NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I would like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, our second meeting today.

General, you may know that we heard this morning from an American and a Russian professor and a couple of other people from Project Ploughshares. We had a lively and interesting exchange of views.

We're very pleased to welcome to the committee today General George Macdonald, deputy commander in chief of NORAD. That's Canadian General George Macdonald, obviously. Also, Colonel David Higgins is here. Welcome to you, too, sir.

I want to thank both General Macdonald and Colonel Higgins and indeed all of your staff who were so hospitable to four members of the committee, and on an earlier occasion to Monsieur Laurin as well. At least five of us have had an opportunity to visit Colorado Springs and Cheyenne Mountain. Four of us went very recently, about a month ago, and found the trip extremely educational. It was a first-rate reception, General, by you and all your staff. I thank you once again and I ask you to communicate our gratitude to your people in Colorado Springs.

Just to let you know, we have not forgotten the discussion we had with the CF members. We are working on a response. We want to make sure we've touched bases with the proper people. We will be getting back to them, through you, in the near future. Again, thank you.

Welcome. We look forward to your remarks on a very important topic for this country, General.

Lieutenant-General George E.C. Macdonald (Deputy Commander in Chief of North American Aerospace Defence Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say first of all that it's indeed a pleasure for me to be here this afternoon. I thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to make a presentation to this important committee.

I think most of you are aware of NORAD. It's been a very successful alliance between Canada and the United States, something that has gone on for some 42 years now. We have continued to evolve to meet the threat as we went through the last four decades. We have changed gradually to respond to whatever the defence policy was of Canada and the United States throughout those four decades.

There have been some challenges. Some people think NORAD disappeared at the end of the Cold War and they're not familiar with our current mission in the year 2000. They feel the Cold War was the end of the responsibilities NORAD had and they don't appreciate that there are some challenges that indeed face NORAD. In fact, I would submit that we're going through a period of transition that is particularly important for the bilateral defence relationship between Canada and the United States. Of course the main topic of concern, national missile defence, is one of the challenges we face.

With your concurrence, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to prevail upon you to give you a short introduction to NORAD, to first discuss some of the current NORAD issues we are faced with and then of course to focus on one of the key subjects you're interested in at this particular time, national missile defence. I think I have a unique perspective on all of these topics, given that I do represent NORAD. We are at the headquarters of NORAD in Colorado Springs.

[Translation]

I was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD two years ago. Previously, I was commander of the Canadian NORAD region, in Winnipeg. I believe I am quite familiar with NORAD issues. I am here as an officer dealing with NORAD operations on a day-to-day basis.

I have reviewed the presentation made by Mr. Bon and the questions you asked last Thursday and tried to include some answers to a number of those questions in my presentation this afternoon.

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I am here to answer your questions, to assist you in understanding the issues relating to NORAD and the national missile defence system. But obviously I do not speak for the government of Canada nor the government of the United States. I am not a member of the National Defence Staff here in Ottawa.

I will make all my presentation in English in order to be able to explain precisely and efficiently the nature of NORAD and the systems that are common to NORAD and the NMD system.

[English]

I'll go through these slides very quickly, Mr. Chairman. There's quite a bit of information, but I will only touch on the key points as I go through them, recognizing that you have a printed copy of the slides in front of you.

As many of you know, NORAD commenced in 1958 as a binational command. It's currently headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, which is on one side of Colorado Springs, and the operations centre for NORAD is in Cheyenne Mountain, on the other side of the city. It's commanded by a four-star American general officer with a three-star Canadian deputy, in this case myself. Although that has been the tradition, the specifics of the agreement do not dictate that the American be the commander-in-chief. Of course the commander-in-chief of NORAD is responsible to what we call the national command authorities of both Canada and the United States, in that it is a binational organization.

Cooperation in defence between Canada and the United States really began during World War II in this area with the Ogdensburg agreement, which precipitated the formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and afterwards the Military Cooperation Committee, both of which are going strong today and doing useful work in our mutual defence efforts. The first NORAD agreement was signed in 1958 and has gone through about eight iterations since then, the next renewal being in the year 2001. It is truly the foundation of our bilateral defence activities.

The structure of NORAD consists of the headquarters at Colorado Springs and three regional commands at the operational level, we would call them. The first is Elmendorf headquarters for the Alaskan NORAD region. The Canadian NORAD region has headquarters at Winnipeg. The continental United States NORAD region has headquarters in the panhandle of Florida, at a placed called Tyndall Air Force Base. Each of these regions has a substructure of air defence sectors, the Canadian one of which is located in North Bay. We cooperate very closely with the commands that are adjacent to us, most notably the Maritime Command on the east and west coasts of Canada and the United States.

The command structure of NORAD is a mixture of Canadian and American officers together. The commander-in-chief for NORAD is General Ed Eberhart, who just took command on February 18. I am his Canadian deputy. The three NORAD regions for Alaska, Canada, and the continental United States are commanded and deputy commanded by Canadians and Americans. The Canadian commander of the Canadian NORAD region is Major General Lloyd Campbell, resident in Winnipeg, and I was his predecessor.

Canadians are located throughout NORAD, both in Canada and outside Canada. I am responsible for the Canadians who work in NORAD outside Canada, of which there are 268. They are focused in some principal areas, such as the headquarters in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center at Colorado Springs, but also at several other locations around the continental United States and Alaska and indeed at one site in Greenland. The abbreviation SWS stands for Space Warning Squadron. You see the number of the Canadians in each location on this slide.

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This slide really depicts the fact that Canadians are dispersed throughout NORAD doing many different kinds of jobs in supporting NORAD, and that these sites are in many cases relevant to the performance of the national missile defence mission, of which I'll speak a little bit later.

Canadians have many diverse and important jobs throughout NORAD. We are in no way considered to be second-class citizens in NORAD. We are very much working at an equal level with our American counterparts, recognizing of course that our overall contribution to NORAD is proportionately smaller than that made by the United States. We are also working in some space-related positions, and we are concerned with increasing the army and navy presence in NORAD in positions that have traditionally been air force only.

The next slide summarizes the NORAD missions, and I'll speak to each of them with a couple of slides to follow.

The NORAD missions of course emanate from the NORAD agreement, and they are summarized as aerospace warning and aerospace control. Of course these give us the raison d'être for the responsibilities we have in aerospace defence.

The first of these is aerospace warning. It's described by the words at the bottom of the slide, “Monitoring of man-made objects in space”, and more importantly, perhaps, “the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles”.

It's important to recognize that the mission for NORAD is really not air or space, but air and space, and therefore the term “aerospace”.

To provide warning, we have the responsibility to first of all detect and identify any potential threats to North America, and then to assess that threat and report accordingly to the national command authorities of Canada and the United States.

When I talk about threats through the air, I'm talking about bombers or cruise missiles, those vehicles that fly through the atmosphere and use the air for propulsion. When we refer to the missile threat, we're talking essentially about ballistic missiles, those that transit through space and then re-enter the atmosphere. And when we talk about space threats, we're talking about vehicles that are on orbit and that could pose a threat to North America from orbit, or could re-enter the atmosphere and therefore pose a threat. So it is air, missile, and space.

The other major area of our mission responsibility is aerospace control, and this is broken into two parts: air sovereignty and air defence. You can see that this is to provide the surveillance and control of air space—not air and space, but the air space; that is, the atmospheric portion of the atmosphere for Canada and the United States.

Air sovereignty is that traditional right that any nation has to protect its own aerospace. It involves the detection, identification, and the potential intercept of any targets that we see on our radar screens. It is an enduring mission, something that exists during peacetime, something that all nations have some responsibilty to perform. You can see by the pictures that we use fighter aircraft, of course, and the one picture, the big balloon there, is a balloon-borne radar that we use for this mission as well.

The other half of our aerospace control mission is that related to air defence. This is the mission of deterrence by providing a capability to actually engage a threat to North America by providing the appropriate response to an air attack through air intercept and identification, and ultimately to shoot a target down if that becomes necessary in case of war. So this is the ultimate defence that we have, in addition to air sovereignty, the other part of our aerospace control mission.

The list of capabilities on the next slide is a list of things I will talk about, with the exception of two. This list, first of all, is a list of the capabilities that we have to perform our mission. I will address each one of them, with the exception of the airborne warning and control system aircraft. This is the AWACS aircraft with the radar on top that we use from time to time for air surveillance. I won't go into specifics about the space surveillance system, or the network that exists.

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This network is largely operated by U.S. forces and is owned and operated by the U.S., but we do have Canadians who are based at a number of sensor sites that support the space surveillance network. This is monitoring man-made objects in space to determine which are friendly and which could pose a threat, and when a possible re-entering vehicle comes through the atmosphere to distinguish one from another.

I'll have one slide on each of the subsequent capabilities, starting with the defence support program.

