



House of Commons
CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence

NDDN • NUMBER 005 • 2nd SESSION • 40th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Monday, March 2, 2009

—
Chair

Mr. Rick Casson

Also available on the Parliament of Canada Web Site at the following address:

<http://www.parl.gc.ca>

Standing Committee on National Defence

Monday, March 2, 2009

• (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, CPC)): I call the meeting to order.

Today, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on Monday, February 23, 2009, we have a briefing on the security preparations for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games. That's the first order of business. After that we have a notice of motion from Mr. Wilfert to deal with.

I'd like to welcome Vice-Admiral McFadden, Commander, Canada Command, and Rear-Admiral Davidson, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff.

I understand, Admiral McFadden, that you have a presentation to make. Then we'll get into the questioning. You are familiar with committees and how they function, I'm sure.

Sir, the floor is yours.

[Translation]

Vice-Admiral D. McFadden (Commander, Canada Command, Department of National Defence): Thank you.

Good day, Mr. Chair.

First I want to say that it's an honour for me to be invited to speak to you about the Canadian Forces' preparations for the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games security between January and March of 2010. I am very pleased to do this.

I have prepared a very short brief describing the types of activities in which we are taking part, the planning underway, schedule of main activities and an overview of the operational structure in which security planning is taking place. However, first of all, I believe it would be proper to speak about the context in which operations are occurring and the way in which, internally, controls are continuing to be developed and expanded.

To be clear, the RCMP is the organization responsible for planning and implementing security operations for the games, and the Canadian Forces are providing support.

[English]

This is not a unique circumstance. In fact, the Canadian Forces contribute to security efforts and logistics support for most major national special events, working in support of the RCMP or other law enforcement agencies. We did so for the Montreal Olympics in 1976 and for Calgary in 1988.

Today is different, because the need for security is of heightened concern, and the means by which it is assured are more complex and comprehensive than was the case before. The importance of security and of having confidence that we do it well is perhaps best expressed not by those of us charged with the task but by others who have been seized by its importance, certainly for the Olympics.

Dr. Jacques Rogge, president of the International Olympic Committee, made the following statement three months after Vancouver was awarded the games:

The games have survived many things, from boycotts to organization that was not as good as it should have been. ... But we have to ensure that there are no security breaches and that is why I put security at the top of the list of priorities.

[Translation]

Clearly, security is an important responsibility of the host country. However, we understand that all eyes must remain on the sporting events and the athletes. Ensuring this balance between adequate preparation and the guarantee that this preparation will have no impact on the normal and smooth operation of such events is at the heart of a modern approach to defence and security planning in Canada.

Over the past few years, we have implemented a much more exhaustive security architecture and it was used during the G8 Summit in 2002, at the 2007 North American Leaders' Summit and at the Francophonie Summit last year. Those experiences were enriching for us all.

The 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games represent a complex challenge in terms of security. They are not the first, but they will help to reinforce an architecture through a government-wide approach that will allow us to achieve the desired results, meaning safe games.

[English]

The Canadian Forces and the unique capabilities that we provide form part of that effect. I talk to you today in response to your request for information, but I do so as the commander of Canada Command, a relatively new organizational structure of the Canadian Forces and one specifically created to support delivery of the effect I've just described.

Certainly for the first time in our history, and in underscoring a “Canada first” approach to operations, all CF domestic operations are placed under a single commander, and at present I have both that privilege and responsibility. So if you have questions, I am the individual either to give you the answers you need, to find the answer if I don't have it, or to tell you why your question can't be answered.

I would now ask that you turn your attention to the slides before you, which I have prepared for your reference as an overview of Canadian Forces support to the security requirements of the games, showing how our activities come about and how they are embedded within an integrated security approach.

As you can see on slide 2, the involvement of the CF in supporting both the planning and conduct of security operations in Vancouver results from a formal request by the Minister of Public Safety to the Minister of National Defence, which occurred in August of 2007. The list you have before you is of those general military capabilities that are being provided in response to that request and in support of the RCMP.

Based on that response, the next slide shows the intent of the Chief of Defence Staff. He identifies the priority of the mission and the general scope of the military contribution. His intent also notes the requirement to sustain appropriate readiness to support other domestic needs should these arise elsewhere in the country. And, finally, it defines and tasks his direct subordinate commanders—me and the commander of NORAD.

As I said in the introductory remarks, this operation is undeniably complex, but it does afford significant opportunity for us to plan, practise, and conduct it in a more comprehensive manner than was the case in the past. This truly is a whole-of-government effort that is improving governance structure and planning amongst departments, as well as with our U.S. partners, and one that is moving us all to a more considered and deliberate method of preparing for special security events of this or a similar nature.

The role of the Canadian Forces and of the Department of National Defence in doing that is appreciable, but it is guided by these two specific limitations. I've already mentioned them, but they bear repeating. We are in a support role to a lead agency, the RCMP, which sets the security requirements. Our contribution and certainly the physical presence of the CF and the action we take will be low profile.

The next slide is really just to show you the organizational structure that is in place for Vancouver 2010 at the federal level. It may be of use in focusing some of the questions you have with respect to the whole-of-government effort of which I've spoken.

The slide after that then relates to the ground and shows how it has been divided by the RCMP into two distinct areas of operation or responsibility, which are referred to on the slide as AORs. These are the Vancouver area, which encompasses the greater Vancouver regional district and all of the venues that are identified in the lower left corner of that slide, as well as the Cypress Mountain area on the north shore of Vancouver; and the Whistler AOR, which contains the venues not only in the community of Whistler itself but also in the Callaghan Valley to the west and along the length of the Sea-to-Sky

Highway on the east side of Howe Sound, through Squamish, Whistler, and on to Pemberton.

My final slide shows the timeline of preparation and when the Olympic and Paralympic games will occur. The countdown clock is right across the street, and I'm sure you see that every day. We're now at 347 days to go. This also shows the major Government of Canada exercises that are getting us ready and when they occur. We have completed Exercise Bronze. That was done last year as a regional table-top exercise to establish a common baseline understanding of what departmental plans are required and what linkages must be established between them.

● (1540)

Exercise Silver then occurred last month. That was a major live play of numerous security injects to stress procedures and to afford the opportunity to modify and refine plans as required. This was the largest whole-of-government exercise ever conducted in Canada. It came hard on the heels of Exercise Bronze and was deliberately set so as to replicate the conditions that will exist during the games: winter in the Lower Mainland of the west coast and in the sea and air approaches.

Exercise Gold, which will occur in November, will be a validation exercise to confirm we all have it right, we being the whole-of-government structure that will be deployed to ensure a safe and secure games.

● (1545)

[*Translation*]

I would now be pleased to answer your questions. You have before you some slides that you could consult for your information or, if you wish, to help you formulate your questions.

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll start the questions with the official opposition. This is a seven-minute round.

Mr. Wilfert, go ahead.

Hon. Bryon Wilfert (Richmond Hill, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming here today.

I have a series of questions, Mr. Chairman. I will put them on the floor.

What level of communication has occurred with the Americans regarding the coordination of our security for the games with the Department of Homeland Security and Border Services? How is that information managed and coordinated between the different agencies and different orders of government?

With most of our helicopters involved in our mission in Afghanistan, how will the military air needs in Afghanistan balance those of the Olympics to ensure that air surveillance for this complex geographic area and search and rescue responsibilities are sufficiently met?

The federal government has agreed, with the Province of British Columbia, to be responsible for any increase in the security budget, currently estimated at \$647.5 million. If the budget is based on a potential medium-security threat, are there any projections for what a budget might look like under a high-security threat?

How much would a high-security threat cost? What resources would be needed? Could you elaborate on the contingency fund and available resources of personnel reserved for such a plan? What impact would the current wage agreement dilemma between the government and the RCMP have on the overall forces manpower? Who would be responsible for providing those additional resources since the RCMP and Canadian Forces are significantly stretched as it is?

Finally, with the population influx, there are increased security implications regarding prostitution and human trafficking. Has this been calculated into our overall security strategy? Who is responsible for the execution of that strategy?

The Chair: You have five minutes to answer that.

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, I'll start with communications with the United States. I've made the point that this is undeniably a whole-of-government effort to establish that communication, so there are far more linkages established than simply a military-to-military connection with the United States. I am aware that this is being done with police services, it is being done with Health Canada, and it is being done by all of the agencies I am aware of that are engaged in this planning process.

