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Mr. John Cannis

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Thursday, June 9, 2005

• (1020)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we continue our study on review of defence policy.

It's certainly our pleasure to welcome our witness and our guest here today from the Department of National Defence, Lieutenant-General Marc J. Dumais, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

General, welcome. We look forward to hearing your comments today.

The floor is yours, sir, and we apologize for the delay.

Lieutenant-General Marc J. Dumais (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): No problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bonjour.

Honourable members of SCONDVA, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I do have with me—behind me, not before the committee officially—Colonel Guy Laroche. If you ask specific questions I can't answer, if it so please you, he can come before the committee and answer some more detailed questions. But we'll see as we go along. Hopefully I can answer all your questions.

As the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, one of my responsibilities is to plan and execute the missions assigned to the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Government of Canada. The forces to execute these missions are primarily generated by the commanders of the navy, the army, and the air force, although I do have direct responsibility for generating some of the more specialized forces, such as Joint Task Force Two and the Joint Operations Group. Once the commanders have trained and equipped their personnel, it is my responsibility, on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff, to employ them around the world or in response to a crisis at home.

[Translation]

As you know, the Canadian Forces have performed remarkably well on behalf of all Canadians. We are just emerging from a period of operational pause brought on by the severe operational tempo placed on our forces since the end of the Cold War period.

Since 1990, the number of deployed operations in which our military has participated has tripled compared to the period between 1945 and 1989. Concurrently, both the length of these deployments, as well as the number of simultaneous deployments to theatres around the globe, has increased. The increase in both the number and complexity of demanding international missions has been striking.

It is important to note that even though we were on an operational pause, we have managed to maintain over 1,300 personnel on 17 missions around the globe. In fact 1,560 personnel are currently on deployment.

[English]

Our recent operational experience and the complex array of security issues have identified the requirement for a change or transformation within our structure. The transformation is felt to be imperative for four overarching reasons. First, emerging threats and operational trends require new concepts and capability. Second, evolving national and international security policies demand a reconsideration of CF capabilities and orientation. Third, the CF must remain abreast of and selectively align itself with emerging allies, predominantly the U.S., and conceptual and technological developments if the maintenance of interoperability is to remain a mainstay of Canada's operational approach. And finally, the acceleration of technological advances presents new possibilities, both for the Canadian Forces and for potential adversaries.

The national security policy released by the Government of Canada in April 2004 set out a broad range of new initiatives in areas such as intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health crises, and transportation and security. More recently, the government released Canada's international policy statement, which clearly defined the priorities of the government and singled out the critical role of the Canadian Forces in security and defence.

[Translation]

Transformation will be realized through the greater integration of the constituent parts of the CF today. The CF will expand and deepen the ability of all components of the military to work closer together to achieve a common operational goal. Transformation will require the Canadian Forces to revise national command and control structures to ensure a fully coordinated and streamlined response.

Through the creation of new standing joint organizations and force structures, the Canadian Forces' maritime, land, air and special operation forces will be better able to achieve an overall effect that is greater than the sum of the individual parts. All four fighting forces will work to achieve common conceptual, doctrinal, training and organizational practices in order to permit them to operate together in a seamless fashion towards common mission goals.

Key to this integration will be the creation of new Command and Control structures that will fuse the individual efforts of the environments together to create a force that can have strategic effect at home and away. Further, the individual readiness cycles of the environments will be aligned and systematically managed so as to ensure that the relevant capabilities of each service are ready to be deployed together as an integrated force in both Canada and abroad when called for. This harmonized process will ensure that the CF transforms its human and material capabilities to meet the expectations of the Government of Canada and its people.

[English]

There are obviously challenges to be faced to bring about the transformation and subsequent improvement in operational readiness levels. Guarding against and combatting the complex threats of the 21st century will require a fully integrated security arrangement. Security can only be assured through close cooperation between federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and international partners.

Liaison, communication, and information sharing are essential, and the Government of Canada must continue to improve its ability to gather, analyze, and share information related to security, both on national and on international levels. Compatible communication systems, both secure and non-secure, must be identified and procured to ensure information sharing among all parties. Development of joint plans and exercises of joint and combined capabilities will be key to the success of the transformation.

Although difficult to predict, the demands on the Canadian Forces, both at home and abroad, are unlikely to decrease. Given the ever-changing context of continental security, it is not unreasonable to expect that the military will be asked to increase its support to other government departments and agencies in a coordinated effort to enhance the protection of Canadians.

As the Canadian Forces are one of the few armed forces in the world that can perform simultaneous missions across the operational spectrum of humanitarian assistance, stabilization, operations, and combat with equal effectiveness—often referred to as the three-block war—the government will continue to be pressured by international agencies to support operations throughout the world.

[Translation]

Suffice to say that the ability of the Canadian Forces to meet these future requirements will depend heavily on the Government's ability to invest in both our people and in our operational capabilities.

•(1025)

[English]

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian Forces have made a difference in the lives of many, both at home and abroad.

Further, it remains my belief that the role of the Canadian Forces in protecting Canadians and their interests and values will remain an essential one in our national security policy in the future. Accordingly, I remain confident the changes being undertaken will allow us to more quickly react to the government's direction in international requirements in an ever-changing and increasingly complex environment.

We in the Canadian Forces are keenly aware of your support, and we thank you for it.

[Translation]

We will now be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Dumais.

I will go to Mr. O'Connor.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor (Carleton—Mississippi Mills, CPC): General Dumais, welcome.

Under the current arrangements, the environmental commanders train and prepare the troops for missions. Once the chief agrees to a mission, you as the DCDS in effect are the staff agency to which these various commanders report when they're deployed offshore, or even in country. Now we understand there's going to be a reorganization of commands. There's going to be a so-called Canada Command, I think a special operations group, and maybe something else.

What's the command and control arrangement, then, with respect to the DCDS? Does your command and control arrangement now change? Will it be different from the current arrangement when you have these new commands?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Yes, absolutely, and that's very much of interest to me, because that's going to have an impact on my job. The details are still being worked out.

