NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 4, 2000

• 0900

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs for the purpose of hearing from our witness today, who is Professor Jim Fergusson. He's deputy director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.

Mr. Fergusson, it's nice to have met you on a trip to Washington, and I'm pleased to welcome you here today and to hear your submissions.

Professor Jim Fergusson (Individual Presentation): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to keep my opening comments very brief and emphasize four points to you.

One, the most important point to understand is that the current issue confronting Canada on national missile defence is that Canada is at a crossroads. This decision, I would argue, is probably one of the most important political strategic decisions facing this country, because whether or not Canada decides to participate will set Canada off on a path in its foreign and defence policies that will have implications one way or the other.

The second point I wanted to raise is based upon something I wrote in 1995. That was in the wake of the 1994 defence white paper, which had two paragraphs on ballistic missile defence in the section on North America. This was published in the Financial Post in March 1995, and I think it serves a useful basis for framing some of the issues we might want to talk about today.

Let me quote from certain sections of it. The title of the article was, “The Coming Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence”, and I quote:

There will be an initial tendency to structure the debate around Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative of the 1980s, better known as “Star Wars”. This tendency must be avoided. The Cold War is over. Russia and the United States are no longer political and military adversaries. Concerns that strategic missile defence could destabilize the nuclear deterrence relationship between them are no longer relevant, if for no other reason than that they no longer practice mutual deterrence.

Arguments are likely to emerge that the development and deployment of a BMD system by the United States could re-ignite the Cold War are simply incorrect. Military systems are a symptom, not a cause of political conflict. Moreover, both the United States and Russia are exploring a cooperative approach to BMD, although it should be recognized that differences do exist between them on this issue.

Also, BMD considerations today are not strategic in the sense of the Cold War debate. Rather, they are a function of increasing evidence of the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities by states which have demonstrated varying degrees of interest in also acquiring weapons of mass destruction.... The common interest is to develop a system capable of dealing only with a country with a very small and limited ballistic missile capability. The belief is that such a system could serve to reduce proliferation incentives.

This common interest will also impact on a potentially misleading debate on the 1972 ABM Treaty, which Canadian policy treats as sacrosanct. On one hand, the fundamental intent of the Treaty is not at issue. As of yet, there is little indication that the United States is truly interested in moving beyond the single site, 100 interceptor limit for strategic defence within the Treaty. Even if the Treaty is abrogated unilaterally...

as some have argued in the United States

...it does not mean that the United States will move towards a Star Wars system. On the contrary, the United States would likely remain within the fundamental limits of ABM, similar to the situation surrounding the SALT II agreement of 1979, which the United States never ratified.

...For Canada, the issue is to develop a Canadian position on ABM revision, not to treat BMD as a fundamental threat to the Treaty.

In this context, the Canadian debate needs to be a truly Canadian one. Too often debates in Canada are largely driven by debates elsewhere, particularly south of the border. Many of the issues and concerns surrounding BMD are common to Canada, the United States, and Europe. However, there are unique Canadian issues which should be the centrepiece of this Canadian debate that concern Canadian foreign, defence, and economic interests in the current political and fiscal climate.

BMD issues are extremely complicated and technical in nature. There is no single BMD system under consideration today

—and this was in 1995—

but rather many competing systems and visions within the United States and Europe. Each system and vision must be carefully considered by Canadians in order to ensure informed policy. Canada's past track record in this regard is not a good one. Part of the problem is that Canadian engagement largely occurs too late. The White Paper has opened the door for considering what will be a very important defence issue in the near future. The time is now to begin the debate, not later on when decisions have already been made by others and Canada can react in only an “ad hoc” fashion.

• 0905

As I said to you, this piece was published in 1995. We are now at 2000. On the basis of the arguments I put forward then, let me track to today and bring to your attention, as you're all aware, the four criteria of the current administration in the United States on national missile defence deployment.

Four criteria have been enunciated upon which the administration will decide whether or not to deploy a national missile defence system. They are the threat, cost, feasibility, and international security concerns. These four areas have in fact been the centrepiece of the recent flurry of public debate, particularly in the media, on Canadian policy, emphasizing mostly the threat issue and as well international security concerns related to the ABM Treaty, Russia, China, and fears about arms races and the threat to the non-proliferation regime.

Unfortunately for Canadians—and I'm not suggesting these should not be talked about, particularly the threat in international security, and I look forward to talking to you about them today—the fact of the matter is that all of them have largely been finished in the United States; that is, the debate is over in the United States. The threat has been accepted by the United States administration.

Initially, in January 1999, Secretary of Defense Cohen made it very clear that the threat is approaching, the criterion has been met, and it likely will emerge by 2005, the deployment date set right now, if a decision is made this summer.

With regard to cost, the money was authorized by last year's Congress, and it has been authorized again by this year's Congress, to include deployment costs in the 2000 and now the 2001 defense budgets.

Feasibility awaits the June test. If that test is successful, the President will, all things being equal, say yes to deployment.

Finally, with regard to international security, it's very clear as a function of last year's bipartisan legislation in the House and the Senate, signed by President Clinton, that this is not a concern or an issue for deployment itself. In fact, if the test is successful or sufficient tests are successful to demonstrate feasibility, the current United States administration and the next administration will be committed to deployment.

The fundamental issue facing Canada, it seems to me, is that there is a degree of inevitability here. Thus, I would suggest to you that the key issue is what Canada's interests are, what the costs and benefits for Canada are when the United States decides to go ahead and, as expected, issues an invitation for Canada to participate.

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the world in 10 to 15 years. I think this issue has been lost sight of, particularly in the public media, as a function of the focus on the United States and national missile defence. Certainly in the years 2010 to 2015 the United States will have a limited ground-based missile defence system likely of one, possibly of two, sites.

It will not only be the United States possessing missile defences. Our European allies will possess, at a minimum, lower-tier naval-based missile defences to go along with existing lower-tier ground-based missile defences already in the possession of Germany and the Netherlands. NATO will have moved ahead on its extended integrated air defence architecture. Its goal is to develop both the lower and upper tier capability, which will ostensibly give Europe a nascent form of strategic missile defence.

Israel will have deployed the Arrow. It already has. It will possess a strategic defence for Israeli territories.

It's likely Japan, possibly Taiwan, possibly South Korea...not to mention Russia itself, who will likely, through cooperative arrangements with the United States, develop much more sophisticated missile defences to go along with its current system deployed around Moscow of 100 interceptors.

In other words, I would strongly argue that we are looking in the future to a world in which missile defences are a strategic reality. I think this certainly has to be taken into account in Canadian policy- and decision-making.

Thank you.

• 0910

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Fergusson.

Before we go to questions from the members, can I get a clarification from you, because it's an important point that we've heard a lot of evidence on. Did I understand you to say that under the ABM Treaty between Russia and the U.S. this proposed U.S. system is allowed or is not allowed?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: The specific details of the proposed deployment...that is, the desire by the United States or the preference to deploy the system itself in Alaska, along with the ground-based radar not co-located with the interceptors in Alaska, violates article 3 of the ABM Treaty and violates article 1 of the 1974 protocol.

The treaty also prohibits—and this is somewhat debatable—national coverage, which ostensibly.... The 100 interceptors deployed in Alaska would give 100% coverage or are estimated to give full coverage, so that by the letter of the treaty it does violate it. However, by the intent of the treaty—that is, a treaty designed to maintain a stable strategic relationship, to avoid competitive investments in strategic offensive and defensive forces, to avoid an arms race—that will not be upset to one degree by the deployment of this site. And it's important to remember that there are no concerns anywhere among any of the public press about the existence of treaty-compliant 100 interceptors defending Moscow, which have been in place since the early 1970s.

The Chair: Thank you very much for that clarification. I think it's an important one to have on the record.

We'll start the questions from our colleagues. Mr. Hart first, for seven minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to start by acknowledging the Centre for Legislative Exchange, which organized our security and defence tour of Washington, D.C., some three weeks ago. It was very informative. Professor Fergusson was with us on that trip. We heard from several senators and congressmen in the United States. All of them appeared to be very supportive of the missile defence system.

One of the most interesting people we met and talked to was His Excellency Raymond Chrétien, Canada's ambassador to Washington. He talked about the missile defence system as well. I asked him directly where Canada would be in our political relationship with the United States if we chose not to go into missile defence. He was very straightforward with me, I believe. He said it would harm the relationship between Canada and the U.S. and it would probably be the first time in history that Canada and the United States did not participate together in a North American bilateral agreement.

