't have our foreign service officers where most of them need to be, which is out across the world. Numerically that's true, and in terms of solid influence, that seems to be true. But secondly, I'm wondering if you could comment—I'd also be in interested in hearing from whoever would want to comment from the University of Ottawa group, because nobody really touched on this issue—on the pros and cons of Foreign Affairs and International Trade being integrated versus split.

Thirdly, I know that when the University of Ottawa group prepared their brief and submitted it, it was prior to the non-proliferation treaty review in May. A lot of optimism was expressed about what Canada could do and what should be accomplished there. I think the general conclusion was that it was a mess, and Canada's role in it was pretty pathetic. I'm wondering if you could comment on that.

Finally, on corporate social responsibility, I know that what you're arguing for is let's forget the voluntary, because we know it doesn't work; we don't do it domestically, why would we do it internationally? I'm wondering if you have looked at the private member's bill prepared by Ed Broadbent, with his considerable background in international human rights, proposing precisely what you're talking about. Basically, it's trying to build in accountability for the actions of Canadian corporations abroad in relation to what we say are our values and actually corresponding with laws and regulations we have about that conduct.

● (1020)

The Chair: Thank you.

David.

Mr. David Eaves: Yes.

The Chair: And try to remember, somebody else might want to answer as well—just to let you know.

Mr. David Eaves: I'll try to be focused.

With the values versus interests, the interesting thing for me about Lester B. Pearson is that I actually think he's largely misunderstood. He is acknowledged as the creator of peacekeeping, and people think of that in terms of values, but we didn't get into peacekeeping for strictly value reasons.

If you look at Canada's initial peacekeeping missions, we first went into the Suez because we were worried that a war in the Arab region would escalate into a third world war, which back in that day—and people don't often remember this—wasn't going to be simply a war in Europe. It was going to be a war fought in the skies above Canada, because you delivered nuclear weapons using fighter planes at the time. The air battle was going to take place over our country, and we didn't want nukes falling out of the sky on Canada. So we had a very real national interest to be there.

When one looks at Turkey and Greece, we were there because we didn't want NATO to fall apart, because NATO was part of a credible defence plan against the Soviet Union.

So we had very real national interests to get involved in peacekeeping, and I think people really forget that.

What I take away from Lester B. Pearson is that I like this report because it talks about interests, but I also like this report because it talks about values. So when I look at it, I say this country needs to be really clear about what its national interests are, but then we need to make sure that whatever our national interests are, we pursue them within a platform that's determined by our values—our values literally, I think, to the boundaries of what kinds of actions we want to take.

I think for a long time we've been in a world where we talked only about values. I'm really pleased to see us talking about interests, but I want to make sure we don't lose that part with the values, the boundaries on how we're going to act and how we comport ourselves in the world, because actually that's more important than ever, given this notion of your reputation and how you carry that everywhere you go.

On the split of the Department of Foreign Affairs and ITCan, I'm actually in favour of the split. The only thing I'm not in favour of is that, first, no one has told me about why they did it; and secondly, I don't understand why ITCan didn't end up in Industry Canada. I can't for a second believe that somehow domestic and international industry policy in this country are so different that we needed to have two departments operating independently doing this. Why aren't these guys together? It seems to me they're incredibly bound.

For me, it meets an interest as well in which I believe the Department of Foreign Affairs really should be the strategic policy resource and the coordinator for Canadian foreign policy. By making them smaller and nimbler, I think we enable them to do that job more effectively. I'd prefer to see foreign affairs become just a central agency.

Finally, with just a brief talk about the role of the foreign service officer, I'm going to ignore most of the questions and just come back to this committee and say something else completely unrelated, which is that we don't pay our foreign service officers enough. We live in a world right now where someone with the credentials we ask of a foreign service officer can go to New York and probably make a starting salary of $100,000, or go to Toronto and do the same. We demand of them exceptional skills, exceptional language skills, and yet we pay them virtually nothing. So it's not surprising to me that we have the retention problems and the attraction problems that we have.

● (1025)

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer: I have a brief point, if I may, in response to that.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer: It touches on something that's of great interest to me.

I spent a number of years with and around NGOs and in fact was a WUSC seminar participant some years back. One of the things that strikes me and has struck me historically, and I'd love to hear how it's being interpreted now, is that we used to go away and come back to Canada, and then there was really no way....

