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**Chair**

**Mr. James Bezan**



## Standing Committee on National Defence

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• (1115)

[English]

**The Chair (Mr. James Bezan (Selkirk—Interlake, CPC)):** Good morning, everyone.

We're having a special televised meeting of the national defence committee.

In the first hour we are joined by a delegation from the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Presenting today is the Minister of National Defence, Rasa Juknevičienė. She's accompanied by Her Excellency Gintė Damušis, ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to Canada, and a large delegation. I want to welcome both of you here and your entire delegation.

To give you a little background, the minister was first elected back in 1988 as a member of a Lithuanian district council. She became a deputy of the Supreme Council in 1990. Before politics, she was a children's physician in the central hospital of Pasvalys. From 1992 to 1996, she was spokesperson for the official opposition. In 2000, she became a member of the National Security Committee, later the National Security and Defence Committee.

In 1996, she was the deputy chair of the Lithuanian Community of the Atlantic Treaty. In 1999, she was the chair of the delegation of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and chair of the NATO Affairs Commission of the Seimas. From 2004 to 2006, she was the deputy head of the Seimas delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and she has been head of that delegation since 2006. She has been very active on the NATO file, and of course, this fits in perfectly with our study on NATO's strategic concept and Canada's role in international defence cooperation.

I understand, Madam Minister, that you're on your way to Chicago for the meetings there.

With that, I turn it over to you for your opening comments. If you can take around 10 minutes or so, that would be great. Thank you.

**Ms. Rasa Juknevičienė (Minister of National Defence, Government of the Republic of Lithuania):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, colleagues, and members of Parliament. I have been a member of the National Security and Defence Committee in my parliament since 1996, so for me, your discussions are very familiar.

First of all, I would like to say thank you very much to Canada for your support of my country before independence, before 1990. For us, it was so important, your not recognizing our occupation. I was born and grew up in occupied Lithuania, so it's very important for

me to underline this particular issue and this particular part of our history.

As already mentioned, I've been in parliament since 1990. It's my first term in government as the Minister of National Defence. It's the first time for a woman to be in this position in Lithuania, but I think not the last.

Turning to the main issue I have to discuss with you today, I would like to start by saying that in Lithuania—and I have to speak on behalf of other Baltic nations—we have never felt more secure than today, despite the problems and despite the regional specificity. Of course, last year was the 20th year of our independence. For a small nation that for most of the 20th century was under occupation, it already looks like a long-time success.

Today, Lithuania and other Baltic states are members of the Euro-Atlantic community, which shares common values and concerns. Of course, I think that for the rest of NATO, the rest of our partners, it's very important to have our states independent, to keep going, and to have this particular part of the region—the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea—with the developments that we have now.

The Chicago decisions will be based on the decisions taken in Lisbon, where NATO approved a new strategic concept. We were very happy to participate. It was the first time in our history as a NATO member to have the opportunity to be reactive, to have this NATO new strategic concept.

The new concept includes many elements that are critical to our security and defence policies. As I understand this strategic concept, it was very interesting that all 28 members approved it, having in mind that it's their own national strategic concept of NATO. It's very important for everybody to feel that it's their own—not NATO's, not somebody's, but their own. We have the same feeling.

First of all, why? For us, NATO means a strong transatlantic link. A strong NATO is in our interests. It is in the very deep interests of Lithuania to have a strong, capable NATO. It's the foundation of our Lithuanian defence policy.

Second, the new strategic concept draws a balance between collective defence and crisis management, and between security at home and in distant places. NATO remains a collective defence alliance. This is what is most important for us—to keep the alliance as a defence alliance and our own territory's defence alliance.

Finally, in Lisbon there was a breakthrough on NATO's role in energy security.

•(1120)

Why are these three key principles so important for my country? We are concerned about recent developments in our regional security environment. There is no doubt that we have concerns.

I would like not to speak about Russia at all, but my job and my reality is that I have to. I have no other choice.

Of course, our main concern is Russia's intention to dominate the region and the Baltic states. Some 22 years ago, I thought it would be a totally different situation with our neighbours. Unfortunately, since 2000, when the Yeltsin era ended and the new regime came to the Kremlin, we've been facing very similar threats, or maybe it is better to say challenges. We unfortunately have them now.

Russia still regards the Baltic states as an area of its privileged interests, and it is not hiding this. They are increasing Russia's military presence and activities close to the Baltic borders. It has become a little bit of a different situation since 2007, when the Russian Federation started its military reform, and mainly its military reform westward.

The military exercises are offensive, anti-NATO scenarios, with bomber flights, etc. Everyone's country has military exercises, but the NATO military exercises held in our region are defensive. The Russian Federation is having military exercises with offensive scenarios. That is the main difference and is the main concern we have.

Nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapon installations still exist around our countries. It's a reality.

Belarus, next to us, has quite good-quality military armed forces. Our main concern is that they're very much integrated with the Russian Federation, and they are becoming more and more integrated with the Russian Federation every year.

Russia has intensively modernized its military forces in the Kaliningrad enclave. Instead of being a pilot region for Russia's cooperation with NATO and the EU, as we expected some 10 years ago, today Russia's behaviour is the opposite. We expected a benefit from this cooperation with the Kaliningrad region, but unfortunately, it didn't happen, and it's not in our interest. We have to keep in mind that this very much militarized area is in the very centre of Europe.

NATO summits, in general, offer a good opportunity to reaffirm the transatlantic link and to reassert our commitment to each other's security. The Chicago summit will not be different.

I would like to say something about Afghanistan. You know that we faced a very heavy period when our economy was in crisis. The recession was at about minus 15 of GDP a few years ago. We had to do a lot to overcome this crisis. My government, of course, did this. I am proud of that. We cut salaries, wages, and pensions even, but we didn't cut anything from our participation in the mission in Afghanistan. It was not an easy job, but we did it, understanding how important this solidarity with NATO is and how important this mission is for NATO and for our security also. Afghanistan was at the top of the agenda for my ministry, and Afghanistan will be on the top of the agenda in Chicago.

Together with Canada, Lithuania remains firmly committed to security in Afghanistan. We are planning to provide trainers and advisers in support of NATO's training and mentoring role post-2014. Also, Lithuania will financially support the development and sustainment of Afghan national security forces. We must, together with you, stay committed to Afghanistan in the post-2014 period. This is a clear message from my government; we already made this decision about our commitment a few weeks ago.

•(1125)

However, we also have to focus on military activities at home. Here are the main areas.

On NATO visibility, we very much await the NATO Response Force's exercise Steadfast Jazz, to be held next year in the Baltic states and Poland, together. It will be the first partial live exercise of the NATO Response Force in the last five years.

Regarding smart defence, Lithuania is a strong supporter of the smart defence concept, which requires more cooperation in developing capabilities. My country applies the same idea in regional cooperation, Baltic defence integration, and Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation. We think it will be good for NATO and that NATO will be stronger, if regions are strong enough and cooperate among themselves.

In NATO, one of the most prominent examples of smart defence is the NATO air policing mission. For my country, this is the very symbol of our NATO membership. It is also a practical example of NATO's presence in the Baltic region, especially because last year, and not only last year but during the last years, we have seen the increasing activity of the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea Region, with their heavy bombers and with their military fighters. It is very practical to have this mission in this region.