The defence support program is a series of infrared-seeking satellites that are on orbit daily to provide us a detection of an infrared source on the surface of the earth, any ballistic missile that is launched and has a rocket motor that produces that infrared source. So this series of satellites in very high orbit gives us the capability to detect the launch of a ballistic missile from any point on the surface of the earth. The defence support program satellites would be the first indication that we would receive of a ballistic missile launch.

Additionally, we have a series of what we call ballistic missile radars that would detect predominately a re-entering vehicle or the ballistic missile itself as it enters radar coverage. And you can see that the dispersement of these radars is focused on the north. As you can see on the upper left-hand portion of the slide, the yellow dots are located in the north and east corners of North America and one in the United Kingdom, or in the continental United States, as you can see by the dots on the map on the lower right-hand side. These radars are to detect re-entering vehicles or warheads from a ballistic missile launch to pinpoint where they are and to predict their point of impact. So this would be the second indication that we would have of an attack on North America after having received the infrared information from the satellite-based capability.

Another capability we have is what we call atmospheric radars. These are perhaps the net of surveillance radars that are most commonly understood and known by people familiar with NORAD. This includes the North Warning System series of radars along the northern perimeter of Canada previously called the DEW Line, the Distant Early Warning Line. These are an upgraded series of those radars. And, as you can see, there are others circling the United States and based in Alaska.

Supplementing this system of aerospace surveillance is a series of aerostats, the balloon-based radars that are located along the southern coast of the United States, notably that with Mexico and bordering the Caribbean. These radars give us the capability to look down on the surface of the earth and have a better low-level coverage. These radars collectively provide us the capability to see aircraft or cruise missiles and provide detection and warning to NORAD.

We also, of course, have fighters. They're located at alert sites throughout North America. These ten sites are those sites at which we have fighters on day-to-day alert, two fighters each, for a total of twenty. You can see in Canada the main or principal sites are Cold Lake, Alberta, and Bagotville, Quebec. We can deploy to sites further north or to sites east and west as well.

We feel that the distribution of these ten sites is a reasonable risk in being able to prosecute any target, to go out and identify a particular target that may show up on our radar screens, given the relatively low threat that exists in the year 2000. In times of war, the number of fighters who could be deployed to these sites and others would increase from 20 to about 330, still quite a significantly small number when you compare this to some 3,400 fighters who were available to NORAD at the peak of our fighter activity.

We also have a system of command and control. The left-hand bottom of this slide shows a picture of the command centre in Cheyenne Mountain and the operation centre in Colorado Springs, which some of the members of SCONDVA visited earlier this year.

This slide describes the evolution of the threat NORAD has had to deal with over the years. Initially, of course, we had what we would call the traditional threat from predominantly the former Soviet Union and China, which includes nuclear-based capabilities, either airborne capabilities, submarine-launched capabilities, or land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

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Over the years, while these threats maintain their quantity—the capability is still there—the intent has clearly changed since the end of the Cold War. So we're not so much worried about the immediacy of an attack from Russia and China as we may have been during the Cold War years. Rather, we're more focused on the threats shown on the bottom half of the slide. Initially, the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology is a concern for all countries in the world. And as a responsible agency for aerospace defence for North America, it's a serious concern of ours.

We're also involved in drug trafficking, the apprehension and detection of people trying to smuggle drugs into Canada or North America. We have a supporting role. This is predominantly a law enforcement agency responsibility. We support them with our capabilities.

As are all major military commands, we are concerned with the threat that's represented by undeterred actors or nations. These are essentially terrorists who provide the suitcase bomb threat or the chemical attack in a large city. This is not unique to NORAD. It's something we all have to address.

Similarly, for the more evolving threat, it is the computer network defence. This is the need for us, as for all major commands, to ensure that our information, computer, and communication systems are properly protected against any infiltration—hacking, destruction, or any kind of other threat. It's important that we maintain a balance among these threats. It's important that the response we have is reasonable and consistent with the resources we have available to us—and of course with the threat that could be posed in the future.

The first threat that has always been there and perhaps always will be is that from Russia. This slide depicts the Russian nuclear triad, from ICBMs to the submarine-launched ballistic missile capability to the airborne air-launch cruise missile capability. These are all nuclear capabilities and represent the three pillars of Russian nuclear capability.

Even though Russia's stockpile of ballistic missiles has decreased over the years, their current capability is still formidable. They have some 800 delivery platforms with 5,000 warheads that are still capable of targeting North America. Russia remains committed to maintaining the core competencies of this nuclear triad. They continue R and D, research and development, to ensure that they maintain the capability and to ensure that they have the control and the proper modernization elements in place to ensure that the nuclear triad is effective.

So it does remain the most significant threat in terms of capability to the west, if not the intent. We do not expect a massive nuclear attack or even a single nuclear attack from Russia. The capability clearly still exists.

One other point that I might make is that the the deterioration of the Russian conventional forces has increased their dependence on their nuclear capability.

The other country that currently has the capability to target North America with intercontinental ballistic missiles is China. They have a submarine launch capability and a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile capability. Their force is very much smaller than Russia, but China is gradually expanding their capability, improving their arsenal. Their current inventory is about twenty intercontinental ballistic missiles.

I have to correct the slide where it says sixty intercontinental ballistic missiles. That includes a broader range of missiles that you would term as shorter range and actually being intercontinental. So the actual correct number for those missiles that can reach North America would be twenty.

They also continue with research and development. As noted there, they have an SBM, a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles. China does not present an immediate threat, though. Their doctrine is no first use. They do not maintain the warheads connected to the missiles on a day-to-day basis. So they're not on a hair-trigger to launch missiles at any particular time. We have to balance, of course, this lack of intent with the capability that exists.

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Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of ballistic missiles and the threat to North America rests with other countries in the world. Most ballistic missiles are regional or shorter-range ballistic missiles. The threat, though, is evolving.

North Korea is perhaps the single most predominant country that poses a long-range ballistic missile threat or could pose one in the near future. Their Taepo Dong missile, which was launched about a year and a half ago, demonstrated a capability that surprised us. We did not expect it to have the kind of long-range capability they were evidently developing.

No other country has yet developed an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten North America, but clearly the assessment from intelligence sources are that North Korea could very likely develop this capability within the next five years or so. Iran could probably develop it within the next ten years, and Iraq, possibly, within the next ten years.

Of course we never really know for certain whether this is going to evolve or not. The technological surprise is a possibility that could bring this threat closer to us.

At the bottom of the slide you'll see a true statement, although it is misplaced. I'll talk about cruise missiles in the next couple of slides.

To summarize the ballistic missile threat, you can see this list of countries that currently is developing or has a ballistic missile capability.

Ballistic missiles are a popular, nation-building, high-profile capability that many nations have. They provide a deterrent to an aggressor. They provide a tool for what you could term “coercive diplomacy”, and they provide a no-notice, long-range threat to countries like Canada and the United States. With that summary for ballistic missiles, I'd like to just touch briefly on cruise missiles.

This slide shows the capabilities that exist throughout the world by some countries that have cruise missile technology. Some seventy countries in the world have cruise missiles. These are generally the small, low-level weapons that can fly, some for very long range, as shown by the capabilities demonstrated in the United States and Russia. These can be air, land, or sea-launched. They're an air-breathing threat. While the cruise missile technology and the profile of cruise missiles have not reached that of ballistic missiles, this is a serious longer-term threat for North America.

The majority of cruise missiles are navy-based—that is, they're ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore. If you noticed on the previous slide, Canada has a cruise missile technology that is represented by the Harpoon capability we have in our navy.

These cruise missiles have been predominantly developed in Russia and China and other sophisticated countries, but proliferation has occurred and it is expected to continue. They could be launched from ships; they don't necessarily have to be launched from land or aircraft. They could be launched at fairly close range without any warning. That's what gives us the concern within NORAD of our capability to effectively defend against them.

I must point out that national missile defence is a capability against ballistic missiles. It does not have a capability against cruise missiles that are lower, slower, with a through-the-atmosphere capability.

This slide depicts our NORAD vision for the next ten years. While I won't delay in the interests of time on it at all, I would just like to point out the circle around the cluster of arrows that's identified as “information superiority”. This reflects our need to ensure we have the information and the communications computer systems, as necessary, to perform our mission, because we are very dependent on that. The computer network defence mission that I mentioned earlier of course applies to this particular capability.

I'd also like to divert your attention for just a couple of slides and reinforce the fact that NORAD is very heavily dependent on space-based capabilities. In fact, the five capabilities that are existing today from space vehicles are used every day by those of us in NORAD. These capabilities in fact contribute to the stability and confidence around the world—nuclear stability and others.

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The warning of missile attacks, shown as the second from the bottom there, is the defence support program infrared satellites I referred to earlier.

The bottom capability of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gives us the ability to warn against possible developments that could evolve to threats against North America and to have, of course, timely intelligence of their particular actions.

As the next slide shows, space is also an economic centre of gravity. In fact, I bet many would be surprised if they were to learn how dependent we are on a day-to-day basis on the capabilities that exist in space. Canada is one of the countries that is active in space. We have a number of payloads on orbit in space today, and we in fact were the third nation in space after Russia and the United States. We depend on space capabilities for communications, weather information, ecological and environmental issues, and so on.