Part of our mandate as WUSC seminar participants was to come back and speak to church groups and various other committees, and so on, to tell them about our experience, but that was almost the extent of it, the extent to which that international experience and that enthusiasm that was developed overseas was actually seeded in our real life in Canada. It kind of drifted away. To me, it seems now there's more of an imperative than ever—which actually brings up my question within my little brief about Canada Corps.

We already have volunteer-sending agencies in this country. We have CARE Canada, we have WUSC, we have CECI, we have CUSO, and so on, who are out doing that work, but what do we hear about it? We have Canadians making a difference in the world, that the communications branch of CIDA is promoting, and so on. It's great when you see it, but how often do we see it?

I have had experience in the media, and I realize that two issues that are close to my heart, international development and culture, are probably the least reported in the country. It's very difficult to get the momentum going around these issues. This is a forum that may be perfectly placed to get more of that out there, which is why I'm hopeful about the public engagement strategy, using the experience—I don't know so much around foreign service officers—but more interchange among groups that are actually doing work with international affairs and then somehow making that relevant to people on the ground.

They do it in the universities. In the Maritimes, where I'm from, there's a lot of seeding between some of the universities and overseas groups, and so on, but it's all very much under the radar. That, I think, is regrettable.

The Chair: Thank you.

Any other comments?

Rachel.

Ms. Rachel Hird: I'll just answer the question about the NPT talks.

I also was very optimistic about it, and I thought there was a great deal of potential for it. I think the main problem resulted from the fact that this was the first set of talks that had happened since 2000, and pretty much everything relating to international policy had really changed since then, especially for the United States, one of the big players in the talks. It was a complete mess, and nothing substantive was ever dealt with, mainly because Iran and the United States couldn't even get around to discussing what should be put on the agenda. They couldn't get past the fact that Iran and some of their fellow countries wanted to get the U.S. to declare that the new weapons of mass destruction programs within the United States are looking at developing new nuclear weapons, ones that can penetrate bunkers. They are also looking at replacing their existing nuclear arsenal with so-called more reliable nuclear weapons.

The extent to which they could actually go out and start developing new weaponry was really up in the air. Some of these countries wanted an agreement that it wouldn't be used to attack them directly, whereas the U.S. of course wanted to know about Iran's uranium enrichment facilities and what not. But because the countries couldn't even decide what to put on the agenda, they couldn't do anything substantive.

One idea that Canada floated was to push for yearly talks on the NPT, because it is such an important agreement. By meeting every year, or at least every other year, hopefully countries would then be meeting frequently enough that there wouldn't be these long gaps in between meetings for issues to fester, and for countries to really get set in positions on their policies. I think that definitely is something Canada should do in the future, especially coming out of this, because it was such a complete disaster.

I think another thing Canada needs to do, as I said, is really increase our diplomatic efforts. There used to be a time, and I know Pearson has been mentioned a lot, when Canada was able to work wonders behind the scenes at these kinds of meetings and really figure out what countries wanted. As I think Nadia has mentioned several times, not really quid pro quo, but Canada could find out what countries wanted to gain from each other in order to actually get them to discuss more important matters.

I think there's hope for Canada to start doing that if we can convince countries to meet more frequently and find out exactly what we can do to get Iran and the United States—because there was obviously a big dichotomy there—back to the bargaining table. If it's working with European countries to get Iran into the WTO, and working with concessions on that, that's one thing, but there needs to be some kind of bargaining chip that Canada can find to get these countries back to the table. I think we would be able to do that in the future.

The Chair: Thank you, Rachel.

We'll now go to Mr. McTeague.

● (1030)

Hon. Dan McTeague: Thank you for being here today. Like all the commentators here, we are certainly pleased to see the richness and diversity in perspectives, very much along the lines of the diversity that I think exists in this country, and more so than ever before.

I won't delve into the Canada-U.S. issue. I'll leave that to the commentary made by one of the more pre-eminent diplomats of this country in its golden age, John Holmes, who put it quite succinctly when he said that we find security in the presence and the power of the Americans but insecurity in how they might use it.

