NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, April 26, 2001

• 1530

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, by my watch it is now 3:30, so I think we should get this meeting under way.

It's a real pleasure for me today to welcome members of the Conference of Defence Associations, Colonel Alain Pellerin, Lieutenant-General Belzile, and Colonel Henry. Welcome, gentlemen.

Before I begin, I did see—and yes, he is still there in the back—a person who is no stranger to these halls and committee rooms, a former Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais. Jean-Jacques, welcome to the committee. We're pleased to have you here.

I don't think there's any reason for any further delay, so, General Belzile, you have the floor.

Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile (Retired)(Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As I checked with you before, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to digress a little bit from committee protocol for just one reason, to indicate that other than my Conference of Defence Association hat, I sometimes wear one called the presidency of the Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation. We send students to Europe, and I usually am there at the beginning of June, where we run some commemorative activities, specifically on June 7 around Caen. And it's my pleasure, with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, to invite any one of you who happens to be in Europe to let me know, and we'll look after you and make sure you can meet our students and walk some of the battlefields with us.

Thank you.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Peter and I will be there for sure.

[Translation]

LGen Charles Belzile: As indicated, I am Lieutenant-General Charles Belzile and I am Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, or CDA. I am accompanied by Colonel Pellerin, also retired, and Executive Director, as well as Colonel Sean Henry, retired, Chief Defence Analyst.

The CDA is the largest pro-military public awareness organization in Canada. It has been in existence since 1932. Today, it is composed of over 30 member organizations, which represent some 600,000 Canadians. Our mandate is to advise government and the public on issues of good defence policies and efficient armed forces which could put these policies into practice.

The attention given to the operational capacity of the Canadian Forces is important and timely. We hope that this interest will serve as a catalyst as efficiently as your work did two years ago on the issue of quality of life. Subsequent government approval of additional funding for the Department of National Defence was welcomed, but the amounts given are insufficient to stop the decline of the Canadian Forces and to start rebuilding.

[English]

We at the CDA have continued our effort to focus public attention on the continuing crisis in defence. An important tool in this campaign is our study Stability and Prosperity, which has been issued to you and was published in September 2000. I urge you to read it, giving special attention to sections on budget process and analysis of DND budget 2000. The theme of the document is that money spent on defence is well spent, since it enhances peace and security, which in turn support international trade, the lifeblood of Canada's prosperity and well-being.

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The study concludes that recent additions to the defence budget were roughly 50% short of what would be required to provide stability and a basis for recovery of the Canadian Forces. That is, there is still a shortfall of some $2 billion, mainly in the DND operating budget. This does not include the additional $5 billion to $6 billion identified by the Auditor General for equipment replacement over the next five to ten years. Our study has generated widespread interest and it has been judged credible by DND, the Auditor General, and people in the central agencies, as well as academia.

It was always our intention to publish a supplement, which would identify specific shortfalls that comprise the critical $2 billion needed in the short term. However, recently we have become concerned over the perception that the Canadian Forces are able to meet all their commitments and are more combat capable than they were 10 years ago. In our view, these statements are open to question, and we now intend to expand the scope of our supplementary study to assess them in light of the costed shortfalls. The subject of the study will therefore be the state of operational readiness of the Canadian Forces and whether they are able to meet the commitments stated in the 1994 white paper, the official government document.

You will thus understand why we are pleased to see that you too will study Canadian Forces operational readiness. It is indeed useful cynicism. Our study will not be published until September 2001, with a view to, we hope, influencing the Standing Committee on Finance and the federal budget 2001. My remarks today will comprise an outline of how we intend to proceed, and this may assist you in your endeavours as well. We also hope that we shall have the opportunity to testify before you once again after the study has been published.

I shall start by reminding you that from the CDA perspective, the serious problems of DND and the Canadian Forces, which have really been developing over the past 30 years, proceed from two seminal sources, underfunding and demilitarization. The underfunding was most pronounced during the program review cuts in the period 1994 to 1996. However, the demilitarization process dates from the early 1970s and may, in the end, be the most damaging factor. In any case, both have a very negative impact on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces.

More recently, the Auditor General has stated in his 2000 report and in testimony before this committee that the operational readiness situation of the Canadian Forces is not satisfactory in respect of both defining it and measuring it. The problem here is partly related to our British military heritage. The British, as you all know, have always placed great stock in the personal responsibility of commanders at each level to decide the state of readiness of the troops under their command. That in itself is valid, but there has been a reluctance to submit commanders and their units to measurable tests of their readiness. The complexity of modern military operations renders this approach questionable. The Americans have recognized this for some time, and they now formally test their military units at the National Training Centre at Fort Irwin, California, in the case of the army, and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada in the case of their air force. Operational readiness testing is not totally absent in Canada, especially in the navy and the air force, but it needs much work to reach a satisfactory level across the Canadian Forces.

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In Canada there is a yet more basic problem. It is the lack of understanding on the part of government and the public as to how and why the armed forces are organized the way they are and how they operate.

A useful analogy would be to compare the armed forces to a symphony orchestra, whereby diverse elements are brought together to produce harmonious results. It's a complex process, even for musicians. To be successful an orchestra needs a rational organization, trained individuals, a musical score, instruments, and time to rehearse before the curtain goes up. For the armed forces, the analogous elements are much the same, but with a few additions reflecting the unique nature of military forces.

For our study of operational readiness, we intend to use the following factors or criteria: core structure; doctrine; human resources; equipment; training; logistics; stability; as well as military ethos. Although some would argue over points of details, these factors fall generally within the definition of operational readiness found in NATO with our allied nations and in the Canadian Forces.

Our assessment of operational readiness will be conducted by examining each of the above factors as they apply today in the Canadian Forces. The results will then be measured against each of the tasks presently assigned to the Canadian Forces in the 1994 white paper. But that is the bottom line.

On that basis, a rating as to operational effectiveness and ability to meet commitments can be derived. The common standard against which each task shall be measured is stated in the white paper as follows:

Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent—that is, they must be able to fight “alongside the best, against the best”.

I would be tempted to add “and win”.

I would like to conclude this intervention by quoting from Michael Ignatieff's book, Virtual War. It is a quote that I believe goes to the heart of the matter before us.

Those...who believe in using force as a last resort in defending or protecting human rights need to understand military power much better than we usually do. If we will the ends, we had better will the right means, for the means we select may betray our ends.