What was your impression of that meeting?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: That is the basic impression I got from the meeting as well, that the ambassador did express concerns about the impact of a negative Canadian decision on Canada-U.S. defence relations. I would agree with him. It seems to me that is perhaps the most important issue for the Government of Canada and for the House of Commons in debating this issue, what this will do to Canada-U.S. defence relations.

It has been for too long in this country, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the general assumption that Canada-U.S. relations are immune to disagreements. I'm not at all suggesting that Canada has to be subservient to Washington on these issues, but we do have to be sensitive to the fact that there are certain issues where the United States, as we in Canada.... The example for Canada, of course, is Canadian concerns about the international traffic in arms regulations issue, where the United States by and large unilaterally ended our waiver, which has had an impact in this country and on which we are seeking to influence the United States to alter its policies. In that regard, similarly, Canada feels the brunt at times, but also at times Canada does have to be concerned that there are issues that could seriously damage Canada-U.S. relations, and as a result, Canada would pay significant costs.

Mr. Jim Hart: Is NORAD, for instance, one of those areas we should be concerned about?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Well, particularly NORAD. I think one has to be careful about turning this into a debate about the future of NORAD as an institution—and I don't want to do that—but it is important in terms of NORAD representing the core institution or what I like to call the centrepiece of Canada-U.S. defence relations. The direct impact to NORAD would likely be the marginalization of NORAD, or as I like to put it, NORAD would wither on the vine if Canada did not participate.

• 0915

Mr. Jim Hart: NORAD can be considered for Canada a value-added bilateral agreement, because we probably get far more out of NORAD then we actually contribute since the Americans cover about 90% of the cost. Would that be a comparison as to what Canada would gain from missile defence as well?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: It's hard to say how much we would gain by missile defence. Certainly in terms of maintaining the benefits of the relationship—the low cost to Canada of participating in joint surveillance of North American territory, in air defence, also in missile defence; continuing our role in aerospace, early warning, and attack characterization; maintaining our entree or our cost-effective approach to having a Canadian role in outer space, which hinges upon our close relationship through NORAD to U.S. Space Command; an independent Canadian interest in military and civilian interests in ensuring that that relationship continues—those are certainly great benefits that Canada receives, and I would agree that we receive them at a relatively low cost.

I think if you went back to the arguments at the time of NORAD's negotiation and signing in the fifties and did a comparative cost of what Canada would have paid if it had to go a national route to develop aerospace control, if you will, or surveillance of its national territory, the costs would have been horrendous to this country.

Mr. Jim Hart: In your opening remarks you mentioned actual cooperation between the U.S. and Russia with respect to technology. I assume it's technology we're talking about, shared technology, in missile defence. One of the arguments we hear all the time from those opposed to national missile defence systems is that it's going to harm the relationship between Canada, the U.S., and Russia. I would like you to explore that a little bit more. Can you tell us how that would work and, with shared cooperation, why that would take place?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: If one traces back to the early 1990s when the then Bush administration revised what had been the strategic defence initiative into what became known as global protection against limited strikes, the GPALS system, it was done with close consultation and close discussions with then President Yeltsin of Russia. Where that looked like it was heading at the time was an initial stage of cooperation on the development of a global warning system, not least of all to deal with some of the problems that Russia faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and certain major gaps in its early warning systems.

This was going to be the centrepiece at the time, or looked like the centrepiece, of building a cooperative relationship. Of course, at that time the United States also began, in cooperation with Russia, to provide a greater exchange of information. START I, and subsequently START II, was signed with very significant movement in verification. The United States and Russia also began to move, through the Nunn-Lugar amendments, to support Russian dismantling of its nuclear warheads.

In the missile defence area specifically, Russia and the United States at a variety of cooperative levels, particularly in theatre missile defence, began exchanges of information. Russian military officials attended testing in White Sands. I would also add that the Russians did provide sounding rockets for a variety of experiments that are central to missile defence interception for basically high-level endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric intercepts.

So there's been a long history, in fact, despite the public strategic rhetoric, if you will, of cooperation between the United States and Russia. And it has always been the case, since the time of President Reagan, that the United States has said that when the technology is developed it would be willing to share this technology. President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton have all said the same thing: that once this becomes more mature, Russia has an interest, as the United States does, in strategic defences. And if you go back to our trip of two weeks ago and take the argument of Representative Curt Weldon, he strongly believes that this will be a very important element of cooperation in the future with Russia.

• 0920

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have seven minutes, please.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Jim, I would like to begin by apologizing for having missed your submission. I was a little late, but I am nevertheless happy to be here after having had the privilege of meeting you on our trip to Washington and even to have been able to discuss a few things with you that I found very informative. So I'm very happy to find you here today.

I hope that I will not be asking questions that you covered in your submission. If I do, please tell me.

A General in the U.S. Armed Forces said yesterday that if a bomb landed on Ottawa, the capital, the United States would not necessarily feel obligated to defend Canada, to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that Canada would not allow itself to be impressed by blackmail. This is an opinion that I share.

It seems in this matter that Canada is speaking two languages. Mr. Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, appears to be opposed to Canada's participation in the missile defence system, whereas the Minister of Defence and all the military representatives we have met, both in Canada and abroad, appear to be rather in favour of Canada's participation in the system. We therefore conclude that Canada has not yet reached consensus on this issue.

I think that in such debates, we perhaps too often forget that the United States is our friend and a very important partner, but that we too are a very important partner to the United States. When the United States threatens us in some way, I wonder to what extent they should be afraid of Canada not participating in the deployment of such a missile system, because we represent a degree of security for them. We are indeed a buffer between the United States and its potential enemies elsewhere in the world.

From this standpoint, can Canada, from the diplomatic and even the trade standpoint, remain neutral on the issues at stake, and if not, can it go so far as to oppose the establishment of this missile system in the United States? Can this be done while at the same time assessing the risks and disadvantages and hope that the damage is not as bad as feared?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: You've raised, perhaps, one of the most difficult speculative questions on the commercial side of the equation, and I think it's a very important one.

I would agree with you entirely that Canada and the United States economically, commercially, are in a mutual dependency relationship. We both benefit from the relationship and it's very unlikely, given the importance of each of us to each other's economy, that the United States would then seek to punish Canada, if you will, on a commercial basis for a decision not to participate. We do have to be very careful when we assess the costs commercially of non-participation.

Having said that, however, I think we do have to be sensitive to potential costs. On the commercial side there are two direct potential costs. One is directly in the defence industrial relationship and the evolution of Canada's defence industrial capacity and, with it, its high-technology aerospace sectors, which have largely evolved hand in glove, if you will, with the United States through the defence production sharing arrangements and other arrangements as well, one of those parts of our relationship that of course, as I said earlier, was recently damaged by the ITAR decision by the State Department.

• 0925

Historically—and I'll use the one example—there has been a range of irritants between Canada and the United States over the defence industrial relationship, particularly certain legislation passed by Congress that undermined the spirit or in fact closed Canadian companies out, even though Canadian companies are supposed to be treated like American companies for bids from the Department of Defense. And there are other aspects of problems in that relationship.

But historically many of those problems have been managed by the conjunction of the lobbying efforts of Canadian industry through American industry—the close relationship—by embassy officials in Washington, and particularly by the Pentagon and the State Department, which have worked time and time again to try to remind Congress of the different or unique relationship with Canada.

If you think in those terms or recognize this value that stems from that overarching close allied relationship with the United States, if Canada says no to national missile defence, one thing we do have to be sensitive to is how this would then spill into attitudes within the Pentagon, within the State Department, within American industry.

The United States will not cut off its nose to spite its face and damage its economy, but in the willingness on issues that may be very important to certain parts of Canada's aerospace sector, as it closely links to the defence sector, in which Congress moves in a direction that punishes Canada or simply ignores our relationship, one has to be sensitive to the possibility that the Pentagon and the State Department will no longer come to bat for Canada. That doesn't mean the economic relationship is going to collapse or the broader economic relationship is going to be seriously damaged, but I think it is something one has to be sensitive to if we say no to participation, and even more sensitive if Canada says no and then publicly tries to round up the international posse to oppose and condemn the United States. That is something that I think is important and has to be taken into account.

The Chair: Merci beaucoup.

On this side, we have three people who want to ask questions. Mr. O'Reilly is first, and then Mr. Pratt and Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Professor Fergusson, for coming.

I think you've touched on a lot of the questions this committee has in your answer on the cost, both industrial and military, and the relationship between Canada and the United States. In my visit to Cheyenne Mountain and the NORAD site, Schriever, and so forth, I felt that this marginalization was actually taking place now, that it had actually started, because even though Canada hasn't been invited to participate and the United States hasn't agreed that it's going to go ahead, there's a reluctance among the top brass of the U.S. military to involve Canada at the present time in some of the planning that's going on in that NORAD defence area.