But I want to leave that, and say I agree with David Eaves' comments on domestic interest as a basis for our foreign policy. Although we do yearn for a more altruistic definition of how we might see Canada's place in the world, I think we are nevertheless compelled, increasingly so, and certainly in my capacity in trying to help Canadians abroad, by the international and global or multi-cultural dimension of Canada, particularly as there appears to be a wish list or a very strong emphasis on Canada becoming more involved increasingly in all aspects of difficulty in the world. And yet, of course, we are constrained by our resources.

I'd like to get a comment, if I could, on what some had spoken earlier about, and that's the issue with respect to human rights and creating a code of conduct, I believe, with respect to Canadian companies. We have to take into consideration the fact that many of those Canadian companies are indeed multinational and multi-faceted. How do you do so without jeopardizing the health of our domestic economy, coming back to the fact that our domestic policy is in fact a prime generator in how we see international policy?

The Chair: Ms. Watts, I think it's your subject. Go ahead.

Ms. Heather Watts: Thank you.

As I said in my previous answer to another question, I think the problem is that we view it such that we'll be disadvantaged if we start regulating the operations of our companies overseas, so our domestic legislation will have an impact internationally in a negative way.

I think the solution to that problem is to continue to work at the international level. If we can build a consensus around these proposed UN norms for corporate activity and get everybody out there to agree that this is what the standard should be, then, when you demand those things of Canadian corporations domestically, it won't jeopardize our interests.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I understand that, but I'm trying to understand how it is possible for us to advocate from a domestic perspective. We have a voluntary code of conduct. Whether or not it's respected is quite a different matter.

I had a job—as some would suggest, a “real” job—working for an international company, Toyota Canada. How is it possible that I would be able to see the influence of that company, which of course has a very strong presence in many nations around the world, to, as it were, adjust its policies so that it isn't reflecting some kind of contravention of international covenants as it relates to human rights? How would we influence that domestically when we're dealing with companies that are so transnational?

Ms. Heather Watts: In some other countries, and I mentioned Denmark, Holland, and France, they require companies to report the impact of their overseas operations on the environment and other social issues. In fact, in France that is a precondition to being listed on the stock exchange.

I mean, we require companies to report on all sorts of things. Canadian corporations that are listed on American stock exchanges have to report, under Sarbanes-Oxley, on their corporate activity.

Hon. Dan McTeague: Let me take up the question of France, which is well known for its willingness to work with other nations in the proliferation of small arms, for instance. I appreciate the example of France, but I also understand that France is one of many nations that may, on the one hand, have such a restriction on its domestic companies where it can have that impact, but more importantly, it has no compunction about selling arms to certain nations, thereby reducing the vitality of international covenants as it relates to responsibilities to protect human beings. It's part of the problem, in essence.

And I don't mean to say that France is.... I just picked it up from your example.

How would you reconcile that? Canada is not in the same boat as France, certainly, when it comes to that kind of production of products.

Ms. Heather Watts: No, I don't think those positions can be reconciled, and I think that's the problem. As I said in my presentation, if we're going to say that we want to look at things like the responsibility to protect, the document speaks of building a world based on human rights. So it's inexcusable for our trade policy to allow human rights violations and for our diplomatic policy to say that this is something that we respect. We can't talk out of both sides of our mouths. We can't say that these things are important, but, by the way, if a Canadian company happens to engage in terrible activities in a Third World country, we're going to overlook that.

I think that's why the international policy has to be more consistent.

● (1035)

The Chair: Do you want to get a comment from Mr. Eaves?

Hon. Dan McTeague: I would, but I have very little time left, and I want to get one more question in.

The Chair: No, it's okay.

Mr. Eaves.

Mr. David Eaves: I feel like we've been down this road before. This is not a new subject for us.

We went down this road before when it came to financial audits. There was a period in time when companies did not have to submit financial audits that were approved by an independent auditor. I recently met with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and they say of course they believe in the mechanism we have for reviewing financial audits. Why? It's not just because investors or the government want to ensure that companies are sound. Companies themselves have an interest in spending money on this issue, because they recognize that if a given actor in an industry does not keep its books well, it actually has an impact on all the actors in that industry.

But I'm willing to bet—several dollars—that when this issue first came up, if I had gone to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, they would have said, “We absolutely are opposed to financial audits. We believe we need to have a voluntary system. We do not need to be regulated in any way. We'll take care of this problem, because that's the way we want to do it.” Now, 50 years later, they're completely on board with financial audits, because they recognize that actually it's in their interests.