I look forward to reporting the results of our study to you in due course and would now be pleased to take your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, General, for your comments.

We have a number of questioners, I'm sure.

Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, General, and gentlemen.

I'll start my questioning with a comment about a paragraph you had in your presentation where you made reference to the lack of understanding on the part of government and the public as to why the armed forces are organized the way they are.

Are you referring to basically that even in the House of Commons and in the Senate there are very few people who have had military background experience? Does this somehow impact and reflect on the legislation we bring forward too?

LGen Charles Belzile: Not quite to that point, Mr. Chairman. What really concerns us occurs with a lot of people, including those in government. It has been my experience quite a few times in one-on-one conversation that there is a lack of understanding of the organizational structure.

It brings questions such as “You've got 57,000 people in the forces and 3,000 committed overseas, so what's your problem?” Our problem is that really those 2,000 to 3,000 committed overseas on a constant cycle really come from a pool, by and large a combat arm, that totals 9,000.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But doesn't this add to the confusion when during the Kosovo war the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Baril, claimed Canada could deploy 20,000 soldiers overseas if necessary? Was that a credible statement, in your view? By open-ending it that way, for what length of time would that have been? Was it not quantified or qualified at all?

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LGen Charles Belzile: The only thing I could say, not being able to read the mind of General Baril when he made this statement, is 20,000 people would wipe out the army. The durability of those people and their sustainability overseas for any period of time would be very problematic.

If you include the number of people who are serving on ships, all the aircraft supports that exist, and so on, you can build the 20,000. The true detailed ratio of that is very lopsided. For the people who are in fact on the line, either in peacekeeping, peacemaking, or combat situations, there are probably not much more than 3,000 to 4,000 of those people. The rest are simply support systems in the back, all the way back to Canada.

Mr. Peter Goldring: You're saying we're in a maximum situation to deploy 3,000 to 4,000 in the front line at one particular time. For what length of time would that be? Would that be an extremely short-term rotation? Would we be able to have reserves rotate in and replace them?

LGen Charles Belzile: You may know that six years ago I was a commissioner on a study of the restructuring of the reserves with the regretted Brian Dickson, former Chief Justice. At that time we said not only was there a requirement for 18% to 20% of reservists to supplement the forces we deploy overseas, but some of these people, of course, disappear into the woodwork when they come back and you have to bring them in two or three months ahead of time. They are not necessarily full-time service people. They have no job protection. They do it because they want to do it. You cannot count on them for sustainability, period.

You hire them for a year and three months is spent in training with the units with which they will deploy. They go overseas for six or seven months. They leave and then make their way back to their own communities across the country. They do not necessarily stay in the army.

The other 80% are the regulars, who come back to Canada. Six to twelve months later, the 2,000 or so that we rotate every six months are churned back up again, particularly the officers in the CM and NCOs. It leads to fatigue and to a tremendous amount of the nightmarish things that people read about today, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and a variety of others.

While not a medical officer, I accept the fact that we take people overseas who are healthy. They come back and somehow they're sick. Somehow I think they deserve the benefit of the doubt. They didn't create those problems. One of the things that created the problems is fatigue and stress, which is continuing because there's really very little relief.

The whole of the Canadian army, for all intents and purposes, does almost nothing except churning out 2,000 more people every six months.

Mr. Peter Goldring: General, given the numbers of 3,000 to 4,000, and given it would be a relatively short tour of duty, I suppose that would be the quick-in and quick-out capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces of today. How does that relate to numbers from ten years ago, from 1990? What were our capabilities then, given the same realm of approximations of equipment changes, theatre changes, and everything else? We're talking in raw numbers of men on the front line, 3,000 to 4,000 men. What were our capabilities in 1990?

LGen Charles Belzile: The year 1990 is not very long after I left the forces. When I was still commanding in the Canadian army, we had close to 75,000 people in the forces. They have shrunk to 60,000 since then. Not very far from that time, I remember when I was still in uniform having about 80,000 people available. We not only had the troops in Canada, but, as you very well know, until about 1993-94 we had a brigade in Germany. It in fact was the one that was used to initially go into Bosnia.

We had one more brigade in the case of the army. I'm not talking about the air force and the navy. It was one more brigade than we have today. The brigade that was brought back home was obliterated. It wasn't moved back home; it just disappeared.

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Mr. Peter Goldring: So we're at half capacity?

LGen Charles Belzile: We're at about two-thirds of what the strength used to be.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Given the total number of members in the armed forces—of course, there's a lot in supply and in service, and our air force has changed—in the basic ground troop numbering, you're saying we have virtually been halved in ten years.

LGen Charles Belzile: Yes, pretty close.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would also like to congratulate you on your presentation and especially for the document entitled Stability and Prosperity. I think it is a gold mine. No later than yesterday, I went to consult your Internet site. My assistant is here; I had told her that people in your association seemed quite expert in the area and that it would be interesting to meet with them. I had not noticed that your association was appearing before the committee today and I had even asked my colleagues if this association of retired military people was a stand-up organization. They told me that it was a very, very serious organization. And we see today that you deal with issues quite seriously.

I have two brief questions for you, one of which seems rather benign. As you know, in my riding of St-Jean, we were victims of the ice storm. There was reference to the black triangle of St. Jean, Granby and St. Hyacinthe. We needed the Canadian Armed Forces. And yet you used some rather harsh language regarding the National Defence budget. You say that funds are being misused internally. Well, I think that if the Canadian army wants to improve its image with the public, when there is a natural disaster, they must first go to help out their own citizens.

Currently, there are members of the forces all over the planet to help people in Erythria, in East-Timor and so forth. Sometimes it is difficult to justify that. We go out and help people in East- Timor and yet there is a natural disaster at home and the army does not intervene. You are saying that payments made to the provinces in cases of natural catastrophes are a way of using funds internally for purposes for which they were not intended. Could you perhaps nuance what you said?

LGen Charles Belzile: First I would like to explain exactly what I mean. The budget is approximately 12 billion dollars as we speak. Of this amount, some 3 billion dollars have absolutely no effect on the operational ability of the army. It goes to pay credit cards accounts, pension adjustments, expenses incurred at Kosovo, for example. We know that 450 or 500 million dollars were spent there. In English, it is called flow-through cash. Therefore, the operational efficiency of the Canadian Forces can only depend on 9 of these 12 billion dollars. That is the first problem.