The next slide is the last one I'll show you on the introduction to NORAD. It lists the issues with which we are dealing today. I've already addressed the cruise missile capability and mentioned the computer network defence evolution and the importance of that. I mentioned that the NORAD agreement renewal, although not contentious, is something that's occurring in the next little while. And I've briefly alluded to the understanding of NORAD, the fact that one of our issues or concerns is that people appreciate what NORAD does and understand that we do have an evolving mission that's important for the future.

The last and perhaps most topical issue is that of national missile defence. I would like to spend the rest of my time detailing some of the issues and concerns we have vis-à-vis national missile defence.

It's important for me to highlight that the national missile defence program is a program evolved by the United States for the protection of the United States. The national missile defence program is based on the threat as perceived by the United States, recognizing that the traditional threats of Russia and China are there, but, as I mentioned, have much lower intent than they have had in the past. But the ballistic missile proliferation around the world has precipitated a rogue nation or an accidental threat that could pose itself in the not too distant future. Whether the threat is intentional or unintentional, the national missile defence will provide a very limited capability to defend against it.

The operational requirements of this United States national missile defence system are to protect all 50 states of the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska, of course, against a limited attack. It's not to defeat a Russian massed attack or a large number of ballistic missiles; it's against a limited attack only. It's to negate an attack, in protection of those 50 states. They have two other criteria: to have a human in control so that some judgment is exercised in the employment of that defence, but it is supported by what we call “a highly automated battle manager” or an automated computer system that assists the defender in exercising the system.

As was explained by Mr. Bon last week, the national missile defense system is going to be implemented, if the decision is made to do so, in a series of steps, beginning with the capability to defend against a few missiles, a few inbound targets, as few as five, but evolving the capability to defend against as many as twenty.

As missiles are developed in their sophistication, they have countermeasures of decoys and other deception devices on board the warheads that evolve from simple to more complex. The system would evolve to be able to counteract against those kinds of capabilities. But again, it's not the Star Wars system envisaged in the 1980s. It's a limited system that would deal with the kinds of attack shown on this slide, one that was perhaps intentional but from a rogue nation, or a small number of missiles, an accidental launch. It could be a Russian or a Chinese launch that's simply accidental, against which we would have the capability to defend, or an unauthorized launch, one where somehow somebody managed to gain the codes and the access to actually launch a missile.

Some 100 interceptors are planned now, versus the original 20 that were initially envisaged, due to an economy of scale argument to deploy a reasonable number of interceptors to defeat as many as 20 missiles.

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The next slide depicts the evolution of national missile defence in the United States from what was known as the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s to what is now known as the National Missile Defense Program. You can see that the culmination of this activity is coming up very soon with what is called the deployment readiness review decision in the United States in June of this year. That could precipitate a decision in the autumn by the President of the United States to deploy or not deploy a system, or to delay the deployment. If the deployment decision were taken to deploy it, it could achieve an initial operational capability by the year 2005. Again, this would be against a rogue attack or an unauthorized or an accidental attack, and it would provide a deterrent. It really does give a different mindset to the current doctrine of mutually assured destruction that exists.

Right now, if there's an attack on the United States, really the only options that exist would be to accept the attack and suffer the consequences or to accept the attack and retaliate. With the national missile defense system, if there is a small number of missiles or a single missile that's inbound toward North America or the United States, then a defensive system allows the defence to take place and diplomacy hopefully to work out the issues afterwards.

The next slide shows a toolbox of the capabilities that exist in the proposed national missile defence system. I would be happy to answer any detailed questions you have on it.

The top left of the slide is the same defence support program satellites that I identified earlier, which would detect an infrared indication of a ballistic missile launch.

The upper right-hand portion of the slide is another component of a satellite system that would augment that detection as well in the future.

The bottom left is a series of X-band radars, as they're called, that would serve to give high-resolution tracking of an inbound missile that would discern which are the real targets and which might be the decoys, or to discern the actual position of a target.

The centre bottom part of the slide is what we call the upgraded early warning radars. These are the same ballistic missile warning radars that I identified previously that would be upgraded to have more capability to detect a threat.

The bottom right-hand corner of the slide is what is called the ground-based interceptor. It's important to note that the interceptor or the capability to actually engage a ballistic missile threat is not any kind of an explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead, but a kinetic warhead. That is, these warheads are based on missiles that would be launched toward an incoming threat, and the intercept of that missile is based on the kinetic impact of what they call the kill vehicle with the target. So it's a physical destruction of the target without any explosion or any kind of nuclear detonation. It's based on a bullet hitting a bullet, as they say.

The top centre of the slide indicates the battle management, command, control, and communication system, which is the heart and soul of the control of the ballistic missile defence that's proposed. It would be located in the Cheyenne Mountain operations centre in Colorado Springs.

Many of the tools in this toolbox support the current mission we have in NORAD, the warning and aerospace control mission I referred to earlier.

I mentioned that the United States was coming in June of this year to what we call the deployment readiness review, which is an assessment of the program to that point. This would provide the basis for a decision to deploy or not to deploy the system. The factors that will affect the review are shown on the slide, and essentially they are key factors that I'm sure you'll want to discuss. The first thing, of course, is confirmation of the threat, which is essentially accepted in the United States with the passing of the National Missile Defense Act last year.

The real key issue the United States is waiting to evolve is the technology itself. This will be dependent on the next missile test, which is planned to occur in late April or early May of this year. If that test is successful, it will provide an important criterion for a decision in June. Of course the anti-ballistic missile treaty issues are a major factor in the United States in making a decision in this regard.

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My last slide summarizes the current situation vis-à-vis the bilateral activities that are ongoing regarding ballistic missile defence. Of course, the United States is actively developing a system and is preparing to field it. They are negotiating anti-ballistic missile treaty issues with Russia, but apparently without much success thus far.

Canada is continuing research and consultation, as was stated in the white paper of 1994. We spend about $1 million a year on this program. We are monitoring the progress on anti-ballistic missile discussions because of the predominant importance that holds for the Government of Canada, and we are staying abreast of national missile defence progress and the issues related to it. But clearly there is a need for close bilateral consultation in order for us to stay tuned with the issues that surround this important aerospace defence issue for North America.

That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Macdonald.

Just for colleagues who haven't had the opportunity, when we did travel to Cheyenne Mountain, we had this or a very similar briefing from General Macdonald and his staff, and we were able to see it right at the mountain as we spent two days going around and actually seeing the different Canadian and American forces doing their job as they plugged into the mission of NORAD. I highly recommend to anyone who hasn't had the chance to seize the opportunity when it presents itself. I know Mr. Clouthier would agree with that, because he was part of that worthwhile trip.

General, you know our procedure. We now go to questions from members on both sides of the table. We always start with the official opposition.

Colleagues, it's your seven minutes, but it's seven minutes of questions and answers, so I'm going to encourage us to have crisp questions so that we can have maximum time for answers and for more questions—and I say that to all of us. I really think it facilitates the discussion.

I'm going to start with Mr. Hanger, as usual, for seven minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General, for your presentation. It's been valuable for myself, at least, and probably for other members of the committee who have not been down to the NORAD locations. I'm looking forward to being able to do that.

There's one question I would like to ask you. It's not intended to embarrass you or anything of that nature. There was a quote in Jane's Defence Weekly saying that Canada might withdraw from NORAD—you were quoted as saying that—if the NMD were approved. Would you clarify your position for us?

LGen George Macdonald: Absolutely, sir, and I'm happy to respond to that. Effectively I was misunderstood, and subsequently, Jane's Defence Weekly accepted that. In response to a letter that I wrote to them, they responded in their subsequent issue and identified that they had misinterpreted my comments.

I interpret the Canadian participation to national missile defence to be an important NORAD issue. How we eventually respond to national missile defence and the participation that we have in such a fundamental aerospace defence issue for North America will, I think, have some significant import for NORAD in the future.

The Chairman: I won't take this from your time, Mr. Hanger. I have here the Jane's—and I'll make it available to members after it's translated—retraction of February 9, where they admit misrepresenting General Macdonald's views.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I'm surprised in regard to your last slide. You had indicated that Canada contributes what, $1 million, to this entire operation? Am I hearing you correctly?

LGen George Macdonald: Yes, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: If Canada contributes $1 million, what portion is that of the total?

LGen George Macdonald: It would be perhaps specifically inaccurate to say that Canada contributed $1 million. We Canadians spend $1 million in the research and development activities we have that are consistent with some ballistic missile undertakings. That is responsive to our white paper's declared intentions for research and consultation in this particular area.

It is, however, a minuscule amount compared to the amount that the United States has spent over the years and plans to spend in the next several years if a deployment decision is taken. From the years of 2000 to 2005, there is an anticipated commitment of slightly over $10 billion American, which would be necessary to deploy the initial phase of the system if the United States decided to deploy it. Numbers vary on how much has been spent so far, but the bracket I have seen goes from $40 billion to $60 billion spent on the technology that affords the United States the opportunity to arrive at this particular point.