This is where I just don't buy into this argument that there are the companies that have their interests and there are the buyers that have theirs, and they're somehow irreconcilable. I recognize the importance of voluntary standards, but I do believe there is room here for at least some regulation, which could be audited.

The Chair: Mr. McTeague.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I want to thank you for that.

I want to shift gears. I know that someone had passed it off as a constitutional issue a little earlier, but private members' bills and certainly motions in the House of Commons tend to take on a life of their own. We've had several here, emanating from this committee, given the rigour and effectiveness of so many of our good members.

One of them you're going to have to deal with, and it's not based on a hierarchical basis, is the recognition by at least two parties in this House that they do in fact want provinces to be able to enter into treaties internationally. I was wondering, because this is a reality-based, day-in, day-out, daily check-up for all of us, if we could have comments from some of you here, for those who wish to make a comment, on the implications. We've been down this road before. We have the Conservative Party, which says it supports it in principle, and of course the Bloc Québécois, which has proposed it many times in the past.

How difficult do you think this would be for international policy-making, of all the things that you have just discussed, if we have to consult and have the provinces involved in areas that are currently not part of their jurisdiction, but nevertheless they feel, should Parliament delegate that authority, not only to the provinces, but also to have Parliament in fact ratify treaties...?

The Chair: Maybe it's a question for the teacher; they don't know. But guys, these are becoming more and more difficult.

You've very silent. You have the advantage there.

Mr. Craig Forcese: There are several layers in your question. The first layer is the international layer. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, I believe, talks about a treaty between two states. The provinces in their own right would not be able to enter into an international agreement that rises to the level of a treaty for the purposes of international law. It would have to ultimately be something Canada in its own right agreed to.

The second point is there's a constitutional question raised by the prospect of provinces entering into international agreements. As you know, the Constitution Act of 1867 is silent on a treaty power. It's been interpreted, in now fairly dated cases from the Privy Council, as residing in the peace, order, and good government provision at the front end of the federal power in the Constitution Act of 1867. There is a literature that suggests that this need not be; that there is in fact some kind of capacity on the part of the provinces to enter into international agreements within their sphere of jurisdiction. It's a contested issue; it's not clear-cut constitutionally, at least as far as I know.

The other issue that came up, though it's not maybe what you were getting at, is the issue of the parliamentary role in relation to ratification of treaties. At present, of course, it's a role exercised by the executive at the federal level. That's a royal prerogative power. It's not constitutionalized, although arguably a private member's bill would have to receive royal consent, because it trenches on a royal prerogative power. As a matter of parliamentary procedure, it is my understanding it would have to receive royal consent, which presumably would have to come from the government—which I assume is an extra hurdle for any private member's bill.

I don't know if that answers your question.

● (1040)

The Chair: That's it. Thank you.

Hon. Dan McTeague: I think we should all bone up on the labour conventions.

The Chair: We'll go for five minutes each with Mr. Sorenson, Ms. Phinney, and Madame Lalonde.

Mr. Sorenson, five minutes.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you. I can tell you that this has been a very refreshing morning. I wasn't certain what I would find here when I came this morning—

The Chair: Trust your chair.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: —but it's been refreshing, and I think a number of us have been challenged to think outside the box.

In fact, Ms. Awad, in your presentation you challenged us to think outside the trade box. You touched a little on the WTO. You talked about how Canada needs to step up to the plate and examine some of the policies we have. I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on that. You ask: “How does Canada's move toward 'freer trade' fit within the larger normative objectives of Canadian economic and social policy?” What are the specific areas Canada needs to address domestically that perhaps are hindering us outside as we deal with trade?

Ms. Amy Awad: I focused especially on the question of development. I think obviously trade policy will delve into every possible area, and there are many different issues we need to look at. But I was looking specifically at the area of development, and specifically at the way we pursue trade liberalization. Where is it important for us, and where are the areas in which we prefer to maintain protectionism?

My suggestion was that we need to look at how we handle agriculture and how we handle textiles, but particularly at agriculture and our supply management programs, and whether these are really consistent with our long-term goals as a country that really wants the liberalization of trade.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Would you suggest that they are not, then—that we need to re-examine tariffs and the setting of tariffs? Right now, or in Geneva just a while back, the whole question of tariffs and reducing tariffs.... Those are the issues we are discussing right now.

Just continue on the agricultural end.