When we are talking about funds being used for other purposes internally, it is internally within government, in that even if National Defence receives the money, the department cannot use it, practically speaking. We are not opposed to the army going to serve in the province of Quebec or anywhere else where natural disasters may occur. On the contrary, it is very good for the morale of the troops and they like that type of work.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Now I come to a question on a new concept which is around and which is called first in, first out. I haven't been a member of the National Defence Committee for long, but I have been a union member and I always noted that institutions had tendencies to develop concepts based on their budget, based on the amount of money at their disposal. And what has struck me since I arrived here, is that rather than basing actions on a philosophy that states there should be X number of members in the forces and that given that number of members we need a budget of X, the opposite is done. Am I wrong? The government imposes budgetary cutbacks, which requires a decrease in the number of soldiers, and all of sudden we have to come up with a new concept. What new concept will fit the new budgetary framework? We come up with this concept in order to get it over with because it is expensive. You have to get in first, and then get out quickly. Am I wrong when I say that the intellectual reasoning of the thing is totally conditioned by the budget?

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LGen Charles Belzile: You are absolutely correct. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I will make some comments on the concept of first in, first out, whose limits appear to be completely artificial. We are at a situation where 2,000 individuals are on rotation every six months.

As you say, the same government gives us money and then gives us duties that we could never have foreseen. These duties appear overnight, but there's an artificial ceiling in place. We say that 432 troops will go off somewhere. That was probably decided somewhere in the department, but it is because that is the maximum number that we have the means to send at this point. It is not a concept, in my opinion. In fact, personally, I think that it is not up to us to decide how long we will be there. It's all very well and good to say that we will be first in and then first out, but we can only be first out if the problem is solved. In wartime operations, our tactics are often dictated by the enemy. You have to react to what is happening elsewhere.

You cannot claim to organize all of that out in advance.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Are you saying that your enemy is the government because the government sets the budget?

LGen Charles Belzile: No, no.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Then I don't understand.

LGen Charles Belzile: The government gives us the task of going there, but it doesn't necessarily have at that point and time the supplementary funds or the appropriate number of troops to do everything. The government then asks the department what it can do, and we end up with an ad hoc organization which, in my opinion, is dangerous.

Mr. Claude Bachand: First in, first out is an ad hoc organization, is it not?

LGen. Charles Belzile: It is often had hoc. In other words, it is not based on a homogeneous unit where people know each other well, have worked together, have trained together. If all goes well, there's no problem, but if things go badly, more serious problems may arise than if we had had a more homogeneous entity such as a battle group, at the battalion level.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General. It's good to see you again, and I'll try to take you up on your invitation to meet in France. In fact, I will be representing the minister there on June 6 in that area—

LGen Charles Belzile: I'll be happy to see you.

Mr. John O'Reilly: We'll try to remember where that is and why it's there. It's a very important part of our history.

There are a couple of things I haven't been able to grasp in your paper. You go through heavily the fact that $2 billion in additional funding is required. I'm not sure where that breaks down. How do you get to $2 billion? What facts do you have to back that up, to justify $2 billion?

LGen Charles Belzile: I would ask Colonel Henry, who in fact has researched most of this paper, to answer that question.

The Chair: Colonel Henry.

Colonel Sean Henry (Retired) (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

If I could refer to the main document here, at the bottom of page 12, as an introductory response to the question, I would point out that in that list there is about $2 billion of so-called flow-through money. So if you're looking at the DND estimates, which are about $11.199 billion, you're immediately down at about $9 billion as far as useful money to spend on military effectiveness is concerned.

In fact, if we had the time, we could show you that there's another $1 billion that's not really there. It goes on institutional things that are put out by Treasury Board, and so on.

• 1600

That gets you in the ballpark. However, I believe the important part of your question has to do with exactly how the money is going to be spent. We're going to address that in the study we're doing, but, generally, I can say the essence of the problem within DND is that they are running up a deficit every day. It's like a MasterCard bill. I was out at an army briefing today, and the army itself is running at about an 18% deficit in terms of the money it has versus what it needs, just to keep body and soul together and just to operate. That money, the extra $2 billion, is initially to go toward O and M expenditures, operating expenditures, to stop the decline of the army, the navy, and the air force, and to get them onto a level field so they can begin the recovery.

On page 13 there's an interesting set of numbers. There is an increase of $894 million, in the right-hand column under “Increase”. But take a look at how it is disbursed. Vote 1, operating expenses, took $728.8 million out of that $894.5 million. That means most of the money that was handed out in extra funds in the 2000 budget was absorbed like water by a sponge to pay the MasterCard bill. The other money beyond the $894.5 million went to things like quality of life, and so on.

First of all, there is a need to address the MasterCard bill and to get the O and M under control. What's happening now is in order to pay the O and M when there isn't extra money in the budget, they have to take money out of capital. That means the equipment replacement program slows down, and we're going to have not only rust-out, but, as Colonel MacDonald points out, we're going to probably have mass extinction of equipment in about ten to fifteen years.

You have to get the situation stabilized so that you do not have to do things like borrow money out of your capital account. The army, for instance, now has to pay money back into the capital account that they took out before, so their O and M account, their MasterCard bill, is going up even faster.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much for that answer, by the way. Once you get into numbers and quoting billions, people tend to throw them around and use them as a defence to say your report isn't justified or is justified. That's why I asked that of you.

I don't want to usurp your new book that's coming out. You don't have to give me that information now. Maybe I'll have to wait for that new study to be published in order to get the other answer.

When you're taking into account the replacement of equipment, are you taking into account the actual equipment that's required, or are you looking at the equipment that presently exists being replaced?

You know, a lot of studies show that we need lighter tanks, different types of warships, different types of.... There is a revolution in military affairs, with the upgrading of computer systems, the limited number of CF-18s versus.... I think you're critical of the number that it is being downsized to, yet I understand that we still have more than the white paper called for. I sometimes have trouble justifying those numbers when they're brought out in different reports, so perhaps you could comment on that.

LGen Charles Belzile: If I may, Mr. Chairman, initially I'd like to perhaps come back to your first concern at the beginning, about how the $2 billion is going to be spent, if I can just amplify a bit what my colleague has said.