What many Canadians have asked me and the questions I should ask are: Based on that, is there a threat? Is it perceived to be or is it a made-in-the-U.S. type of spending program that Congress feels is necessary to make the people of the United States feel safer? What are the possibilities of rogue states, and who are the rogue states against whom they are defending or trying to defend? There are also the comments on the fact that Canada is in the middle of any missile attack. We are no longer a fireproof house. Whatever takes place in missiles is going to take place over Canadian skies.

• 0930

I'm interested also in your statements on the 1994 white paper, because that's the time a lot of us came into Parliament and we dealt with that as a defence committee. So if you could touch on that, I'd be interested.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: On the issue of the threat, there are legitimate degrees of debate on the nature of the threat from, as you point out, using the American term, “the rogue states”. The usual suspects are always, first, North Korea; second, Iran; third, Iraq; and then if you push a little further, you might get Syria, and you might get Libya. Those are basically what I'd call “the usual suspects”.

There is room for legitimate debate on the exact nature of the threat, but when you look particularly among those in the United States debating the issue, and as well among the European allies, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is agreed upon in NATO. It's agreed upon at the Washington summit. One of the key elements of the summit, the revised strategic doctrine, is the issue of proliferation.

The real debate is not about the threat per se but the timing of the threat, when it will happen. For the United States, specifically pushed by the August 1998 North Korean three-stage missile test, that sort of sparked the quick shift in American thinking from what had been the administration's position, that the threat wouldn't emerge until 2010 to 2015. It reaffirmed the Rumsfeld commission's argument that the threat could happen much more quickly than we expect it could be manifested, and secondly, it could happen and we wouldn't know about it. Intelligence would fail.

The North Korean three-stage test was an intelligence failure. Everyone got caught by surprise. That sort of confirmed the Rumsfeld commission argument. It was the event that then shifted the timeline to around 2005 as the most likely or earliest date in which North Koreans could acquire an operational capability, probably married to a very crude nuclear warhead.

The Europeans disagree with that. Many of the Europeans, the French in particular, argue that testing does not make an operational capability and that the threat is much further down the road. I think there's a wide range of legitimate arguments for and against when the threat will actually materialize, but let me emphasize that there is general consensus that it will materialize unless something is done.

For those in the United States to go to what I think is the lost argument in the whole national missile defence debate.... One can understand deploying missile defences—tactical for deployed forces in the field, the Patriot systems, theatre missile defences for area defence of allies in expeditionary or intervention operations, and national missile defence for North America—and that this serves as a potential supporter of an addition to the non-proliferation regime. That is, it raises the costs for potential proliferators to invest technology and limited financial resources into developing basic, crude missile technologies and delivery systems that in effect may not work, and if they don't work, that alters the political calculus.

We are concerned, through the non-proliferation regime itself, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, through the various other elements of the regime, including the missile technology control regime, to try to prevent the spread of ballistic missile technology. Missile defence, the way I see it, is something that supports that regime because it raises the cost and becomes a disincentive to proliferation.

With regard to the white paper, as I said in my opening statement, I thought the white paper was a dramatic change in policy. When I read the white paper right after it came out, I was shocked to find the two paragraphs in it on missile defence. I couldn't believe it. It was the most dramatic shift in Canadian defence policy, as far as I was concerned, because it moved—not boldly, but slightly—away from the previous standing policy set in 1985 by the Mulroney government. It moved away from simply company-to-company involvement and non-official involvement and in fact opened the door to official government involvement in research and consultation under the conditions of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

• 0935

After that, I expected one would see in this country a greater movement and greater attention being paid to missile defence. It didn't surprise me at the end of the day, when I think back now, that it didn't happen, because of the sensitive nature of the issue.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

We'll go now to Mr. Earle, please, for seven minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I, like Mr. Laurin, apologize for coming in a bit late. I was at another meeting, incidentally part of which touched upon the topic we're discussing here. I do thank you for coming and for the information you're providing to us.

You mentioned the ABM Treaty and you talked about the idea that participation in this NMD system would not necessarily upset that treaty in its spirit. You talked about avoiding an arms race. I tend to disagree with that. I feel the NMD is in fact part of an arms race, and I'll use an example.

I liken it to a sport I follow, karate, where one is taught self-defence, but a part of that self-defence is you block and then you counter-attack. So it's a complete weapons system. When we're talking about defence here, we're talking about a complete weapons system, because obviously if someone is more skilled in defending than someone else, then they have an upper hand in terms of their overall ability to launch an offensive. So I can understand the concerns of the Russians, the Chinese, and others about this system.

You mentioned also the dismantling of nuclear warheads. Wouldn't it be more advisable for us to be putting our efforts, our energy, and our money into working toward dismantling arms, rather than a buildup of arms through this NMD?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I'm glad you asked that question, because for too long, or at least most recently, in this debate, it's been either disarmament or defences. We tend to forget these are integrally linked to one another.

I'm not suggesting at all that Canada or any other nation among the western allies or any nation should not be working hard to develop a much improved disarmament regime and working for continued reductions in nuclear warheads in particular, and let me emphasize the nuclear side. But remember there have been significant reductions in nuclear warheads.

It seems to me your argument becomes whether or not the deployment of national missile defence will act as an incentive for particularly Russia, or China or anyone else for that matter, to in fact develop more offensive military systems and thus undermine the probability of disarmament or significant reductions.

When we look empirically at those areas where there has been success in disarmament, what we find is a combination of successful diplomatic initiatives based upon common values among states in the international community, but always supported by either the absence of military utility or the ability to negate a military weapons system.

What I'm referring to in particular here is the Chemical Weapons Convention. There's general agreement in the international community that chemical weapons are horrible. They are morally repugnant. Most of the international community is fully supportive of the convention to ban them, to eliminate them entirely, with proper inspection regimes, etc.

But the possibility of doing that exists because it's supported by two important other factors. One is that there is a defence against chemical weapons. You can defend yourself. You can defend your people and your troops in the field against the use of the weapon, with gas masks or what have you.

• 0940

That then raises the question, how militarily useful is this weapon? It eliminates or significantly reduces the value of that type of weapons system. So when you have defence supporting the moral side of the equation, that then gives you a fairly robust and confident disarmament regime in chemical weapons.

If we then turn to the issue of national missile defence or missile defences and proliferation, it seems to me two points are very clear. First of all, when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, many people said we were going to sign this treaty, and that would be the cornerstone for reductions in strategic arms. Well, in fact, when the treaty was signed, there were no reductions in strategic arms. The strategic arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to increase throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. The decline only began when there was a fundamental change in the political relationship with the end of the Cold War.

So the issue becomes then, to what extent does the acquisition of a very limited number create incentives for those Cold War strategic arguments in the absence of that type of political strategic conflict? I can't see where there are any incentives.

First of all, even if we think about dropping down to 500 deliverable warheads each, the ability of the Russian strategic arsenal to threaten the United States if it had to—and I can't understand the political reasons that would exist—would still be robust against 200 interceptors, against 300 interceptors. So I can't see any logical evidence of why Russia in fact will not continue to want to negotiate down.

In fact, as you start to get to really low levels—and this is where we need to rethink missile defences a bit—the ability to defend yourself becomes an important hedge against the potential of cheating on the part of others.

We also then change the moral foundation of strategic relationships, because there's now potential to change it from a relationship based on the ability not to defend our security based upon assured destruction, to the potential where we perhaps can be on a long path—and I'm talking about a very long path here, fifty to a hundred years—in which the system can shift itself to one based upon mutual survival and defence in the moral elements.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I would agree with some of what you said, but I'm not convinced we don't have the capability now to defend against any kind of attack that's currently a threat. I think this threat is over-exaggerated. But we'll move on from there.

You talked about U.S.-Canada relations and about the idea of the U.S. not coming to the aid of Canada and us being concerned about the U.S. not backing up Canada. It strikes me there's always the concern that the U.S. is doing us a favour and we're concerned about them. We never talk about the other direction, of us assisting or coming to the aid of the U.S. in issues, whether they're economic or military.

I get the feeling that in this whole issue, we're being pushed and threatened by the U.S. to participate whether we want to or not. Can I have your comments on that, please?

The Chair: Very briefly, Professor, please.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: [Inaudible—Editor].

The Chair: No, no. It's just that I have other colleagues waiting, and Mr. Earle is over his time.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Oh, okay.

I'm certainly glad you raised the statement from the deputy commander of U.S. Space Command yesterday. I think that's been misunderstood. I don't see it as blackmail. Likely it was a response to a particular question about, if Canada does get in, what obligations does the United States have?