Ms. Amy Awad: I guess we have different methods of managing our agricultural supply. One of our objectives has been, up till now, to establish these tariff rate quotas—to have in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs imposed on agricultural goods—and then, depending on the way the wind is going, either increase the tariff rate quota, allowing countries to import more under quota, or less under quota. But the bottom line isn't....

I'm not criticizing the methodology by which we're doing this. It's not a question of whether we should be moving towards tariff rate quotas more quickly or less quickly. It's actually more an issue of our commitment to eliminating these tariff rate quotas, especially when it comes to developing countries, where their major products are agricultural. This is their key to economic success as the world stands right now. Is it really justifiable for us to maintain high tariffs, as compared with every single other product, on the products that are specifically of advantage to developing countries?

In terms of the details of the methodology of how we do it, all I'm saying is we need to do it more quickly. If we want to establish tariff rate quotas and then increase the amount of quotas, or if we want to provide programs where certain developing countries aren't subject to those quotas, it doesn't really make a difference. It's just a question of a commitment to doing it and doing it more quickly.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: All right, thank you.

I think I have a few more minutes here.

The Chair: Very quickly, please. You have a minute and a half. We're leaving at eleven sharp. We have another committee.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: On the first page of the brief you talk a little bit about Canada's inability to participate meaningfully in international operations—I think this is for Amy.

Maybe you could just tell us a little bit more about what's contributed to that. When did it start breaking down? That wasn't the question I was going to ask.

What are the main factors in the loss of the influence that Canada has had in the past? Is it just dollars and cents? Do you believe it's been a time when Canada has already said our values have shifted to a degree, or has it all been based on dollars and cents? That would be one of the questions I would ask.

And in your recommendations, just very quickly, you mention the Brahimi report, dealing with chapter 1, I guess. What is that report?

The Chair: It's the UN report.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: That's the UN report.

The Chair: The human security report.

Ms. Amy Groothuis: Yes, it's the human security report on reform of peacekeeping.

The Chair: Yes, go ahead if you've got some very brief comments, please.

● (1045)

Ms. Amy Groothuis: Okay, very quickly—because the first question is an enormous question—if I understand it correctly, you ask where has there been a breakdown or a switch in values for our operational capabilities.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: What initiated it? If we did lose this influence that we've used as our banner all the time, here we are, we're the peacekeepers and all that, and now you say that we need to regain the international influence we've lost and that we have an inability to participate. What were the factors that led us to losing that influence?

Ms. Amy Groothuis: I would say, very briefly, because I know that we're short on time, it probably does come down to dollars and cents. I think successive budgets in the 1990s that stripped funding from the military, and from the foreign service as well, have played a very large role in it. I don't know if there's necessarily been a switch in values—perhaps that came as a result of these successive cuts—but I think our capabilities, in terms of the military and the Canadian Forces, are such that we can't, at this point, contribute meaningfully. I don't think this is a conclusion I'm alone in reaching.

Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Ms. Phinney, then Madame Lalonde.

Madam Phinney, please.

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): I have two questions on totally different areas.

First of all, I'd like to thank the chair of the committee or whoever it was who had the idea to bring these two groups to us today. It's very refreshing. I think Kevin already commented on that. It scares me a little bit that I'm getting ready to retire and you people are all just starting.

Hon. Maurizio Bevilacqua: Don't be scared.

Ms. Beth Phinney: Your first comment from the Canada25 group—I had one of your group in my office for a while, and she was a great asset—was that you would like to see a five-year work visa for foreign graduates. I'd like to know what Canada is doing for people of your abilities to help you get more knowledgeable by travelling around the world, etc.

The reason I'm bringing this up is that my brother was able, 15 or 20 years ago—I believe through the Department of Foreign Affairs—to apply to go to any third world country, and the Canadian government paid his way over and his way back as long as he got a job over there. He went to Papua New Guinea and then went on from there to Indonesia.

I know we have some NGOs doing this type of work and offering some programs like this, but is there money available for this, and what are they paying for? Why didn't you put something in here for Canadians going overseas to Europe, etc.? That's the first question.

The second question.... Well, do that one first, and then I'll do my second one.

Mr. David Eaves: May I respond to that, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: Rapidly, Mr. Eaves.