The Auditor General, when he was here—in fact, I was sitting on the side and I remember this—used much greater figures than we did. To my surprise, we were very conservative when compared to the Auditor General. He talked about a shortage of $3 billion instead of $2 billion, at about $750 million a year.

Some of this comes into play, obviously, but the money that we get and the extra money that we seek is really to arrest the erosion to a certain extent. Equipment, replacements, and those sorts of things are a bit of all the examples in the scenario that you presented.

• 1605

I have a paper here that nobody else here has, and it talks about a thing that has just been referred to by Colonel Henry. It's called “The Mass Extinction Scenario of 2010-2015”. Every major piece of equipment in the Canadian Forces right now is either expired, such as the naval helicopters, or has in fact been refitted, but only until 2000. That being the case, it's not only expended now, but it was expended again after its refit.

Every major piece of equipment in the forces will have to be replaced by about 2010 or 2015. Whether we replace that exact equipment or not, obviously technology, the RMA, and all of the things that are mentioned, are going to be taken into account in deciding the numbers that you need, based on the forces that you have, and based on the missions that you have.

Incidentally, when you buy them, you buy them with twenty-year packages of spare parts, complete refits, and that sort of thing. When we talk about the cost of equipment, we effectively talk about a life-cycle cost. The price of a truck is the price of a truck like you would buy on the civilian market, but we probably pay three times as much. But you must realize that we have paid three times as much because we have twenty years' worth of spare parts in there, we have three built-in rebuilds, transmissions, a number of engines, and all of these things. So military equipment tends to be viewed, in money terms, as being extremely expensive. But presumably it is also that way for a large transportation company that must replace its fleets and so on.

The Chair: General, I'm going to have to cut you off there, because Mr. O'Reilly is well over his time.

Mr. Stoffer, do you have any questions?

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before the committee today. I must admit that in the part I've read in this book so far—I don't know your political background in any way—it looks like a New Democrat wrote some of it, and I want to thank you very much.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Col Sean Henry: A simple soldier wrote it. It's apolitical.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I want to point out page 4—and this I say to my colleagues on all sides of the House:

Until the disparities between rich and poor are satisfactorily addressed, there is likely to be turbulence in international and intranational affairs.

I want to thank you very much for putting that in there.

On page 8, you also put down something that I think is very true. On a personal level, I believe this to be basically the crux of what your report says:

Perhaps most important of all, the national interest centres on the public well-being emerging from progressive social programs. It is false logic to make defence on the one hand and social programmes on the other part of a zero-sum equation. In fact, a healthy defence establishment and an effective social assistance framework go hand in hand to serve the national interest.

I personally wanted to thank you very much for putting that in there.

I'll now get to my question, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, in the Chronicle-Herald in Nova Scotia, Scott Taylor had a week-long session doing a very critical analysis of the military. He says there are far too many generals and top brass when compared to the reservists. In your opinion, is he right or is he wrong?

LGen Charles Belzile: Can I start by saying it's a bit of both?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

LGen Charles Belzile: The headquarters in the organization right now is very heavy. There's no question it's top-heavy. But if you have a good, hard look, it is not necessarily top-heavy in people in uniform. When you look at the senior executive levels of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence, there are a hell of a lot more.... If this is on record, maybe I should use a better word.

The Chair: You may want to measure your comments.

LGen Charles Belzile: There are many more civilians of general officer rank than there are in uniform.

Also, do not forget that in the 1970s—or maybe in the late 1960s, when the forces were unified—generals were just immediately, by a stroke of the pen, doubled in number, because we took officers who were called brigadiers and we made them all brigadier generals. That number can also be reduced by the same stroke of the pen by removing brigadiers from the generals list and making them colonels. But once you have that in place, this is part of the NDA. This is now legislated.

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Now, it is true that in wartime, during the Second World War, we had fewer generals for the number of troops overseas and that sort of thing. The organization of the senior headquarters does not change sensibly depending on the size of the forces that you have. It is very large here, but a lot of it is not military.

But even if you had a much smaller force, it would not be sensibly reduced, because of all things you have to do that are not necessarily defence-oriented but may be administrative or due to Treasury Board regulations. You have to staff all those things, so, yes, you do wind up with a lot of senior people, but a lot of senior people are not necessarily involved in the operational activities of the forces.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much, sir.

On page 18 you state:

The Canadian Forces are an essential component of the framework of the nation. They assist in defining Canada as a sovereign nation, and provide an array of vital services to the Canadian population.

My question comes in terms of alternate service delivery, which the federal government has engaged in over the last few years. You gentlemen must have had a lot of contact with the civilian force that is attached to various military bases across the country. To me, on a personal note, they are an extremely vital part of our military function. A lot of them are extremely nervous about the future of their careers if their jobs go to private contractors with the so-called outlook that the military might save money. Have you at all touched upon alternate service delivery, or are you planning to study that and the effects it may have, not only on the economic aspects across the country, but on morale as well?

LGen Charles Belzile: Mr. Chairman, we have not gone into it in great detail. However, having spent a lot of years in the defence industry after removing my uniform, I realize it creates a lot of work for defence-oriented exercises or defence-oriented enterprises, and also for support-oriented enterprises.

There's a caveat to all of this, and you touched on it yourself. You must realize that, to the tradesman who is being displaced because of that, it makes the organization a little nervous. When you go into a place like Bosnia, suddenly the balloon goes up in there. You have in your midst a group of civilians who are now working very near to the front line. The commander will find himself morally bound to protect them. These people are not armed and are not capable of looking after themselves. I don't mean that in a derogatory fashion. Soldiers have an unlimited liability. They're there to fight if need be, but the civilian is not. So those things are not totally taken care of. I think we have to have a look at that, because some of the technical trades are extremely concerned about this. They see their own trade structures in the forces being weakened by ASD.

Now, from the point of view of spreading the money around, or from a social point of view of getting more Canadians working, yes, it works. At the same time, the same number of people you used to have in the army, in the air force, and in the navy who were doing what is now done by ASD are out of a job now. But quite often, the same people are hired by a company to go back into the system to do what they were doing before. If they're near retirement, it's ideal. But they're not military anymore. They're not bound by the same rules of discipline. They're not bound by the same code of service discipline. They're not bound to fight to the hilt if they have to.

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Stoffer, but your time has expired.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): General Belzile, I was just reading an article the other day that stated that they have increased the retirement age to age 60 from 55. What impact do you think that will have on our men and women?