NATO missile defence also falls under the umbrella of smart defence. Unfortunately, Russia responded with a proposal to divide NATO into sectors. That is totally unacceptable for the alliance, and us especially. We don't want to be separated from NATO, according to a Russian Federation proposal on a sectoral approach.

On energy security, having it start in Lisbon is among our priorities in Chicago. A Lithuanian-established national energy security centre, we expect, will become a NATO centre of excellence this year. Meeting with your minister of defence, I invited Canada to be a very active partner in this centre of excellence. I think it will be a very good example of a win-win situation for member countries.

Finally, regarding partnerships, Lithuania supports NATO attention to North Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, there is a need to send a strong signal of reassurance to aspirant countries, especially to Georgia, as this is an important incentive to continue the reform process.

The recent developments in Ukraine are disappointing. We have to do our best to persuade the Ukraine to follow the westernization path. The isolation of the Ukraine would not offer a credible way ahead.

I had a meeting with my Polish colleague, Tomasz Siemoniak, on Monday. We spoke a lot about Ukraine, because we have a common project, the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade. Today they have a meeting of the Ukrainian and Polish ministers of defence in Warsaw. I will be waiting for information about that. We would like to go forward with this particular project, keeping in mind that Canada has the Maple Arch military exercises, and it could be very useful to have this brigade project and those exercises develop together.

• (1130)

In summary, the Chicago summit offers my country a good opportunity to address our security concerns as well as to share the concerns of our allies. We are strong supporters of smart defence. It requires closer cooperation between allies as a response to austerity and the challenges ahead.

Thank you for your attention.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Madam Minister. We appreciate those opening comments. In the interests of time, we're going to do rounds of five minutes.

Mr. Harris, you have the first question.

**Mr. Jack Harris (St. John's East, NDP):** Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome, minister and ambassador and others from Lithuania. We're very pleased to have you with us. Your presentation of course was somewhat detailed, and in five minutes it's difficult to delve into the details.

First of all I want to reflect on your comment that Lithuania now feels more secure than it ever has. Given your very negative history of occupation, going back decades, it's obviously very important for you to be within the umbrella of NATO.

I know you've only been a member of NATO for five years. Do you see yourselves simply as a beneficiary of NATO or as a contributor? Obviously you're a small country; you're not going to be a huge contributor financially to NATO. But in terms of smart defence, how does Lithuania, with forces limited as they are and with other activity that is not necessarily military, see itself contributing to the overall activities of NATO, either within or outside your borders?

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Thank you very much for your question.

On smart defence related to the air policing mission, we decided to increase our host nation support, keeping in mind that this mission has to be smart for everybody—smart for us, in getting partnership from our partners, and for our partners to come and have a win-win situation for training, for understanding this region, for interoperability, and so on.

I think we have a balanced approach as to what we get from NATO by way of benefit, and as to our contribution. I already mentioned Afghanistan, and I would like to quote the Danish minister of defence, who spoke during the last defence ministerial in Brussels. He mentioned that for Denmark it is very beneficial to participate in this air policing mission, and spending, over the mission, about one million euros—keeping in mind that, together, about 500 personnel from three Baltic countries are deployed every day in Afghanistan. It means that it's win-win. We can be in

Afghanistan, and NATO members can defend our space or do air policing in our space.

• (1135)

**Mr. Jack Harris:** Thank you.

Here is one other question. You obviously express your concerns about Russia, and in particular, about its activities near your country. NATO and Russia of course have some work that they're doing together. In that work, there's the NATO-Russia Council and there are activities attempting to make some progress and engagement with Russia. What would you say, if you had to decide what the priorities would be for NATO-Russia engagement? What would you suggest as the top priorities?

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Of course we have a lot in common—anti-piracy activities, for example. We even made several proposals ourselves to Russia for military cooperation—

**Mr. Jack Harris:** I mean, to diminish your concerns.

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** I'm sorry...?

**Mr. Jack Harris:** You expressed your concerns about the Russian Federation; you called them threats and then stepped back from that. To diminish your concerns about Russia, what would you suggest as the priorities for NATO-Russia engagement, we'll call it?

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** We need mutual understanding, of course, among NATO and Russia, first of all. We have to have the common will to cooperate. It's very difficult to answer your question if one partner has no such will for cooperation.

So I don't think that we have to “bargain”—how to say—with Russia trying to diminish what we have now around our borders. I mentioned already about NATO visibility in Baltic states, about common military exercises, and about common defence planning. Everything helps us to stop Russia, because Russians, unfortunately, they usually respect strong people, strong power, big power.

That's why we think keeping NATO strong and engaged in this region is the only way to cooperate with Russia. Only then, I think, are they able to rethink and to have some kind of cooperation among themselves.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Mr. Harris, your time has expired, so we'll move on.

Mr. Norlock, you have the floor.

**Mr. Rick Norlock (Northumberland—Quinte West, CPC):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Through you to the witnesses, thank you for appearing today. Some of my questions have been asked, but I'm going to ask them in a different context.

First, what is the greatest threat to Lithuania and her peace and security? I think you've indicated very well already what and who that is. I would ask you to be more fulsome in your response to how NATO helps in the solving of some of the issues with regard to that threat.

As well, how does that threat manifest itself in Lithuanian society? In other words, how is it affecting your economy? How is it affecting the psyche of your citizens, their feelings of security, and so on? I'd like to know how you're dealing with that in the context of your relationship with NATO, and how your government is handling that.

Before you respond to that, Minister, I do think it's necessary to say one thing. Your commitment to Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed by the world, in particular by this country. We want to thank you for your nation's sacrifice. We know how difficult that has been for you.

**Some hon. members:** Hear, hear.

• (1140)

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Thank you very much. Thank you for those good words.

On the threats, I would like to name them maybe more as challenges, not threats. We don't say that we have today direct military threats. I just spoke about increasing militarization in an environment that has been changing during the last years. But the main security challenges for Lithuania today are energy and security.

Today, when I am here, my Parliament voted in the first reading for very important laws on energy security issues, on an LNG terminal, and the special law on a nuclear plant we would like to build together with the Japanese company, Hitachi, and General Electric. We still have the former Soviet Union infrastructure on energy and on railways also. We need to do a lot to change this, and this is the main challenge for my government. We are finalizing now what we already were doing for the last three years, and this is challenge number one, because the Russian Federation thinks that it has the right to use energy resources as a tool to influence neighbouring countries, and this is what we feel every day.

The second one is the information environment. I have a lot of examples of how Russia is trying to influence Baltic states via media, via TV, and they are even spending special funding, special money. We know that they are spending \$8 billion a year especially for spreading information around. So it's something. We call it propaganda, but it's our reality, and still we have to fight this to convince people. You ask the question, what do people think about that? There is still some kind of battle every day in every country.

The last example is the Latvian referendum on language. It was a real battle, and it was funded from outside, not only from inside the country but from outside the country. If we are able to fight these challenges, to overcome these challenges, especially on energy security, we will be much safer in the future, and these threats or militarization that is going around will not be so dangerous for us if we are more secure inside the country, not having any tool and instrument to intervene in our region, as there is up to now.

I am very much optimistic on that, because of what I mentioned already: Baltic cooperation, Baltic-Nordic cooperation, our membership in EU. We are solving these problems together with the EU. We're not left alone. What we are doing today on energy security is very common for the rest of Europe and in NATO also.