Mr. David Eaves: I think there is something in there about getting Canadians out of the country. One of the larger sections is actually about the need to concentrate resources on this. And again, we're sorry; we'll make sure that you get a copy of the full report. I think there's absolutely a necessity to get Canadians out there.

What programs are available? I don't think there are that many, and I'm certainly not familiar with the ones that do exist.

Ms. Beth Phinney: What do you suggest we do?

Mr. David Eaves: I do believe there's room there for the government to have a role. I know a lot of universities are incredibly committed to getting their students abroad and to bringing international students in. They're mostly going to private donors, in my understanding, to try to subsidize these types of programs. But there is a gap.

Again, my real concern here is that the people who are able to go abroad to study and to work are going to be those who are wealthy or are well connected. We need to enable all Canadians to develop these skills, because they're going to be essential to operate in the 21st century in any job. To ensure that everybody has access to these types of opportunities seems to me to be critical.

The Chair: Ms. Macpherson Brewer, do you want to add something?

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer: I just have a point to add to that. Actually, it supports my issue around public engagement or the lack of communications, because there are a number of programs that exist within CIDA—there's an internship program—and throughout the NGOs. If you go to the CCIC—Canadian Council for International Co-operation—website, for instance, you'll see employment opportunities and study opportunities. They're rife but they are not coordinated, so anyone who wants to actually set out on this and find out how to get overseas with all that entails, which can be quite complicated, really has a research job ahead of them. I think more support in that area would be of value.

The Chair: Thank you.

Yes, Ms. Alexandra.

Ms. Alexandra Tcheremenska: It's a very valid question. When I interviewed the Millennium Scholarship Foundation director, he had data showing that essentially it's the wealthy and well-connected Canadians who get the scholarships in the country, and they also get the opportunities to travel abroad, because travelling abroad is still an expense. A lot of universities, when you come back, do not recognize the time you've spent abroad as credible course work, so it lengthens your studies.

It's easier for Canadians right now, relatively speaking, to find work in the U.S. and other countries. It's easier for them to get visas than it is for non-Canadians to come here. I think that after the university stage, this process of having opportunities to go abroad and having others come in is very deficient.

● (1050)

The Chair: Go ahead, Nadia.

Ms. Nadia Campion: I'm not sure where the director gets his information, but I know among my friends that the University of Ottawa scholarships do not go to the wealthy; they go to people who are on financial aid who have good academic standing. Those of us who are right on the border—I'm one of those people who don't qualify for a scholarship but don't have money from the parents—are trapped in the middle. I went to Michigan for two years to do my GD and incurred a huge debt because of that. I don't agree with those findings at all.

The Chair: Ms. Phinney, put your question, and I'll have the question from Madame Lalonde also.

Ms. Beth Phinney: I just want to ask the people down here who mentioned supply management what they feel is necessary for Canadian agriculture to survive.

The Chair: Amy, go ahead.

Ms. Amy Awad: The simple answer would be no, I don't think it's necessary. There's probably room for some amount of supply management in terms of ensuring security of food supply, but not in the sense it's used right now, which is essentially to fix prices and ensure there's a certain amount available and then limit the amount of imports that are brought into Canada. If the dairy farmers' association or the egg marketing board or the wheat marketing board were here, they would be very unhappy with that finding.

There's no reason why it would be necessary. Canada is a very rich country, very rich in resources; it has a very extensive and healthy agricultural industry. There's no reason why we wouldn't be able to operate in a free market like everyone else, why we can't let our market go. If there's room for management, it's probably just for a very small amount to ensure security, but there's no reason we need these supply management programs. They just artificially inflate the price for Canadians themselves, and it's actually the poorest Canadians who suffer from higher costs related to food. That's all I can say.

[*Translation*]

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, please.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I am going to turn to a different area. Some conflicts are not being resolved—I am thinking of Africa for example—and particularly are maintained by oil and mining companies and others, such as those involved in trafficking small weapons. This very much suits some countries. I did not hear you suggest that Canada should take action with respect to the companies involved, such as Talisman awhile ago, or that we should amend the Special Economic Measures Act. I spoke about this a great deal when Talisman was in the news, because this is a Canadian law that would allow for intervention if there were no multilateral obligation involved.

Second, you all stressed the responsibility to protect. In your view, is it clear that this must come under the UN, so that we are not accused of practising a new type of colonialism?

Third, why did the new prime minister not feel obliged to set Canada's objective for international aid at 0.7 per cent of the GDP by 2015? Should people not be better informed, and young people more vocal?