LGen Charles Belzile: Mr. Chairman, my initial response is that I wasn't aware of that. I must confess to that.

The second response is that it will increase stagnation. I'm talking about.... This is another CDA statement here. It's a very personal one. I got out of the forces at age 53. I think it's a young man's business and young woman's business. It is not a place to have people reaching their second pension age. That's not because they can't do the job and they don't have the experience, depending on what they do.

Back in Canada, on support systems, there's no problem. But you must realize there are a number of generals and colonels that you're talking about, and some of them will have to lead troops in action if a problem starts. With all due respect, I think some may be able to do it at age 60, but I personally think that armed forces should rotate through young people reasonably quickly, commensurate with experience.

• 1615

The Chair: Colonel Henry.

Col Sean Henry: I certainly concur with that.

I would point out that my understanding—and perhaps the researchers can check this—is that retirement age applies to certain specialist officers, such as doctors and judges. This is not unusual in other armies in the world. But at the other end of the spectrum, I believe that the Canadian Forces are looking at short-term engagements for young people, who would not get nearly that old before they left. I believe that what you're talking about refers to specialist officers.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you are probably aware, I've been very concerned about the replacement of the Sea Kings. I'm very concerned about how the government at the present time is looking at the replacements and the type of contract that has gone out, which eliminates Sikorsky and the Cormorants and leaves us with Eurocopter.

I feel very strongly that when it comes to the military, you take the politics out of it. I feel very strongly about that, having been made an honorary gunner. As soon as I was made an honorary gunner—I'm the only woman who's an honorary gunner of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment—they brought in gun control. They said “She can't have a gun”.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I am really and truly very concerned about this. I'd like to know how you feel about this. This is a major concern for me. I believe in my own heart that the Minister of National Defence is concerned about it. I believe he would like to see a rewording of that so that all of them can bid on it, and we can give our men and women the best tools to do the job we ask them to do.

LGen Charles Belzile: Mr. Chairman, I could not possibly disagree with that last statement. The military are our people. They're our men, our women, our sons, our daughters, our brothers, and our sisters. We ask them to go somewhere with an unlimited liability, so we should give them the best tools possible.

But it is not for the military, as much as it would like to, to dictate the political imperatives that sometimes come into play—i.e., regional development and whether a kit is going to be built in Canada and create work. This is outside the purview of the military. I do not know any military person who would want second best because you have a directed buy. But like everybody else, we have to live by procurement processes that are designed by the nation's government. Whatever their reasons are for writing things a certain way so that it cuts out certain people or increases the number of applicants, that is really a bit out of our league. You're asking me to make a political statement here.

I've lived with it in the past when it came to replacing a simple family of small arms. A German company got in with a big legal firm in Montreal, and the next thing we knew we were reopening the whole process for a weapon that wasn't even ready. That has very little to do with that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm not asking for a political statement. I'm worried about the wording when it says the lowest price, not the best. That's the thing that worries me. You can get something for a low price, but you're not necessarily giving your men and women the best tools to do the job. That really worries me.

LGen Charles Belzile: I couldn't agree more.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Chair: Colonel Pellerin.

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retired) (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations): I would just like to add to what the chairman has said. I think Mrs. Wayne raises an important issue. I wouldn't want to address the technical issue of the replacement.

As soldiers, they accept the unlimited liability contract and put their lives in harm's way if the state asks them to do so. They accept that. That is part of our professional environment. But there is a concomitant to that, which is that there's also an unlimited responsibility of government to make sure that if they're put in harm's way, the best tools are provided to our soldiers. I think as a general principle, we should abide by that.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mrs. Wayne?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, that's fine. Thank you very much.

• 1620

The Chair: Mr. Anders, five minutes.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is directed to General Belzile. What in your view are the most urgent equipment requirements facing the Canadian Forces and what capabilities are we at most risk of losing? What do you worry about the most?

LGen Charles Belzile: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I think Mrs. Wayne brought out that probably the most urgent requirement right now is the naval helicopters. I don't think you'd find anybody recently in uniform who would disagree with the statement that this is an item of major equipment that has outlived its life about twice. I could show my previous colours by stating something else, but I will abide by professionalism here and say the naval helicopters.

With regard to some of the capabilities we're in danger of losing, in the case of the army, I think it's probably the tank. We have equipment now that is on wheels, which is not a tank. There's a tanker here who can follow up on that a lot more precisely than I can. As a former commander overseas, with the possibility of facing a high-intensity battlefield for many years, I would be extremely worried if I were there without tanks and the direct firepower these things have.

I think the ordinary fleet of trucks in the army is in bad shape. I think they badly need refurbishing, or, better yet, to be replaced by a whole new fleet. One of the problems we often have is that because of procurement systems, we don't seem to be able to do things as civilian companies can. If I'm Smith Trucks, for instance, with a fleet of 200 trucks, I can buy 20 a year. So every 10 years I have a completely recycled fleet. We can't do that in the military for some reason, because these programs all come out with a big ball pushing them, pushing them, and pushing them, and the next thing you know, you need 10 new ships and you need 10 new ships now. They can't be built now. It takes a while to build them.

Most of us would like to see a program where you have constant buying of major equipment, with the newer ones always having the better RMA or the better technological capabilities. Eventually, your whole fleet gets turned over.

Unfortunately, the procurement system as presently set up simply doesn't permit it, whether it's caused by the duration of the life of a given government or purely by bureaucracy. I think it's probably a bit of both. Governments, theoretically anyway, can change every four or five years and, presumably, people who are in there like to see things happen when they're in there. So we have been locked into a system of procurement that makes it almost impossible.

In the case of aircraft, I'd be getting a little worried about the Hercules fleet, which is getting on in age.

I would also be worried about the capability to deploy heavy equipment by sea. There's obviously a need to replace the existing AORs, the fleet support ships, and they will be replaced in a reasonable time. It's the time also to look at the design of ships that will be more flexible and allow a roll-on, roll-off capability so that you can deploy heavy equipment overseas quicker. In a lot of ways this is a better deployment capability than even heavy aircraft, because it still takes a lot of trips to move say 10 tanks, one tank per trip possibly, while a ship will get them there quicker, that sort of thing.

Off the top of my head, those would be what I would see as the major equipment concerns.