So I don't know if I answered your question, but NATO also helps a lot. I already mentioned common planning, planning on possible

contingencies in our region. It's very important, this breakthrough during our membership, and what we are doing now together with NATO. I mentioned military exercises. I mentioned missile defence, which is very important for Europe and us, too, because we are like a sandwich. The Russian Federation is doing their installations, so that's why for us it's so important that the European part of NATO could cover it by missile defence installations.

• (1145)

**The Chair:** Time has expired.

Moving on, Mr. Byrne.

**Hon. Gerry Byrne (Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, Lib.):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Madam Minister. Thank you, Your Excellency, and senior officers. I'm delighted to have you here. Welcome to Canada's Parliament and to these discussions.

Would you be able to expand a little further on your thoughts concerning your relationship with the Russian Federation? In the current context, you indicated that Lithuania feels much safer because of the partnership and the covenants within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but at the same time you feel very clearly that there does seem to be an increased level of threat or concern because of an increase in military activity along the border states.

Could you describe for this committee the nature of the diplomatic dialogue that's currently occurring between yourselves and the Russian Federation, but as well the dialogue that's occurring between NATO and the Russian Federation, and how NATO could further increase if necessary your feeling of safety, given the nature of the NATO charter?

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** On the Russian Federation, we have a normal diplomatic relationship, recognizing we are both independent states. We have quite an intensive economic relationship. Our agriculture exports a lot of products to Russia, and they are very welcome in Russia because they're very good quality. Our transport relationship.... It is also based on the issue of NATO activities, ISAF transit, for example. ISAF transit in Lithuania, Latvia, and the Russian Federation is very important today, and maybe it will be even more important for reverse transit from Afghanistan. It's the shortest way, keeping in mind what we have now in Pakistan. So Lithuania is the safest and shortest way for ISAF transit. We're doing a lot together, but the main challenge today, as I mentioned already, is energy issues.

The Russian Federation's interest is to keep it as is, to keep the infrastructure owned by their companies, and so on. Their ownership is not the problem. The main problem is monopolization. They monopolize the market and the gas sector especially. They own the pipeline 100%. The gas we have today is from the Russian Federation. They also own this infrastructure inside the country. That's why the third package of the EU adopted a rule that this market can't be monopolized. So we are using this very important European Union tool in Lithuania to de-monopolize gas from influence, gas from ownership.

So of course Russia is not happy, but we can't act any other way because it's in our interest to de-monopolize infrastructure and sectors like the electricity and gas sectors. That's why we need a nuclear plant. That's why we need LNG, and I hope we could cooperate with Canada too. It will be a very important part of security, not only direct military exercises but also investments—Canadian and American investments in very important sectors of our economy. It's a very important part of our security, maybe today even more important than military cooperation. I'm speaking now maybe against myself as Minister of Defence by saying that, of course, both are very important.

That's why your visits to Lithuania are necessary, keeping in mind that afterwards business will also follow your advice or your impressions of the region.

• (1150)

**Hon. Gerry Byrne:** Thank you, Madam Minister.

Would it be—

**The Chair:** Your time has expired, unfortunately. They are only five-minute rounds because of the time constraints.

We're going to keep moving on. Mr. Chisu, you have the floor.

**Mr. Corneliu Chisu (Pickering—Scarborough East, CPC):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for appearing in front of our committee. Welcome to Canada.

I was born in eastern Europe, so I know what your feelings are on the issues. The Russian chief of defence recently made some very hostile comments regarding certain NATO initiatives, specifically the ballistic missile system. I know it is not only for Lithuania, but also encroaching on other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and so on.

Minister, can you provide this committee with Lithuania's thoughts on the ballistic missile system, especially in light of this recent flexing of muscles by the Russian Federation? Also, you mentioned Georgia, but I would go closer to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and that is the Transnistria region where there is a presence of the Russian so-called peacekeepers.

Further to this question I would also ask you about the position on the strategic area of Kaliningrad, which is an enclave basically. Quite recently they declared they will put missiles and so on, if NATO continues with its ballistic missile system.

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** What you asked about Kaliningrad and the missile defence issue is closely related to what General Makarov made a presentation in Moscow about. My political director, Mr. Vaidotas Urbelis, attended this, I would say, propaganda-style meeting in Moscow a few weeks ago. They made their presentations. Of course, they have their own opinion on that.

I already mentioned that I think this sectorial approach, which was proposed by the Russian Federation is not acceptable to any NATO countries. What does it mean? It means that they would like to have common infrastructure and to divide the European territory. The Baltic states and more than half of Poland would be defended by the missile defence system of the Russian Federation, so it is not

acceptable. It's impossible for us to accept such an approach. I do think that Russians know that it's not acceptable, so why are they proposing such things when they know that they are not acceptable? Maybe they are buying time, because they are already building their missile defence and they are doing this in the Kaliningrad region.

Speaking of the Iskander issue, you know that President Medvedev in November mentioned that if NATO develops a missile defence shield over the European territory, they will deploy Iskander in Kaliningrad. According to our knowledge and understanding, it's not related to missile defence. Today, they have in the Kaliningrad region not so much old-fashioned but Tochka-style rocket installations. They need to be replaced. This is the last year for the resources they have, which means they planned to replace them with more modern Iskander-style rockets this year or next year. They already did this near St. Petersburg. They already made these Iskander installations near St. Petersburg last year.

So, according to our understanding, they will do this in the Kaliningrad region despite the decision on missile defence. They are just using this as propaganda, to say to people, "Look what these bad guys from NATO are doing. That's why we are forced to do this in the Kaliningrad region". It's not the truth. They are doing this because of their modernization plans. They made these plans a long time ago.

The Kaliningrad region is very interesting because of what has been going on there up until now. It's connected to our energy security issue. Why? The Kaliningrad region is also very dependent on transit via Lithuania. They have only one pipeline. We have the same pipeline for gas, and the end of this pipeline is in the Kaliningrad region. So it means that as long as the Kaliningrad region is dependent on getting its supply from Russia via Lithuania, it will be more or less one situation, but if they really do what they are planning to do—to have a Nordic pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea—and they get a branch of this gas pipeline into the Kaliningrad region, the situation will be different.

• (1155)

**The Chair:** Thank you.

I'm going to keep moving on.

[*Translation*]

Ms. Moore, you have five minutes.

**Ms. Christine Moore (Abitibi—Témiscamingue, NDP):** Thank you very much.

You mentioned the smart defence concept a few times. I'd like to hear your take on smart defence cooperation between European countries and North America, mainly Canada and the United States.

[*English*]

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** I mentioned already one very important example we are involved in. It's the Baltic air policing mission. Americans are very active in this mission. Our partners help us to protect our airspace, protecting all three Baltic countries. In this austerity period, there is no other way than just to be active and to share.

In the European Union, we say there's pooling and sharing. But in terms of NATO, smart defence is something very similar, because one country has fighter capabilities and other countries have other capabilities, so this is what we are speaking about in smart defence.

Canada and the United States are the utmost important countries for smart defence projects.

[Translation]

**Ms. Christine Moore:** Very well. But how do you see that cooperation playing out, in more concrete terms?

It's easy to see how it would work in Europe, with so many borders and countries being so close together. The distribution of capabilities would be a bit more logical.