He simply stated a fact. Legally the United States would have no obligation through NORAD to defend Canada. The United States would have an obligation to defend Canada as a function of article 5 of the NATO treaty, but article 5 does not specify exactly what the United States would have to do or would be committed to do to defend Canada. It's a bit open-ended. So I think he was just making a simple point of fact, which certainly, I agree, had repercussions here.

To your key question about Canada assisting the United States, yes, it's an important point—and we forget that point a great deal in our debate—that it is a mutually beneficial relationship. Canada does assist the United States in a variety of different places, not just in North America but internationally.

I like to use the example of peacekeeping. One of the prime reasons Canada was so successful at peacekeeping in the Cold War and was so desired was that it was something Canada could do that the United States couldn't do. It assisted the western community of nations, our allies as a whole. Of course, during the Cold War as well, Canada assisted the United States' defence because of the importance of our territory and of the radar sites in Canada.

• 0945

The Chair: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Now we start a second round of questions, five minutes. Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you.

There are a couple of things I want to do. My colleague Mr. Earle said that he studies karate. I think that's interesting, because he doesn't support national missile defence. You'd think that if you were studying karate, you would be just egging on a fight. If you extend that to national missile defence, you take karate because you want to be able to defend yourself, and that's exactly what national missile defence does.

I just want to say that Canada should not be involved because it fears economic retribution by the United States. That's the wrong reason to be involved in the national missile defence program. We should be involved in national missile defence if we have identified the threat and if the proliferation of ballistic missiles is truly a threat, because Canada has a sovereign responsibility to protect our shores.

I can't understand the argument on the other side from those people who would say that Canada should not participate. I don't understand how they think that Canadians would not support defending our own shores. It's just a ludicrous argument to me. When did it become a crime to defend our sovereign nation?

Then you extend that to, how should we do that? If we had to do it alone, could we afford it? The answer is no. It's quite simply no. The only way we can do it is by teaming up with our closest ally, and that is the United States. So it makes perfect sense to me.

There's this other argument about soft power, and I'd like you to comment on this. We hear a lot from our foreign affairs minister that the Cold War is over and we have to move toward soft power. In my understanding of soft power, it only works if you have hard military assets to back it up. What is your feeling on that?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Certainly Joseph Nye, who coined the term “soft power” in a debate on American foreign policy in the 1980s, made that very point, that there's an inherent relationship between soft power—diplomatic; the use of non-traditional, if you will, means to advance the interests of the state—and fundamentally being buttressed by hard military power.

What's missing, however—and one of the problems I have with the use of soft power in the context of Canada—is the other element of soft power that Joseph Nye and others talked about. That was the power of American culture and American society and the ability to express that, and the envy of many people in the world when they look at the wealth of North America. That is the other element that is important. That element is really more useful to the United States than it is to Canada.

Mr. Jim Hart: I'd like to explore the argument that the system would not work because of countermeasures that render the missile defence system ineffective. Do you have any information on those specific issues?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: It's an interesting point. There's confusion, because on the one hand people will say that nations such as North Korea don't have the capacity to do this. Fair enough. We're not sure when they will. On the other hand they'll say, but if they can do it, they can somehow develop sophisticated countermeasures, either decoys or penetration aids. If you don't have the technology to do it, you can't develop sophisticated countermeasures, because they're not easy things to do. Placing decoys, balloons, etc., on the top of a warhead to disguise it or to confuse a guidance radar is not an easy thing to do. It took the Americans and the Russians a great deal of time to master that technology.

Can it undermine the feasibility of a potential missile defence system? It's certainly a problem for any missile defence capacity using kinetic kill as distinct from a nuclear kill, which is what the Russians use right now and which the U.S. did use in the 1970s. It will be significantly difficult for the ground-based guidance radar and then the on-board terminal radar on the interceptors to be able to distinguish a warhead from, say, three or four decoys, and there's a limit on how many decoys.

• 0950

This is one of the reasons the United State's current strategy on this is to hold so many missiles in reserve. When they say “We'll have 100 interceptors that will enable us to deal with 20 warheads”, what they're really saying is “We have 100 missiles, and we'll devote five to each warhead so that if there are decoys, we can take different shots at it and eventually get it.” It is technically challenging, but it can be done.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

The five-minute round goes more quickly, as we know, so we'll come to this side now to Mr. Pratt, please.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank you for being here, Professor Fergusson. I think you've demonstrated to the committee an almost encyclopedic knowledge of this subject, and I think your contributions are certainly very much appreciated.

You seem to be prone to making predictions going back to 1995, and I'm wondering if you have any thoughts on the upcoming meeting between Mr. Putin and Mr. Clinton. I think it's expected that there are going to be some discussions on national missile defence and possible amendments to the ABM Treaty. Are you willing to venture a guess as to whether or not there is going to be an agreement?

I have some other questions as well, so....

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Very briefly, I was warned years ago by a former professor of mine not to be making predictions because usually political scientists get things wrong when they try to predict things that happened 20 years ago.

In answer to your question, I'm not sure if there will be an agreement per se, but I think what you will likely get is a joint statement out of the summit, similar to the summit in February or March 1997 between Yeltsin and Clinton, which set the foundation for the demarcation agreements of September of that year. I think you will get a basic statement in which the Russians will essentially say they can accept the fundamentals of the system, so that if push comes to shove, President Clinton can then announce a deployment decision, but not one that will irrevocably constrain either Russia or the United States. Then he can basically hand it over to the next administration to deal with the real thorny issues, which no one's talking about right now.

Mr. David Pratt: The second question I have is with regard to what has been characterized by some elements of the media as European opposition to national missile defence. You hear some media commentators saying that the French are opposed, the Germans are opposed, and some elements within the British Labour government are opposed to NMD. How accurate do you think those characterizations are? Are there nuances to these positions?

From what I've gathered in terms of some of your previous comments on the subject, and correct me if I'm wrong on this, my impression is that the message you've been providing—it might have been at the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies meeting—is that the European allies are essentially putting together missile defence systems of their own, and that the issue here is more of timing than of fundamental disagreement with the thrust of where the United States is going. Could you comment on that?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: There are great nuances in the European position. The Italians are particularly the most torn on this, not least of all because their territory has been attacked. Libya launched two SCUD missiles in the 1980s at an island held by the Italians. They of course are likely in the evolutionary process to meet with the earliest threat.

The French are the most opposed to the issue for a variety of reasons. Interestingly enough, the French are deeply concerned about the potential for a Russian-American deal, which could affect their strategic interests.

The Germans are concerned about Russia. Very briefly and without going into details, if the Russians can be brought on board, this isn't a problem for the Germans.

• 0955

For Britain, it's a problem of alliance management. The Brits are the most advanced in terms of cooperative technology arrangements with the United States on missile defence programs as a function of the 1997 pre-feasibility study and the technology access program.

The Europeans are, at a very slow level with very limited investment, trying to keep abreast of the technology, trying to ensure that European industries can be involved in the future, and developing new programs, particularly naval programs—and to just quickly go through the countries, they are Britain, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and elsewhere—frigate capabilities primarily, which will have nascent missile defence, expandable missile defence programs. And NATO has its own extended integrated air defence studies, which are being released this year, feasibility studies and plans for a relatively sophisticated—if all things work out in the future—missile defence architecture.

If I could have one last quick point, my view—and this is just my view; it's a bit heretical—is that the Europeans are very concerned about being pressured by the United States, on the threat side in particular, that if the United States does something it could create public debate in Europe about why governments aren't defending Europe. This could then demand them to invest heavily in an area where they have other demands.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay. Very briefly, where do you think Canadian public opinion is headed on this issue, and if you could isolate the most compelling argument against NMD for Canada, what would it be?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Well, I think, regarding public opinion, I've seen a couple of polls done that show the public overwhelmingly in support of both the NORAD relationship and missile defence. Whether the public understands what that really means is difficult to know.

The example I give is if you go back to 1985—and I hate to bring up SDI, because there's too much baggage there—the majority of the Canadian public supported full Canadian participation in SDI, and it's been consistent with Canadian public response to defence. I think the public would support fully Canadian participation.

What is the key problem? I don't know how to answer that because I don't see many problems except political problems, what I like to call the political dilemma of living beside the United States.

The Chair: I think that may say it all. Thank you.

Mr. Pratt, just by way of information, I'm currently polling my constituents on this topic. The responses are still coming in—trickling in at this point—but they're running at 65% support among my constituents in London—Fanshawe for such a missile system. I just thought I'd share that.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes.