There is no doubt we have a deep relationship on a military-to-military basis with the United States. The geography of where the games will occur—Vancouver—make them very close to the international border; therefore, there are very substantial plans under way within the United States both to ensure their preparedness and also to liaise with us in a military sense. That coordination has been extensive. It will continue. We will ensure that we each know what the other is doing with respect to the plans they're making for the games.

The military-to-military relationship is essentially led by the relationship between my command and U.S. Northern Command. We have been close in our discussions with them to ensure we each know what's happening so that if there were to be a need for support, measures would be in place so it could happen effortlessly, provided the government asked for that level of support. So very extensive communications have been going on, to my knowledge, by all agencies with their American counterparts.

Your second question had to do with availability of helicopters. Sir, there is no doubt that 2010 will be an extremely busy year for the Canadian Forces. We have had to ensure that we coordinate the assignment of resources to make sure we can accomplish all the missions that are on our plate for that period. One of the real benefits we have is the fact that we will have had about three years of planning this event before the Olympics occur. So there has been a long planning process to make sure we're being as efficient as we possibly can, and it's a short-duration engagement—the deployment and employment piece will be of short duration.

Yes, those resources are being called upon for many requirements, and some very extensive discussions have been going on to ensure that we are able to meet that requirement. That's one of the real benefits of having the opportunity to plan in advance.

Sir, in terms of explaining what a whole-of-government process for the response is, we have been very pleased with the means by which the RCMP has adopted an integrated fashion to be able to do this. So it's not only within the Canadian Forces that we have been ensuring the most efficient assignment of resources, but we've been doing that also with our security partners across the whole of the federal government. So the planning time that we have, the efficiencies we're able to achieve by doing that, and the new way of looking at how we would deliver in an integrated fashion have certainly helped to ensure that we do not over stretch.

The third question you asked, sir, was on the extent of the types of deployments and contributions we're making, and that obviously is dependent upon the level of security response that would be required. We are planning, in conjunction with the RCMP's request, to have a level of contribution that will be scalable. By scalable I mean that we are ensuring we have both deployed and placed at readiness forces that could respond to a fairly broad range of threat scenarios that could materialize. The RCMP will lead in determining what they believe the threat envelope is. We are putting in place a program in conjunction with them that would be scalable to that need.

I would not be able to comment upon the monetary costs of that; I don't have any information to do that. I am aware that the personnel resource costs are already part of the planning cycle that we're involved in.

• (1550)

The Chair: We have only a few seconds left. There were a couple more questions. One was to do with the general increase in population and the chance for human trafficking. We're out of time in this session, but we're going to have lots of time to get back to that. We have these gentlemen for almost two hours, so you'll have a chance to pose your questions again.

Mr. Bachand, seven minutes.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to start by congratulating our two witnesses who were recently promoted. Vice-Admiral McFadden was named Chief of the Maritime Staff, deservedly so. This is one promotion in an already distinguished career. He is just one step away from being Chief of the Defence Staff. Perhaps one day we will see a sailor become Chief of the Defence Staff. For the moment, he is Rear-Admiral of the Maritime Forces. The commodore becomes rear-admiral and director of maritime strategy at headquarters. I want to congratulate both of you on your promotions.

I would like to ask questions about the presence of troops. Since you are in the armed forces, I will not ask you how many RCMP or CSIS officers there are. However, I'd like you to give me an idea of the number of troops.

A press release from National Defence on February 25 talks about the presence of troops. Does what we see here correspond to what is in Vancouver? Among other things, from the navy, there is talk of a frigate, two coastal defence ships, two patrol ships and 19 rigid hull inflatables. Naturally reservists in the Canadian Navy Reserves took part in the exercise.

Will the military equipment that I have just mentioned be identical to what's planned for the 2010 Olympic Games?

Vadm D. McFadden: Thank you very much for your question.
[English]

The press release I think identified what resources had been available for the conduct of Exercise Silver, which occurred last month. The purpose of that exercise was to allow us to do a live play to validate procedures.

The range of forces you've identified are not all that would be earmarked to support the security requirements of the Olympics.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Can we expect to see the same armada during the Olympic Games?

• (1555)

[English]

Vadm D. McFadden: No, sir. There would be more maritime assets available to be able to support the requirement than what we employed during Exercise Silver.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Concerning the air force, we have heard about Griffons, Sea Kings, Auroras and transport helicopters. It's my impression that since the war isn't over, we can't expect to have American Cormorans or Chinooks here as there are in Afghanistan. Will there be any other air force equipment other than Griffons, Sea Kings and Auroras?

Vadm D. McFadden: The contribution of those forces was identified during operation Silver.

[English]

The intent will be to ensure that what we place on notice are sufficient air resources to manage what we refer to as "lines of operation". The plan that will be created will identify what type of effect we need to have. The resources will then be assigned to be able to achieve that effect.

I have no doubt we'll be making use of the Griffon helicopters and the Sea King helicopters in the role of both air surveillance and maritime surveillance. There will be fixed-wing aircraft also assigned to conduct that surveillance role.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Will F-18s patrol the air space?

[English]

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, the assignment of CF-18s will be in support of a NORAD mission, so I'll identify two commanders. NORAD will be assigned, as a subordinate commander to the Chief of the Defence Staff, responsibilities for aerospace surveillance and control. Predominantly, aerospace control will be assigned as a

responsibility for the Canadian NORAD region, headquartered in Winnipeg. The primary assets we intend to use will be CF-18s for the intercept role.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: In the press release, you were discreet with regard to the land forces. We know that there were tragic events in Munich; a rather spectacular terrorist attack targeted the Israeli delegation. In the event of a terrorist attack, will the FOI 2 be close by and readily available? After all counter-terrorism is its priority. Will those forces be in place during the Vancouver Olympic Games, in the event that something would occur requiring a rapid response?

[English]

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, special operations forces will be assigned to support the operation of the Vancouver Olympics. They will be in two capacities, one in support of an RCMP requirement and the other to be able to provide the response capacity if that is required. There will be both deployments and forces placed upon notice to be able to respond.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I imagine that the number of troops, for example, is a state secret and that, consequently, you would be unable to divulge that information.

[English]

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, putting numbers to that would make that classified. Special operations forces have been earmarked and will support the Olympics.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: The Chemical, Radiological, Biological and Nuclear Threats Unit or the CRBN, seems extremely important. Will it also be playing a role? If something were to occur, it would have to act quickly. I think that it is based out of Alberta at the moment. I imagine that this unit will be on-site in case there is a biological, chemical or nuclear attack. Will that be the case?

[English]

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, again, I wouldn't comment upon the location of where those forces would be. The response within Canada for the response unit is under the lead of the RCMP. The RCMP will have such things as explosives expertise, forensics expertise. There are other elements of that RCMP-led team. Health Canada forms a part of it. The Canadian Forces form a part of it, and there will be a program to employ, exercise, and ensure that this national response team is capable of responding very rapidly.

Mr. Claude Bachand: You can tell me later if ADATS will also be there, like Patriots, to intercept planes.

Vadm D. McFadden: The intercepting of a plane would be an aerospace responsibility and therefore the commander in NORAD would appropriately comment upon that in his plan to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

• (1600)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Julian.

Mr. Peter Julian (Burnaby—New Westminster, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Vice-Admiral McFadden and Rear-Admiral Davidson, for coming before us today.

I have three series of questions, so I'll put the first one to you. It's regarding the overall security budget. We had initially figures of about \$175 million. That was an estimate. Then it went up to \$900 million. Now the public safety minister has said that is a guess. I'm wondering, in terms of the budget overall, do you have some sense of what the margin of error is, depending on, as Mr. Wilfert said, whether it is a high level of security requirement or a medium level of security? And I'd like to know the budgeting around some of the operations prior to the Olympics. For example, on Operation Gold, what would be the budget for that particular security planning?

Around the World Police and Fire Games, I believe the Department of National Defence is involved in some of the events there to ensure appropriate operational readiness for the Olympics. Do you have any sense of what the budgets would be and what the involvement of DND is in the World Police and Fire Games to be held on the Lower Mainland this summer?

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, as to the overall extent of the whole of government's budget, I could offer you nothing more than what has already been said. I certainly could provide more information with respect to the departmental budget, the Canadian Forces contribution to that. Our budget has been identified as \$212 million. That \$212 million is to be able to provide the types of unique capabilities the RCMP will have requested. I think that request was formally made in August of 2007, as I said. The budgetary requirements based upon that request were \$212 million as soon as it was assessed. It has remained \$212 million through the intervening period, so we are on track to deliver the capabilities for the cost we said we would.