To come back to the structure you mentioned, the intent, according to the defence policy statement and CDS's vision, is to create a Canada command for domestic operations. What we're calling a Canadian expeditionary forces command—that's perhaps not the official term yet—will deal with international operations. Those are the two main structures. The special operations group is one of the capabilities and formations we're going to create to respond to domestic and international situations, in the same vein as the standing contingency task force and the mission-specific task forces. Those are all laid out in the defence policy statement.

The command and control relationships still have to be ironed out. General Hillier has stood up some CDS action teams to do that work in fairly small numbers, to define the various elements of this new structure, but his intent is to have a command chain. I technically don't have any command responsibilities, other than for some of the units embedded in the DCDS group, but in terms of deployed operations, I'm basically the J3, the operations officer. I act daily on behalf of the CDS, but he's the command authority, and the task force commanders in the various missions report to him.

The intent now is to have an operational-level construct of Canada Command for domestic, and Canadian expeditionary forces command for international. These missions would report to them and then to the CDS, so ostensibly the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, as we know it today, would be out of that chain.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: So if I understand it, as an example—because the navy's a confusing one—in the army, the current land forces, the land force commander doesn't command any operational troops in the sense of operations. He just raises troops and trains them. Are you saying now that the proposed Canada commands, or whatever you're going to call the offshore commands, are actual operational commands, and that they will employ forces?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's the intent. They will be the force employers.

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: So on a command chain, those commands would go directly to the CDS, but on a staff chain all their staff officers would report through you as the operations.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: No. I mean, we're not sure how all of this is going to evolve because we're also looking at a new construct for joint force development, and perhaps joint force generation. I think my position is going to evolve into other things because the responsibilities of the staff who work for me now, who plan and maintain the operations day-to-day, will devolve to those two command structures. So residual responsibilities within my organization will include, for example, the generating of the joint task force and the joint operations group. It may not be the DCDS that does that. It might be somebody else. The DCDS position per se may cease to exist as we know it today.

• (1030)

Mr. Gordon O'Connor: The net result is that we end up with more commands, unless we get rid of land forces command, air force, etc.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Part of the construct is that the regional headquarters across the country would become more integrated with all three environments. They would report to the Canada commander for domestic. The CLS, the Chief of the Air Staff, and Chief of the Maritime Staff will exist, but the distribution of responsibilities between the force generators and force employers will evolve. We haven't ironed out all the details on that yet. We've only had two armed forces councils on this, and it's in its early days still. As you correctly point out, there will be an impact on all of us in terms of how this is all generated and employed.

[Translation]

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Dumais. Our paths are crossing a lot these days. I think we've seen each other three or four times in the last week or two.

Continuing along the same lines as Mr. O'Connor, you aren't certain that you will remain in this position, if I understand correctly.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: My job is set to change.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I see.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: One has to be flexible when one is a Canadian Forces member.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I was under the impression that Canada's Command structures would automatically report to you, since you're already responsible for planning, both within and outside the Canadian Forces.

Today, I want to focus on one of your responsibilities, namely JTF2 .

But first, can you tell me if all of the changes that you are currently working on require the approval of civilian authorities, that is the Minister himself, or do they come under internal operations?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's already explained in the defence policy statement that was recently released.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Except for the details.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: As far as the details are concerned, of course we will keep the minister apprised, but I believe the policy's broad concepts have been unveiled. Our job is to implement the plans. We keep the minister informed because geographical locations, deployments and so forth are likely to be impacted.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'd now like to discuss JTF2 with you. You refer to it as a fourth environment. We have land, air and maritime forces, but we also have JTF2. Could you explain to me how security clearance levels work. Because of security clearance levels, you're privy to information that cannot be disclosed to me. Can you tell me how many security clearance levels there actually are?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It's a highly complex matter. Generally speaking we have such security clearance levels as "unclassified", "confidential", "secret" and "top secret". On the administrative side, we have "Protected A", "Protected B" and "Protected C". "Protected A" is equivalent to "confidential", in terms of data storage, while "Protected B" is equivalent to "secret" and "Protected C", to "top secret".

In terms of classifying information, there are other levels of security clearance linked to how much the person needs to know the information. Not everyone has full access to every piece of information.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I would think that you should have full access to every piece of information.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Not necessarily. It all depends on needs and circumstances.

Mr. Claude Bachand: The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs must have the lowest possible security clearance, because members do not have access to any information whatsoever. Over the past five years, I've noticed that we're pretty much kept out of the loop. Conversely, in the United States, both the Senate and Congressional defence committees are given wider access to information.

I'd like your opinion. I hope you feel that members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs have an important role to play. Personally, do you think we should have access to more information concerning JTF2 operations, among other things, so that we can exercise better civilian control over JTF2 operations?

• (1035)

LGen Marc J. Dumais: My opinion matters little. It's a question of complying with our country's laws. Quite simply, I would be breaking the law if I were to share certain information with certain individuals who did not have the proper security clearance.

Mr. Claude Bachand: And is that a stipulation of the National Defence Act?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Most certainly. Very specific legislation has been enacted.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Is there in fact more than one relevant act that applies here?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: You're getting into specifics. Without question, there are laws in Canada governing information security.

Mr. Claude Bachand: So you're telling us then that as lawmakers, all we need to do is amend the legislation in order to gain access to the information we require.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's one option you can choose to consider.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Still on the subject of JTF2, I know the committee was supposed to observe a training exercise. Is it possible for committee members possibly to attend one in person? What type of demonstration might we see: practical exercises such as the storming of buildings and so forth?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We could give you a demonstration, if you like. Of course, we wouldn't be able to show you everything we do. We do stage some demonstrations on occasion. I would have to confirm, but I think we could arrange it.