At the same time, I was wondering how you think integrated smart defence would work with an ocean separating Europe from Canada and the U.S.

[English]

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** That load is becoming smaller and smaller. Communications are becoming most important. One more concrete example is training, military exercises, your participation in European parts of NATO with your armed forces, your troops in military exercises in our region, ours also....

Our cooperation in Afghanistan, I already mentioned, is the best example of what we are doing together. For example, in our mentoring team in Kandahar, there are Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Latvians, and Belgian members. We are training Afghans on Russian Mi helicopters. We are training them. It means that we have this capability. You haven't had experience on Mi helicopters. You have other experience.

This is what we think about smart defence today, very clear, very concrete examples, and maybe we will find in the future new AWACS. I know that Canada has a little bit of a different understanding, but for us the AGS project is very important, and other projects we have now in NATO.

• (1200)

[Translation]

**Ms. Christine Moore:** I have one last question for you.

We are really seeing the U.S. encouraging European nations to assume more and more responsibility from both a military standpoint and a regional one. There is also this idea that European countries should increase their military spending. I'd like to hear your thoughts on that.

[English]

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Of course I am in favour. As Minister of Defence, I have to say that for me it's the main concern. As Minister of Defence to have this budget that we have now in Lithuania, it's not enough.

The U.S. pays for 75% of NATO's spending. Of course it's a gap, a huge gap. The gap is increasing. I made a proposal some months ago to the secretary general to have permanent meetings not only of ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defence in NATO, but also ministers of finance.

On the other hand, we have to understand that today to overcome the crisis we are facing is also part of security. If we do not overcome this deficit problem, as we were doing last year, we will not have an economy, we will not have incomes. So it's very much related to what we are doing now with our economies and trying to overcome the situation. But of course, challenge number one for NATO is the huge gap between European spending and that of the United States, Canada, and other countries, which are spending much more.

[Translation]

**The Chair:** Thank you kindly.

Your time is up, Ms. Moore.

[English]

Mr. Strahl, you have the final question for the minister.

**Mr. Mark Strahl (Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Madam Minister, thank you for making time for us today; I imagine you have a busy schedule.

In our previous meetings we talked about NATO and about the world economic environment we find ourselves in, where countries across the board are reducing expenditures, certainly on defence. In the face of that challenge, I appreciated hearing from you your commitment to continue to support the mission in Afghanistan. Certainly, as Mr. Norlock said, that does not go unnoticed. You did expand a little on the role Lithuanian forces have played there, and that is appreciated.

You mentioned briefly the Chicago summit that you're on your way to. Many analysts see the Chicago summit as a defining moment for NATO, coming out of our successful missions in the last number of years. But as I said, many nations are undergoing significant budget cuts.

Going into the Chicago summit, what are Lithuania's objectives, and what do you hope to see accomplished and discussed at that conference?

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Collective defence—NATO must reaffirm its readiness to perform major joint operations. This is critical for the implementation of COPs, the contingency operational planning that we are doing now.

Of course our interest is to have NATO air policing long term. You know that in the beginning, when we became members of NATO, the mission was established until 2014. Today everybody agrees that we need this mission. NATO needs this mission. NAC has already made the decision that it has to be a long-term solution with permanent periodic reviews of such missions, so we would like to keep going and be mentioned in the documents of this summit.

I already mentioned missile defence. I will not go into the details because we already discussed.

As for capabilities, the ministers of defence will discuss capabilities during the meeting in Chicago, focusing on collective defence; support for joint forces; more exercises, including in our region, as I already mentioned with the Article 5 scenario; Steadfast Jazz, next year's military exercises.

All these issues relating to a strong NATO are in our interest in Chicago. I think it will be in our interest to keep this alliance as strong as possible for a long time. It's the fundamental interest of our state.

• (1205)

**Mr. Mark Strahl:** Thank you, Madam Minister.

I want to go back to Afghanistan a little. One of the failings of NATO is the communication of... In Canada anyway, we all know how we contribute. We see what the U.S., Britain, and Australia do. We don't often hear about what might be called the smaller countries.

Can you expand, again, on the role you played in Afghanistan in the training mission? You mentioned some helicopter training. What else is Lithuania doing there?

It's good for us to share these stories. Too often the view is that there are only a few NATO partners pulling the load, and obviously that's not true. We want to hear more about Lithuania's contributions.

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** According to our partners, we Lithuanians are doing more proportionally than such medium-sized or smaller countries can do. We are leading PRTs in the very centre of Afghanistan, in Ghor province, and we are leading alone. For my ministry it is a great challenge, and we are doing very well.

Of course, we are very happy having partners such as Japan. We provide civilian projects such as hospitals, roads, and schools. It's one of the poorest provinces in all of Afghanistan. I think it's the most important part of our activities in Afghanistan.

Special operations forces are acting in the Kandahar region and in Zabul province, together with our partners the Americans, and are doing very well. I am getting only the best evaluations of what they are doing there—the highest level. They, of course, have become more experienced. It's also good for them.

Also, we have established new groups for, as I mentioned already, the air mentoring team.

Today, we are reshaping our activities, trying to concentrate more on training, training, and training—training in Chaghcharan in the Ghor province, and training armed forces, the Afghanistan National Army. We are also training local police together with Americans from the Pennsylvania National Guard. In Kandahar, our special operations forces are training Afghanistan special operations forces.

Our logistics and everything that is located there related to that, we are conducting.

• (1210)

**The Chair:** Thank you, Mr. Strahl. Time has expired. I know that the minister and her delegation have a busy schedule ahead of them.

We appreciate your taking the time to come and join our committee to share with us the Lithuanian perspective of NATO and the strategic concept.

Even though NATO is an organization that is 63 years old now, since you joined in 2004 and your eight years' experience in NATO and your joining in right away with the efforts in Afghanistan in 2005—and I know it was greatly appreciated by Canada and our allies to have had your involvement in the battle in Afghanistan—really provides us with the opportunity to have this two-way exchange of ideas and to find out how things are going, and to have your perspective on how the relationship with NATO continues to progress and hopefully improve the lives of Lithuanians and all the partners in the alliance.

I want to wish you the best of luck in your meetings in Chicago at the NATO summit. I know that you're going to be doing a little bit of touring around Canada and are going to visit the Lithuanian community in Toronto. I hope you have a pleasant trip to Toronto and meeting with the diaspora who are there and who are excited about having you here in Canada.

**Ms. Rasa Jukneviene:** Thank you very much indeed. I am very happy to be here among friends and allies.

I would very much like to invite you to my country to visit. It's better to see once than to listen ten times. Please come; I think it's a very important venture.

**The Chair:** We appreciate that invitation.

Minister Jukneviene, thank you so much for coming, and Ambassador and members of your delegation. Enjoy the rest of your stay in Canada.

With that, we're going to suspend. We're going to change out our witnesses, and then we will get right back at business.

Thank you.

• (1210)

(Pause)

• (1215)

**The Chair:** I call the meeting back to order. We're continuing with our hearings.

Joining us for the second hour is David Perry, who is a doctoral candidate in political science at Carleton University, where he holds the Dr. Ronald Baker Security and Defence Forum Ph.D. scholarship.

Congratulations.