On the point I'd made about that being a scalable response, the intent is to ensure that the resources drawn upon to be able to provide that effect can both be reduced or augmented without there being a substantial increase in additional resources. But you have to pick a point where you say that's what we believe a reasonable planning activity rate is; those are the resources we would commit to that. If we were substantively wrong, because of a major crisis or if intelligence information were to identify there was a very substantively greater threat than we had anticipated, I have no doubt we would do what was necessary to ensure the games were safe. For the budget allocations we have at the moment, I can give you more details with respect to the \$212 million, but as to what contingency is built in for the whole of government, there are better folks than I who would be able to answer that.

Your other question was about the cost of participation in things like Exercise Gold. The means by which we are preparing for the games are included in what we have identified as being the cost for Canadian Forces participation. So the exercise cycle to get us ready is a cost that we've already accounted for.

On your question with respect to whether the Canadian Forces are engaged in the World Police and Fire Games, there has not been a formal request for Canadian Forces participation, which would leave me to believe that local police services believe they have the capabilities and do not need to call upon unique capabilities, except for the elements we have as a matter of course: standing forces that contribute, for example, the national response team for chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear response. We contribute to that team all the time, so that's a standing commitment. But apart from that, to my knowledge, there has not been a request for additional support.

Mr. Peter Julian: Okay. Thank you very much for those answers.

I'll put my second and third group together to give you a chance to answer those questions.

There was an agreement signed between the Canada Command and the U.S. Northern Command, as you know, on February 14 last year, that provides for the deployment of U.S. troops in Canada in certain cases. I'm wondering if there are any scenarios around the Olympic games where you would foresee American troops coming into Canada or the use of American naval vessels inside Canadian waters.

● (1605)

[*Translation*]

My last question concerns resources and Afghanistan. You talked about those two priorities. With regard to military personnel, will we have to increasingly rely on reservists? Do you need more equipment for the coming year in order to reach the objectives which are both a priority: Afghanistan and the Olympic Games?

Vadm D. McFadden: Thank you, sir.

I will respond to your first question first, which concerns planning between the United States and Canada.

[*English*]

You're referring to a document that was a plan signed into place in February. It's called the Civil Assistance Plan. It's not the means by which American forces could operate on our side of the border; it is a plan to allow effective coordination if there were a requirement established by the government for one or the other to draw upon aid.

The Civil Assistance Plan really brought together many of the arrangements that already existed into one more efficient mechanism by which collaboration could occur. It's not an agreement and it doesn't allow the movement of forces. It's a plan. The movement of forces occurs when the governments decide that's what they want and they request and an answer is given. The Civil Assistance Plan simply puts in place a more efficient means by which we can execute that order.

As I said at the start, there is no doubt that we are engaged in very deep conversations with the United States to understand what capabilities they will put in place and to ensure they understand what capabilities we have in place. I envision no circumstance at the moment that would see dramatic movement across the border one way or the other, but, sir, you're asking me to predict the future, and we're all notoriously bad at that. What that plan puts in place is an efficient means by which military-to-military cooperation could occur were a decision made by the governments to do that.

I would make the point that it's perhaps surprising that we've gone south of the border more frequently than we've seen it happen the other way around. In fact, the first exercise of the Civil Assistance Plan, based upon a request made by the United States government to Canada, was us going into the United States in anticipation of Hurricane Gustav. We deployed a C-17 aircraft and took patients who were medically at risk out of New Orleans and flew them to Little Rock, Arkansas.

That was a request of the American government, approved by the Canadian government, but the mechanism of the CAP, the Civil Assistance Plan, allowed the effect to be brought to bear within two hours of the request having been made.

The formalized mechanism happens because governments decide. What the Civil Assistance Plan puts in place are many of the things that had been there before. I took a task group into the Gulf of Mexico many years ago as a result of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The Civil Assistance Plan establishes the mechanism by which, once the approvals are in place, coordination can happen more efficiently.

The Chair: Thank you, sir.

It's over to the government side, with Mr. Boughen.

Mr. Ray Boughen (Palliser, CPC): Thank you, Chair.

First of all, early congratulations, gentlemen, for your work on the Olympics. From what I've been able to understand, it's going very well, and your two exercises, Exercise Bronze and Exercise Silver, went very well.

Can you characterize at this time, from the Canadian Forces perspective, how the exercises have helped you prepare as a team to go to work on the security that's needed at the games? Are you confident that you have everything in place that needs to be in place for the optimizing of the security procedures as we know them?

Vadm D. McFadden: Sir, perhaps I could start answering that question by explaining some of the culture of the Canadian Forces. What do we mean by a good exercise? A good exercise to us is one where we turned over lots of rocks, identified lots of things that we wanted to make better so that we learned lessons from them. They could be observed; we could put a process in place to actually be able to implement those lessons learned. From the perspective of the Canadian Forces, with any exercise that occurs, if you get to the end of it and it all went very well, there are two things: you either didn't make a tough enough exercise, or you weren't tough enough on yourselves in figuring out how you do it. I should say that is, to some degree, a culture of the Canadian Forces. We want to wring every last drop of benefit that we can out of exercising.

Those three major exercises that I talked about—Bronze, Silver, and Gold—are the whole-of-government exercises. They are the big ones in the calendar where a great many agencies are brought together—there's a tabletop exercise, a live exercise—so that the problem in all its complexity can be addressed. Those aren't the only exercises being done. The Canadian Forces have numerous exercises that we will do, both in preparation for and subsequent to those major ones, and the same is true of the RCMP. The integrated security unit in Vancouver will do far more training cycles than those major events that are pulled together.

Both Bronze and Silver went well, in that, for example, in Silver, we had over 1,000 people actually participating in the exercise. In excess of 100 different agencies, departments, or organizations—a little over 50 operations centres—actually stood up in being exercised during that week. I've no doubt that was a very busy week for a great many people. There are lots of things that we will have identified with respect to the plans that are in place to allow us to respond to an incident, a security concern, and there are bits now that we will improve upon, not just within the Canadian Forces but in many other departments that will do the same thing. What we are involved in this week, in fact, is in bringing together the lessons learned that we have observed within the military organization to support the RCMP and within the RCMP's integrated security organization, so that we both see the world the same way with respect to where we go from here. That series of out-briefs will occur later this week. We've already gathered the lessons out of an exercise in the middle of February. We're pushing that timeline very rapidly, because what we want to do is make sure that when we get to Gold, it is a validation exercise. That's not the time for us to figure out there are more things that we need to do.

We were undeniably brutal during Silver. That's what we intended; that's what was advertised by Mr. Elcock, who is the coordinator for security requirements of the games and also for the G-8. His office was the one that put the exercise program together. We set very high targets. The level of cooperation that we've seen during that exercise has never, to my knowledge, been achieved before in an exercise. That's success as far as we're concerned. There's lots of stuff that we will now take for action to make changes. That's a good thing.

• (1610)

Mr. Ray Boughen: Thank you.

The Chair: You have a couple of minutes left. Do you want another question?

Mr. Ray Boughen: Could you elaborate a little bit on the number of agencies that are involved? I know all the exercises, as you've said, include a whole lot of folks. Are they all Canadian agencies? I know there are some from the U.S., but are there agencies from other parts of the world, or is it pretty much Canada and the U.S.?

Vadm D. McFadden: The exercise play is predominantly Canadian and American. But just as we—by “we” I mean many agencies and federal departments—engaged with those who had conducted Olympics in the past, in Salt Lake City and Beijing, we connected with those who had recently conducted Olympic games to ensure that we had the same sort of process in the culture of the exercise. What are the lessons they learned, not in the exercise but in the conduct of the games? We have had discussions already with folks from London, in the U.K., who will conduct the next summer games. The level of observation that I think is appropriate I think we will see more of. I anticipate seeing more observers at the Gold exercise. We would encourage that to the degree we can for subsequent activities.

Engagement in the planning and in the conduct of it has undeniably been predominantly led by Canadian agencies. Almost all the departments, in fact all those I can think of, have established and are maintaining contact with their counterparts south of the border so that they understand what capabilities the United States intends to have at the ready and how the United States is organized within its own streams. I'm talking about Health Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, and so on. It is not just military to military.

•(1615)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

That ends our opening round. We'll start on the five-minute round with Mr. Coderre, and then we'll come over to the government.