Col Sean Henry: Just an add-on from an army point of view and also going back to Mr. O'Reilly's question, I'd like to assure him that the RMA, the revolution in military affairs, is very much in the mind of the army commander. I've just come from discussions along those lines.

As an interesting point, in order to get value from what they have, the army is using the upgraded Leopard as a direct fire support vehicle. As you probably know, the Leopard is not in the league of modern main battle tanks, but it is a good direct fire support vehicle. So that's going to hang in there for a few more years.

• 1625

Somewhere out on the horizon there is an RMA solution to direct fire support, and I think it's quite wise for the army to wait until they see what emerges.

Back to your original question, there still is going to have to be money spent for that direct fire support capability.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, gentlemen. I hope your navy colleagues appreciate your willingness to put the naval helicopter replacement ahead of some of the army affairs.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, I'm going to have to cut you off.

Mr. Rob Anders: I've got one last one. That's it.

I want to know your personal positions with regard to ballistic missile defence and the U.S. plan to go ahead and use the AEGIS combat system to protect North America from incoming ballistic missiles. How do you feel about that?

The Chair: Mr. Anders, I'm going to have to cut you off, because you're well over your time and that is a very large question to ask these gentlemen. If you have some patience, I will get back to you.

Mr. Bachand, you have the floor.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your document, you state that the federal budget for Defence should be a major intervention lever for a fragile economy.

There is a fact, and one that has already been cited in several doctrines, that military investment in Canada has very large economic benefits for some regions. Of course, we could discuss the benefits provided by the members of the forces themselves, by their salaries, by the operational budget of military bases, such as the one in my riding of Saint-Jean but I would rather focus on the equipment.

We spoke about the Eurocopter. Do you believe that the Canadian government has any flexibility to require that the equipment contain some Canadian content? I bring up the Eurocopter because we just might be buying a Lada because it costs less money than a Mercedes. These are examples that I used in the House. But I also remember a debate about the LAV III, in which I asked the government to examine the possibility of having GM build the vehicle in Ontario; the gun turret could also have been built by Oerlikon, in my riding, rather than by Delco, in California.

I haven't much studied the equipment contracts. Are they normally turn-key contracts? Is the government able to advertise that it has a contract to give, but that it wants the content to be entirely Canadian? Americans are not shy when it comes to telling us that if we want access to their market, we will have to set up our industries south of the border. Could we do the same thing? Can we act like the Americans, free to do what we want, or is there some sort of international will, especially American, to ensure that everything goes through them before coming back to us, with taxpayer dollars?

LGen Charles Belzile: In the case of contracts for major equipment, normally one company is chosen as the prime contractor from among its competitors. The Canadian government imposes a certain number of conditions on the organization, through Public Works Government Services Canada (PWGSC), when a decision is made, even if there are five or six different offers. Some parts for this equipment must come from specific manufacturers, but a lot of equipment and technology is not necessarily available in Canada. In such cases, the equipment may come from Delco or elsewhere, but there is normally an agreement between GM, in London, and government of Canada purchasers, who must approve all subcontractors. In such cases, the contractorship is given to GM to manage the project. There is some freedom, but we can't ignore the fact that Canadian industry lacks certain capabilities. That's the first point.

The government's equipment acquisitions system is completely flexible. In the case of the patrol frigates, the government insisted that everything come from Canada, in the case of naval ships, but here again, there is the equipment or the arms for the ships that were purchased elsewhere and that were likely installed using technology from elsewhere as well, whether it be from the United States or from France. The different components of a major piece of equipment such as this probably come from 200 subcontractors, from a whole bunch of subcontractors.

• 1630

Mr. Claude Bachand: You spoke of ships earlier. You would like to modernize our fleet, particularly to transport heavy material. The government launches a bidding procedure. If Taiwan, for a specific contract, makes an offer that is $1,000 less than that of a Canadian industry, would the government not be inclined to accept the offer from Taiwan because it costs $1,000 less?

If contracts of this magnitude were awarded directly to Canadian shipyards, it would create an enormous amount of wealth which would stay within our borders. I would like your opinion on this.

LGen Charles Belzile: I think that in most cases, we try to keep as much work as possible within Canada, but there are some problems that we are unable to solve ourselves. In those cases, what choices do we have? We have to allow for some flexibility.

I had the experience of purchasing, from the French, the Eryx anti-tank system. I was working for SNC, who manufacture weapons in Canada. We wanted to build the warhead that would be launched, the rocket which would be launched to destroy the tank, but the French were not ready to give that to us. So, we had to decide if we wanted this equipment even though the French wanted to manufacture it in its entirety. This decision was made through the government procurement system. We now have the equipment. We have it in Canada, but with a French warhead.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well, thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, gentlemen, it's good to see you again.

First of all, I was struck by reading a couple of statistics. The first was that in the defence department's last annual baseline survey, it said that 92% of Canadians surveyed believe it's important for Canada to maintain a modern, combat-capable military. That's a staggering level of support. It is not surprising, maybe, but I think staggering in the context of the discussion.

On stability and prosperity, I read this and had a chance today to go over it. At the same time, I read this publication by the department on plans and priorities for 2001-2002. The idea, of course, is in some degree we want to try to see whether they are at loggerheads or whether in fact they can be meshed together in terms of some of the issues you've raised. In the conclusions, in particular, the department indicates that the forces structure needs to be modernized. Clearly, you've talked about it.

Human resource and corporate management practices need to be strengthened, which this committee has been talking about. And defence must unequivocably demonstrate that it's managing its resources efficiently and effectively. You and your colleagues have said before, General, that new equipment is one thing, but it's being able to optimize the use of that equipment by having the personnel to use it. I've heard your comments before on the in-and-out strategy or the theatre activation team that was used in the Eritrean theatre.

I'm just wondering on this issue. We know that it's essential to have the latest equipment to be able to.... The changes we're asking the military to undertake today are different from what they were in many respects in the Cold War period. I guess I'd really like you to elaborate on the issue of.... We can never, I don't think, replace people with technology. But how do we assure that we're going to be able to maximize the use of this personnel, which we're not, if I understood you correctly with regard to the in-and-out approach? How do we get to that point? Why do you think there has been this shift in thinking—at least in political or military circles—from the more protracted stay that we've had to this in-and-out strategy, which clearly, if I read you correctly, you're not in favour of, particularly because you're not sure who's on your right and who's on your left sometimes when you go in there? Could you elaborate?