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Mr. Art Hanger: If Canada were to say no to involvement—and I understand we haven't been asked yet—in the national missile defence, do you think the U.S. would still have as high an interest in NORAD with Canada's involvement?

LGen George Macdonald: As I mentioned before, it's an extremely important issue for NORAD.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

LGen George Macdonald: There are some practicalities that prevail here. As I mentioned, the system we have now, whereby we perform our current NORAD mission for warning and detection of aerospace threats based in Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs, is operated by Americans and Canadians working side by side.

Many of the components of that facility that are currently used for our mission would be the same computers, the same display screens, the same infrastructure that would be applied to the ballistic missile defence mission. Ballistic missile defence as an extension of ballistic missile warning that we currently do today, simply as air warning, would be the preliminary stages of air defence if that were to occur, so there are some fundamental practicalities about the use of NORAD or the application of NORAD to the schematic control structure.

If Canadians declined to participate, there would be some practicalities about how this would actually work in Cheyenne Mountain itself, about how we would segregate Canadians to those roles that we had agreed to participate in and how we would keep them separate from the ballistic missile defence role. I would suspect that a position such as mine in the chain of command for NORAD would become non-viable, because I would only be able to participate in a portion of the mission that would seem to be overall a part of the aerospace defence of North America.

But perhaps there's a larger issue at stake, and that would be the perception of Canada not wanting to participate in an extension of a role that we have contributed to over the last 42 years, since NORAD was conceived. This would be the first departure from an agreement of a common threat by Canada and the United States and from an agreement of how to address that threat. That, coupled with other irritants that exist between our two countries on the level of defence-sharing between Canada and the United States, may well be the initial stages of the atrophying of NORAD.

I think there's considerable promise, but there's also considerable concern about the future of NORAD when one considers the participation of Canada in national missile defence. It will have to be determined over time, if and when the United States makes the decision to deploy the system, what our ultimate position will be.

Mr. Art Hanger: One hears all kinds of statements—I don't care if it's from the defence industry—about strained relationships between Canada and the United States, about loss of favoured status in even bidding on defence contracts. One statement I heard the other day was that the British are very interested in becoming involved in the position that Canadians hold in the NORAD union. You have to ask yourself, or at least I do as a politician, what's happening that is really causing some of this uneasiness between our two countries. From your point of view, do you see that as becoming more of a reality as these irritants, as you describe them, manifest themselves in barriers between us?

LGen George Macdonald: That's a question upon which I really won't speculate, but I will give you a couple of facts that have been reported. Dr. Hamre, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, speaking in Calgary last week, said in his presentation,

We want a stronger military power on our border. And we worry that it is not always the perception, frankly, of the Canadians.

He is suggesting that perhaps Canada wasn't contributing as much as the Americans feel we should be to defence. While that may not be a perception of everybody, it's certainly a concern that is there.

• 1620

From a point of view of sharing information, the recent ITAR issue, the sharing or foreign disclosure of export information between Canada and the United States, has been a concern to us. In this particular area, where Canadians have been excluded in some circles from access to information related to national missile defence, we are concerned because of the implications of having a nation—other than Americans—having access to some of the sensitive technological information. I would include the ITAR issue as one the list of irritants, as I mentioned, that is a real issue for us, something that is of concern to us on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. Art Hanger: Do you see us being replaced?

LGen George Macdonald: No, sir, I don't. I have not heard of any other possible partnerships.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Laurin, you have seven minutes.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Thank you.

Regarding the mission of NORAD you explained, General Macdonald, in the slide on air sovereignty, that one of the missions is to detect, identify and intercept. We are talking here about the interception of any incoming object. Is there any distinction between an interceptor and a sensor? In the defence system, the NMD, there is also a mention of sensors. What is the difference between the two?

LGen George Macdonald: We are talking here, under the air sovereignty issue, about intercepting an aircraft, specifically to identify a potential threat. This is the term commonly used to describe the scrambling of an interceptor in order to determine if a target is hostile or not.

Mr. René Laurin: So this has nothing to do with intercepting a missile.

LGen George Macdonald: No, not at all.

Mr. René Laurin: Fine.

Next, in another slide, the one dealing with atmospheric radars, you show the whole DEW line. It extends all around Alaska, along the northern border of Canada, the eastern seaboard of Canada and the United States and around the southern and northern borders of the United States. However, along the western seaboard, only one part is not enclosed, and that is the West Coast of Canada. But on the West Coast of the United States, there is a whole string of atmospheric radars. Why does the West Coast of Canada not require atmospheric radars?

LGen George Macdonald: There is a radar on Vancouver Island near Holberg, but there are none on the Alaskan Peninsula. The decision was made by the United States, about 15 years ago, not to spend money to install radars in those parts. If you consider the position of the Aleutian Islands, south of Alaska, you see it is very difficult to go around them to attack Northern America. Therefore, surveillance is not as important on the western side of Canada.

But we have the capability to deploy a number of mobile radars in some places on the West Coast if required.

Mr. René Laurin: So this was not a refusal in the past to install defence systems there. Neither is it a break in the protection system of this border.

LGen George Macdonald: No.

Mr. René Laurin: I would like you to comment on the NMD. Would this system complement that of NORAD? If missile defence bases were built, would the role of NORAD become less important? Are the two systems complementary or would one supplant the others in some regards?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: I would like to answer that in English, if you'll permit me.

The assumption is, thus far, that NORAD would be the agency or the command that would have the command control of national missile defence. The deployment of national missile defence will not replace NORAD, but rather could be, if it's deployed and if Canada participates, part of the NORAD mission.

• 1625

If a decision were taken for Canada not to participate in national missile defence, it is our understanding that the Americans would still deploy the battle management command and control system in Cheyenne Mountain and the system throughout the United States to effect the defence against ballistic missiles, but the command and control of that system would be under another agency, not under NORAD.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Since Canada has not been invited at this point in time to join this system, how could Canada continue to have a role in NORAD?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: I would agree with the commentary that Mr. Bon made last Thursday: it is probably simply a matter of Canada indicating an interest in wanting to participate that would precipitate an invitation by the United States.

It's not a question where we are at odds on this. I think enough consultation has gone on such that if we were to indicate an interest, the United States would respond with at least an agreement to negotiate participation. I don't think there's a real risk of us being forcibly excluded from the possibility of participation if the United States decides to deploy the system.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: There is something in there that does not make sense, General. Why would Canada, to be invited, have to indicate an interest? If the United States are interested in having Canada taking part in the deployment, why don't they just ask Canada, since they are initiating the project. If the United States are interested in Canadian participation, it seems to me the initiative of inviting Canada should come from them. Why should Canada take the initiative to request from the United States an invitation to become a participant?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: Again, I don't think I would want to speculate on the specific position of the United States, but it is clear that the national missile defence program is structured to defend the fifty United States and structured to be contained within infrastructure that would not include Canada, based on their plan for national security as perceived by the United States. I don't think they actively exclude the possibility of Canadian participation, as I indicated earlier, but I also think they would welcome some indication from Canada about the willingness of Canada to participate.

Our commander-in-chief of NORAD assumes, in what we call the concept of operations that is being developed, that NORAD will have the command control of the ballistic missile system that could be deployed if a decision were taken, and that it would be Canada and the United States participating together, located in Cheyenne Mountain, and so on. But that's just an assumption for the time being. There has been no close negotiation or exchange of positions that might precipitate a formal invitation or a formal declaration by Canada that would indicate we would like to participate—thus far.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

Now we come to this side, colleagues.

General, just by way of information, Mr. Proud has just been elected chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here in Ottawa. A number of our colleagues here are participating in that as well. Mr. Hanger is vice-chair of it. A number of our colleagues are actively involved in that, so I'm going to give the first question or the first opportunity to Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Macdonald. As the chairman said earlier, this morning we had the pleasure of receiving testimony from Project Ploughshares. They repeatedly stressed that there is no system available that will stop ballistic missiles from landing on our doorstep. Now, we know—or we're led to believe—that the threat is there. There is a threat. It's real. Nobody, I think, would deny that. Is there any truth to the claim that the NMD is not presently technically possible? My question is, if this is a fact, why would the U.S. be pursuing it if they don't have the technical ability to stop these missiles?

• 1630

LGen George Macdonald: Well, sir, there's no doubt that the national missile defence program is a very challenging, high-technology, high-risk undertaking, but the United States has invested a great deal of time and effort and money to develop the technology. In fact my understanding is it's not necessarily the individual technologies of the sensors or of the interception vehicle but more the integration of all of the information that's available and the coordination of the respective components that is the real challenge.

The program proceeds with a number of flight tests. A number of tests have been performed thus far, and a series of many more tests is to be accomplished. The last flight test, as you may have read in the media, was considered a failure in that it did not actually result in the intercept of the target by the kill vehicle. The reality is the test only failed in the last six seconds of its term, when the infrared cooling of the last sensor that was to have operated failed to provide the necessary cooling, and the interceptor missed the target by only a hair, only a very small margin. Many other test elements occurred before that point, in the launch and the detection and the discrimination of the target, quite successfully.