[*Translation*]

Hon. Denis Coderre (Bourassa, Lib.): Vice-Admiral, it's a pleasure to have you here.

I want to thank you for both coming, gentlemen.

I am not as optimistic as you with regard to equipment. In fact, we know that, given the climate in Afghanistan, much of this equipment will be outdated and likely unusable for the Olympic Games. So, with regard to resources, we will need to reinforce our capacities. Unless government tanks can be sent to Vancouver, I don't think we have the necessary capacity to respond to everything. That's why I hope that we will have a plan B. The condition of the equipment being used in Afghanistan and that could be sent back to Canada concerns me somewhat. I think that we need some reassurance here.

[*English*]

I'd like to talk to you about tactical control radar. That is an issue in itself.

As you know, there are two units right now, and their principal mission is to train the CF-18. They're coming in support of the different radar lines. First of all, there was a notice of proposed procurement on MERX on November 17, 2008. That was for kind of a mobile system that's more helpful for providing a better view for the CF-18. If they don't have that kind of capacity, it might have an impact on security during the next Olympics. Those systems date from 1993, and it's impossible right now to even get parts for some of the components. Do you have faith that we will be able to have that kind of equipment? What capacity will we need to really be assured that we'll be okay for the security of the Olympics?

[*Translation*]

VAdm D. McFadden: Thank you, sir.

[*English*]

The first question was with respect to the capacity required and the impact of operations in Afghanistan. I would make the point, sir, really, to set the scene, that what we are talking about are two extremely different types of operation. We are operating in equipment in Afghanistan intended for employment in a war zone. Therefore, the type of equipment we have, the training of the soldiers who go there, and the employment of the aircraft there are predominantly meant for a hostile environment. They are intended to enable people to survive the violence of the enemy.

The situation we perceive in Vancouver will not be a hostile environment with respect to the rate of usage of equipment. Your question to me is whether I am confident that we have sufficient capacity to address both the international mission and a major domestic mission—the Olympics—at the same time. My answer to that is yes. I have no doubt that we are being very tough on the equipment in Afghanistan, because that's the environment in which it's being used. I'm not really the fellow to give you an answer as to the rates. But I do not, at the moment, perceive there to be a difficulty with respect to usage rates in Afghanistan and how that will affect the availability of resources for supporting the operation in Vancouver, even for the Griffon helicopters. Sir, the Griffon helicopters we have deployed are specifically planned and tailored to deal with combat missions. Those are not the Griffon helicopters we will be using in Vancouver, where they have a surveillance mission.

•(1620)

Hon. Denis Coderre: Regarding the tactical control radar?

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, I don't mean to say I'm not the guy to answer that question, but specifically you are asking about how we would do aerospace surveillance. It is a NORAD mission, ongoing today and during the Olympics, to be able to provide aerospace surveillance. A means of doing that is with ground-based tactical control radar. There are other means by which that can be done by airborne-based radar.

I have no doubt, from what I have heard thus far in the concept of operations, that there is not a degree of concern with respect to our ability to be able to establish effective airborne surveillance.

[*Translation*]

Hon. Denis Coderre: With all due respect, Vice-Admiral, experts are saying that without this new equipment, we are going to lose part of our vision. As you know they give a much better image than a plain radar system does. It's all fine and well that there is NORAD and all the rest, but without that equipment, how can we guarantee our own fighter aircraft that they'll have the tools they need to do their jobs properly?

[*English*]

The Chair: You'll have to come back to that, if you don't mind. Your time is up.

We'll go over to the government, then back to the Bloc, and then back to the government.

Mr. Hawn.

Mr. Laurie Hawn (Edmonton Centre, CPC): Thank you, Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.

I need to pick up on a couple of things Mr. Coderre addressed. The first one is helicopters in Afghanistan. We've got eight Griffons in Afghanistan. We have approximately 125 helicopters in the Canadian Forces. So is it fair to say eight will not unduly jeopardize helicopter resources for the Vancouver mission?

VAdm D. McFadden: I have no concern that we have sufficient capability to be able to address the mission set.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: With respect to CAP, is it correct to say that the command and control of the U.S. forces when they come to Canada will be exercised by Canadians?

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, as you are aware, the NORAD organization is a completely integrated binational organization. The intent for the Olympics is to use the Canadian NORAD region to effect the control of all assets, and that would be out of Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: I'm not just talking about air assets, but ground forces of some kind. They would be under Canadian command and control in Canada?

VAdm D. McFadden: That's correct.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: Just as we would be under U.S. command and control if we were in the U.S.

VAdm D. McFadden: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: Obviously there is no suggestion that we are going to use tanks in Vancouver, other than fuel tanks. Chinooks were never in the plan for Vancouver in the first place?

VAdm D. McFadden: That's correct, sir.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: With respect to tactical control of radars, is it true to say those radars have been used not just for training of F-18s but in fact have deployed many times to places in the north and around the country to actually support operations?

VAdm D. McFadden: Yes, sir.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: And those radars are still functioning.

VAdm D. McFadden: They are.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: With respect to command and control for air assets, you didn't mention the existing military-civil radar surveillance system, and I want to confirm that this system, which is currently available to NORAD, is currently being used by NORAD and it doesn't change. That system is still there and will be used in Vancouver.

VAdm D. McFadden: Yes, sir.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: Is it also true that AWACS will be a part of the air surveillance plan in the Vancouver Olympics?

VAdm D. McFadden: I wouldn't be able to answer that directly. I have no doubt there will be a program in place already worked through to ensure aerial surveillance is not a difficulty.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: Are we concerned about any aerial incursions by the Russians for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics? Are you concerned?

VAdm D. McFadden: No, sir, we're not planning....

Mr. Laurie Hawn: Okay. With respect to the capability of CF-18s and F-15s—you may not be aware of this, Admiral; I suspect you are, but for the edification of others. The CF-18 has just undergone a very expensive upgrade to radar fire-controlled communication systems, and so on, that brings it up to the level in that respect of virtually the F-22 and certainly the F-15. We have a variety of airplanes that will be participating in the air surveillance of the Olympics—CF-18s, F-15s if required, F-16s if required. Do you have any concerns about the technological capability and efficiency of those assets?

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, the primary air intercept platform would be a CF-18, and there is absolutely no concern with respect to the ability of that aircraft to fulfill this mission set.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: If they can do a pretty good job against the Russians north of Inuvik, they can probably do a pretty good job against civil airplanes or whatever may be, probably inadvertently, entering restricted airspace.

VAdm D. McFadden: I would agree with that, sir.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: How much time do I have left?

•(1625)

The Chair: You have a minute and a half.

Mr. Laurie Hawn: I'll turn it over to Mr. Payne and let him carry on in the next round as well.

Mr. LaVar Payne (Medicine Hat, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Hawn.

Welcome, gentlemen.

In terms of the Olympics, obviously this is an opportunity for Canada to showcase the Olympics here in Canada and our Canadian government and our security that you folks are planning, as well as the province of B.C. and the city of Vancouver. I'm expecting this to be a very, very popular event as well as an extremely well-handled security effort.

I did have a question in regard to your opening remarks. You talked about the security architecture that has been developed over a number of years. I'm not sure if that was in reference to this document that you handed out. I'm not sure what page that is on.

VAdm D. McFadden: It was slide 5.

Mr. LaVar Payne: Yes, it's slide 5. Is that the same document we're talking about, then?

VAdm D. McFadden: Yes, sir, but it's more than simply an organizational chart. What's contained in what is a fairly complicated diagram, I admit, are some agencies that have actually been established and are being modelled and exercised. I would hope that as we mature the architecture it's not just for the conduct of the games. We are developing a more comprehensive means by which we do these security special events at the national level. I expect that those things will remain in existence because people will understand the utility of doing them.

For example, as opposed to the deputy minister and assistant deputy minister level of meetings occurring as a result of a crisis, there is the intent for this type of operation such that they will meet on a regular basis, so that information sharing is already ongoing, and if something happens you're not bringing everybody up to speed from a cold start. That is a substantive change in the governance mechanism of how, at the national level, people would be animated by events as they are unfolding.

So in my view, there are a lot of things that are becoming much more mature by the means of exercising them. In Exercise Silver, we exercise, both at the ADM and the DM level, the actual conduct of those groupings that are brought together, not just for crisis response, which is what we've always done up until now, but so that they are animated by the events as they develop. It's a warm start to any problem. That's an advantage over what we had in the past.