Mr. Claude Bachand: So then, we'll get back to you on this?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We'll be in touch with the committee chair, if you're interested.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I think it would be a good idea to see a demonstration first hand. Mr. Chairman, did we not agree that as part of our study of defence policy, we would go to... Could someone remind me of the facility's name?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Dwyer Hill.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Are we still planning to go to Dwyer Hill?
[*English*]

The Chair: I understand it was scheduled for May 31 to do that, but unfortunately—

Mr. Claude Bachand: It could be planned for a quite early occasion; it's not that far. I think it's right nearby here, isn't it?

[*Translation*]

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It's located about 30 minutes away from here, just west of Kanata.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay. I have no further questions. I'll bring up the subject of visiting this facility again later. I think the committee could arrange a visit.

Thank you, General.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: You're welcome.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Bachand.

[*English*]

I don't know the reason why it was postponed, but certainly we'll look at it.

We'll go to Mr. Bagnell.

Hon. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.): Merci.

Thank you for coming.

I have two quick comments first. One is to pass on to JTF2 that they have my highest admiration. They've guarded me on occasion and they'll always have my undying support.

Just as a comment for future witnesses from the Department of National Defence, in the Yukon our land claim has created a situation where you have 14 first nations governments that now in some areas have more power than the provinces, say, of Quebec or Ontario, and they certainly have much larger land mass than municipalities. So in the sentence on the bottom of page 4/6 that says "close cooperation between federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, and international", you should probably add "first nation governments" there.

My question, as I'm sure your colleagues have advised you, is related to the north. As you know, two of the major security incursions we have, on Hans Island and the Alaska-Canada border, are adjacent to two of our 13 territories in Canada, Yukon and Nunavut; and yet out of our 50,000 or 60,000 complement of people, we have one in Nunavut and seven in the Yukon.

This isn't to downgrade the Canadian Rangers. They're very important, and we get excellent support for the rangers; it's been increasing—which is great—in Junior Canadian Rangers. But I don't want to discuss that; that's fantastic.

My comments relate to regular forces and reserves, whether it be concerning search and rescue or any ways we could increase the complement in the north, in that I don't think things necessarily have to be in any particular spot in Canada, and more, that there's no reason there couldn't be a more balanced distribution of our regular forces.

Could you comment on increasing protection of the north and deployment in the north?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Right. I'd be pleased to do so.

As you know, the defence policy statement put a fair amount of emphasis on the north. We've essentially been directed through the budget as well to undertake certain initiatives in favour of the north.

As I mentioned to Mr. O'Connor earlier, the regional headquarters will be modified to be more integrated for the army, air force, and navy to operate in a holistic fashion. That includes the Canadian Forces northern area in Yellowknife. We are working to expand that headquarters and beef it up. Again, these are in the early stages, so we don't know the final outcome, but we sense a need to increase the presence there.

In addition, it was identified in the budget that we need to replace the Twin Otters with a utility aircraft. We were also directed in the defence policy statement to consider search and rescue in the north, which we are doing through the fixed-wing SAR project.

We have provided more new equipment for the rangers. We've provided them with new radios and global positioning system capabilities, so that they're more up to date and can be more effective. As you point out, there are roughly 4,400 rangers up north, and they are very effective in what they do. We also have a significant number of activities up north. There are about 200 different patrols a year and four or five company-level deployments up north.

We will certainly enhance that as the Aurora aircraft has its ISR modernization program. It will become an even more potent surveillance platform, and the intent would be to use it up north. In the defence policy statement, there is mention of areas, such as using space capability and unmanned aerial vehicles, to increase our surveillance capability up north.

We are looking at all the ways to enhance and support our sovereignty up there. We're definitely working in line with the budget and the defence policy statement to do just that. Again, it's early stages, but I think there will be some very positive outcomes.

• (1040)

Hon. Larry Bagnell: To follow up on the SAR item, I'd like to get this point on the record again. If you were to take a hypothetical country and it's a rectangle, to my sense, it wouldn't make sense to have the location of the various search and rescue bases all along one line of the rectangle, but rather leave the whole country with a better and broader distribution.

I know of four or five locations right along the U.S. border, very close to where all our planes are now. If we're getting roughly 15 planes in the new purchase, as I've said before, it's my opinion that at least one of those planes should be in the northern half of the country, even if it's used for dual purposes, as a compromise, for some of the other air capabilities that we're losing because our other planes are becoming obsolete.

Even if it was used for something else between rescues, there should be at least one plane out of 15 to cover the northern half of Canada in a reasonable time, especially when there are very dangerous hypothermia situations in the north, fewer civilians, and fewer people who could normally otherwise help out, because it's less populated. To me, it would be a very reasonable proposition. I'd like to get that on the record.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: As I said, the fixed-wing SAR project is exploring different options.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. MacKenzie.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie (Oxford, CPC): Thank you.

Are you the officer in charge of deployment of the DART component?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: The DART reports to me and I'm responsible for deploying it, but it isn't my decision per se.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Okay. Fair enough. How long would it take to deploy it fully to a domestic location in a disaster now and/or to an international location?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: The readiness timelines are a 12-hour notice to move for the advance party.

I'm sorry. The reconnaissance party is 12 hours, and the advance and main bodies are 48 hours. They're on fairly tight timelines.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: How long would it take physically to get it there?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That depends on where you're going, primarily. But as we saw in Sri Lanka, once the decision is made they can deploy fairly quickly. And of course once they arrive they need to set up and get their bearings and start working, but it's fairly rapid.

Now, I think one point that needs to be mentioned is that they're not designed or intended to be immediate responders to an incident; they are intended to come and assist with the consequence management. So you can appreciate that you don't just plunk down a capability like that somewhere immediately after a disaster, because nobody knows exactly what the situation on the ground is. What's initially going on is rescue, trying to find people who are still alive and those who are injured. Then you get past that. The confusion settles, and you get a sense of where you need to have resources to help deal with the situation after the immediate event. Because clearly this capability is not like a 911. It's not designed to be the first on the scene to an earthquake or tsunami or anything like that. That's not what it was designed for.