He's a defence analyst with the CDA Institute, a member of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Canadian International Council's strategic studies working group, and a pre-doctoral fellow with the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton. Prior to beginning his doctoral studies at Carleton, he served as the deputy director of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. He has done a lot of research and has presented on conferences in North America and Israel and been published widely.

Mr. Perry, I'll give you the floor to bring us your opening comments.

• (1220)

**Mr. David Perry (Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations Institute):** Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Honourable members, it's a privilege to be asked to appear before you today, and I thank you for the invitation. In my opening remarks I'll be drawing from a study, "Leading From Behind Is Still Leading", which was recently published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. In doing so, I'll try to be brief and focus on what I think the Libyan operation can tell us about future NATO military deployments.

In February of last year, the Arab spring spread to Libya, prompting large-scale protests in Benghazi. In response, Colonel Gadhafi's regime retaliated with rapidly escalating levels of violence. Consequently, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 on March 17, authorizing all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians. Soon after, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector to enforce this UN mandate. This started with a naval arms embargo on March 22, and NATO assumed command of the no-fly zone on March 31.

Unified Protector's goals were three-fold: ending attacks against civilians, returning regime forces to base, and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access to all Libyans. By the conclusion of the mission at the end of October, NATO had flown more than 26,000 air sorties. The Canadian Forces flew 6% of these overall and roughly 10% of the strike missions. As well, our maritime forces made a crucial contribution to the defence of Misrata, preventing that city's fall to Gadhafi's forces at a vital point in the campaign.

Overall, I think two broad lessons can be drawn from this experience for NATO's future military deployments.

First, Unified Protector was an operational success. It ensured the protection of Libyan civilians while keeping collateral damage to a bare minimum. In doing so, it proved the value of NATO's command and control, standardization, and interoperability arrangements, and the alliance was able to assemble and deploy operational forces in roughly two weeks—a remarkable achievement that no other organization could achieve.

Furthermore, the operation demonstrated NATO's ability to work effectively with non-traditional partners. Qatar, the U.A.E., and other players had a significant role in the operation, providing unique capabilities and serving as interlocutors with anti-Gadhafi forces. In doing so, they validated NATO's cooperative security initiative articulated in the 2010 strategic concept.

In sum, Unified Protector demonstrated that under the right conditions and enabled by special operations forces, NATO's air and maritime assets can conduct an effective intervention.

At the same time, however, Libya highlighted a number of shortcomings related to NATO burden sharing. Despite statements that the United States led from behind in Libya, Unified Protector demonstrated the degree to which NATO relies on American military power. U.S. forces conducted the bulk of initial strikes, which allowed the rest of the alliance to conduct a no-fly zone over essentially undefended skies.

Thereafter, the United States contributed the majority of reconnaissance, air control, and electronic warfare aircraft, flew 80% of refuelling flights, and provided most combat search and rescue. In short, while U.S. efforts were not publicly prominent in Libya, without them the mission would simply not have happened.

How the United States implements its defence reductions and pivots to Asia will therefore be highly consequential for future NATO operations.

This is especially the case because the role in Libya of other NATO members was highly uneven. Only eight members in total participated in the air campaign, and some of the European partners who did would not fly strike sorties. Libya may have actually provided an early demonstration of the impact the financial crisis is having on NATO Europe, as some of these members were forced to withdraw assets early because of funding shortfalls.

Finally, Unified Protector demonstrated both the potential benefits of NATO smart defence and the likely challenges involved in actually implementing it. The dependence on American air-to-air refuelling, for instance, highlights the rest of NATO's need for such operational enablers. If smart defence can increase the alliance's capabilities in these areas, it will help reduce NATO's reliance on the Americans.

Germany's decision to withdraw its pilots from the AWACS missions over Libya, however, suggests that this is not going to be easy. Both the specialization and cooperation components of smart defence will ultimately require that nations be willing to deploy the assets on operations. Otherwise, the alliance may gain enabling capabilities but still experience burden-sharing shortfalls when the time comes to actually use them.

To conclude, Libya demonstrated NATO's operational benefits and that they are unmatched, but at the same time, exposed a number of major burden-sharing problems. Consequently, while NATO will remain an important element of Canada's role in international defence cooperation, we should be realistic about the contributions we can expect individual members to make to future missions. Not all will contribute equally, but at the same time, this does not undermine the value of operating under NATO command. As a result, Canada should develop even stronger working relationships with the subset of NATO members—particularly France, Britain, and the United States—with whom we are likely to operate alongside in the future.

● (1225)

Focusing any Canadian smart defence efforts on this key group of allies would provide the greatest net benefit for any future Canadian contribution to a NATO crisis response.

Thank you. With that, I'm happy to answer your questions.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Mr. Perry. We're still going to go with five-minute rounds.

We'll start with Mr. Harris.

**Mr. Jack Harris:** Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Perry, for your presentation.

Your assessment of the Libyan situation obviously is a subset of what we heard from General Abrial when he was here a couple of weeks ago, that NATO as a group makes a decision on a consensus basis to get active in a mission but that contributions to any mission are the choice of individual countries. That's not going to change, as far as I see it, and I guess as you see it as well.

Is there any particular reason why Canada should step up and say that regardless of what NATO does we're going to be in the top rank on a military basis, or is there potentially another role for Canada internationally? I'm not saying we wouldn't participate, but instead of putting all our efforts on the military side have you considered other alternatives that Canada might play as an alternative, whether it be in NATO or through the United Nations, to contribute to international peace and security?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think in answering that question it is important to keep in mind that even though there are significant problems related to burden sharing, not everyone is going to do what we or other people may want them to. A NATO operation versus a UN operation or operations, which could be ad hoc in other parts of the world, do have an enormous number of benefits in terms of standardization, interoperability, and these kinds of things, that simply aren't matched anywhere else.

**Mr. Jack Harris:** I agree. The reason NATO stepped in here, and it was a very vital reason, was that aside from a single command by the U.S., NATO was probably the only organization that could provide the command and control function and make that happen between multilateral parties, so I'm not taking away from NATO's role.

One of the concerns is about burden sharing. I know it comes up because it seems sometimes that certain nations contribute more than others, but again that's the NATO pact, particularly when we're outside the area of article 5. That would be a very different set-up, and maybe you can comment on that. But some of the NATO members in the Libya mission, in my view, acted, spoke, and talked up beyond the actual mandate. There was a lot of talk about regime change in Libya, which was not part of the UN Security Council role, of course.

How do you see NATO being able to control its members, in particular the contributors, in a situation perhaps like Libya where the protection of civilians can be defined in very many ways? I'm not suggesting that you went beyond the legal limits, but just because you can do something doesn't mean you should. So how is NATO as a body able to control the perhaps more aggressive members in a particular mission like Libya?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think it's important to keep in mind that just because certain nations that were NATO members, that were contributing to the NATO mission, did other things that may have been, let's say, stretching the mandate, they weren't necessarily doing so in a NATO capacity. I think a lot of initiatives were undertaken by countries, like France, that have admitted openly to doing things in a national capacity that were not specifically within the NATO framework.

I think it's important for the alliance to have a coordinating function, but ultimately if nations wanted to go a little bit beyond

what the consensus approves and is willing to do, then the goal is to try to have that all work toward a common purpose.

**Mr. Jack Harris:** Unfortunately, of course that then taints the mission itself, and you have countries like Russia saying now that they're reluctant to get involved in Security Council resolutions if they see countries going beyond the mandates on an individual basis.