Mr. René Laurin: I would like to speak somewhat outside of the framework of the American missile defence system to return to Canada's defence policy. Mr. Fergusson, Canada's national defence policy is based on a white paper that was written in 1994. In view of the revolution in military matters, do you believe that Canada's policy in this area should be reviewed or whether it still meets the needs of today's world?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I would tend to suggest that it meets basic requirements, given the level of investment over the past several years and the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. I think the emphasis on the revolution in military affairs is a bit overstated in terms of its actual impact on Canada. I do think, however, that if Canada does not participate—

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, there is a microphone problem. I cannot hear the interpreter very well. I do not know if the interpreter is speaking too far away from the microphone, but I am having trouble hearing. I could hear the previous interpreter properly.

[English]

The Chair: Right. Okay, you've brought it to their attention.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I'm sorry, Mr. Fergusson.

[English]

The Chair: We'll continue and see, Monsieur Laurin, if things work all right.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Do you want me to continue?

The Chair: Okay.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: If Canada does not participate, then there will have to be an overhaul, certainly of the white paper, and a renewal. My views are that it's largely because the white paper as well as the joint Parliamentary committee report are very realistic—

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[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Sorry. You were saying that if Canada does not participate, the white paper would have to be overhauled. Do you feel that an overhaul of the white paper is linked to Canada's participation in the U.S. missile system?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: It's not linked to the part of NMD, but if you go back to the white paper—and I know the people who drafted it in National Defence will deny this—if you look at the order in which it's laid out, it's sovereignty and defence of Canada; number two is bilateral North American defence cooperation; and number three is international security. If there's significant damage to the defence relationship, then that whole pillar, if you will, has to be rethought in terms of what Canada will do, which then will affect investment in international security capabilities and in national sovereignty issues.

That's what I mean about having to.... If we don't participate, it will affect that key component or pillar of defence policy in the white paper, and that will then have to be rethought, which will affect investments in what we do elsewhere.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Fergusson, it seems that at the moment, Canadian political thought with respect to national defence is closely tied to assuming there would be an attack against the United States, which is very specific to Canada. It is very unusual for a country to assess its own security on the basis of a threat to a neighbouring country. In any event, it strikes me that this is very specific to Canada. It is a question of geography, if you will. Why should Canada feel more threatened by a foreign country that is an enemy of the United States.? Is the extent to which other countries are friendly towards the United States something that Canada should consider in deciding whether or not they constitute a threat to its own security? Generally speaking, one's security is based more on one's own relations with foreign countries. It would appear that here in Canada, we believe that our security depends more on the relations of the United States with other countries, which strikes me as somewhat aberrant. What do you think?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: That's a very good point, but it's problematic for several reasons. First of all, Canada has been part of the western system of alliances since the end of World War II, not to mention what happened with Canada's involvement with the United Kingdom through the British Empire and the Commonwealth before World War II. The assumption that people make is that other countries, adversaries of the United States, for example, clearly differentiate between the United States being a threat and Canada not being a threat or an adversary.

I would suggest in many cases those adversaries see Canada as part of the whole group, so a threat to the United States from that perspective is also then, by definition, a threat to Canada. I am not sure why we should necessarily believe that under any conditions there aren't states, as a result of Canadian involvement in UN-based intervention missions, etc., that Canada itself would not potentially be a target for. We have to be careful in just assuming that everyone thinks we're nice and good and that no one wants to threaten Canada.

The third point I would make is that we do share geography, and in ballistic missile technology, against a crude capability, if their guidance systems are off by a few degrees, they may not intend to hit Canada, but that adversary may end up hitting Canada anyway. That's a fact of geography that also motivated the original relationship on bombers and air defence.

The final point is that our security, our well-being, and the wealth of this nation is a function of the well-being, wealth, and status of the United States. The United States has created an international system by and large that Canada benefits from. The stability we place in that international system, which the United States is the backbone of, is one that is in Canada's interests. So our values and our interest are like this with the United States; and thus we should think that a threat to the United States is in effect a threat to Canada and a threat to the stability of the international system.

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The Chair: Thank you.

We will go now to the parliamentary secretary for national defence, Monsieur Bertrand, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about four factors that influence the United States in going ahead with NMD. You talked about the threat, the cost feasibility, and the international security concerns. I'd like to come back to the first one, the threat.

You mentioned North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as possible bad guys out there. To use your expression, how robust is the threat out there from North Korea, for instance?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: It's fairly low right now, but if I can ask you a question back—and I hate to answer a question with a question—what do you mean by robust?

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I forget in which meeting, but we were told that possibly in the next five to seven years, North Korea could have a missile that could hit North America. In your opinion, is that possible?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Yes, it's possible. Is it likely? If I can just elaborate on this, when the North Koreans withdrew unilaterally from the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency and raised the big spectre of a North Korean atomic weapon, the west intervened. The United States stuck a deal with the North Koreans by which, through opening them up, rejoining the regime, to inspections, they would provide basic civilian nuclear energy to alleviate the energy problems in North Korea and other food aid for the horrible state of the North Korean people.

In August 1998, the North Koreans tested a three-stage missile, which demonstrated a rudimentary ICBM capability. The United States responded by beginning discussions with the North Koreans for a deal in which they will agree to not do any more missile testing or develop any more missiles. In return, the United States will give them food, money, what have you.

To go to the point that came from the papers, the North Koreans are using sophisticated blackmailing. The United States, in this case, is being blackmailed, because of our fears of the North Korean regime, into supporting and propping up that regime. The North Koreans will continue to use whatever means possible, given the nature of that regime, to attempt to blackmail the United States, the western community of nations.

On missile defence then, the issue becomes not so much whether they will have the capabilities per se as whether the United States and the rest of the allies will deploy systems that take that card out of the North Korean hand and say “You cannot use that to put us in a situation where we will support you in this horrendous regime.”

Mr. Robert Bertrand: What about the threat from an individual or an organization, as opposed to a rogue state? Is there any information out there that this could possibly happen?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: There's always the potential of terrorist fanatics, terrorist organizations, uncontrolled by states, operating on their own means, capital, etc., attempting to penetrate into North American society to do damage. It is not an option, in my view, that states would follow, because the development of weapons capabilities, etc., are for political purposes. They don't do you much good when you're smuggling them around.

On the suitcase and the bomb idea, I'm not convinced, not least of all given the empirical record of North America. North America has not been attacked by many terrorist organizations from outside. There are other measures to deal with that type of problem. No matter what you do, by and large, there's nothing you can do about the fanatic, unless you want to live in a military state, a police state, which we won't do in this country or in the United States.

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At the end of the day, that is a different problem. It's not a matter of doing either missile defence or that type of homeland defence. One can do both of those, not least of all because the latter type of defence is really an intelligence and policing issue, and not a missile defence problem.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have one final question, Professor Fergusson. If Canada were ever to agree to it, and if the United States were to ask us to take part in the establishment of this new system, what do you feel Canada's contribution would be to the new system? Would it be a monetary, technological or other form of contribution?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: The Canadian contribution is to be there. The basic answer is that we would participate. We would continue to cooperate with the United States in the joint defence of North America.

My understanding of the American program is that the United States is not requesting from Canada any monetary contribution into the system. Based upon the NORAD funding formula, all infrastructure related to NORAD and deployed in the United States is paid 100% by the United States. They are not requesting the building of any radar or interceptor sites on Canadian soil, although as a side note, Canada should ask whether we could potentially contribute, through building a radar site on Canadian soil, to make the system more effective. But that is a question we can't really ask until Canada decides whether or not it will participate.

In terms of technology, there may be some future technological industrial benefits. Canadian industry may be able to find certain niches, if you will, not with the current system as planned, but as it develops and becomes more sophisticated down the road. I'm referring to the ongoing development of new generations of space-based tracking systems, infra-red type systems that are planned to go into outer space for a variety of purposes, including missile defence.

By and large, the United States will come to Canada for the technology, the capacity, whether Canada's in or not, unless the government decides to not allow Canadian companies to participate. At end of the day, the United States wants Canada in because the United States has lived for the past several decades and fought in terms of North American defence as a cooperative arrangement. It's an important symbol to the United States that their closest ally, Canada, participate with them.

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bertrand.

Next is Mr. Earle again, for five minutes, please.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The comments of my colleague Mr. Hart tell me he either clearly has never studied karate, or if he did, he didn't understand it properly, because anyone who has studied the martial arts knows the key is to avoid fighting. I've been involved in karate for over 20 years and have never egged on a fight. The only fights I've been involved in have been in organized tournaments. The idea is you build self-discipline, inner peace, self-control, and character—-things I'm not sure always exist at the political and military levels in the U.S.