There are domestic emergency services no matter what country. Governments have a responsibility to be able to provide response to their people in the event of a catastrophe, and this is a capability that's there for the follow-on, until the non-government organizations and the indigenous capabilities are back on their feet and able to carry on. So in fact it's designed to last about 40 days, to bridge that gap between the initial rescue and when more stability can be brought by the standard agencies that provide services and support.

• (1045)

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: I guess my question is partly because of the tsunami, but I also wonder about western Canada. If we had a larger disaster there, how long would it take us to move the equipment in a domestic situation?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It wouldn't be very long. It would depend on the availability of airlift, for example, and things of that nature. But to be honest, it's not clear whether the DART is necessarily the capability that you need domestically, because we have a lot of capacity inside Canada, in terms of medical capacity and things of that nature. We could just as easily.... Whatever the scenario is, other locations that are not directly affected would immediately respond and would drive or fly as well.

The Canadian Forces would do whatever we're required to do, but what I'm saying is the DART wouldn't necessarily be value added in a Canadian situation—depending on where it is, of course.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Is it unique? Do other countries have a similar...?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It is pretty much unique in its capability to provide medical support and drinking water and some limited engineering support. So it's unique as a military organization and its readiness levels. There aren't too many like that.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Could you comment on the lack of heavy-lift aircraft with respect to deployment of the forces?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It's an ongoing issue. Right now inside the department an airlift requirement study is being undertaken, and it obviously has to incorporate the defence policy statement that just recently came out. But there are two phases to this study, and one is to put on the table all the various airlift scenarios that we have and then to find the best mix of capabilities to address those requirements. It covers the whole gamut from rotary wing—in other words, helicopter lift—in a tactical setting to strategic airlift.

The key here is that we need to have access to strategic airlift. That doesn't necessarily mean we have to own it inside the Canadian Forces. There are different options that present themselves. What we're doing right now is we usually lease capability, for example, Antonov 124s. We've done that often. On occasion we rely on our U.S. allies and others to airlift, as do many other nations.

Strategic airlift is critical to deploying, but it's also very expensive. We know that no military has enough strategic airlift, and it is a challenge for our NATO partners as well.

So it's an issue we have to address, but there are different ways to address that deficiency.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Would you have some kind of estimate of how many of your active people are currently on post-traumatic stress leave?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: I don't have those kinds of statistics. I'm more in the force employment business. I'd just be guessing. Our assistant deputy minister of human resources for the military would be in a better position to provide that, and we certainly can provide that to you, Mr. Chairman.

• (1050)

The Chair: We wish to have that information, General. Would you kindly send it to the clerk, and we'll get it to the members?

Thank you, Mr. MacKenzie.

Are there any other questions from the members?

Mr. Desrochers, go ahead, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Odina Desrochers (Lotbinière—Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good day, General Dumais. I'd like to start off by discussing the international missions in which you are involved. You stated in your opening remarks that the increase in both the number and complexity of these international missions has been striking. You also mentioned an operational pause. What do you mean by operational pause?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It's not the kind of operational pause that applies to all CF components. Some continue to do their work without any kind of changes. We're talking here mainly about land forces. Following the deployment in Afghanistan, we needed an

operational pause. We reduced personnel from a little under 2,000 to the current level of about 700.

After a deployment, a CF member needs at least one year of rest. Given the large numbers of CF members deployed recently in conjunction with various missions, many of these members will not be available for a certain period of time. In February 2006, we will once again be ready to undertake some important missions. Personnel levels should then increase in Afghanistan.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Have you launched any recruitment operations to make up for personnel shortages?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: In the budget, the government has planned for an increase in personnel levels, to 5,000 members in the case of the regular forces, and to 3,000 in the case of the reserves.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Is that sufficient?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's the level that we have been allotted. The additional funding will certainly allow us to increase our operational capabilities, particularly those of our land forces. The fact remains, however, that we are caught in a vicious circle. If we lack personnel, we cannot take part in more missions, but, if we want to take part in more missions, we need more personnel. Nevertheless, given the current situation, the increase provided for in the budget will help us considerably.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Are you saying that you couldn't deploy more troops to Darfour because of a shortage of personnel?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Not necessarily. In that particular, we're talking about the needs of the African Union. It was agreed that in Darfour, the African Union would be the organization in charge of resolving regional issues. This organization identified needs, in particular logistical and support requirements. It wrote to NATO to obtain some support services.

The Prime Minister made a statement concerning Darfour. He indicated that Canada was willing to provide some assistance and that's what we are doing. General Hillier has visited the region. The needs of the African Union have been identified. Collectively, we are trying to respond to these needs. However, the number of troops is not necessarily a critical element. There are already over 2,000 personnel on site, and the number is set to increase to approximately 7,500 by the fall. I'm talking here about African Union troops. Therefore, there is likely to be a greater need for logistical support than for additional troops.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Are you still ensuring a presence in Haiti?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: At present, there are two CF members deployed in Haiti, and they will be joined shortly by a third individual. To a certain extent, it's a question of capability, given the personnel we have and CF members on deployment in Afghanistan. Currently we are involved in 18 missions in various corners of the globe.

Given the context, we apply the government's "3D" approach — defence, diplomacy and development — aimed at meeting international needs. CF personnel are not alone in responding to crises. For example, I understand that 100 law enforcement officers from Canada are now in Haiti helping to train that country's national police force. Furthermore, CIDA will allocate \$180 million over two years to provide assistance to Haiti. In short, we provide support to Haiti through several channels.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: I have another question. When the tsunami struck, there was a considerable delay in deploying CF members to the disaster area. Why was that? The media was critical of the delay in getting this vital humanitarian relief effort under way.

• (1055)

LGen Marc J. Dumais: As I said earlier, Canadian Forces are prepared to deploy a reconnaissance unit on two hours' notice, once a decision is made, and to deploy all other units within 48 hours. You have to understand that before we can do anything, we need to await a decision, which follows some discussions.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Are we talking about waiting for a decision, or for permission?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: About both.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: In the case of the tsunami, did you have the country's permission, or did Canada take the initiative to deploy troops? Who requested our assistance?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: I can't say. I'm certain that the government was involved in discussions with the various countries in the region. However, as I said, we can't do anything until a decision is made and until we're informed of it.