The assessment of the ballistic missile defence program director is that while it's unfortunate the actual intercept did not occur, the system performed very well up until that point, and this failure is considered a fairly small glitch in the overall testing that's going on.

So while there have been some failures, some problems, certainly everything is pointing towards the technology eventually being proven and developed to the point where a decision could be taken as early as June of this year.

We have participated as members of NORAD in some of the national missile defence simulations, as they call them, to examine the various scenarios of practice or exercise attacks of missiles to North America and how the system would function in defending against them. I can assure you that the system, although very complex, is becoming very well developed and is clearly evident of a great deal of investment by the United States to make it work, and work well.

I can't predict whether the technology will be available by June of this year to make a decision, or by a year or two later than that, but I believe the technology will eventually be available and that the current system certainly has the promise that would refute the points made by your witnesses this morning.

Mr. George Proud: So you are comfortable with the tests that have gone on thus far and are hoping the one in April will prove to be more accurate than the previous ones were? And if that is the case, then it will likely be a go-ahead by the United States to start this NMD?

LGen George Macdonald: I'm not an American and I'm not in the program, but certainly from what I have observed, there's a great deal of promise here. Even if the one coming up in April or May is unsuccessful, I'm sure there will be successful tests subsequent to that. If the test in April or May is successful and it does demonstrate an intercept and does prove the criteria the program office has established for the program, then all the ducks will be lined up for a decision to be taken in June. So the President of the United States could ultimately be given a recommendation to deploy the system if this next test proves to be fully successful.

Mr. George Proud: Another of the allegations of the group this morning was that this step is just one step in a number of steps to reach a larger scale and probably go on to Star Wars II or whatever the case may be. They believe this step, this NMD, is just the beginning of something that's going to grow much larger. Have you any comments on that?

LGen George Macdonald: As I indicated on one of my slides, there is a phased approach to include a larger number of missiles, but probably more important, a more sophisticated capability to defeat countermeasures of missiles. But the reality is there's no way an effective defence could be mounted against a large-scale attack.

Mr. George Proud: No.

LGen George Macdonald: When it was previously estimated, I think it was hundreds of billions of dollars that would be required to deploy the Star Wars systems of the 1980s. It's unaffordable and unrealistic to deploy a system that would defeat any large number of missiles. So the system really does appear to be a limited defence system responding to those accidental or unauthorized or single threats.

• 1635

Mr. George Proud: Your system now, the NORAD system, can detect incoming missiles, incoming planes, all this type of thing. You mentioned in your slides the cruise missile that can be launched from very short-range ships or whatever the case may be. Can you detect that? Do you people have the capability to detect incoming cruise missiles?

LGen George Macdonald: Yes, sir, we have the capability, using our atmospheric radars. Those are the ones referred to earlier by Monsieur Laurin that are on the periphery of the continent. Also the AWACS, the airborne radars, are useful for that capability. And the balloon-based radars also have that capability to look down to the surface of the earth. So we can detect them.

But a cruise missile is a very challenging threat. It's a small target, it can fly at very low altitude, and if it's launched from a cargo ship or something at close distance, then we could have very little warning of a possible launch. So while we have the capability if we have good information, we are susceptible perhaps to, in the future, an attack that could surprise us.

Mr. George Proud: Okay. Thank you.

The Chairman: Now we go to Mr. Earle for seven minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Just to follow up a bit on the capability of this system, you mentioned there would be further testing, and if they failed, then there would be further testing. When the system is being tested, is it tested in a way that it would measure the element of surprise? Because I doubt, if a rogue nation or someone is going to send off an unauthorized attack, that you will have any warning about it. Whereas when a test is taking place, I would assume one knows the test is taking place and has the conditions set up to operate the test. It would seem to me that is a structured arrangement, whereas an unauthorized attack would not necessarily be structured. Is the system set up to accommodate that?

LGen George Macdonald: There are two parts to your question, sir.

On the first, regarding the tests, a series of tests is programmed. I think seventeen or more are currently planned. So even after a decision were taken to deploy, if that were the case, a series of tests would occur over a period of years to ultimately develop increasing confidence in the system and its capabilities.

A test is always a very organized affair, as you say. You launch a target, you have an interceptor, you monitor both very closely, and you assess the outcome. An unauthorized attack or a surprise attack could occur at no notice, but we do have the capability in our current mission in NORAD to provide aerospace warning of detecting a surprise attack essentially from anywhere on earth.

We have good intelligence, so we're not often surprised, but when a ballistic missile is launched, we see it, and we can detect from where it comes and where it's going approximately. If it were indeed a threat to North America, we would be able to provide the necessary warning, reporting, assessing, and so on in good time. In fact we have a very strict, rigorous procedure we follow to ensure we can provide that warning as quickly as necessary.

So we are prepared for that now, and having a ballistic missile defence system would afford North America or the United States the possibility of actually defending against that, rather than simply accepting the consequences.

Mr. Gordon Earle: You mentioned the program was evolved by the U.S. and for the U.S. based upon the U.S. perception of threats. At this point, is the Canadian military basically in agreement with the U.S. perception of threats? Do we agree that same threat is real or the threat is there, and do we have the same concerns the Americans have with respect to that threat?

LGen George Macdonald: Generally yes. There are always some differences of opinion and different analyses of the time it may take to develop a certain threat, but there's no doubt that there's fairly strong agreement about the capability that exists, or that could exist, with proliferation and the exchange of technology we see happening every day.

Mr. Gordon Earle: You mentioned also in your presentation that the decision about deployment would be made after considering certain factors, one of which is ABM Treaty issues. That seems to be a big concern. We heard this morning that Russia is quite concerned about the U.S. taking any action that would violate that treaty. What is the position of the Canadian military in that regard? Do we not feel it's important to make sure that this issue is thoroughly ironed out before there's any association with this project on the part of Canada?

• 1640

LGen George Macdonald: The Canadian government has very clearly stated the concern Canada has over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It's seen to be an important pillar for nuclear stability and maintaining a high level of confidence, and Canada and other nations have expressed their concern about the possibility of unilateral abrogation of the treaty by one party or another. So it is of serious concern. The Canadian military does not have a position. We clearly acknowledge that of the Government of Canada.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Finally, do you feel that other measures could be deployed, I suppose primarily on the diplomatic front, that might offset the need for this project going ahead?

LGen George Macdonald: One would always hope that diplomatic actions will create or enhance stability worldwide.

The United States would appear to have concerns regardless of that. We're not talking just about an intentional launch, but even an accidental launch from China or Russia, which I think is a very low probability. But if the capability exists to defend against that sort of potential threat, then I think the United States feels it's in their interests and a concern of their national security to actually deploy a system that could do that.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Do we know whether China and Russia would be developing a similar system for their countries?

LGen George Macdonald: The Russians have an anti-ballistic missile system now. The treaty was established in 1972, and the Russians deployed a system of interceptors to protect Moscow. The United States initially developed a system that would be deployed to protect the missile fields of North Dakota, but later they decommissioned it. So none are available in North America right now, but there is one in Russia. I can't speak to China, I'm afraid.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Just as an aside, as a student and teacher of Canadian history, when I met General Macdonald I noted the spelling of his name with the small “d”. This is for Mrs. Wayne. I inquired, and he confirmed that he is related to one Sir John A. Macdonald. Mrs. Wayne, I know you'd want to know that, and it's your turn to question General Macdonald.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much.

I have to say I'm very pleased to see that we are involved with NORAD and that we are working with the United States, because I honestly do not believe that countries such as Russia, China, or North Korea would be involved with ballistic missiles if they didn't have a long-range plan sometime down the road to make use of them. I think we definitely should be prepared for that.

You mentioned that the cruise missile threat is growing, and that is something else we should definitely be prepared for. The only way we can do that is to work with our people throughout the United States who have been working on this for a long time.

Why would these other countries bother having these ballistic missiles if they didn't have a reason for doing so? Why would you bother with it? When the United States knows that and here we know it now, certainly there should be no question that we're involved. So I have major concerns, I truly do, about what I heard this morning about how we should not be involved and we should be staying away from this. That really bothers me. It really does.

You say here that the evolving threat to North America is probably from North Korea. Do you see that to be more of a threat than from Russia or China?

LGen George Macdonald: Yes, ma'am. Clearly, the Russians and the Chinese have the capability now, but, as I said, they do not demonstrate the intent. The Russians have a different relationship with the west from what they had during the Cold War, and the Chinese have a no-first-use doctrine, which is what we would call it. They do not intend to employ nuclear weapons as an offensive capability.