• 1635

LGen Charles Belzile: I would touch on the last one first, as opposed to the dichotomy you may notice between these two documents. My argument on ad hoc units, which is what we now see in some of these “quick in, quick out” things, is that they are not the cohesive teams the military forces naturally should develop, where there is mutual trust between everybody. Soldiers will all trust each other to a certain extent, but not nearly as much as two people who have been in the same slit trench or on the same tank crew for five or six months together. This is a simple human behaviour thing.

I remember being involved many times in arguing—it's something like hockey—that people will not fight willingly for Base Valcartier or for Petawawa. They'll fight for their regiment. They'll fight for their colleagues. They'll fight for the people around them. This is such a critical issue in the case of troops. I'm always concerned if you have an ad hoc organization that doesn't have the homogénéité it should have. As long as things go well, they'll come out of there and everybody smells like roses. If something goes sour, I think they are more vulnerable than the properly trained and equipped organization together.

As to whether the department is, and ourselves..... In looking at those two things, I must confess I've seen this one for the first time this morning. I'm struck immediately by a couple of things in the picture, right on the cover. It concerns me because, for one thing, I don't even see a weapon in any of those pictures. Perhaps in the rest of the book there are. I don't see a weapon in there. I see a title that says “Plans and Priorities”, I'm seeing radar screens, I'm seeing helicopters, I'm seeing a Van Doos soldier holding a baby on his way somewhere, presumably, I'm seeing a young lady, who is obviously a technician, with a naval-coloured shirt, so she's on a ship somewhere, I see the wheeled vehicles that come from Canada and no weapons showing. So quite honestly....

A voice: It's politically correct.

LGen Charles Belzile: I don't know if I should use the term politically correct with politicians. Maybe this is not a popular term. This is obviously very politically correct. Who is it dictated by? I don't know. I would like to point out that ours are First World War soldiers.

This brings me to my final point, if I may, in answer to Mr. Wilfert, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Sum up very quickly, General.

LGen Charles Belzile: Nobody will ever replace people. I don't care what kind of RMA you're going to bring in, a lot of people will tell you that they can replace soldiers, but soldiers are irreplaceable. The thing we owe to them is to make them capable of using, to an optimal degree, the equipment we put in their hands, and hopefully that's the best. They must learn to use it properly.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Sir, the policy of National Defence is to ensure that the regular Forces are at 60,000, but we're below that now. In your opinion, your group's opinion, what should the level of regular forces be in order to achieve the goals you've outlined?

Col Sean Henry: Two studies have been done, the first one back at the time of the 1987 white paper, and a follow-up prior to the publication of the 1994 white paper. Both of these studies have shown, notwithstanding, that we pulled back out of Germany because up to a certain degree, the commitments were roughly the same. It was shown in both studies that when you get to a total Canadian Forces regular establishment of 78,000 people, that's the line.

Do you remember the first drawdown in the early 1990s, before program review, was 76,000? They were just under the line, but you were probably going to still be viable. When program review came along—and that's where things really got bad—huge chunks of money were taken away. The only way the Armed Forces could continue to exist in that type of austere fiscal climate was to drop down to 60,000 people, because they just had to suddenly come up with a huge chunk of money. The only way you could do it quick was to reduce people, and it's now gone down to about 57,000 real people. So everywhere you look, the shortage of people is a critical element in the problems of the armed forces.

• 1640

The Chair: Colonel Pellerin.

Col Alain Pellerin: I'd like to follow up on that, and also the question that Mr. Wilfert asked. Obviously these two questions are related.

When you speak to some people at NDHQ now and talk about the decreasing numbers—it's below 60,000, probably closer to 55,000—the response you'll get is that numbers don't matter any more, it's capability, and that's the issue of RMA. But I think in the case of the Canadian Forces we've gone below the critical mass, and we can't justify it any more by bringing in the RMA.

The Coyote is a good example. It might be an excellent vehicle, but it's much more complicated and requires a lot more maintenance than the vehicle it replaced. So you need more people to maintain the vehicle.

That is the predicament now, because there's not enough money in the budget to address the RMA, which needs to be addressed, and the resources, the personnel. We justify the reduction of personnel by the fact that we're deep into RMA. I would suggest that we're below the critical mass, and it's not satisfactory.

Col Sean Henry: If I may, Mr. Chairman, it's very important to follow that up.

Going back to Mr. Goldring's question at the very beginning as to the sort of facts that you should know in this committee, one of the main ones, going back to the analogy of the symphony orchestra, is that the armed forces, particularly the army, are being arbitrarily chopped all over the place. Units are losing sub-units, and so on and so forth, simply to remain in existence. That in itself is a response to the reduction in personnel, and it is also a response to what Colonel Pellerin said with respect to having to generate more people for new, largely technically oriented jobs. What the army commander has had to do is quite arbitrarily cut pieces out of his organization. So there's no coherent force structure any more. The symphony orchestra is not organized to play music; it's organized to simply exist.

Going back to your question, this means for all intents and purposes that the army has become a manpower pool, with all that implies, and every six months they grab 2,000 people and shove them over.

It's not quite that bad. There is a core in there of a battalion, but none of the battalions are big enough to carry out this job by themselves.

So that in itself is bad, but it builds on itself. The people lose their experience, and the instability breeds further instability, and so on. To me, that is the sort of question you should be going into in detail on with officials.

The Chair: In deference to our questioners, I would ask the witnesses to respond to current rather than previous questions.

Mr. Stoffer, I'm going to give you a bit more time, a minute and a half.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Obviously it falls upon the difficulties the military has in recruiting, in trying to convince young men and women that the military can be a very good and effective career in your lifetime.

But the question I have is on the reduction of hours flown by the Auroras over our three coastlines. Mr. Wilfert said that 92% of Canadians want a combat-ready force. I think what they also want is to know that the military is at least in a surveillance mode, checking our oceans to ensure that drug smugglers, people smugglers, illegal fishing, and environmental concerns are at least being monitored, or given the perception that they're being monitored.

DND has told us that with the reduction of hours we will still be able to maintain our so-called economic sovereignty of our three coasts. I disagree with them on that, and I'd like your opinion. Can the military effectively patrol its coasts in an economic way with those reductions of the Aurora fleet?