But my analogy to karate was simply to show that we should not be lulled into thinking, as sometimes is portrayed, this NMD is defensive only. It is a base for a very powerful offensive as well, and we must talk of it in those terms. I think that's what gives cause for concern by the other nations within the world.

I want to turn to another aspect of it that is not often discussed, and that's the business component. You mentioned that when you talked about defence-industrial relationships. Obviously there's more money to be made from advancing with this system, building on the technology and building up this system, than from dismantling warheads. So there's a very strong business component that is driving this as well, and people don't talk about that, the corporate interests of the defence industry in having something like this go forward.

• 1015

I'd like to have your comments on that, because I think it's very important to touch upon that component so people know what they're dealing with and not just feel that we're in danger and we have to protect ourselves at any cost.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: As a brief comment, we disagree entirely on the offensive-defensive implications of national missile defence, not least of all because I find them to be extremely esoteric and Cold War, and my central argument is that the Cold War is over.

But on the key point about the business component, there is no doubt that if I was in business I would have an interest in obtaining contracts in supporting areas where, because of the nature of my corporate identity, I seek profit for my taxpayers and also, of course, provide jobs and advance technology. I agree with you entirely. However, that is only one portion, and a very small portion, of the various political forces that are driving what I see as overwhelming bipartisan support consensus in the United States in support of national missile defence.

The interesting element about this is that when you look at the Pentagon, the military, you will find in many ways more opponents in the military to investing great amounts of dollars in national missile defence, particularly in the previous years when the defence budget was declining in the United States because they saw it as a threat to much more important, immediate military capabilities. In that sense, it seems to me that on a defence budget of $300 billion at the cost—and I can't think off the top of my head—of a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the cost of the planned F-22 program, and the planned joint strike fighter program, all those programs.... The companies involved in all of those are the same companies, by and large, that are also involved in national missile defence. If you ask them where their biggest profits are, the biggest benefit, I would suggest you'll probably find them not in national missile defence but in fact in other areas.

The other element, of course, is that there are many components or elements of the missile defence program, and not just national but missile defence across the board, elements such as the command and control, the surveillance, the tracking capabilities, data management, that certainly will play a role in national missile defence and theatre missile defence. But they're also important capabilities that—to go back to the point made about the revolution of military affairs—are key to the whole restructuring of American thinking about military affairs. The space-based assets for missile defence are also the key assets that will enhance the operational ability of American—and subsequently Canadian and allied—forces in the military field. They are multiple-use forces, so you will get the investment.... In a way, the companies will get this regardless of whether national missile defence...and their actual stake in the specifics of missile defence isn't that significant that they would live or die or go to bat for it.

But I do agree with you, they have business interests, and why wouldn't they support areas where they can make money?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have asked the vice-chair to take the chair because I want to make a couple of comments and ask some questions too.

In regard to the so-called offensive capacity of this, I just don't understand that argument at all. Hasn't the United States right now, Professor Fergusson, got more than enough offensive capacity in its nuclear arsenal?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Definitely.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: So I don't understand this argument about this being a hidden agenda for more offensive capacity. The United States doesn't need any more offensive capacity.

On the statement by Admiral Browne, a man I met and enjoyed talking with, I wish he hadn't made the statement, but he did make it. But I think we have to be careful—and I'm referring to the earlier comment by my colleague Mr. Laurin—and I don't take this as a threat from the United States of America. This is one admiral, who believes and has a point of view that we should participate in this, making a statement that perhaps may have been better not made. I don't know.

My question is do you not think this was a bit of a reality check, though, for Canada from Admiral Browne?

• 1020

Prof. Jim Fergusson: That's my view. It is a reality check, and I think it's an important reality check for Canada and it goes to the defence side of the equation.

The debate has been really focused on the testing envelope. What's being forgotten right now is that while the testing is going on with the system, the computer people are writing the software programs for mission planning, and that's what in fact he's talking about. There's a reality; we have to plan the missions of who we're going to defend and the priorities of defence.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you.

On Canada planning its own security or taking care of its own security, can I recall for colleagues—and correct me if I'm wrong, Professor—that I think it's 90% or more of Canadians who live within 200 miles of the U.S. border. Is that an accurate figure?

I think that when we reflect on this reality we don't have to think about much else to understand why we've been a defence partner of the United States through two world wars and then a formal defence partner since the 1940s—and certainly since the 1950s with NORAD, but in the 1940s with the defence sharing agreements and so on. Isn't it literally impossible for Canada to plan its national security without closely involving the United States? Do you agree with that?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I agree entirely.

You raise a very good point that goes back to the NORAD debate, and it relates to differentiating between the admiral's obligation and what the United States will or will not do in terms of defending Canada if Canada doesn't participate. And it goes back, as I said, to NORAD, when the central argument, which we still all agree with, was that because of geographic reality the United States will defend Canada whether Canada likes it or not. But what's important is that we want to have a say to ensure that they defend us the way we want to be defended, not the way they want to defend us.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you.

My last question, if I have some time, Mr. Chair, relates to that point. Frankly, as an individual MP, I'm leaning very much to Canada's participating in this system if we can get the ABM situation resolved. That's one Canadian MP's feeling.

But I'm getting a little tired of the notion that we don't have a responsibility in our own security. Quite frankly, I don't want to be in the embarrassing position of saying no to this missile system and then expecting the United States, because they're our good neighbour next door, to take care of us if there's a problem. I would find that highly offensive and irresponsible, and it's not a view that I can support at all.

My last question is this. Isn't the threat of the cost of this, the cost argument—which is that we will have to automatically put up 10% of the money because that's our ratio to the United States, population-wise and so on, which I'm starting to hear from many people as a reason why we shouldn't participate—an exaggeration?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I haven't seen any information whatsoever that in the 90%-10% operating costs the costs of integrating the command and control and battle management of what I would prefer to call North American missile defence into NORAD headquarters would mean any significant increase either to the United States or Canada. The increase in cost is infrastructure costs, which the United States will pay for.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: And indeed that confirms previous testimony, Mr. Chair, we've had at this committee, all the way from the deputy commander of NORAD, a Canadian general, George Macdonald, that the contribution we'd most likely be asked to make would be an asymmetrical contribution in NORAD—in other words, taking up more of what goes on at Cheyenne Mountain, freeing up Americans to do more on this system. And I think it's just an exaggeration that this is going to be far too expensive for us and that it would shoot a major hole in our defence budget.

Do you not agree that's an argument without much credibility?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I see very little credibility—in fact, no credibility at all. I'd like to point out to the committee, however, that my understanding from a variety of research I've done is that the idea of an asymmetric contribution to national missile defence, whether it's through the joint space project or releasing Americans in Cheyenne Mountain, in fact is a Canadian idea. It's not an American request or desire, and those are in areas we want to invest in anyway for other purposes.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you very much, and thank you for being here today.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. O'Brien, for your questioning.

I have Mr. Hart now.

• 1025

Mr. Jim Hart: Professor Fergusson, the argument we're hearing here from the government is that the Americans haven't really asked us to participate in national missile defence, but haven't they made it really quite clear? The reality is that the Americans have made it clear that they want Canada in this program, is it not?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: There has been sufficient enough signal sent by the United States to Canada, to the government, to the departments of defence and I think foreign affairs as well, that they do want Canada to participate.

The major evidence I would put to you is the reported decision in 1996 by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States that stated that their preference was to place command and control and battle management in NORAD, which was a clear signal. The problem is what I like to call the great Canadian-American dance, which is mutually sensitive. As much as Canada is always concerned about the United States interfering, the United States has always been very sensitive about ever seen to be interfering in the Canadian domestic political debate. So we dance with one another.

They won't ask unless they're fairly sure they've been signalled enough that they know what the answer will be. We won't try to signal the answer to them until we get an idea of whether or not they're really going to ask us. So we go around and around until eventually someone goes first.

Mr. Jim Hart: Speaking of the dance, there are the June tests coming up. This is speculation, but do you think the current President of the United States is going to make a decision on this, or is it more likely that he will defer that decision to a new administration?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: That's a very important question. If the test is successful, all the evidence, the indicators that I track say that the President will have no choice but to say yes. What's important to remember, and this is key to when the invitation would be timed, is that what he is saying yes to is site selection, which will be Alaska, and the beginning of the contract letting for the construction of the site. It's what the Welch committee called last year a feasibility decision, not a deployment decision. In fact, a deployment decision would actually still be handed over to the next administration to go further ahead than just the beginnings.