• 1645

North Korea, on the other hand, has demonstrated the intent and some of the capability that would comprise a threat. On August 31, 1998, they launched a Taepo Dong 1 missile that attempted to put a payload into orbit. While it failed, if it had been successful—and it came close to being successful—it would have demonstrated a desire to develop a longer-range capability that would actually deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms eventually to North America.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: This morning I informed the presenters that I had been in St. Petersburg at a meeting where 54 countries were represented, and when the motion was put on the floor that all of us there should support getting rid of nuclear arsenals, six or eight countries voted against it. One of them was North Korea. I'm going to tell you that sitting there, it was frightening. Russia was also one of them. The rest of these countries from around the world were saying that it is time to put all of this aside and that we really don't need them because we're all going to work together throughout the world. It was either six or eight countries—I have it in my records in my office—and I was really astonished when I saw who it was that was saying no to the motion on the floor.

So I think there is a real need for us to be involved with NORAD and for us to continue to work with our colleagues across the border. I'm very pleased that you are here, sir, and I'm hoping that you will stay on top of it, because I never want to see a cruise missile coming here and taking us out, that's for bloody well sure—not while I'm around, anyway.

The Chairman: You don't want it to land in Saint John.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, don't you dare. That's right.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

We'll now go to a second round of questions. This is a five-minute round, colleagues. We'll start again with Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

General, so that I understand the program a little better, the national missile defence site will be at one location on the entire continent. Is that correct?

LGen George Macdonald: The architecture for the proposed national missile defence system actually includes several sites, but there would be one site for the principal command and control in Colorado Springs. The ground-based interceptors would be at another single site, but clearly there are sensors that would be at various locations. There would be backup command-and-control facilities as well. So it's scattered, I suppose, from a surveillance perspective, but the interceptors would be in one place, and the predominant command and control would be in another place.

The Chairman: For clarification for Mr. Hanger and all of us, is it the Alaska site where the actual missiles would be housed?

LGen George Macdonald: There are actually two proposed sites for missiles, one in North Dakota and one in Alaska. Alaska appears to be the obvious single site for the protection of all fifty states.

Mr. Art Hanger: The intention over time, then, would be to expand on the number of interceptors. Is that correct? If they decided to deploy in the year 2005, a limited number would be set up initially, and then in subsequent years they would increase those numbers.

LGen George Macdonald: The initial deployment is envisaged to incorporate 100 interceptors. The initial deployment decision, if taken, would involve the deployment of 100 interceptors with what we call an initial operational capability of a smaller number in about 2005.

Mr. Art Hanger: If Canada were to become involved in the national missile defence program, what do you think it would cost us? There has to be a fair dollar attached to this, no doubt.

LGen George Macdonald: That's an interesting question, sir. The reality is that I can't give you a specific answer because we have not had discussions or negotiations with the Americans to determine what the cost might be.

• 1650

I don't think we should jump to the conclusion that it would be expensive, though. There is a possibility for us to contribute to aerospace defence of North America in participation with the Americans, including ballistic missile defence, without necessarily committing a great number of resources to it. The national missile defence program, as I've said, is totally a United States proposal, and if it is deployed it would be funded by the United States without the necessary participation of Canada.

I personally think that if Canada opted to participate, it's almost too late for us to make some tangible contribution to the initial deployment, either industrially or as a nation. Perhaps the best alternative would be to seek some quid pro quo contribution we could make to our mutual defence needs that would be seen as an acceptable alternative to direct participation in the natural deployment of the system. That quid pro quo could be something associated with our initiatives in providing enhanced space surveillance capability or in some other negotiated area that would be considered to be an acceptable alternative to direct investment in the national missile defence system.

I honestly don't know what the outcome might be if we were to go to that point, but I don't think we should conclude that it would necessarily be prohibitively expensive.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have quite a picture now of what really has happened, through that explanation. When it comes right down to it, the United States doesn't need Canada at all in this program. They could establish the ground they're going to protect, and they probably have already. I can certainly see why they would want to establish such a system. Canada's role being very limited in the whole scheme, we could be sidelined completely. They wouldn't need Canadian territory. They could work within the framework they've set up and do quite nicely without Canada.

LGen George Macdonald: That's essentially correct. There's no need for them to deploy any components of the system on Canadian soil. Canadian territory is academic in this case. We're talking about space and the interception of a vehicle in space. The funding has been identified within the American defence budget. The technology and the total control of the program, of course, is American.

Perhaps the anomaly is that we have cooperated very successfully throughout NORAD for some four decades in defending against aerospace threats to North America. This is clearly an extension of our current mission, and while the technology maybe didn't exist before, it could exist in the very near future and the decision could be made to deploy it.

One would expect, in confirmation of Mr. Bon's answer last week, that it would be something the Americans would certainly be amenable to. With a positive indication of our interest, I think we would find a way to extend the North American aerospace defence arrangement we have had in the past to include this particular mission.

Mr. Art Hanger: I think it would be very wise for our country to do that.

The Chairman: Thank you, General.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you, Chairman.

Do you think Canada should take the initiative and seek to become part of this? Obviously there's a reason that the United States hasn't asked us. I don't know what the reason is, but for some reason they haven't asked for Canada's participation. Do you think we should take the initiative and see that we become a partner in this?

LGen George Macdonald: Let me comment first on your comment that there's a reason that the United States hasn't asked us. I think one of the reasons is our declared concern with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To be frank, the United States is not about to ask a question they might get a negative answer or a convoluted answer to.

The real concern for us should be to maintain a very close awareness of what the implications are for Canada, for our NORAD agreement, for our defence relationship with the United States as it concerns national missile defence.

• 1655

I don't think Canada should be forced to make an immediate decision. In fact the Minister of National Defence has declared we would not make a decision until the United States made a positive decision to deploy the system. But in the interim I think it's important that Canadians be familiar with the facts of the national missile defence system and with the implications for us from a defence perspective, and that we make an intelligent assessment of what the options would be for Canada. It's incumbent on people like me and NORAD to ensure that information is available to our leadership and to the government so that they can assess the possibilities and use that information appropriately.

Of course at the same time we should be concerned about our overall defence relationship with the United States. We benefit a great deal from our relationship in NORAD. We have access to technology, we're able to influence defence policy, we're able to ensure we have interoperable systems and so on with the United States, largely as a result of our evident day-to-day relationship in NORAD. There's a tremendous defence exchange of goods across the border, about $1 billion every year each way, and 10,000 jobs created in Canada as a result of defence exports to the United States. The defence relationship expands to much more than just this particular issue.

Mr. George Proud: From your vantage point as a deputy CINC, do you hear of any ongoing negotiations or ongoing diplomatic representations in the European NATO countries as to what they feel about this? Do you see any stress points, any problems, if the United States decides to go ahead with this?

LGen George Macdonald: Well, sir, in my position I'm not privy to the specifics of any kinds of backroom negotiations that may occur with NATO, but I'm obviously aware of some of the open concerns that have been expressed by NATO allies about the implications of the deployment of a national missile defence system by the United States. There are concerns about the ABM Treaty and there are concerns about what they call decoupling of NATO, the alienation perhaps of North America and Europe in NATO, because one part would have a protection or defence that the other part did not have. But no, I'm not aware of any of the perhaps more sensitive comments that have been made.

Mr. George Proud: One of the questions I asked the group that was here this morning concerned Russia. Russia has a missile defence system, as I understand it, around Moscow. I was wondering why Russia would be upset if in fact the United States came up with a national missile defence system to protect themselves, when they already have one.

LGen George Macdonald: The issue concerns the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty itself. The treaty affords the opportunity to protect the capital of the country or a missile field, one or the other, but not the entire territory of the country. So the Russians have a system that is compliant with the ABM Treaty as it currently is written, but the proposed deployment of the national missile defence system would in fact defend the entire country of the United States, something that is not compliant with the treaty as it exists now.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Proud.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes.

Mr. René Laurin: It is not yet clear in my mind what Canada's position should be on these two issues: participation in NORAD and participation in the NMD system.

Suppose Canada decided to remain on the sideline in order to convince the United States or deter them from going ahead with their deployment of such a system, would Canada... We have been told this morning that Canada wields enough influence, together with our other allies within NATO, to deter the Americans from going ahead with their project.

Therefore, if we are convinced that Canada has such an influence, should we ask the United States to invite us to participate in the deployment of an NMD system, or should it desist from asking an invitation in order to play the role of a peacebroker or go-between between Russia and the United States, or just with the American government?

• 1700

I would like your comments.

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: Well, sir, it's not for me to speak for the Government of Canada on what choices might be made, but pursuant to my earlier answer, it's important that the Government of Canada be informed of the issues surrounding national missile defence, what the American concerns are for deploying it and their assessment of the threat and the ABM Treaty issues and so on, and the implications they have for NORAD and our broader defence relationship.