Do you see any way of NATO controlling that in a mission situation?

• (1230)

**Mr. David Perry:** The short answer would be no. I think if there are countries that have a desire to go further, then only a limited degree of coordination can happen in Brussels.

**Mr. Jack Harris:** Thank you.

Have I used up my five minutes?

**The Chair:** You're pretty much over time.

Carrying on, we have Mr. Opitz.

**Mr. Ted Opitz (Etobicoke Centre, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chair. Through you, thank you for being here today, Mr. Perry.

We've just heard, of course, from the Lithuanian minister, and keeping some of the elements in mind with BALTBAT and the fact that they interoperate with other Baltic states—Poland and so forth, and Ukraine on some levels—smart defence means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. It will probably mean some different things to some of the smaller nations. We talked about the air force capabilities. She just described the fact that a lot of their air surveillance is helped by the other Baltic states—Poland, and the United States and others providing those ranges of capability.

Are you able, sir, to touch on how smart defence for Canada could mean a drastically different thing than it would for a smaller partner nation like Lithuania? As well, how can members of the alliance work together to ensure that while each nation may have different capabilities, the mandate of NATO, as found in article 5, will always remain its top priority?

Can you comment, sir?

**Mr. David Perry:** Thank you.

I think the size of the military that's involved does make a difference, so obviously Lithuania is very circumscribed in the kinds of capabilities and the numbers they can devote to any particular task, so they are forced to specialize quite heavily. Therefore, for countries like that there is a significant interest in developing an arrangement whereby they can specialize quite clearly and leave it to other people to do various things for them.

What we've seen so far from Canada is that smart defence is essentially going to mean a continuation of our status quo military posture. I know that some of the witnesses who have appeared before you have essentially said that smart defence for Canada is going to be more of the same. We've seen that the Canadian government has pulled out of two of what would be considered smart defence initiatives. The AWACS contribution and AGS are coming to an end.

**Mr. Ted Opitz:** We had James Appathurai here not long ago. In 2010, NATO produced its strategic concept that establishes a road map for NATO over the next ten years.

Sir, what are your thoughts on this strategic concept? In your opinion, does it do enough to address the emerging threats like space and cyber-security? Does the strategic concept itself provide a clear mandate and a way forward for the NATO alliance for the better half of the next ten years?

If not, what would you like to have seen added to this?

**Mr. David Perry:** The strategic concept was relatively comprehensive. I think the critical issue is going to be trying to match capabilities to the intent that's laid out in the strategic concept. There is a lot of good stuff in there, a lot of aspiration with new security threats, and also new initiatives, like the cooperation with new partners. Then we've also seen the smart defence come later. So I think the key issue will be to try to find the capacity and the willingness within the alliance members to implement what was laid out.

**Mr. Ted Opitz:** In terms of Russia and what the ambassador said earlier, what is your view on Russia, NATO, and how sincere do you believe Russia is in cooperating with NATO?

**Mr. David Perry:** I'm not quite sure. I think a lot of conflicting messages are coming out of Russia. I think they certainly have had a bit of response to NATO's push right up to their doorstep, something they're very sensitive about. So I think it remains to be seen what the evolution of that mission is now that President Putin has returned to office for the third time.

**Mr. Ted Opitz:** Do you see a way forward for Ukraine and Georgia to enter the alliance at some point?

**Mr. David Perry:** That's certainly something that there's been a lot of interest expressed in. I don't think that's necessarily going to attenuate any of the potential conflicts we have with Russia, if membership is granted to those states.

**Mr. Ted Opitz:** Canada has developed some significant capabilities in our years in Afghanistan and our cooperation in other missions. How important is it, in your opinion, that Canada maintain these capabilities and is able to grow these capabilities in the NATO context, in terms of smart defence and collaboration with other partner nations?

**Mr. David Perry:** If we want to keep playing the same kind of active international role that we have in the past, I think it's very necessary. If there is a reduction that certainly exceeds what has been laid out, we're going to have some serious rethinking about what our strategy and policies are, going forward.

Simply put, we need to have at least as much as we have now, if we want to be able to play the same role in the future as we have in recent years.

• (1235)

**Mr. Ted Opitz:** If our capabilities were diminished, do you think this would have a serious impact on our reputation abroad and impact our skill sets?

**Mr. David Perry:** I'm not sure about the reputation part of that, but in terms of our skill sets and our capacity to do things, I think absolutely that would be the case.

**The Chair:** Your time has expired.

We're moving on to Mr. McKay.

**Hon. John McKay (Scarborough—Guildwood, Lib.):** Thank you, Chair. Thank you for coming, Mr. Perry.

I want to explore the issue of limitations on interoperability. We've had some discussion here and elsewhere about the caveats that nations impose on their participation in joint operations. We've had some observations with respect to intelligence sharing, that some people get more intelligence than others, and that's clearly a limitation.

One of the things that's coming up, and I don't know whether you've addressed your mind to it, is that the government has introduced a treaty in the Senate, the cluster munitions treaty. A couple of clauses are contained in the proposed bill, which frankly you could drive a truck through. We as a nation say we will not use cluster munitions—and I'm paraphrasing here and somewhat exaggerating, but I'm not too far off—but if we are in joint operations with other nations that do use them, then we can use them or we can command those that do use them. It's a strange position to be in to say we don't use them, but we'll go along with people who do use them. Of course, the principal nation that does use them is the United States.

I'd be interested in your thoughts on what that does to interoperability going forward vis-à-vis NATO operations, but also your thoughts with respect to whether that came up or should have come up with respect to, say, General Bouchard's command of the NATO force in Libya.

**Mr. David Perry:** With respect to the last point, I'm not aware that issue was raised because I don't believe there were instances of cluster munitions being dropped in Libya.

**Hon. John McKay:** Yes, I think you're right.

**Mr. David Perry:** I haven't read the Senate bill, so I don't want to comment on that in too much detail.

I think the current approach we've been taking does make sense. We don't want to totally proscribe our ability to work with folks who use these kinds of munitions, because as long as the United States is using them—I think Libya gives us a perfect example—NATO or Canada, anyone else, essentially can't do very much at all without the United States. As long as the United States is still employing these types of munitions, if we were to proscribe ourselves from being involved in a coalition or commanding one involving American aircraft because they might be using cluster munitions, then we'd be setting some pretty narrow limits on what we were prepared to do internationally.

**Hon. John McKay:** It is also an intensely hypocritical position, wouldn't you agree? Somehow or other, we won't use them for our own purposes, but where somebody else does use them, we will use them.

**Mr. David Perry:** I don't think we're saying we'll use them, just that we're not going to not participate and operate with folks who do.

**Hon. John McKay:** So as long as we're participating in joint operations, it's okay to use what has arguably been described as a horrific weapons system.

**Mr. David Perry:** Again, I'm not familiar with any previous experiences of the Canadian Forces using them, so I'd take issue with the use of the words "our using them". I'd just point out that—

**Hon. John McKay:** I think you're right. The Canadian Forces have never used them. I think Canadians would be pretty horrified if we did use them. It's almost a guilt by association concept when you enter into a joint operation, you in effect have to go to the "lowest common denominator" and participate, because in this case, the United States has no hesitation to use them in certain situations.