The Welch committee argued that you only needed one integrated system's successful test. In that case, if the test is successful, this is politically cost-free in many ways to the President and you will get the decision to go ahead.

I should point out to the committee that the time permitted by the Pentagon to make a recommendation.... The deployment readiness review has been shrunk from 60 days to 30 days, which would bring a presidential decision up to probably around the end of August, or September, just when the campaigns are in full swing. It seems really interesting to me that even if it fails, you might still get a yes because of the low political cost for the President to say yes.

Mr. Jim Hart: Finally, my last question would be, if you were advising the Prime Minister this morning about what to do with missile defence, what would your recommendation be for Canada?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: My recommendation to the Prime Minister would be that the costs of non-participation and delay are mounting for Canada. It is in Canada's national interests to ensure the important cost-effective defence relationship with the United States. The value of that relationship for Canada on the international stage is vital.

I would suggest that while Canada has differences in views about the actual nature of the threat, Canada can appreciate the threat assessment in the United States and understand their views and their concerns.

Finally, I would strongly suggest that the Canadian government in fact play an important role by standing up and publicly saying to the United States and to Moscow that the national missile defence system as planned, in their view, does not undermine in any way the intent of the ABM Treaty, and this is not a problem for Canada.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you very much for your testimony today.

• 1030

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt, for taking the chair for a while.

Mr. Hart has concluded. Are there other questions from this side? Seeing none now, then,

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, please.

Mr. René Laurin: I had a question similar to the one asked by my colleague Mr. Hart. As I missed your submission, Mr. Fergusson, I am tempted to ask you how you might summarize your testimony of this morning in two or three sentences. How would you do that?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: First, this is a very important, if not the most important, strategic issue facing Canada. And I see Canada potentially at a crossroads about where it will go, about whether it'll stay on the path it's been on for the past 40 or 50 years, or whether it will diverge on an entirely different path into what I call the leap into the unknown.

Secondly, too much of the debate that has emerged in Canada right now is largely on issues surrounding the American debate or the international debate about arms races, arms control, disarmament, strategic stability. There is a need to talk, to focus the debate on Canada's interests.

Thirdly, this is going to happen.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I thank you for being so clear, but this leads me to ask you another question concerning what you said right before the answer you just gave me. You said that in the position Canada was going to take, it would have to evaluate the price of not participating in the American system. What then ought we to think about the price Canada would have to pay for world peace if it decided to participate? There is a price there as well. Canada's reputation has a price. Canada has always been recognized as a peaceful country. Is the price that Canada risks paying in terms of its reputation as a peacemaker lower than the price it might have to pay by not appearing to be an ally of the U.S. in establishing a missile defence system?

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I disagree entirely with the argument that this would have any impact on Canada's reputation on the international stage. I have a personal view or opinion that the rhetoric of Canadians about our peaceful self-image, a rhetoric almost that we are neutrals, is somehow the way the rest of the world sees Canada. I think the rest of the world, including Russia, including Beijing, know very well that Canada is one of the core members of the western community of nations, the western alliance, centred upon NATO and, in the bilateral sense, NORAD.

My belief is that Canada's reputation in the area of arms codes, specifically disarmament and peacekeeping, will continue if Canada participates. I see a greater danger for Canada—in fact for our reputation, our influence—if Canada says no, because I believe that our independent voice in the councils in Europe, our independent voice internationally, is a function of the close relationship with Washington.

Perhaps one might ask why major states outside of North America, in the world at large, would talk to a relatively wealthy but small power in the world of international security when everyone knows the dominant major powers are the United States, Russia, China, the Europeans, etc. The reason they do talk to Canada is because they believe, whether it's real or not, that by talking to Canada they are in fact also talking to the United States. And Canada can use that relationship to enhance its independent influence on the international stage.

• 1035

My personal view, which turns the whole argument that is generally made and that you have made.... I can see elements of the argument, but my personal view is that in fact if we don't participate, that may be more damaging to our reputation and our influence on the international stage than if we do.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Laurin, please.

Mr. René Laurin: I have trouble understanding your position, Professor Fergusson. You said that Canada's reputation as a peaceful country was not in danger. If it is not at risk, why would Canada not use its reputation to come to the defence of weapons non-proliferation to ensure that there are changes to the 1972 ABM treaty? Indeed, why would Canada not use its reputation to make international relations more harmonious if we are convinced that the threat perceived by the United States is not a real one?

If our reputation is not in danger, as you say, why would we not use it to tell Russia that we disagree with what the United States wants to do and tell China that we are not in agreement with what the United States wishes to accomplish with its missile defence system? This would make these countries better friends. That's all I have to say.

[English]

Prof. Jim Fergusson: In response to the last part of your question, my view is that if Canada participates, we would not become more or less enemies to anyone. If Canada doesn't participate, we won't be more or less enemies to anyone. I think we have to be very careful about what Canada can do on the international stage and where it is that we can move the yardsticks, if I can use that metaphor.

When it gets to the end of the day on the major security issues such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, no matter what Canada does, it's not going to have any significant impact on the final decisions that are made in Washington and Moscow. I do not see why this is going to affect whatsoever the non-proliferation regime. If it does, Canada can stand up and speak from the mount—morality, condemnation—but at the end of the day there are major security issues that the United States will not sacrifice and will not listen to peaceful countries like Canada about.

The final point I would make on this is that when we look at where Canada has been most effective internationally in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, it has generally been in areas where the issues are not primary security issues of the major players, but more in the secondary or lower levels. Landmines are a good example. Canada can influence that. Canada can work in those areas for a variety of different reasons, which I won't go into. But when one gets into major strategic issues, the only influence Canada can have is by and large trying to influence Washington.

That's where I stand on that issue.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Pratt, please.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Going back to your earlier comments, Professor Fergusson, about the various capabilities that countries have, I was able to very quickly jot down some notes on Israel, Japan, South Korea, Russia, etc., but I'm sure there are others. Can you give the committee a little bit of a primer as to which countries are at what level of development in terms of tactical and theatre missile capabilities?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Outside of the United States, let me start with the allied side, if you will. I use that term loosely. The Israelis are the most advanced. The development of the Arrow, a cooperative program with Israel and the United States, has led to the beginnings early this year, I believe, of the operational deployment of the first Arrow batteries. They will continue to be deployed. I think that deployment will conclude in 2002 or 2003. Israel and the United States are also cooperating on an unmanned aerial vehicle boost phase system designed to shoot missiles during their initial launch.

• 1040

The European programs, by and large, are in the initial development phases. They are likely projected to have some basic capability. Partially trailing on—

Mr. David Pratt: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but could you specify whether these are tactical or theatre missile defences?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: The Arrow is a theatre missile defence. The initial European programs centred, if you will, on the most.... Well, I shouldn't say the most, but the European program, which is the Franco-Italian Aster, is a lower-tier tactical system. If it were deployed, it could defend a city.

Britain is looking at the Aster as well for their frigate system. The Germans, the Dutch, and possibly the Norwegians and the Spanish are developing frigate platforms that will be able to take the standard missile block IVB interceptor, which will be the core of first a tactical and then a theatre missile defence from the navy programs in the United States.

The NATO programs are in the fledgling feasibility study stage. They're going to tie into the existing capabilities and provide centralized command and control. The Russians have deployed the Galosh, which is an exo-atmospheric theatre defence using a nuclear warhead. They have deployed the S-300, which is similar to the Patriot, which is a tactical missile defence, and are developing the S-400 system, which is to provide a theatre missile defence for the southern flank of Russia.

Finally, both Japan and Taiwan are looking primarily at naval platforms beginning at the tactical level and then, as technology matures, moving to the theatre level.

Mr. David Pratt: You may have mentioned a date earlier in your presentation, but if you were going to make a forecast with respect to when the European Union would be covered by a general national missile defence system, what would that date be? Are you willing to speculate as to when they would have that capability?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I'm always willing to speculate. In fact, in the last couple of years I've been getting myself in trouble for speculating.

Let me put a caveat in here. In 1995, after I wrote this op-ed piece, I made a bet with a friend of mine and said the first national missile defence interceptor would be planted in the ground and operational by December 31, 2000. I missed by five years.

The target for the NATO extended integrated air defence is 2015 to 2020. I should add with regard to NATO that they are also modernizing their air command control system. New generations of radars are going into the southern flank, which provide that capacity for theatre missile defence support. So it's moving slowly.

The alliance, the Europeans, for a variety of reasons.... Politics always moves slower than academics like it to move. I would suggest that by 2010 you're going to have some fairly sophisticated tactical lower-tier systems, mostly on naval vessels. Depending on where you can deploy them, they can provide fairly robust coverage, potentially for national capitals and certain areas.