Given those facts, then we can afford the officials of the involved departments in the Government of Canada itself the opportunity to make an objective assessment of whether it's important for Canada to choose a route where we partner with the Americans on national missile defence or whether we choose an alternate route, with the concomitant results that may occur.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Is your advisory role—since you are Canada's advisor regarding NORAD—limited to inform the Canadian leadership of the technical properties or the existence of those weapons or of the threat they represent, or do you also provide a political assessment of the threat?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: I would characterize my role, sir, as providing the military assessment, the operational information, and the technical information, given that we in NORAD are closest to the source of much of that information. But ultimately it's for the national defence and foreign affairs departments, working from their perspectives, and the respective ministers and the government itself to assess the implications for Canada, the resource implications, and the diplomatic and political implications for the future.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I have a question of a financial nature. What would be the amount of Canada's participation in NORAD when the agreement comes up for renewal, that is our participation in the deployment of a ballistic missile defence system? What sort of a financial participation of Canada would be acceptable to the United States?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: There isn't an easy answer to that. There have been no specific negotiations that would indicate what kind of participation would be acceptable to the United States if Canada indicated an interest in participating.

My own personal opinion is that there are opportunities to negotiate an arrangement that would be acceptable to Canada and the United States that perhaps may not include a direct involvement in the deployment of the national missile defence system itself. That is, we could participate in some way that would be seen to be mutually beneficial to the aerospace defence of North America and that would be seen as a quid pro quo to direct involvement in the deployment.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Do you believe Canada could renew the NORAD agreement next summer regardless of its potential participation in the NMD?

[English]

LGen George Macdonald: It's clear they are currently in conflict. An important issue such as national missile defence would, in the future, if a system were deployed, clearly have an important impact on the NORAD agreement itself.

The current thinking on the NORAD agreement is that consideration is being given to the extension of the current agreement for a period of time that would allow us to get through a period when the United States could make a decision on national missile defence, and then, depending on the outcome, to renegotiate the terms of the NORAD agreement for the future.

So you're correct in saying they are in conflict right now, but there is a plan to de-conflict them to permit the opportunity to determine the outcome of what could be a very fundamental aerospace defence issue for Canada and the United States, and then to incorporate that into a future agreement.

The Chairman: Before we continue with Mr. Earle and Mrs. Wayne, I see an opportunity to ask some questions myself, General, and I have several I'd like to ask.

• 1705

This morning we had expert witnesses, as you know, from Project Ploughshares, and I asked the same question there. Is it your view that such a missile defence system would lower the likelihood of...? I hate to say a nuclear exchange. Would it lower the likelihood of an aggressive action or an exchange of some type, or would it raise the possibility of such a situation?

LGen George Macdonald: I think most people would agree it would lower the possibility of that occurrence. A national missile defence system provides a deterrence against an aggressor, be it a rogue nation or what have you.

As I indicated earlier, the ability to defend against a small number of threats really changes the mindset that has existed in the United States since the beginning of nuclear weapons. Rather than considering the potential retaliatory actions that could be taken if an attack should occur, the existence of a national missile defence system affords the opportunity to conduct the defence, hopefully successfully, and then to deal with the consequences.

Hopefully diplomacy would be the follow-on consequence, and any kind of accidental or unauthorized launch would be negated. That in itself would elevate then the threshold of any kind of potential nuclear exchange.

The Chairman: Thank you.

From the testimony we had this morning, those witnesses at least disagreed with that point of view. They stated they felt if the United States were to go into this missile defence system, with or without Canada, it would raise the likelihood. That surprised me a bit, but in fairness, that was the gist of their testimony.

In fact I asked why, and the answer was that a missile defence system would cause the Russians to feel more insecure, so they would go on a heightened state of alertness or readiness. They interpreted that as increasing the threat to peace. I'd be interested in your reaction to that.

LGen George Macdonald: Clearly a national missile defence system is a defensive system, so it provides no offensive threat to a perpetrator of a ballistic missile attack. As I indicated in my presentation, the Russians have some 5,000 warheads they are capable of deploying in a number of ways. The extent of the national missile defence system that is proposed—something like a hundred interceptors—really only has the capability to defeat a very small portion of the overall Russian nuclear arsenal.

So I personally fail to connect the logic between a defensive system and the increased, heightened state of alert, or the Russian point of view that this is somehow negating their nuclear arsenal.

The Chairman: Thank you. General, if, hypothetically speaking, the United States moved forward on this missile system, and if, hypothetically, Canada were not to partner with them on that system, what do you think that would do to the bilateral defence arrangement we have had called NORAD? Do you think it would be viable for Canada to continue? How do you think it would impact on NORAD?

LGen George Macdonald: It would depend on the overall defence relationship that would exist at that time between Canada and the United States, but I have concerns that it would affect NORAD and the future of NORAD negatively.

I think it would be difficult, first of all, due to the practical reasons of using the same types of computer systems and the same infrastructure for the current NORAD mission, which we have done for many years now, to apply that to the future national missile defence system and still expect Canadians and Americans to work closely together. That would be hard to rationalize. It would be difficult for the Americans to find a way to include Canadians in the overall NORAD mission as we have done it in the past, and add on ballistic missile defence as part of that mission.

And as I've indicated, the hierarchy, or the command-and-control structure, of NORAD currently includes me, for example, as the deputy commander-in-chief. When the commander-in-chief is not in Colorado Springs, then I'm essentially in charge of the day-to-day operation there. I don't think that would be possible if the ballistic missile defence mission were being conducted from Cheyenne Mountain in the aerospace defence context.

So I think there will be some serious issues for NORAD to address as a result of this if we do not participate and if the Americans decide to deploy it.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I do have the clock on myself here; I have about a minute.

• 1710

General, in touring Cheyenne Mountain with some of my colleagues, it was my perception that a lot of your staff are feeling already, as we speak, marginalized. I picked up the vibrations that there seems to be an assumption in the American military—whether perception or misperception—that Canada has no interest, and because that misperception, or perception, is there that our people under your command are feeling somewhat marginalized. I heard this from your own staff. Do you share that concern? What would you say about that?

LGen George Macdonald: Certainly there's an element of truth to that. While individual Americans may not harbour any overt sense of trying to exclude us from national missile defence, or from these issues, the reality is that the fact that Canada is not overtly participating allows them to draw some conclusions that result in some marginalization of Canadian activity.

For example, these national missile defence simulations I referred to earlier have enjoyed Canadian participation as members of NORAD for the last several years, whereas next year, because of an issue related to the disclosure of information by the contractor who is doing the work for the Americans in national missile defence, some Canadians will not be included because they have not been afforded the necessary training to be participants to the next simulation. That limits our capability to provide the necessary information and advice to officials and the government about what the system is all about and what some of the implications might be for NORAD.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General.

That's my time. I will go now to Mr. Earle for five minutes.

We've been joined by our colleague, Bill Graham, chair of the foreign affairs and international trade committee. After we've worked through my list of colleagues on defence, if there's some time, I'd be happy to give Bill a chance for a couple of questions.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to return to the point the chairman was raising that we heard about this morning with respect to the heightened concern by Russia and other countries if the U.S. proceeds with this system. It puzzled me a bit too, because I'm thinking if it's a defensive system without any offensive potential, then why would people be concerned? But the answer was that basically it's not the defence system in itself, but it's that combined with the offensive capability the U.S. would have that creates the overall concern.

I noticed in your presentation you talk about how ballistic missiles have become a national symbol of strength and prestige. If that's the case, then it would seem to me that a country that has this capability, plus also the capability of defending itself against other countries' missiles, would be stronger and more prestigious than a country that only has the capability of offensive missiles but doesn't have a national defence missile system.

That would then perhaps cause these other countries to want to build up their systems. It becomes almost a race to the top to see who can be the strongest with both the defence system and the offensive system. That creates a climate of build up, build up, build up, rather than what I would like to see, which is it coming down, people starting to dismantle their weapons and their systems.

In that regard, I wondered if you could comment a bit. I noticed on one of your slides you have supply and demand and you show the customers for these missiles, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and so forth; and then suppliers—Russia, China, North Korea and so forth. Can you tell me, first of all, if something is being done on that front to deal with that particular issue? And are either Canada or the United States suppliers to other countries, either for components or for these missiles themselves?

LGen George Macdonald: To start with your last question first, no, neither Canada nor the United States contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the world. But clearly, as you can see on the list, there are countries that are actively involved in selling that technology. North Korea is developing the indigenous technology itself, but also proliferating that to a number of other countries. That of course is a concern for all of us.

I think we would all agree that having fewer ballistic missiles or fewer nuclear weapons in the world would be a positive development we would all welcome.

In your earlier comments about a defensive versus offensive capability, the United States does not purport to provide a system that would defend against a large attack. So the Russia concern about having the effectiveness of their offensive systems negated or diminished in some way as a result of a national missile defence system doesn't figure when you compare the numbers of the offensive nuclear weapons they currently possess and those that are being reported to be deployed in this defensive system.