**Mr. David Perry:** Right. I think you're getting into specifics that I can't necessarily address, but I would simply state that I think there is an opportunity for arrangements like NATO to try to set out rules of engagement and any kinds of restrictions that other members of a coalition, like Canada, might want to set on the types of munitions that could be used and the types of situations under which they could be deployed.

• (1240)

**Hon. John McKay:** It does strike me as a limitation on interoperability, but it also strikes me as an opportunity for nations such as Canada to say that if this is going to be in the game, if this is going to be a weapons system, we will use in conflict X, Y, or Z, then we will have to pull back, or we will have to write a caveat or something of that nature.

**Mr. David Perry:** I think that's an accurate assessment.

**Hon. John McKay:** Okay. Thank you.

Am I done?

**The Chair:** Time is done. Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, you have the floor.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to our witness.

Mr. Perry, you've recommended that in future operations, Canada will likely be part of a coalition of the willing built around the Five Eyes nations, France, and a select group of willing NATO nations operating with NATO's stamp of approval.

Is this similar to what we saw in Libya, where there was a smaller group of nations within NATO working together to achieve mission success?

**Mr. David Perry:** Yes, absolutely. I think that experience in Libya actually was a continuation of what eventually evolved in southern Afghanistan. While you have approval at the level of the entire alliance to conduct an operation, it's a smaller set that's actually doing the day-to-day operations. We therefore developed much closer working relationships with those folks who we were actually operating with on a day-to-day basis, because that's where the real action, so to speak, was happening.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant:** Is this the future of NATO with other nations and key partners undergoing defence budget realignment?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think it is. I think the nations of the smaller subset are experiencing some pretty significant challenges financially, and are going to undergo some fairly steep reductions, but compared to a lot of the other members of NATO they look pretty good in comparison. Those that weren't even of the subset to begin

with are facing some pretty serious pain right now in terms of their defence budgets.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant:** With respect to the Five Eyes nations and France, with their recent change in government, do you foresee any significant change in policy and participation in NATO?

**Mr. David Perry:** It will certainly be very interesting to see what happens. Certainly President Sarkozy was a pretty active international player, I think it's fair to say. So whether or not the new president, even if he wants to, has the financial resources, for instance, to devote to taking a very active international role, I think it remains to be seen.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant:** Coming out of the Libyan mission, there was a lot of criticism of the disproportionate amount of burden sharing by some of the larger partners in the alliance. While no one disputes that there are difficulties within NATO, some forget that there are also significant benefits that being part of this regional organization provides to not only Canada but all partner nations. These benefits include a standardization of practices, command and control, interoperability.

Mr. Perry, can you please tell us, with regard to our study on NATO, what are some of the current difficulties and the advantages for members of the alliance?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think the absolute bottom line is that burden sharing is an issue, but I think it's one that we simply need to accept. Rather than continually hope that certain members are going to do more, recognize the fact that there's a smaller subset—the "swimmers" is what some folks call them—who are actually going to do the operations, and some other people, who are restricted for various different reasons, aren't going to be able to do everything we might like.

The rest of the benefits that the alliance affords, including the ones you mentioned, are things that simply don't exist in other parts of the world. For instance, if a ship goes to the Pacific and it's operating in a non-NATO context, it's a lot more challenging to communicate with people, potentially get refuelling, or do simple things related to seamanship—i.e., to know where somebody is going to be if you're undertaking a certain type of activity.

Those things simply don't exist outside of NATO, for the most part.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant:** Speaking of the Pacific, there have been many reports indicating that there's a shift in American policy away from the North Atlantic towards the Asia-Pacific. In your opinion, how will this impact the future of the alliance?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think it's already becoming clear that the United States is going to de-emphasize its attachment to Europe. I think there have been a number of statements long-standing from the United States that they're looking for Europe to do more.

If you actually look at the specifics of the pivot, I would argue that it's mostly reducing their force posture elsewhere, primarily in Europe. They're not really adding all that much to the Pacific, at least in terms of ground forces. We're talking about a few thousand troops and redistributing some of the ones who are already there.

Looking to the future, they're making some adjustments to their procurement plans. What is actually changing is withdrawing the brigades from Europe. Essentially everything else is more or less status quo, with the exception of the fact that they're going to reduce the size of their land force fairly significantly.

• (1245)

**The Chair:** You have time for one more short question.

**Mrs. Cheryl Gallant:** Okay.

So this change in focus is simply a change in focus as opposed to a balancing of priorities.

**Mr. David Perry:** I think that's fair. It's certainly nothing that's a bolt from the blue under this administration after the new year. These are fairly long-developing trends, having greater emphasis on the Pacific. There have been a number of statements over the past several years, I think to a large extent simply following the reality of both trade patterns and the emergence of several nations in Asia as larger military players.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Mr. Kellway, it's your turn.

**Mr. Matthew Kellway (Beaches—East York, NDP):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to Mr. Perry.

Mr. Perry, I'm a bit curious about the conclusions you draw, on the basis of the presentation you made, where you talk about the fundamental challenge of burden sharing. Yet we have this new strategic concept from NATO that talks about smart defence and gives kind of explicit licence to NATO members to specialize in the context of economic austerity, etc.

We just heard from the Lithuanian defence minister, and she gave very concrete examples of implementing that specialization; "pooling and sharing" I think is the way she described it. Your conclusion, though, is that we're kind of stuck with it. We have to accept the challenge and carry on with the status quo.

Why don't we pick up on this explicit "permission", if I can say, in the strategic concept to do something around specialization and smart defence?

**Mr. David Perry:** I'm not sure there are as many good examples as the one that you just raised where that kind of specialization can work. For instance, patrolling and keeping safe the airspace of a member that we're obligated to defend is in our interest as the rest of the alliance. I'm not sure to what extent there are many other opportunities that are that clear-cut, where it's simply much better for the rest of the alliance to ensure the security of that airspace than it would be to have it go poorly or undefended.

If you look at other situations, I think particularly in the context of crisis management response, the real issue is not whether or not you specialize and whether or not as an alliance you can gain more capability with certain people having certain things; that's great as long as you have a reasonable certainty that the people who have specialized to do X are actually going to send X on whatever operation you're currently involved in. If you don't have the confidence that they're going to be able to deploy what they've specialized in, then you really haven't gained much overall, right?

**Mr. Matthew Kellway:** Is this development of the new strategic concept largely not, I guess, a very meaningful one? Is that your suggestion?

Secondly, you talk at the end of your presentation paper about focusing Canadian smart defence efforts at this key group of France, Britain, and the United States. Can you give us some concrete notion of what that focusing might reap?

**Mr. David Perry:** With respect to the first part, I'm not saying that the strategic concept overall is moot; it's just that smart defence, which is one component of the NATO program going forward, will be very challenging to implement, because I don't think....

I mean, the concept of an alliance that shares burdens is certainly nothing new. I think smart defence is an attempt to put a brave face on a pretty challenging fiscal environment and say that despite the fact that everyone is gutting their defence budget and everyone is disarming, we're still going to be able to do the same stuff we did before. I'm pretty pessimistic that we're not going to actually see the alliance as a whole being able to do less with less resources.

With regard to the focus on smart defence, targeting the smaller subset, again, this is going back to the comment I made that it doesn't really make a whole lot of sense to me that you're going to have specialization with a whole bunch of people at the level of the alliance writ large, if not all of them are going to be there when you actually want to do something.