Mr. Odina Desrochers: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, sir.

Go ahead, Mr. Bagnell.

[English]

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Thank you.

The three block war philosophy, which is great, will require more skills and function through resources in areas that were either performed by NGOs, other departments, or not at all, such as with the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.

Maybe you could just outline to us in a bit more detail how this will change the Canadian military—I mean, I think it's great—and where we'll get those new resources. Are they transforming existing resources? Are they additional resources and skills? Because they're things we didn't have in the past, and I think it's the way to go. Could you just explain the transformation a bit and how that might occur?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: In fact the Canadian Forces have a lot of skill sets because of all the operations that the Canadian Forces have undertaken in the last 15 years or so since the end of the Cold War. We actually have quite a few skill sets in all three areas of the three-block war, which go from the scale of combat to stabilization operations to humanitarian operations. We're skilled at doing all of those.

The point of the three-block war is to indicate that in today's environment, with the threat levels and the instability in various regions where we go, when your troops deploy, they have to be

ready for all three eventualities. Things might start off being fairly benign, but just around the corner there can be an insurgency activity, and you might have to go into combat. Our troops have to be trained for the full gamut and have to be equipped and have the doctrine to deal with all possible phases. You can have a rapid change from one to another. It speaks to that as much as anything else.

In terms of the transformation piece, and as you quite rightly pointed out, in the 3-D context—defence, diplomacy, and development—there is very much a need for multi-agency involvement where we decide to get involved in these failed or failing states. Afghanistan is a case in point. As you mentioned, the provincial reconstruction teams, the PRTs, will have representation from CIDA, from the RCMP, and others there to ensure that the various elements of the 3-D approach are addressed to the best of our ability.

The military component provides the stability and goes out and creates the links. Then our other representatives can go and invest and help to build infrastructure and help the other machinery, elements of their society to get on their feet.

I think part of the transformation is in further improving that interdepartmental collaboration in the planning stages and in the employment stages. The PRT should be an excellent example of that once it deploys in August. I mean, we've done this in the past, but it's getting more emphasis now in the doctrine that's in the defence policy statement.

In terms of transformation, we're talking about being interconnected more with other government departments. I've spoken to you before about C4ISR in terms of having better situational awareness and sharing of information among departments so we can collectively come to a better plan for dealing with a particular situation. The planning and the execution of the operation has to be multi-agency and multi-department.

It also means continuing the links with non-government organizations and obviously with the allies and the groups that are in the country itself that are involved in rebuilding the nation as well. It's increasingly complex. That's where the training and skill comes in; it's in being able to discuss and do transactions with all these various groups and have a coordinated approach from a national perspective in dealing with situations internationally.

• (1100)

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Could you discuss a bit what the plans for the 5,000 new troops and 3,000 new reserves might be and where they would fit in the forces?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: I haven't seen the latest plan. The 3,000 are for the army reserve, as part of the land forces reserve restructuring program. That will bring them up to 18,500 reserves when it's completed.

The 5,000 regular forces are not uniquely but are primarily oriented to beefing up the number of soldiers in deployable units for the army, to give them more depth and robustness, as we had discussed earlier, in terms of being able to sustain the mission-specific task force that's mentioned in the defence policy statement, and also to provide enough depth to supply the standing contingency task force as well.

So it provides more depth and robustness to the land forces, essentially.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: I have another question, but I'll ask it in the next round.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Casson.

Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC): I want to talk a bit about interoperability, not so much as it deals with our allies, but within our own structures. You've touched on that to some degree.

Particularly in the area of intelligence collection and sharing, I think one of the things we learned from September 11 in the U.S. was the fact that all the agencies were spinning their wheels, and they couldn't really communicate effectively with each other and share the information that needed to be shared.

I had the opportunity to go down to Cheyenne Mountain shortly after that happened, and we got a pretty good briefing on some of the issues they face. But it seems to me we've got different organizations collecting information and having the capacity.... The way I envision it is that this information is collected from wherever it comes from, it's put into a pool or into a databank, and anybody who needs it can go in there and get it—of course, the proper people. But I don't think that's how it works.

Maybe you can explain to me how we are going to improve our capacity to gather this type of information, and how it's going to be collected and dispensed to the people who need it when it is needed.

On one of my other government trips, we were in a country and this gentleman I talked to—through the embassy there—had been some kind of an operative. I don't know what his role was, but he indicated to me that when you go out into the field to collect intelligence, it takes a long, long time to establish the type of network you need to be effective.

Are we years away from being able to collect information that is going to be useful to you and to the security of our country? And has it truly been a void in the past that needs to be filled, or is it just a matter of sorting and filing it and accessing it properly?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's a good question and it's a complicated subject.

The chief of defence intelligence reports to me but he manages that whole area. Sharing information and intelligence is an ongoing issue, and what you alluded to earlier about September 11 was primarily about various agencies sharing information. There has been a lot of work done inside the government since then within Canada to improve that.

We have various agencies that are involved in intelligence collection and information collection for various reasons. We have CSIS and the Canadian Security Establishment. We have others as

well, and different organizations have different mandates—some are domestic, some not.

But we have very good rapport with the Canadian Security Establishment and with CSIS as well, and they are partners with us in Afghanistan. They contribute to our intelligence situation and to having a better sense of what's going on, on the ground there.

To some extent, the inter-agency coordination is a responsibility of the Privy Council Office, and there is a whole machinery around intelligence and information-sharing to make sure we're aware of what's going on around the world. I would say it's getting better and better every day.

I think that's about all I can say about that right now. Did you have any other specific area you wanted to address there?

• (1105)

Mr. Rick Casson: In the defence review, it indicates an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre that CSIS is establishing or has established.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: The ITAC.