Mr. LaVar Payne: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Paillé.

[Translation]

Mr. Pascal-Pierre Paillé (Louis-Hébert, BQ): Thank you for being here today. We very much appreciate it.

There is barely a year left before the Vancouver Olympic Games, and we note that the \$175 million projected security budget has not doubled, tripled or quadrupled, but is in fact five times more than projected. The figure now is close to a billion dollars. I'd like to know why the costs have gone up so steeply?

VAdm D. McFadden: As I said, sir, it's difficult for me to identify the reasons for that overall budget increase.

[English]

The Canadian Forces-Department of National Defence budget is really what I'm able to comment upon. From the time of the requirement for the skill sets the Canadian Forces would bring to this in response to an RCMP request, that was \$212 million, and it has remained at \$212 million.

On the growth of budgets elsewhere, I think there are other folks who are much better positioned than I to tell you how their budgets are unfolding. I can tell you how ours is. We continue to be on track for what we said this was going to cost.

[Translation]

Mr. Pascal-Pierre Paillé: Perhaps you will be unable to answer this question as well: initially, under an agreement concluded with British Columbia on December 8, 2006, the costs were to be shared equally. Recently, we have seen that the government will have to cover 72 rather than 50% of the costs, as well as any cost overruns. Under the new agreement with British Columbia, Canadian taxpayers are going to foot the bill.

Can you tell us why that agreement was reached?

[English]

VAdm D. McFadden: Again, sir, I am not the fellow who is going to be able to tell you that information. The arrangements between the federal government and the Province of British Columbia as to a cost-sharing basis are well outside my lane of expertise.

What I can identify in some detail is the amount of money we need to be able to conduct the mission set. Beyond that, I think there are probably others who would be more appropriate to ask that question to.

• (1630)

[Translation]

Mr. Pascal-Pierre Paillé: I'll move on to a different topic.

On July 25, 2008, a report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service provided information on groups opposed to the Olympic Games, something that raised some concern regarding potential violent demonstrations.

Have you received further information on this?

[English]

VAdm D. McFadden: I'm afraid I don't have it in front of me, sir. I'm not sure of the CSIS report talking about violent demonstrations.

Do you mean demonstrations anticipated during the Olympics themselves?

[Translation]

Mr. Pascal-Pierre Paillé: According to the report, groups opposed to the Olympic Games could organize violent demonstrations, and that is something which is raising concern within the government.

One group of civil liberty defence organizations mentioned that there could be violent reprisals. Do you have any further information, or do you have any particular concerns about violent demonstrations by opposition groups?

[English]

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, I don't have any more specific information than you have.

I would say that in terms of such demonstrations, I would not anticipate there being a substantive role for the Canadian Forces. Undeniably it's within the mandate of both the RCMP and municipal police forces to be able to address that circumstance. It is not an eventuality that I would anticipate the Canadian Forces being involved in. I would anticipate there being sufficient resources from a policing perspective to be able to address it.

[Translation]

Mr. Pascal-Pierre Paillé: Have you received any specific requests relating to security from the United States? As you said earlier, the border is very close. Have there been any particular requests that might lead to changes in the RCMP's or Canadian Forces' initial plans?

[English]

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, I can't answer on whether there have been any specific requests between United States law enforcement agencies and the RCMP. I am aware, in our conversations right from the start with the United States, that there have not been any requests for things to change. But collaboration means that we understand what they will intend with respect to deployment and capabilities. They understand the same things from us.

I have no doubt that both Canada and the United States, certainly both militaries, are ensuring that what we're doing is posturing in the most effective and efficient way we can. That hasn't been in response to a request from one to the other to do certain things, but as we have developed plans, we have been engaged in a process of sharing information to the greatest degree we can so that we're aware of what the other is going to do.

I can't think of a specific example, but I have no doubt that, understanding what's going to happen south of the border, we'll have also identified what we think is necessary to do here, and vice versa. But that hasn't been as the result of a request one way or the other.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go back over to the government side.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. LaVar Payne: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have some questions around the ISU. I understand that certainly it maintains overall command and control over the Olympics and security. Obviously the RCMP and Public Safety have the lead on this whole file.

Can you explain exactly how Canadian Forces operates in this command structure? What are the lines of authority? How does Joint Task Force Games fit into the ISU? And what kind of backup communications systems do you have in place in case something falters with the plan you already have?

VAdm D. McFadden: From an organizational perspective, first of all, the integrated security unit is located in Richmond, as you're aware. There are elements of many other agencies located in there. From a military perspective, the commander of Joint Task Force Games is co-located, so there is a military headquarters that allows coordination between the two of them. There is also an air operations centre, which coordinates the activity between the RCMP's requirements and those of NORAD. So there is a fairly complicated organizational structure in place.

But it's not simply the military and the RCMP. It's also to allow other agencies that need to be represented within the ISU so that it can be coordinated. Undoubtedly, that was one of the major issues we wanted to come to grips with during the live play of Exercise Silver. We did that very well. That means we identified lots of things that we wanted to do better. In terms of the communications structure that is in place from a primary basis to satisfy that, we identified some problems with the primary means by which we'd do it—and we're working on a fix—and there are methods in place so that there are alternate operation centres. Should there be a problem, we would be able to distribute and exercise from alternate locations. And that is also something we will be further exercising, not in a whole-of-government sense in a major exercise but in terms of things the RCMP and the Canadian Forces are doing independently of all the other exercises that are ongoing.

The ISU is a complicated beast. It's never been done to this level of complexity before, and it's working well.

• (1635)

Mr. LaVar Payne: Thank you.

The Chair: You have two minutes left.

Mr. LaVar Payne: I've had some indication that there is probably going to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 4,500 troops involved in the Olympic security exercises. The question is, how is the department doing in terms of practical realities such as housing resources, food, and transportation, and will the military be renting out houses, hotels, and motels? What's the field base going to look like?

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, 4,500 is the full-blown number of Canadian Forces members either earmarked for deployment into the region or who we will put at specific notice to move in response. That doesn't mean all 4,500 will deploy into the Vancouver and the Whistler areas. There will be a number forward deployed. But 4,500 is the entire asset base that we have currently identified to be able to support all of the mission sets we have in place. For those we deploy,

some will deploy into and some will deploy closer to the region where they're currently based.

In terms of the means by which we're going to accommodate people, there is a range of means that we will use. Some will go into our own facilities. We have some fairly substantial lay-down areas that we can use. We're also going to lease some provincial facilities in remote locations, which is where we need to put some substantive numbers of the Canadian Forces. And we will share accommodations in some cases with the RCMP, both commercially and potentially with accommodation vessels that we will put in the right places. So there's a whole range of options going into place to be able to ensure that contracts are in place, the structure is there, and that we're able to do the bed-downs we will need within the region.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go over to Ms. Neville, and then back to the government.

Hon. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

Thank you for being here today.

I have a quick point of clarification. I'm assuming, by your conversation, that the security you're outlining for the Olympics includes the Paralympics. Is that correct?

VAdm D. McFadden: Yes, Ma'am, it does.

Hon. Anita Neville: Okay. I just wanted some clarity.

My colleague earlier asked you a question about the increase in the numbers of people coming in and the issues related to human trafficking and prostitution. You may be aware, or maybe not, that this has been dealt with in a number of committees of Parliament as well as in the House of Commons. Are you undertaking any specific security measures to address the issue?

And then I have one more question.

VAdm D. McFadden: The Canadian Forces has not been requested for any specific mission set that would address that, so it is being handled directly by policing agencies and by Border Services. We don't have a mission set that would engage in the Canadian Forces participation.

Hon. Anita Neville: Thank you for the clarification.

My other question was one that Mr. Payne began questioning you on, which was the integrated security unit. It sounds like a very complicated beast that you're dealing with. Is it a continuous group of people? Is there movement in and out? Does it meet regularly? Could you provide a bit more about the operations of it?

• (1640)

VAdm D. McFadden: Certainly, Ma'am. It is an operations centre, which means it stands up; it operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

I will give you one example of how the Canadian Forces is developing its capabilities, some of which will be embedded within the ISU. Other government departments have different rates at which they're standing up.

We are at the moment in the Joint Task Force Games structure. So the military structure on the west coast that we're standing up specifically to support security requirements of the games is at the moment modelled for a planning headquarters. So it's engaged in many of the things we've been talking about. Over this summer it will shift from being a planning organization to a conduct of operations. That means we augment the number of people so that they become not just planners, but they do some work, run an exercise, and then go and study it again. But we dramatically increase the number of watch standers, people who are on that operations floor on a watch rotation basis.