If you were to target some things, potentially things like ISR surveillance aircraft, looking at down the road acquiring that kind of a capability, that might be an area where you could work out some kind of cooperative arrangement with some of those partners and develop not at the level of the wider alliance—which I think, incidentally, is part of the reason that we aren't going forward with the AGS and the AWACS contribution.

There were concerns that despite the fact that we're contributing to this—and the amount of money was pretty small, about \$20 million—that because it was common funded, and received part of the funding through NATO's common funding, when you wanted to deploy it to do something, everybody got a vote and a veto, essentially, and if you didn't have consensus, you might not be able to use it.

So if you could take even those similar types of capabilities, such as surveillance, within the smaller subset, that might be something we can build on.

• (1250)

**Mr. Matthew Kellway:** To try to bring this down to something a little more concrete, would this focusing on Canadian smart defence efforts impact, in your view, procurement plans for this country?

**Mr. David Perry:** Potentially, yes.

**Mr. Matthew Kellway:** Do you have any notions about in what way?

**Mr. David Perry:** The plan to acquire UAV, I believe medium-altitude UAV, through the JUSTAS program might be one, for instance. That's the kind of surveillance capability that Libya showed was, one, in very short supply, and two, essentially a necessity now in any potential operational scenario.

**The Chair:** Time has expired.

Mr. Alexander.

**Mr. Chris Alexander (Ajax—Pickering, CPC):** Thank you, Chair, for not forgetting the rest of us members of the committee. We're delighted to be part of this conversation.

Thanks for your testimony, Mr. Perry. Your work is extremely interesting.

I want to drill down a little bit into the concept of "leading from behind". You made it clear that the United States provided enablers and leadership in other forms without which the mission literally couldn't have gotten off the ground. Was it the U.S. leading from behind, though, or the U.S. in NATO leading from behind?

**Mr. David Perry:** That's a good question. I'm not sure about that.

I think overall it was largely a political decision in Washington that they didn't want to be seen to be out front, ahead of everyone else, on another intervention in that part of the world. There are also issues with President Obama's relationship with Congress, and about whether this was or was not a conflict that triggered a bunch of congressional involvements.

So there was a desire, definitely, to take a bit of back seat. I think that even applied before NATO assumed command. When Operation Odyssey Dawn was launched with the United States, Britain, and France, even then you saw President Sarkozy taking surely a more publicly prominent role in leading the charge, even before it transitioned to NATO leadership.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** Right. But putting aside the issue of political will, which was expressed sometimes more visibly, sometimes less visibly, was the actual command and control form of leadership mostly from NATO commands—the operational one was led by Charlie Bouchard, but obviously there were higher commands above him—or was it mostly from U.S. stand-alone commands?

**Mr. David Perry:** It's my understanding, at least certainly with the air component, that it was done through NATO.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** And for the maritime component and the overall strategic direction?

**Mr. David Perry:** I would have to check on that, but I believe it was also NATO-directed.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** So this concept of leadership from behind, which you've analyzed in the case of Libya, I think also has a current application for NATO in Afghanistan, to the extent that many nations are now shifting to a training mission as opposed to a first-echelon combat mission.

Do you see the concept of leading from behind, enabling the forces of non-NATO countries, as something that is compatible with this strategic concept?

**Mr. David Perry:** Yes, certainly. I think the types of support that the United States provides to all the people who show up but can't essentially feed and sustain themselves, for instance, is an example of that kind of thing. Even if you look at the countries that make very small contributions, they wouldn't be there unless the U.S. military was essentially providing all their logistics.

If you want to take it a step further, I think one of the key issues in Afghanistan—some of my colleagues were talking about this the other day when they appeared before you—is that the annual bill, depending on who you ask, for the Afghan national security forces will be \$6 billion-plus after 2014. These estimates aren't very concrete, but I believe the Afghan government's ability to bring in revenue is something around \$1 billion a year. So there's a huge shortfall just to keep paying for the security forces.

If nothing else, I think it's one example of leadership that may not be so publicly prominent. Someone is going to have to actually keep funding the Afghan government for a very long time into the foreseeable future.

● (1255)

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** Does Canada have the capacity to lead from behind in missions like this?

**Mr. David Perry:** In that kind of capacity, doing things like providing funding, I think absolutely.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** What about in the Libyan kind of capacity, and to some extent even in supporting counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, where its military enablers, command and control, ISR, air defence capabilities, and so forth...? Where do we stand?

**Mr. David Perry:** I think those are examples of us leading from the front.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** But you mentioned that the United States in Libya had provided those enablers while leading from behind.

**Mr. David Perry:** Oh, okay. Yes; I mean, if you did things like provided the airlift, provided the refuelling.... I think we may have actually been the second-largest refuelling contributor to Libya, for instance.

That's an example of where you can provide enabling capacities that allow other people to do things.

**Mr. Chris Alexander:** Do you see gaps in Canada's capabilities in this respect in light of the Libyan and Afghan experience?

**Mr. David Perry:** I certainly think some of them have been addressed by the lift that we've acquired, which all comes down to how you prioritize what you want to do. Depending on the policy direction, there can be gaps or not. I think acquiring lift made a lot of sense, and bolstering our refuelling capacity—if it's not quite up to where we need it to be—would be an example of where you could serve national priorities but also then potentially have something you could contribute to an operation on a wider basis.

Thank you.

**The Chair:** We have time for a couple of very short questions. We have a couple of minutes left before we have to adjourn.

[Translation]

Ms. Moore, you have the floor.

**Ms. Christine Moore:** I would just like to hear your thoughts on something. I noticed that you studied the use of companies or private security firms in Canada, where it starts, and elsewhere. What effect could that have on NATO countries and missions?

[*English*]

**Mr. David Perry:** I think it's a critical one. I think most of NATO relies to a greater or lesser extent on private support. Certainly we do. We did very extensively throughout the contribution in Afghanistan. So it's something that.... Depending on what types of services you're talking about, it provides a pretty critical enabling function, and it's one that allows military commanders to concentrate the share of forces they send overseas on operational military troops to the greatest extent possible.

[*Translation*]

**Ms. Christine Moore:** Okay.

I would like to know what happens when these foreign companies are used. Should special attention be paid to their reputations? The situation can become more complicated if the company does not have a good track record or has been accused of something in the past. If a private firm is contracted to perform certain functions, what should we do to ensure the company doesn't cause problems for us once we've used its services?

[*English*]

**Mr. David Perry:** I think the focus shouldn't be on the companies per se but rather on what they're doing. You need to have pretty

stringent oversight and make sure that the contracts are being managed effectively, and that's more important than what the country may have done eight or nine years ago. So it's more important to make sure that what's being done is executed to the letter of the contract, and to look and make sure that you're getting what you're paying for and that the people who are doing things for you are staying within the parameters you outlined for them at the outset.

I think the focus should be on that kind of enforcement rather than worrying particularly about whether the contract went to a certain company that may or may not have had a bad reputation in the past.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Time has expired, and another committee is due for this room at one o'clock.

Mr. Perry, I want to thank you so much for your input and for your studies that you've undertaken on the Libyan and Afghanistan missions and the overall function of NATO. I want to wish you the best of luck with the rest of your doctoral studies and your dissertation research.

With that, the meeting is adjourned.

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