[*English*]

The Chair: Merci, Madame Lalonde.

For the first two questions, if anyone would like to answer them, go ahead. The third one is for the Prime Minister.

Ms. Watts.

Ms. Heather Watts: In response to your question about what the government can do, you raise the example of Talisman Energy in Sudan. Clearly in that situation Talisman did not live up to any international standards in terms of its activities there.

There are a number of things the government can do in terms of domestic legislation to encourage companies to comply with those responsibilities. One thing we can do is tie government procurement to adherence to national standards. For example, an organization like Export Development Canada does include a human rights assessment when it's deciding which project to fund, but currently the assessment they do is insufficient and it needs to be revamped, to take more things into account.

Another thing we can do is amend the Income Tax Act to remove foreign tax credits for corporations that operate in countries and with governments that have human rights abuses that are well known and well documented—a carrot-and-stick approach to the problem.

Another thing we can do is allow for an amendment to the Special Economic Measures Act to impose sanctions on Canadian corporations that are complicit in human rights violations. I know that this is an issue that many groups have been working on for quite a long time, and it's been proposed before. It essentially would allow for grave breaches of international peace and security to include human rights situations. If SEMA had been amended in the way that's been suggested, with Talisman we could have acted more quickly on a domestic front to have them halt their operations.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go to one-minute questions, one-minute answers.

Madam McDonough.

● (1055)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Brewer, you've mentioned a couple of times that you look forward to the public engagement process flowing from the international policy statement.

David Eaves, you as well talked about needing to have a great, wide public debate, but the original international policy review has turned into an international policy statement with what seems to be a far more restricted notion about what role it's going to play at all. I just wonder if you'd comment on whether you're satisfied with the view of let's just stop talking and let's just do it, without there being further broad engagement, other than a very limited process around this table.

The Chair: One minute.

Mr. David Eaves: I'm glad you asked this question, because it actually comes back, I think, to Pierre Paquette's issue that he raised earlier about the role of the MP on this issue.

When you look at the United States, people talk about the fact that the legislative members in the United States actually are far more involved in foreign policy than they are in Canada. I think one of the big reasons for that is there's a greater effort, despite the apparent partisanship in the United States, to actually agree on common ground in foreign policy across party lines.

I don't see that effort going on here in Canada. The first step for me is not actually do we move on, do we just act, do we not debate this more, but it's actually to get the parties to come together to ask, what are the core interests of Canada? Is there one thing we can agree upon on where we want Canada to go? Then we can debate about what the next action should be, what processes we want to use, and how we want to do it. Until the parties get together and actually align around a common vision, real substantial debate about Canadian foreign policy isn't going to happen.

The Chair: Madam Macpherson Brewer, for the last comment.

Ms. Margot Macpherson Brewer: I'll be very quick.

I think there's a two-pronged element that has to be involved in public engagement. There has to be ongoing discussion, but it's often the trickle-down effect. Only when a discussion takes place at this level does it take ages, if ever, for it to reach the Canadian public. The Canadian public will not engage in international issues and interests unless they affect them somehow personally, unless the farmer who's sitting in Saskatchewan can look out and ask, what do I have to worry about? If you push people too hard—and you're all politicians, you would be well aware—people will shut down, will disengage, or they can disengage.

I would very quickly like to work in the issue about the 0.7% shortfall in the millennium development goals. I think that has to do with this issue that the PM in his wisdom has concluded—or he and his advisers have concluded—that Canadians just don't care enough. I think that if there were a political imperative there, they would have reached that goal.

[*Translation*]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I would like to thank the representatives of Canada25.

I would like to thank all the members from the University of Ottawa group.

[*English*]

I just want to say this to our teacher, Mr. Forcese. Congratulations on the quality and preparation of all your students. It's fabulous. And as Mr. Sorenson said, it's refreshing. Keep up your engagements, and if you have any other way to engage more young people in our study, please do not hesitate to get in touch with our clerk.

Yes, Madam McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Just very briefly, can we agree sometime in the next few meetings to set aside a bit of time for committee business to deal with the priorities for witnesses? I know Madam Lalonde and I both have submitted requests for witnesses that we've never considered as a committee.

Do you agree?

The Chair: Yes, I agree.

The meeting is adjourned.

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