Mr. Rick Casson: Yes, and National Defence will have personnel there.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We are putting people in place there, as are other agencies. Our people will be there by December. That is an organization that is evolving. It's a step in the right direction, for sure. It will provide a focal point for collecting and assessing information about potential threats to Canada.

Mr. Rick Casson: Is there a fairly free flow of information between the Canadian Forces and the U.S.?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Yes, through our chief of defence intelligence. We have people in the States who help coordinate it. We have relationships with the CIA and the FBI, through the RCMP. There's also sharing with other nations. There's a quadripartite sharing organization with the British and the Australians. So there are a lot of good links that have been made and that are mutually beneficial. That's working out well.

Mr. Rick Casson: When there is a perceived threat to Canada, or there's one that intelligence has revealed as a potential, who decides which organization's going to handle it? If it's domestic, is it RCMP? If it's international, is it you guys? How does it work?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Everybody has their own mandate and their own area of responsibility. It depends on the nature of the threat. If it's criminal and it's in Canada, then the RCMP is responsible for it. If it's a threat that comes by air, then NORAD gets involved. If it comes along the maritime approaches, then it's the Canadian Coast Guard. If it's within our national waters, within the 12 miles, then it's the Coast Guard and the RCMP. So it depends on what it is.

Mr. Rick Casson: But who decides what it is and who's going to handle it?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We all know what our mandates are, but we have structures in place where we coordinate and discuss those things, so that we all understand one another's roles and responsibilities better. This kind of discussion and dialogue has improved significantly since September 11, inter-agency coordination.

Mr. Rick Casson: If there were one area you would make a priority to clean up or streamline, the biggest bugaboo you have to work through, whether it's the command structure, working interdepartmentally, or working between the bureaucracy and the military, where would you start? Is there some area that really needs some attention to make your job more meaningful and effective?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: That's the thrust of some of the transformation in the organizational structures—setting up these command structures. In Canada, the Canada Command and the Canadian expeditionary forces command will provide more focus. From a domestic perspective, Canada Command will provide headquarters with a focused approach to dealing with Canadian issues. It will allow us to have military resources available on short notice at high readiness for domestic use, interfacing with Northern Command, USNORTHCOM in the United States. This kind of change will enhance our effectiveness, in both domestic and international operations.

I think that's going in the right direction. You make a good point about sharing of information and intelligence, and that's an ongoing issue we're constantly working to enhance through our various groups and forums, both internally within Canada and internationally with our allies. But those links are there, and we're constantly working to improve them.

● (1110)

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Hon. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here, General. I'm sorry I missed your comments earlier. I had to introduce documents in the House.

I had a chance some years ago to see the military training assistance program in Sierra Leone. I know you have a new contingent going out there to reinforce our numbers. I just want to pass on to you the extraordinary work that they do there, from what other countries have said to me, unsolicited, that our military training assistance program, our people, are the best in the world at what they do.

That leads me to the question that since we're so good at this and since what they're ultimately doing is producing stability and security on the ground, is that not a place where Canada can have a real niche in terms of using an expanded military training assistance program? We could use that tenure of NCOs that we have right now, that window of opportunity of extremely skilled, talented, and experienced NCOs who have seen some very nasty places. We could use that coterie of individuals to function internationally to provide that stability and that training that's essential.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Thanks for your preliminary comments, Dr. Martin. I'll pass those on to the people who work on the IMAT in Sierra Leone. I speak to them once in a while, and I'll pass your comments on to them.

With respect to training, we have very high standards, and we have very highly and proficiently trained people, as you pointed out. We are significantly involved in the MTAP and in Partnership for Peace exercises. We do have some people who are assisting with

training of the Afghanistan national army. So we do that in some locations, where and as required.

I'm not so sure if we want to do more of that, but depending on the circumstances, if they present themselves, where training indigenous troops is appropriate, we certainly offer our people. As you pointed out, a small number of people can have a significant impact on an entire military, if they're at the right location.

I think we do that. I don't know if we necessarily want to increase that. It's mission dependent—I guess that's what I'm trying to say.

Hon. Keith Martin: It's a great bang for our buck, if I may say.

There are two things, General.

In the defence statement, from your perspective, what else do we need to do to improve our combat capability and our interoperability that was not in the paper? In other words, how can this committee advise the government on how we can improve our combat capability and interoperability needs that was not in the defence statement?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We're going to have significant challenges over the next few years, as it is, with the significant budget funding that is programmed and with the defence policy statement changes that are indicated in there. That is going to keep us very busy in terms of doing operations as we are right now, and concurrently, transformational work.

We have a program in place to identify all the equipment requirements that we need and prioritize that. Short of additional funding downstream to help us out even more, right now we are addressing the sustainment challenges with the upfront funding that we're getting in the budget in terms of dealing with our operational budget shortfalls and infrastructure and maintenance requirements. We're going to be expanding by 5,000 and 3,000, so to some extent we'll enhance our capability in that sense, and we have some moneys earmarked in the budget for transformation and procuring new equipment. I think we are attacking on all fronts here.

One of the challenges for us in the short term will be to generate the capacity we need to properly execute and implement the defence policy statement, because we have been in a period for many years where we've been downsizing and reducing, and now we have to ramp up. So as you can appreciate, it requires more personnel to do project management and expertise in pushing projects through.

● (1115)

Hon. Keith Martin: This is a personnel deficit that you are working to—

LGen Marc J. Dumais: It's a skilled personnel issue, as much as anything.

Our initial steps are to generate capacity to be able to absorb all this change and implement all of that.

Hon. Keith Martin: Do I have any time left?

The Chair: You're just over five minutes, and I'm just trying to....

Monsieur Bachand.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I also noted that you are responsible for CF doctrine. No doubt you'll agree with me when I say that this doctrine is evolving very quickly these days. In the past, our troops were accustomed to seeing the enemy in uniform standing in front of them. They conducted tactical manoeuvres in a theatre of operations, fired on the enemy and so on. Today, our enemies are rather invisible. As mentioned earlier, things are different now, hence the likely emergence of a new doctrine as well. New approaches are now being taken. Of course, when CF members are deployed to a very harsh environment, they must be armed and combat-ready. However, they are involved in another kind of struggle, one that is more psychological in nature and that seems to be characteristic of our Canadian Forces.