For the higher altitude systems, the actual theatre systems, which would be the core to the idea of a major defence for Europe as a whole, we're probably looking at 2015 to 2020, assuming everything works out as I think it will.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: First of all, I would like to say that I really find this concept that countries will only talk to Canada on major issues somewhat offensive. The idea is that they'll only talk to Canada because they feel they're talking to the United States. You may say that's reality, but my experience has been that Canada has earned a wide degree of respect in international affairs right across the world.

Quite often students, if they were going backpacking in strange countries, took great care to sew a Canadian flag on their backpacks because they got much better treatment as Canadians than they did as Americans. As a matter of fact, they often put themselves in danger if they went to those countries as Americans.

Canada deserves to be treated with much more respect in these matters. I think it's wrong to say that on major strategic issues the only influence Canada has is to influence Washington. We could look at a lot of things that have happened throughout the world. I think of Nelson Mandela, for example, one person who changed the destiny of that country, and someone might have said at the outset that to talk to that one person would do nothing.

• 1045

Having said that, I may have missed this because I came in late, but I want to talk a bit about the fact that this whole defence system seems to be based on the premise that there's a real threat out there. You may have described this threat before I came in, and if I'm asking you to repeat it, I apologize. To me threats can be real, they can be perceived, or in a lot of cases they can be fabricated for a purpose that someone wants to push ahead. We know that the defence minister for France has indicated that he feels this threat has been exaggerated, and I think there are others who feel that way as well.

Can you tell me a bit more as to why you are so convinced that there's a very real threat that makes this defence system an absolute necessity? Our own chairman indicated earlier that he feels the U.S. has enough offensive power now to do anything it wants. So if we have that much offensive power within the U.S., why do we need this defence system if there's no real threat or if it's a perceived threat?

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I do agree with your first point. The reason I responded to the earlier question the way I did is that we tend to forget that side of the equation.

I have a great respect for successive Canadian governments in being able to balance or manage the important relationship with Washington and leverage that into relations with others and then leverage the relations with others into relations with Washington. It's a wonderful triangle. There's a lot to be said for the skill of successive Canadian governments, regardless of their political stripe. The key for me is the major security issues, and that's where this becomes a different way to understand, I think, what realistically Canada can and cannot do.

With regard to your question about the threat, I can detail for you concerns about not a threat today but the threat of the future, if one goes through the evidence of proliferation. We tend to forget, even though it was only 10 years ago, that despite the fact that it was a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and an adherent to other arms control agreements, Iraq had a robust nuclear weapons capability being developed, chemical weapons—which Iraq used—and a biological weapons development capability. It had also developed medium-range ballistic missiles, and it used them not only in the Gulf War but also against Iran.

Iran has developed and tested a medium-range ballistic missile capability. India has tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile capability and, through its space launch capacity, has rudimentary ICBM technology. Pakistan has tested a medium-range ballistic missile capability. North Korea has tested a three-stage missile capability.

So yes, I agree with the French. What we're talking about is states that by and large have tested capabilities and have demonstrated through the evidence that despite the best efforts of the international community, they are willing to violate their legal agreements to try to develop weapons of mass destruction. The issue for me is that we won't know for sure whether or not that will become an operational reality. The French point is that it won't become an operational reality for a long time, and France may be right, or the United States might be right that it may become an operational capability in a shorter period of time.

The point is that regardless of the timeline, if we see this occurring, under a variety of assumptions, not least of all the fear that these types of states would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation—I'm not necessarily convinced of that, but certainly that's one of the fears in the United States—and if we're as concerned about this as they are in the United States, it seems to me that the time to build defences is now, because it takes a long time to develop the technology. It's going to take five years from a decision to go ahead before the capability is present. If the United States doesn't make a decision now and it ends up being right that suddenly some other nation develops an ICBM with a nuclear warhead and then commits some act of aggression and says to the United States and Canada, “You do not intervene, because if you do, we will launch against you”, it will be too late to be able to deal with that problem.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Fergusson.

• 1050

We can say that it's for a final question from any member. The final question will be to you, then, Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I just want to follow up on that point. We're operating on the prophesy that down the road somewhere we're going to have one of these rogue states wanting to attack and therefore it's necessary to have this defence system. We could always operate and speculate on what may happen down the road.

The fact is that if a rogue state or any state is so determined to attack, this defence system is not going to be of much use, because these rogue states will then devise a way to do harm other than by working through this kind of system and shooting a ballistic missile. They'll send in a cruise missile or come in in some other terrorist form. So there's always the potential for that kind of danger.

I think right now the more immediate and real danger is the threat that if this system proceeds, you're going to antagonize the Russians, the Chinese, and the people who have a concern about this system. So there's a more immediate real threat with proceeding than there is with not proceeding on the basis of some hypothetical instance that may happen farther down the road.

That's why I again come back to this point: would it not be more advisable to put our efforts into trying to work on the kinds of things that would cause states to want to come in and attack other states and to go more in that direction? I'm not saying you have to have one or the other. I think we have enough defences and offensive power now to deter any kind of immediate action. But the problem we're faced with now is that by moving ahead on this system, you're going to trigger an unnecessary conflict that may not arise if one did not proceed with it.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: I'd like to mention a couple of very quick points about that.

Defences are designed to deal with a particular type of offensive problem. No defence can deal with all types of problems. If your scenario is correct that, if they develop missile defences, that means it will channel investment elsewhere into cruise missiles, which I think is a much more difficult technology for these nations than everyone thinks it is, or terrorism—and we could get into a lengthy debate on that—I would agree with you that it may very well channel.... But you have to ask yourself, would it be better to channel it that way than to allow them to have ballistic missiles and to leave that incentive as a useful weapon for them politically? I think we have to calculate those things. But we have to calculate in terms of missile defences to deal with one type of military threat and its political implications. The rest is by and large irrelevant.

With regard to the question about the arms race implications, you mentioned China, and I'm very glad you did. There are no incentives, in my mind. The Russians don't have the capacity to build more missiles. They are going down whether or not they negotiate START III. They have every incentive to negotiate START III, and NMD in START III or at lower levels will not undermine their strategic capability. Technology does not drive political conflict. Political conflict drives technology.

I'd like to make one comment about China, because China has become the focus. This is designed for China. They've threatened to expand their nuclear forces. I've two points about China. One, they've been modernizing their nuclear forces for 30 years, and they will continue to modernize no matter what the west does. Missile defence or not, they will continue. The second point I make about China is that throughout the Cold War it lived in a very...[Inaudible—Editor]...relationship with Moscow, which you were concerned about. The missile defence at Moscow was designed to deal with the Chinese problem. Did the Chinese escalate investment in their nuclear weapons and strategic programs in the 1970s and 1980s? No. They took a gradual path. They will continue no matter what the United States does.

The Chair: Thank you.

I'm going to give Mr. Laurin time for a very brief question and answer.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, please.

Mr. René Laurin: I have a short question. The security of other countries in the world rests on the vulnerability of the United States in terms of defence.

To the extent that the United States is allowed to make itself invulnerable with this system, the security of other countries will be threatened. This strikes me as unacceptable to those people.

[English]

Prof. Don Fergusson: That's a very good point. I don't disagree with you. I've argued elsewhere that one of the problems of the post-Cold War world—and it's not to deal with weapons technology—that a lot of states face is that they no longer can be defended or protected as they were because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States is in a situation where, independent of its military capabilities, its missile defence, it has the freedom to make that choice of intervention, and that undermines everyone else's security. That's going to exist whether or not missile defence occurs. So I don't think you should necessarily link the two of them together.

• 1055

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Laurin.

Professor Fergusson, I want to thank you very much on behalf of the committee. We've heard testimony from other witnesses that took a different point of view. But I think you've done an excellent job of laying out some of the very strong arguments as to why this government has to give very serious consideration to this decision. I think you've answered a number of very important questions and clarified some very important misperceptions; at least that's how some of us see them. So thank you very much for being here and sharing your expertise. We look forward to meeting with you again in the future.

Prof. Jim Fergusson: Thank you very much for the opportunity. If there's anything I can do for the committee, please don't hesitate to contact me.

I brought some extra copies with me of a paper on Canada's missile defence in NORAD that I obtained at the meeting in Washington. If anyone is interested in receiving a copy, I'd be happy to give them out to members of the committee.

The Chair: That's great. Thank you.

Just as a reminder, colleagues, on Monday at 3:30 p.m. there will be s special meeting with representatives of the Bosnian government. I believe we all will be in Ottawa on Monday, if we weren't normally, because of votes. You should have received a notice by now of that special meeting on Monday. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.