The ISU will function from the latter part of 2009 in an operational mode, where it's able to be fully closed up and conducting intelligence coordination—so information that's coming into it. It will be processing that information. It will be assessing what that information means. It will be planning contingency operations that need to go on, and it will be prepared to control operations if they are required.

Hon. Anita Neville: How many people are involved?

Vadm D. McFadden: I would probably need to get back to you on that. Its measured in hundreds. I wouldn't say we're too far off if I were to say 200 people, but I can give you a precise answer to that.

Hon. Anita Neville: I thought it was in the thousands.

I have one other quick question. Do I have time?

The Chair: Yes.

Vadm D. McFadden: The integrated security unit is an operations centre. There are other places around the outside of that that stand up, that analyze, and stand back down again, but the ISU itself functions 24/7.

Hon. Anita Neville: What's the biggest lesson you've learned from the last Olympic Winter Games in terms of security?

Vadm D. McFadden: That coordination needs to be exercised beforehand. In other words, what you do is put in place a fairly rigorous exercise program to allow you to work what are the seams that exist among many agencies.

There is a normal process that exists within the country for security concerns and how those security concerns would match up with what are then safety implications. An event occurs, there are security implications to it, but it will have consequence management plans that are put in place by municipal, provincial, and, as necessary, federal agencies.

What we have realized from observing past Olympics is that once you stand up such a major activity as the Olympics, it then changes how you're doing your consequence management. As a very simple example, normally in Vancouver if you needed to do consequence management there's a plan for the ambulance service that knows what bridges they'll shut down and what routes the ambulance would flow through. Once you impose the requirements of the Vancouver Olympics on top of that, you want to make sure you have an effective response. You also want to ensure that you don't inadvertently or unnecessarily impact the conduct of the games by the plans you've put in place. So instead of having two pillars—security and safety—you have a third pillar, and you need to make sure that from event to completion, the consequence management

takes into consideration how you would go about solving the problem, given that it could affect the normal functioning, the good conduct of the games. That's probably the biggest lesson we learned from previous games and one of the things we're driving into our exercise program here.

• (1645)

Hon. Anita Neville: Thank you.

Rear-Admiral R. Davidson (Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence): If I may, Mr. Chair, I can answer the question on numbers. There are just over 360 in the ISU.

Hon. Anita Neville: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Very good.

Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You've talked today about a whole-of-government approach to this particular operation. I'd like to talk about the joint operation, should it become necessary, between Canada and the United States.

In the past, prior to 2006, there had been such joint exercises conducted between the Department of Homeland Security and what now falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Safety in Canada. In support of those civil agencies, the military came into play. In the past, on the Canadian side, these exercises were abject failures. When Canada chose to participate in the exercise, and when there was a minister to be found at the time it began, our computer system in the Office of Critical Infrastructure crashed, for example. The computer system was the basis upon which the entire critical infrastructure mechanism was to work.

Would you share with this committee the types of experiences that you've had recently, in the lead-up to the Olympics, in terms of joint exercises with the United States?

Vadm D. McFadden: I could probably give you a fair amount of detail of the military-to-military exercises that we've done in preparation. I'll give you one example of the level of complexity, in keeping with the changed circumstances of the modern reality and the threats that we address today.

We were always very good at doing military-to-military exercises with the United States, for example, in my own line, navy to navy. We did lots of those. We are now conducting combined exercises, on both coasts, that will bring in not just Canadian Forces and the United States Navy but also coast guard resources. How those conversations now occur is a matter of course. We address not just the defence relationship but the means by which military forces can be brought to support security requirements as well as requests made appropriately by law enforcement agencies. Many of the exercises that we're doing now in a military-to-military relationship automatically bring in for certain the United States Coast Guard, so there is at least a three-way conversation. That becomes an opportunity for a broader discussion.

Every year there is the Rhode Island war game chaired by the United States military. At the Rhode Island war game that will occur, I think in April of this year, the scenarios that we will play will be scenarios appropriate to the Vancouver Olympics. We will have the participation of the Canada Border Services Agency, the RCMP, Public Safety Canada, Transport Canada, and Health Canada. They will participate in both observing and contributing to how that exercise unfolds. A war game sounds like quite an aggressive term, but it means you can create a fantasy world in which you can play and add levels of complexity.

That movement of engaging far more partners in what are very complicated discussions is indicative of where we are going with respect to that type of inter-agency joint and combined exercise program to both develop understanding and ensure that when there is a request for military forces to be engaged in support of law enforcement, we've actually thought through lots of the things, not just from our perspective but from the perspective of the agencies we will be supporting. In the security realm, we will always be operating in support of someone else's regulatory authority. Not just for the conduct of the Olympics, but simply as a matter of course, that dialogue is becoming much more sophisticated than it ever was.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Chair: We have one more slot in the second round, and that's for the government. Are you guys good?

If we get into the third round, and we get through that, then I think we're going to be just about out of time. That goes to the official opposition, the Bloc, the New Democratic Party, and then back to the government.

We have five minutes for the official opposition.

• (1650)

[*Translation*]

Hon. Denis Coderre: Madam Chair, my question was to the vice-admiral, and not to the person who dreams of being a witness one day, my colleague, Laurie Hawn.

I would like to ask some more detailed questions on radar. It is quite true that NORAD is there and that we can protect ourselves, but occasionally I feel you are being somewhat optimistic about some of our equipment. That is why MERX said we need those TCRs for 2009.

Do we have all the equipment we need? I'm not asking whether we would like that equipment. Can you give us a guarantee that we will have all the equipment we need—and that includes airborne, land and seagoing equipment—to protect Canadians and their guests during the Olympic Games?

[*English*]

Vadm D. McFadden: Do the Canadian Forces have all of the stuff we need to be able to do the job to the greatest degree we can? Do we have all of the people we want? Any admiral or general who sits down in front of you and tells you that we are not stressed needs his head felt. The specific question is, do we have the capacity in place to be able to have an appropriate degree of confidence that the mission sets required for ensuring a safe Olympic games are in place? The answer to that question is yes.

As far as aerospace surveillance, there is a multitude of means by which that is done. On the tactical radars you're talking about, it is undeniably true it is most difficult for them to operate in mountainous regions. They're based on the ground and therefore they don't go through the mountains. Given the mechanisms by which we want to establish the most effective aerospace surveillance regimen we can, there is always going to be a need for that to be done from some airborne capacity as well, simply given the geography of the west coast.

Do I perceive limitations with respect to ground-based radar to be substantive in our surveillance of that space? No.

Hon. Denis Coderre: When I was a cabinet minister, especially after 9/11, I had some exercises regarding dirty bombs and all that, and I was part of the ad hoc cabinet committee for anti-terrorism. I know that all agencies have to work together, but I'd like to ask more specifically about dirty bombs and chemicals, because Claude asked a few questions on that.

What kinds of exercises are you having right now? We all know that you might have a situation through Seattle that will touch Vancouver. What kind of strategy are you using right now with all the agencies to make sure we prevent those kinds of problems?

Vadm D. McFadden: There is the national response team I referred to before. The RCMP lead and bring together a great many levels of expertise to sense the environment and determine whether a problem is developing. We provide forces to that from an analytic perspective. We also provide special operations forces to be able to respond, should that be required.

Hon. Denis Coderre: So you're telling me that the RCMP is calling the shots and you're there as support.

Vadm D. McFadden: The RCMP lead the national response team. It is probably one of the most rigorously exercised capabilities that exists, and will be more vigorously exercised throughout 2009.

Hon. Denis Coderre: I've witnessed that.

Is military intelligence working with CSIS too?

Vadm D. McFadden: On the role of military intelligence and the request by the RCMP as to what capabilities we could bring to bear, one of the fairly substantive discussions that goes on between us and the RCMP is the legal basis for the use of military capabilities in a domestic environment. Those are complicated discussions. We need to make sure we are operating entirely in accordance with the law, as it's set at the moment. If there is any need to bring resources to bear, it is appropriately requested through the federal agencies by the RCMP to bring Canadian Forces capabilities online.

It's a complicated discussion space with a degree of complexity that we have not experienced up to now, which is why those discussions need to be fairly in-depth. They have been ongoing and continue.

• (1655)

[*Translation*]

Hon. Denis Coderre: On a scale of one to ten...