Take, for example, EPRs in Afghanistan. Just a thought, but it might be good to have some idea of the state of preparedness of the EPR in Kandahar. It now seems like there are different doctrines for the EPRs, or stabilization or peace-keeping missions. Admittedly, it's wise for troops to arrive on the scene heavily armed and to make their presence felt in order to stabilize the situation, but there's something else we need to consider. Troops need to get out of their armoured vehicles to mingle with the local population and that necessarily entails some risks.

Would you agree with me that this doctrine is changing and that the specific nature of Canada's involvement will serve as a model for others to follow? Apparently, US EPRs in Afghanistan fire first and ask questions later, whereas CF personnel seem to want to mingle more with the population. What can you tell us about our state of preparedness, given our government's commitment to the EPR in Kandahar? I'd also like to hear your views on the importance of this changing doctrine. I hope CF training will be adapted accordingly. Putting it another way, CF members must be combat-ready, but at the same time, they must be sufficiently astute to mingle with the population and convince them that they are fighting for a just cause.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: First of all, Mr. Bachand, the EPR will be deployed in early August. A reconnaissance unit will be deployed first. Personnel are already in place to prepare the site in Kandahar, but the EPRs will be on site in August. For now, their mission is slated to last 18 months and the nature of that mission will change, as the Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister announced recently. Our troop strength will be increased in February 2006 with the arrival of a task force and a multinational BDE HQ. Preparations are well under way for the EPR.

As for your second question concerning military doctrine, you are quite right. Currently, we are facing very volatile and uncertain situations in a number of foreign countries. Canadian Forces and CF soldiers are renowned for their ability to establish ties with local residents and this enables them to do their job more effectively. Our troops have earned that reputation for themselves. We need to adopt the same approach, and that's what we plan to do in Kandahar. The

EPR will be on the ground carrying out patrols so that locals will become accustomed to seeing the soldiers and will become familiar with their mission, capabilities and ways of helping people. The goal is to get the locals to trust Canadian troops.

As you so aptly stated, each country takes a different approach. We prefer and we advocate a more open approach. When we were in Kandahar in 2002, Canadian troops assigned to patrol duty around the airport in Kandahar were known for communicating with local mayors, chiefs and authorities in each village in order to forge a relationship of sorts with them. As a result of these efforts, the locals came to trust our troops.

• (1120)

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'd like to hear more from you about coordination efforts. For instance, in Kandahar, a number of NGOs will most likely be working under the auspices of CIDA. As well, we're likely to see a number of Foreign Affairs observers.

Who is in charge of coordinating these efforts and how is the planning done? Do minor conflicts of interest arise occasionally? Do CIDA officials or an NGO ever tell you to stay out of something because it's not your responsibility? Is there a *chargé de mission* responsible for arbitrating disputes that can arise between NGOs, Foreign Affairs and DND?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Problems have been known to arise in the field from time to time. However, the approach taken is truly interdepartmental. Discussions are held to confirm the meaning of the EPR concept.

Of course, Foreign Affairs and Canadian Forces each have their own chain of command. Be that as it may, if the people on the ground are not prepared to work together to achieve a common goal, the mission is doomed to fail. Once personnel has been deployed, we'll see how things go. This is a relatively new approach and changes will be made over time. Perhaps a new doctrine will be established.

It's important to understand that each department has its very own mission. However, some goals are compatible, that is to say the strategic goal is the same, namely making the country more stable and a less inviting environment for terrorists.

[*English*]

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Martin.

Hon. Keith Martin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll share my time with Mr. Bagnell, who I think has a question.

General Dumais, at the end of the restructuring of NDHQ, what will that structure look like, as opposed to today? There is quite a significant personnel reduction, I understand.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: We're really just doing some transformation in terms of creating new operational-level headquarters, one for domestic operations and one for international operations, which will report directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff. This will probably result in some of my staff and other staff from headquarters being physically relocated outside of 101 Colonel By Drive, because they will be operational level as opposed to purely strategic staff. I think that's what you're alluding to, that there will be some changes in terms of the numbers of people in the main building, from the creation of other operational-level headquarters.

We're not yet at the point where we have specific numbers or exact details. General Hillier would like to stand up those headquarters this summer, if not this fall—at least for the initial cadre. We haven't decided how large they need to be and where the positions will come from, because it's going to be an internal reallocation, by and large. So that work still has to be done.

• (1125)

Hon. Keith Martin: So it will essentially be divided into two sections, international and domestic. It will flow from that, with Canada Command being the titular head of that.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: No, there will be two parallel headquarters, one dealing with international operations and one dealing with domestic. Those two chains now reside inside my organization and report to me. In the future, the intent is that they would be commanders per se of all the forces that are assigned to them to execute domestic or international tasks, and they will report to the Chief of the Defence Staff. So it will be a clear chain of command.

Hon. Keith Martin: Thank you, sir.

The Chair: Mr. Bagnell.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Canada and our resources are so small, but we have operations in many parts of the world, because of potential or unseen threats from so many parts of the world. Could you comment on any difficulties or solutions to those difficulties we might have, and the intelligence we need to have smart operations?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: One of the challenges is having human intelligence, having people on the ground who have a sense of what is going on in the local area and who can provide information to us, help us have a better understanding of the situation and therefore better shape our plans for our deployment. That's an area we need to work on. It's been identified as a deficiency.

But we have a fairly robust intelligence organization inside National Defence that has several requirements or mandates. It collects a lot of information from different sources—from our allies, from open sources such as newspapers and the Internet—and tries to build a picture of the major hot spots around the world. Our analysts are constantly tracking all the various areas and working with other government departments as well, because they have certain niche capabilities, and trying to build a coherent sense of the situation in various areas before we deploy—in the case that we have to deploy there—or in locations where we have troops deployed.