• 1715

I have indicated that the number of interceptors that is anticipated to be deployed is something like one hundred by the year 2005 or 2007. One hundred interceptors does not necessarily defend against one hundred targets. To provide the level of assurance necessary to have confidence in the capability of the system there could be as many as five interceptors launched at a single target. So when we talk about one hundred interceptors, we're talking about the capability against something like twenty incoming warheads. Those twenty warheads do not even necessarily represent twenty ballistic missiles, but they could represent as few as two ballistic missiles if they were multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

So this really is a system toward a limited attack, and one that would not be effective against the arsenal that Russia has, or any country that develops a significant arsenal.

Mr. Gordon Earle: So with that limited capability, is it still your feeling that it's an endeavour that's worth pursuing and having in place if it is really quite limited in what it can do?

LGen George Macdonald: Rather than giving you my personal impression, I can reiterate the United States' assessment of the threat that exists and that will exist over the next several years. The nearest-term threat is that posed by North Korea to have a capability ultimately to attack the United States.

I think the Americans feel it's in their national interest to deploy such a system, because having developed the technology, and having the capability, and not deploying it against what could be a catastrophic event if any nuclear detonation occurred on United States soil.... It's something they feel they have do to in the interest of their own national security. That's what's reported. That's not my personal opinion. That's their stated aim in this.

I think Canada's participation has to be made from a Canadian perspective and the impact of the fact that we're geographically close to the United States and the ultimate benefits or negative factors it may have on our NORAD relationship.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

We come now to Mr. Proud. Did you have...?

Mr. George Proud: I have a follow-up question.

The NORAD as it exists today with your ability to detect incoming missiles—I asked you this before—would this system be part of the set-up that would be used? Would this be the set-up that would be used for detecting this type of attack that could come to the United States? With everything that's in place now, is that why you're saying that you fellows would be used at Cheyenne Mountain to do this?

LGen George Macdonald: Yes, sir. You should think of a ballistic missile event as a continuum where initially you detect it, you assess it, you determine whether it is indeed a threat, report it, and then ultimately defend against it.

The systems you would use to provide that continuum of capability are all the same systems in Cheyenne Mountain. Admittedly the ballistic missile defence piece of it is an add-on to what currently exists there now from a warning perspective, but it would all be done in the same room, for example. It would be done using the same communications, the same computer systems and so on, and the same displays. So it's difficult to separate the warning from the defence, and from a military perspective it would be a serious disconnect to try to separate them, because the same information used for warning is used for defence as well. It's all part of the same process.

My point earlier was that if Canada and the United States do not agree to participate together on this then there would have to be some conscious delineation of Canadian participation in how we would operate those systems in retaining the capability that we currently have to provide ballistic missile warning, and somehow extrapolating the then uniquely American responsibility to provide the defence.

Mr. George Proud: It would be a bit awkward, wouldn't it?

LGen George Macdonald: Yes, sir.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Proud.

Now Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My understanding is that the next plenary of the conference on disarmament is going to be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, March 2. That's the day after tomorrow. Is Canada invited to that meeting?

• 1720

LGen George Macdonald: I am sorry, ma'am; I'm not aware of the schedule or the participants.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: This was a press release put out: “Russian Federation and China Stress Importance of Addressing Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space in Conference on Disarmament”. I don't know where they're holding this, but they're holding it on Thursday, March 2. It's stated in here:

If the United States implemented its unilateral plans on a national missile defence system, the ABM Treaty would be destroyed.

They're going to discuss that.

This is a very important issue. This document I have, this press release and what's contained in it.... I would have thought that perhaps where there's NORAD, Canada and the United States both would be asked to attend this conference. Certainly with what they're going to discuss on Thursday, there should be some input, particularly from the United States but from us as well.

When Mr. Bon was here, he said that at the present time you had not received direction or standing orders from your superiors here in Ottawa. If that's the case.... You had indicated earlier that your NORAD commander in chief had a concept of operations that assumed Canadian participation and NORAD control. I was wondering if you, sir, had any input into that concept of operations and also this meeting they're having. According to this document I've been reading, it's one in which we certainly should have our voices heard.

LGen George Macdonald: I'm informed that indeed both Canada and the United States are members of this particular organization. As we have participated in the past, I would expect us to participate in this particular event.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right.

LGen George Macdonald: Vis-à-vis the national missile defence concept of operations, the assumption has been that NORAD would assume the command and control of a ballistic missile defence system. The assumption was made because some assumption had to be made, and it was agreed at a fairly high level in the United States a few years ago that this is the obvious assumption. As I had indicated earlier, ballistic missile defence is an extension of ballistic missile warning. So there's a certain logic to that.

We indeed do have significant input to the concept of operations, but I would have to caveat that by saying that as NORAD staff, we participate but our participation becomes a little more tenuous on a day-to-day basis because of the lack of absolute confirmation that NORAD will have the command and control of the system. While it's important to continue with the development of a concept of operations, clearly the ultimate resolution of the Canadian and ultimately the NORAD position will provide a certain amount of impetus to finalize many of the issues we've been discussing over the last few years.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If the United States did implement its unilateral plans on a national missile defence system and if that ABM Treaty, which I guess goes back to 1972, were destroyed because of it, what kind of position does that put us in now? Do you think the Russians and the Chinese and the North Koreans would be much more aggressive in taking on the United States and us, because we're part of NORAD, if they did that unilaterally without sitting down and working out some kind of an agreement with these other countries?

LGen George Macdonald: It would be difficult for me to speculate on the outcome, but clearly the Government of Canada has openly stated the concern we all have for the potential unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It's perfectly legal for the United States to do that with given notice, but that is seen to be a nuclear destabilizing event if it were to occur.

Our encouragement to the Americans has been to abide by the ABM Treaty and to negotiate a suitable amendment with the Russians. If that were to occur, I think any mutually agreed-upon amendment between the United States and Russia would be acceptable to Canada.

• 1725

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Colleagues, that completes two full rounds. I know several of us have other meetings, and before we adjourn at 5:30 I'm going to invite our colleague, Mr. Graham, to ask a couple of questions.

Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.

I'd just like to follow up along the line of thought of both Mr. Earle and Mrs. Wayne. I think this is the core of what we're really struggling with. There's sort of a balance of terror there at the moment and if it is changed.... I'm asking you as a military strategist, not as a politician.

Following up on Mrs. Wayne's question, I specifically was told by the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of China when I was in China that if the United States engages in this, there will be a new arms race because China will not be able to afford to sit there and basically have its defence destroyed. As you know, the theory is that if you have no offensive capacity against another country, you have no essential defence. They're concerned about a second attack and there's a whole host of military concepts that I don't have time to go into in the short time here.

This is ultimately it, isn't it? You've kind of touched on it. You said if this pushes us into a new arms race.... You have to go back to your earlier answer to one of the questions when you said this will increase security. In fact it would decrease security if it pushes us into a new arms race, wouldn't it?

LGen George Macdonald: I beg to differ. I think the nuclear threshold, the exchange of nuclear weapons potential, would be increased by the deployment of a national missile defence system because it offers options or alternatives to retaliating against a nuclear exchange. Of course, the national missile defence system proposed by the United States would defeat a very small number of missiles.

The Chinese doctrine is not to use their offensive capability as a first strike. Their doctrine clearly says they would use it as a retaliatory action against any nuclear strike on China. That's their perspective.

They are increasing their capability. They're building more ballistic missiles. They are developing ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, that will be mobile and therefore less easily detectable by any intelligence sources we may have. They continue to evolve the technology they have in order to develop longer range and better weapons. I'm not so sure there's a connection between that activity and the national missile defence proposal the United States has.

Mr. Bill Graham: That said, you did say this will be a risky enterprise if we don't get a clearance under the ABM Treaty. It is your opinion that this should only go ahead if the United States can get a derogation under the ABM Treaty. I understood you to say that because in fact if we don't get a derogation under the ABM Treaty the ABM Treaty is dead and then we're into a new arms race and nobody knows where that's going to lead. Sure we're going to be ahead technologically today, but there's no guarantee we're going to be ahead forever. We're going to spend a lot of money trying to stay ahead.

All the money that the recent budget devoted toward national defence may have to go into one or two missiles instead of all the other national defence priorities you have. These are the concerns we're trying to deal with and trying to get a better understanding of.

LGen George Macdonald: I would have two comments, sir. One would be that it was not my position or my personal opinion about the concerns we have about the ABM treaty but rather the stated position of the Government of Canada about the concern that unilateral abrogation of the treaty might precipitate.

The second point would be that there's no confirmed level of contribution or monetary commitment that would have to be made by Canada either to enjoy the benefit of this proposed system or to participate in our mutual defence with the United States. The quantification of that has simply not been decided or negotiated between our two countries.

The Chairman: Thank you.

General Macdonald and Colonel Higgins, thank you both very much for being here today. You've brought a level of expertise to these discussions, which are very important. As you know, we're just barely starting hearings on RMA and a sub-theme of national missile defence. I know it will be a topic of great interest here in Ottawa. I thank you very much for sharing your expertise with us this afternoon.

LGen George Macdonald: Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to participate. I would reiterate that I'm available in the future to provide any extra information you may wish.

The Chairman: We appreciate that. Thank you very much.

Colleagues, committee adjourned.