Is my time up?

[English]

The Chair: Yes, you're done.

[Translation]

Hon. Denis Coderre: Pity.

[English]

The Chair: Time flies when you're getting good quality answers.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to come back to the ADATS, because I did not hear your answer properly. Usually, with major events like these, both the U.S. and Canada prepare missiles to protect against low-altitude attacks.

You must be familiar with the ADATS, manufactured by Rheinmetall Canada, a company located in my riding. At the time, it was manufactured under a military contract. When important, high-level meetings like the G8 summit are held in Canada, ADATS are in place.

Does that come under NORAD jurisdiction, or can the federal government decide whether to deploy ADATS? Will the system be in place in Vancouver?

[English]

VADM D. McFadden: Sir, Commander NORAD is responsible for aerospace surveillance control and defence; therefore, how that defence will be effected is Commander NORAD's recommendation to the Chief of Defence Staff. The Chief of Defence Staff is the individual charged to say these are the assets that should go in place to be able to achieve that.

I would caution against drawing the direct connection that we've used it before and therefore it should always be used. Understand that the environment in Vancouver is that of a major urban, built-up area. It's a much more complicated environment in which to use a ground-based missile system than a less built-up area. It's not simply a question of the ability to prevent what has been identified as a threat from proceeding to its target, but that there will be consequences of an engagement. Therefore, the Commander NORAD will make his recommendations to the Chief of Defence Staff as to how he intends to ensure that level of security.

I would say that the conversation now becomes, as in all things, more complicated, in that we're not just talking potentially about an air defence mission—in other words, an armed attack upon Canada—but the employment of NORAD in support of an RCMP requirement to prevent the commission of a crime. A small aircraft operating in a certain way could be assessed by the RCMP as the commission of a crime. The mechanisms by which force is brought to bear are some of the things we're working through at the moment.

As for your specific question on how that kinetic effect occurs, I couldn't comment upon, sir, apart from saying that we are exercising it, and I do not have concerns that the kinetic effect can be brought to bear.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Agreed.

Now, I have two brief questions on the integrated security unit. Earlier, you said that it comprised 360 people. Does it include people from the FBI or the Department of Homeland Security, or does it include only Canadians?

[English]

VADM D. McFadden: I couldn't answer whether there are members of the FBI or Department of Homeland Security. I don't know, and I think it would be an appropriate answer to come from the RCMP. We will ensure from a military perspective that we have people in place to be able to coordinate a response, should a combined response be required.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: You also mentioned the National Response Team. Is there a difference between the integrated security unit and the National Response Team? Are those two different entities?

[English]

VADM D. McFadden: No, sir, the national response team is very specifically intended to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threat. So it is a team that exists and will exist before, during, and after the Olympics. The team is in place to be able to respond to that specific type of threat. The integrated security unit is an operation centre that stands up to control operations for the duration of the Olympic and Paralympic games.

• (1700)

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: In that case, the order to the National Response Team to respond would come from the RCMP.

[English]

VADM D. McFadden: The RCMP lead in that team. They are the ones responsible for bringing the capabilities together. The employment of the team, obviously, is at the recommendation of the RCMP, which decides what's required.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Perfect. I have no further questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Julian.

Mr. Peter Julian: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to come back to the question I asked you earlier around the use of American troops or American naval vessels in Canada. You did reply that there is no circumstance for which you would foresee American troops in Canada, but could you reply on the use of American naval vessels? Do the plans include the use of American naval vessels in Canadian waters?

VAdm D. McFadden: Sir, I suppose I'd refer you to the complicated maritime environment that exists on the west coast. A ferry leaving Tsawwassen crosses the border twice to get to Vancouver Island. So we are undeniably discussing with the United States what is the most effective surveillance process to put in place to allow maritime surveillance to be effectively done. That means we have already engaged with the United States in the maritime field to ensure we are coordinating the assignment of the United States forces to their Pacific northwest, which will occur, and the assignment of Canadian maritime forces to our west coast, which will occur.

They will both be operating in the approaches to Vancouver. The approaches to Vancouver are also the approaches to Puget Sound.

Mr. Peter Julian: So in that sense you see it as a single operational unit, which would mean American naval vessels in Canadian waters and potentially Canadian naval vessels in American waters?

VAdm D. McFadden: No, sir. I think we are a way off from being a single operational unit, but there will be American maritime forces assigned and Canadian maritime forces assigned, and there will be collaboration between them to ensure that we have ongoing effective communications, that we understand what each is doing.

I would hope that as we progress with plans for how we employ forces in the maritime environment, we will continue to progress in the ability for them to operate in a more coherent fashion than they're doing at the moment. We do not yet have that in place. That is an element of the discussions that are ongoing, but that's separate. The Olympics certainly are a forcing function to try to move those quickly, but collaboration within the maritime environment is a separate topic, whether the Olympics are happening or not.

Mr. Peter Julian: Okay. So what I understand then—and I don't want to put words in your mouth—is that you're saying it is a possibility, but at this point the operational plans haven't been fully developed in order for you to respond definitely on that.

VAdm D. McFadden: It is a possibility. In fact, I would hope that someday we are able to do more effective combined maritime operations in support of security requirements. I'll give you an example of where that's happening today—on the Great Lakes. We have United States Coast Guard and RCMP operating collaboratively on the Great Lakes. There is no reason why, in a similarly complicated space such as exists on the west coast, we could not reach discussions to allow us to do that as effectively there as on the Great Lakes.

Mr. Peter Julian: My next question is around the integrated security unit. You indicated that there will be an American military presence within the ISU.

VAdm D. McFadden: No. It will be within Joint Task Force Games. The ISU is a very specific centre, so were we to have military liaison officers, they would be assigned to the joint task force that exists, and they are connected.

Mr. Peter Julian: Can you give us a sense of how many representatives would be part of it?

VAdm D. McFadden: I was off on my 200 to 360, so I'm a little nervous on that now. I'm talking about a dozen, at the very outside. We're talking about officers who are intended to maintain

connections with their home units so that coordination can happen very rapidly—maintain communications, understand structure. I'm not talking about the deployment of forces; they're liaison officers.

Mr. Peter Julian: Okay.

I'll ask three more questions and just put them out. You can answer them briefly or in more depth if you prefer.

Will Exercise Gold involve American forces?

Secondly, around the number of military camps that would be set up in the Lower Mainland, the numbers have ranged from five to six. If you could clarify that, I think it would be helpful for the committee.

Finally, you may not be able to answer this, but there has been some concern about the dismantling of the security apparatus after the games. The privacy commissioners, both for British Columbia and for Canada, have raised concerns around that. Are you aware of any budget for the dismantling of the security apparatus that is being put into place for the Olympic games?

• (1705)

The Chair: Mr. Julian, you only have six seconds left.

You've received the questions. Could you supply the answers to the committee, the ones you can answer?

Would that be all right, Mr. Julian? We're out of time in this slot.

VAdm D. McFadden: I can provide answers to you later.

The Chair: If you would, please.

VAdm D. McFadden: Certainly.

The Chair: The last spot is for the government.

You have five minutes, LaVar.

Mr. LaVar Payne: I'll share whatever time I have with Ms. Gallant.

First of all, Admiral, I'm not sure if I heard a question regarding the reservists. Do you have a number? Can you tell us roughly how many reservists will be used in the Olympic security system?

VAdm D. McFadden: The estimate at the moment, sir, is that approximately 20% of the force—certainly on the land environment—would likely be reservists. It's a ballpark number, but that's pretty close.

Mr. LaVar Payne: I have another question. What's the timing to have the military personnel deployed to the various locations for the Olympics?

VAdm D. McFadden: The deployment phase will not occur until the beginning of January, and the deployment will likely last until the Olympics are completed. There will be a reduction in the deployment between the Olympics and the Paralympics. That's because the number of venues goes down dramatically between those two events. We would start a redeployment phase in between the two, but we will maintain appropriate resources in place for the Paralympics. By March or April, all the redeployment will have occurred.

The bit we will then address essentially is the question of... There will be a bed-down footprint that goes into place. We will dismantle the bed-down footprint, and I expect that will occur through the spring. By the summer, I would expect that all the costs should be predominantly completed.

Mr. LaVar Payne: Thank you.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

I have two questions. One, for the people who are not reservists, would you give us a breakdown by percentage of which soldiers are coming from which bases around Canada in support of the Olympics?