It's a fairly robust structure that's working now.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Thank you. I'll wait for the next round for my other question.

The Chair: We're into that last round, Mr. Bagnell. If you'd like to take another three minutes, you're more than welcome to.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: First I'll make two quick comments, but my question will be on domestic threats, as you perceive them. One is that we've approved a \$3.5 billion program, the largest environmental program in history, partly to clean up northern contaminated sites. I hope the forces will lobby strongly to get your share of that to clean up some of the DEW line sites in the north, so that other departments don't use it all for their contaminated sites.

Once again, just to go on the record for our troops in the north, if you look at Canada, our northern Yukon territory is equivalent to Alaska, and Alaska has between 30,000 and 50,000 troops—more than the people who live in Yukon, almost as much as the entire military. If Canada is one-tenth of the States, then the equivalent to Alaska would be 3,000 or 5,000 people in the Yukon. We only have seven.

My question is about domestic threats, because we have the domestic and now the international breakdown in the military. What is your analysis; do you have any comment on what you feel are the domestic threats? In particular, could you make a comment on any perceived threats to Canada from missiles?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: The issue of domestic threats is really outside our area. That's for the RCMP and other agencies to deal with. We may be asked to contribute to an agency to assist in dealing with a particular threat, but in a generic sense there are all sorts of threats: drugs, criminality, organized crime, terrorism, pollution. Those are all threats to our way of life, and there are others.

In terms of missiles, all I will say is that there are different scenarios people conjure up that could evolve into a threat. It could be something as small as a hang-glider, or it could be somebody in a light aircraft trying to do something. It could be a barge off the coast with a clandestine cruise missile on board. There are all sorts of scenarios people work up, and NORAD and we and NORTHCOM look at these and try to get a sense of what we can do to counter those threats.

In your earlier comments you said it's a small country, and you meant a small military. The challenge for us is we have a large country and a small military, and it's a lot of territory to cover. That is why we're developing Canada Command, to be our counterpart to Northern Command, and we're working within Canada and also with our allies in terms of developing....

We have a good air picture of what's happening across the country, and likewise we need a good picture of what's happening off our coasts, in our maritime approaches, so we are in a better position to do surveillance and monitoring and in a position to control our approaches from the sea. We do have fairly robust marine security operation centres on the two coasts, and the international policy statement, I think, spoke about creating the same thing—or maybe it was the national security policy—for the Great Lakes.

So we do have structures in place, but again, it's a question of enhancing the internal interoperability between agencies, between the RCMP, the coast guard, us, the Canada Border Services Agency, and others such as Health Canada and Transport Canada. All these agencies have to be speaking to deal with the situation in Canada, and then we have to deal with our counterparts in the United States both on the military side, between us and NORAD and us and NORTHCOM, and on the inter-agency side as well. So it's big piece in terms of domestic security.

I know I'm going around the specifics you were looking for, but the agency that's responsible for identifying threats or monitoring that for Canada is PSEPC, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. They issue something daily that I think is on the web and is available to everybody. They monitor overall threat situations for Canada. We, obviously, coordinate and tap into that as well.

• (1130)

The Chair: Thank you.

General, in your presentation DART came up, and I had the privilege of being invited to an event that was put on by an organization called MIFT, the Medical Institute for Tamils. A special guest was the officer responsible for DART in Sri Lanka. There were about 2,000 people raising relief funds that evening. I can't tell you how proud I felt seeing the video, the presentation, what happened, and the warmth. I just wanted, through you, to pass these comments on to everybody involved about the great work that was done and how moved the people I saw that night were, so congratulations and keep up the good work.

With respect to security post-9/11—and my colleague here, Mr. Casson, touched upon it—I know in the committees I sat on at that time one of the biggest concerns was the lack of communication between various agencies, various organizations. In your presentation you talked about federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, and international partners. I was pleased to hear that, and I sense also that there seems to be a new era of cooperation with not just domestic but international partners. Do you see any legislative obstacles today in terms of information, such as the Privacy Act—as you know, so many things are unfolding that could be looked at, could be enhanced, could be altered so indeed this information flow is done properly without jeopardizing any governments, people, organizations, etc.—you could comment on?

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Not from my perspective. There are other agencies outside DND that are responsible for domestic intelligence, so perhaps they would have a different view of, as you say, the Privacy Act. I'd have to defer to those experts.

• (1135)

The Chair: In closing, let me thank you for....

Mr. Martin.

Hon. Keith Martin: I have just one comment.

General, in Sri Lanka, that shipment your air crew sent out is affectionately known as “the big one”. The WHO sent a letter to us. You sent out 132 pallets on January 14 worth \$6.7 million. It got there at the most critical juncture—post-disaster, when lives could have been won or lost depending on those medications. So those medications saved tens of thousands of lives based on what your air crews did in January. The WHO said they call it “the big one”. So thank you.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: I appreciate the chairman's comments and your comments, Dr. Martin. I'll pass them on to Lieutenant-Colonel Voith and the people in the barracks, for sure.

The Chair: General Dumais, in closing, let me thank you for coming here today. More so, let me thank you for your comments with respect to the support that CF has continued to receive from this committee. As a new member of this committee, I am confident saying that that great support will continue. Thank you for being with us here today.

LGen Marc J. Dumais: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. Bagnell, do you have a quick question for the committee?

Hon. Larry Bagnell: In the future, when we have people from our own military, perhaps we should give some thought to whether to have them in camera. As the general said, 90% of the intelligence that all countries collect in the world is actually collected from public sources. And of course this would be a great public source for people from other countries to collect intelligence on our military.

They might feel freer to give us more information at an in-camera meeting rather than at one that's open.

Mr. Claude Bachand: They won't be able to collect it if it's in camera.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: The other countries won't. Exactly. That's the purpose. It's just something to think about.

The Chair: Maybe it's something we can discuss more in depth when the rest of the members are here.

We'll adjourn.

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