And secondly, obviously threat assessments change when the information and the ground game changes. I know that a lot of information is probably sensitive, if not classified. Would you provide us with a characterization of the threat assessments and what you're envisioning as your most serious concerns?

Vadm D. McFadden: The first question with respect to what bases the forces come from to establish that capability I can only answer in a general sense. Even if I were I to give you information afterwards, that identifies the level of capability. As soon as we put numbers to that, it moves it into the classified sphere.

This will require a whole-of-Canada effort, to be able to assign forces into the region, and also to put on notice those forces that won't deploy but who will be trained and identified, ready to move, should that requirement come into play. It would be both a threat and any developing situation that will have us move reserve forces.

I need to explain the use of that word. I don't mean reservists in comparison to full-time regular forces; I mean forces that we hold in reserve to be able to move if required. There are a substantial number of forces that we earmark to be on notice, trained, ready to do specific mission sets, who are called "a reserve". A reserve will already be deployed into the region; there will be other reserves held outside the region.

What was your second question?

• (1710)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: With respect to threat assessments, what are you anticipating may arise during the Olympics?

Vadm D. McFadden: There are both security concerns and safety concerns. By safety concerns, I mean that it's Vancouver and it's winter. I grew up on the north shore, and the Sea-to-Sky Highway seems to close down on a fairly frequent basis.

From a security perspective, I suppose the worst thing we could imagine would be the same types of things that we've just seen in Mumbai. There is, to my knowledge, no indication of a specific threat vector that would be to that extent, but we will ensure that what we have is a scalable response capability in place to support law enforcement.

But I suppose the level of concern from security is really with the movement of very substantial numbers of people. It's the activity that brings with it the level of concern. There will be hundreds of thousands of visitors, the vast majority of whom will be there to enjoy the games. I presume there will be some who will also have other interests.

The harm that could be done as a result of a wilful attempt to do harm is the reason why the Canadian Forces are being asked to bring our skill sets to bear in support of police forces. The wilful harm vector is the greatest concern we have. It also potentially could be the least likely to occur, but the consequences are the most catastrophic, which is always the difficulty.

It's winter on the west coast, so I expect stuff will happen. A capacity to be able to absorb that shock will have as little effect upon the good functioning of the games as there can possibly be.

The Chair: Great. Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank the committee for being so prompt, because it allowed us to get through the full speaking order.

I'd like to thank you gentlemen as well for your responses. It's a huge task you have on your hands, but it sounds to me like you're well on your way to getting it done properly.

I'd just like to dismiss you now. We want to deal with a notice of motion that Mr. Wilfert has put forward. But before I do that, are there any comments you'd like to make to wrap up? No? Thank you very much, but you might want to stay there and listen to this motion, because it might affect you anyway.

Mr. Wilfert, we have a notice of motion, so I'd like to deal with that. It was presented in the right timeframe in both official languages. Sir, I'll let you read it and move it, and then we'll have discussion.

Hon. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The motion is:

That, in light of the recent incident of a Russian military aircraft approaching Canada's Airspace, the Standing Committee on National Defence receive a briefing from Department of National Defence officials on: the current resources available to meet such threats, the role of NORAD, military communications between the Canadian and Russian Governments, and the detailed defence strategy to defend against similar future threats.

Mr. Chairman, this has come about not only because of the comments of the Minister of Defence, but in light of some comments made by the American general for NORAD, who seemed to be at odds with those comments. I thought it might be helpful, and given the fact that we are looking at an Arctic strategy, this might be able to dovetail into that as well. It could be very helpful.

I think Mr. Bachand has what I would consider a friendly amendment.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'm always friendly.

Hon. Bryon Wilfert: He's always friendly to me.

It deals with the Russian ambassador and military attaché.

I put this out for a briefing for members. I think it would be helpful as we move towards our eventual discussions on the Arctic.

The Chair: I would like you to move your motion and then we'll—

Hon. Bryon Wilfert: I so move, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: We'll now open it up for debate.

Mr. Bachand, and then Mr. Julian.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I would be willing to support the motion, on two conditions. I find that our work on post-traumatic stress syndrome is moving forward well. In addition, we have just had a discussion on the Olympic Games. Soon, we will broach the issue of Arctic sovereignty. So here is my first condition—that any testimony we hear on possible intrusion by a Russian airplane into Canadian territory also be used in our study on our Arctic strategy.

In any case, I had said I wished to contribute when it came to establishing the topics we would examine. There is no doubt in my mind that airspace is a significant aspect of Arctic sovereignty.

The second condition would be that the resolution comprise a friendly amendment inviting the Russian embassy to come before us and explain their point of view. Many have said that an intrusion of this kind was useful to the government. Has it been exaggerated? Did the Russians really breach Canadian airspace? Did they cross the line? How many times have such intrusions occurred? NORAD has been tested a number of times when Russian bombers entered our airspace. As far as I know, we haven't seen intrusions of that kind for quite some time now. I would like us to invite the Russian ambassador or military attaché to give us their version. At the same time, we might hear the views of National Defence and have a briefing from them.

If those two conditions could be included in the motion, we would support the motion.

• (1715)

[English]

The Chair: So you're offering an amendment to the motion that the Russian ambassador or a military attaché also appear?

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes.

The Chair: We've heard the amendment. Any discussion on that?

I have Mr. Julian and then Ms. Gallant....

Go ahead, Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm wondering whether the amendment that Claude is suggesting is maybe a motion unto itself. Regardless of whether or not we obtain a briefing, we may want to invite the ambassador to Canada from Russia separately.

I wouldn't want to see these tied together. They both seem like good ideas.

The Chair: Well, if we do it as an amendment, we can deal with it now, but if we do it as a motion, then I'll have to have unanimous consent from the committee for the 48 hours. I guess I'm at the will of the committee.

Let's just leave that for a second.

Mr. Julian.

Mr. Peter Julian: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I support the amendment and I support the motion. Something smells fishy here, and it's not Arctic char. There is a discrepancy between the Prime Minister's initial comments around this and then those of the Minister of National Defence. The Prime Minister was talking initially about Russian intrusions into our airspace. The minister was then sort of backtracking, saying that this was a flight along Canadian airspace. You have indications that there have been regularly, since 2007, these kinds of contacts.

My sense is that there are a lot of unanswered questions around why the Prime Minister came out and why the Minister of National Defence came out...and what is actually happening up in the Arctic. To what degree is there communication between the Russian military and our military about these flights, which are, depending on how you define them, surveillance flights or intrusive flights?

I think we need to get to the bottom of this. I would hope that the committee would be able to speak both to the Russian ambassador or military attaché and also to our Department of National Defence officials to find out exactly what did happen. It's not clear whether or not there was notification.

The Chair: Thanks for that input.

Any further discussion?

Mr. Wilfert.

Hon. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, as I said to Mr. Bachand, I have no trouble with his proposal as a friendly amendment to the motion.

The Chair: Okay.

Go ahead, Mr. Boughen.

Mr. Ray Boughen: Mr. Chairman, I guess we ought to ask ourselves what the intent of the motion is. If it's to ascertain what's happening with unscheduled or unauthorized flights of any nation over Canada, then I guess we're on track for this.

I don't know that we need to belabour it a whole lot. We're asking people to appear before the committee. That's really the intent. I think we can move it along relatively quickly.

The Chair: How should the motion read? Let's deal with the amendment that somewhere in here we add "the Russian ambassador or military attaché".

If we add it to the end, as the clerk has suggested, it will read, "and the detailed defence strategy to defend against similar future threats, and that the Russian ambassador to Canada or Russian military attaché be invited to appear before the committee".

(Amendment agreed to)

(Motion as amended agreed to)

• (1720)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

Published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons

Publié en conformité de l'autorité du Président de la Chambre des communes

**Also available on the Parliament of Canada Web Site at the following address:
Aussi disponible sur le site Web du Parlement du Canada à l'adresse suivante :
<http://www.parl.gc.ca>**

The Speaker of the House hereby grants permission to reproduce this document, in whole or in part, for use in schools and for other purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any commercial or other use or reproduction of this publication requires the express prior written authorization of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Le Président de la Chambre des communes accorde, par la présente, l'autorisation de reproduire la totalité ou une partie de ce document à des fins éducatives et à des fins d'étude privée, de recherche, de critique, de compte rendu ou en vue d'en préparer un résumé de journal. Toute reproduction de ce document à des fins commerciales ou autres nécessite l'obtention au préalable d'une autorisation écrite du Président.