LGen Charles Belzile: Unfortunately we don't have an airman amongst us here. We're all soldiers. I think this is a very valid question to ask of the air force commander when he comes here.

My reaction is somewhat similar to yours. I have a hard time understanding how they can do more with a lot less, but they're the professionals, and presumably they're the ones who should be convincing you. I think these kinds of questions are very legitimate, and they should be asked.

• 1645

If I were to say from the point of view of reconnaissance that I can do an army reconnaissance on the ground as well with 20% of the capability that I had before, you would probably tell me that you had some doubts about that, and I would agree.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I hate to be rude, gentlemen, but I am leaving now, so I want to thank you for your time as well.

Are you going too?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm going in a minute because I have to fly out as well, but I have one quick question.

Mr. John O'Reilly: This is Thursday.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You see, we're so popular. We have speaking engagements, and you guys don't have anything to do.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Nova Scotia is calling, my son.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You referred to ships and the requirement for ships for our military, and that they should be built on a rotating basis, and so on. I'm not sure if you're aware, General Belzile, that we as a committee, on unanimous agreement around the table, tabled a document like that just before the election. We've brought it back and passed a motion again. We agree with that as well.

Of course, I have to say, as you know, right in Saint John, where I am from, we built a frigate with MIL Davie as well, and we feel very strongly that there should be money set aside so that we have an ongoing program whereby we meet the needs of our military, and that our naval ships are built here in Canada—not used submarines from England that are then grounded and you have to pay $800 million to try to fix them up so they'll float. We feel that it definitely should be done here.

LGen Charles Belzile: I have no argument with that. In fact, I'm sorry I didn't say it myself.

This is a hard fact of life, but for a rotational basis, you would have to get more people involved than the military. This is not only a national defence issue—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

LGen Charles Belzile: —this is a government and cabinet issue.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I'm trying.

LGen Charles Belzile: This is an issue that involves more than one department, and I don't think you'd get too much argument, certainly not from us anyway.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As to my other question, with the presentation you're making here today, with your documents, your stability and prosperity, and so on, the benefits of investment in defence, you're here before this committee and we really appreciate what you're doing. I myself feel very strongly that politics should not be playing a role in defence, but you're saying we have to go after different departments in order to achieve what we have to for defence.

Is your group knocking on those doors and getting your voices heard there as well? It's your experience, your knowledge, that will help us to achieve what has to be done for the military.

LGen Charles Belzile: Yes, we are, and we're hoping to appear not only in front of this standing committee again, but also in front of the finance committee and the foreign affairs committee.

I don't want to pre-empt what might be a question, but if there is ever in the near future a new policy review by the Government of Canada, as I've said morning, we think the model that was used recently by the Australians is one that we could easily emulate.

In other words, the Department of Foreign Affairs would do their foreign affairs policy either coincidentally with National Defence, or even ahead of National Defence. In 1994 it went in the opposite direction. Somehow the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board, and all these people, must be brought into it, as was done in Australia. The Australian white paper that has been published is, at least for the time being, not only agreed to by all the departments and signed by the prime minister, but it's also funded, or at least it is predicted to be funded.

Whether four or five years down the road they will still be able to do that.... You ladies and gentlemen who spend your life in the service of the country in government know how government works better than I do, and I think things have a way of changing sometimes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: When your voice is heard the next time, perhaps you will ask them if the chief of review services or the judge advocate general should be looking into what we are doing with our helicopters, and maybe we'll get the right answer.

Col Alain Pellerin: Before you go, could I make a quick comment?

• 1650

Besides coming in front of this committee and the finance committee, we also do a lot of consultations with various departments, bureaucrats, and what not. One point that comes out quite often from people who are not convinced about the need for defence is that we present our case the same as we did to you, and they then say, yes, we're asking for more money for defence and would like to see more money going into defence. But then we hear comments coming from the Department of National Defence that we're more combat-capable now than we were ten years ago. They ask why we should put more money into defence when we're more combat capable than we were ten years ago, and they say we don't need any money.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But they're not.

Col Alain Pellerin: I think that's something that needs to be established.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: We'll fix that up, too, Mr. Chairman, won't we? We'll straighten that situation out before we're through. Yes, indeed.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: We definitely have a lot on our plate.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being here, gentlemen. I think it's really important that you do appear before us, because I think your views—those views being all the experience that you have, and now your ability to look from the outside in—give a good perspective. You're not paid lobbyists, who are the types of people we do get caught with now and then, and who have goals that are not necessarily their own or those of a collective group.

I had a couple of things. First of all, a suggestion I've heard—and this is completely out of the blue, now—from a couple of colonels is that maybe in our recruiting we should have our recruits coming into the forces spending at least a year in the reserves first, and our people in the 55 age bracket spending a couple of years back with the reserves, training our reserves. I hope I'm not hitting you too quickly, but just....

LGen Charles Belzile: No. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd very much like to discuss that very issue.

I'm going to bring you back to 1995, if I may, to a special commission that I served on with Chief Justice Brian Dickson. We in fact stated quite categorically that with the dual-spouse careers that exist now, we should make it easier for people to go from reserve duty to regular duty, and perhaps have them doing a mixed career, if you want.

When the kids are young, you want to stay home, you don't want to travel, and you're building another career or your spouse is building another career. Then, after a number of years, you can have the ability to go into the regular forces, with a commensurate pension protection. You can do that in the United States reasonably well, but we have made it very difficult to cross that membrane, for whatever reason. And I must confess that it was like that when I was in uniform, so it's not the present people. We've been living with that for a long time.

We have been unable to recruit, for instance, on a conditional basis. The security checks that are done on people can take weeks or can take months. People get fed up, they stop waiting, and they go out and find another job. This is true of the reservists.

As for whether they should all start in the reserves or not, it would be useful, but I think it would be very difficult. For that year when you have them at the reserve, unless they're training on a reasonably full-time basis, they will be caught in the reserve training system as it exists now, and that system has some problems. One of its problems is that practically every year in September, because of the size of the units, they start the cycle all over again with new people, and they never get much beyond the individual training level.

We maintained in 1995—and I certainly would still maintain—that you need to build a second capability in there so that they can get into collective training, so that you can start reinforcing, for instance, the regular force in Bosnia not with 50 individuals, but with a couple of formed platoons that come from a regiment, a region. Those platoons will have have trained together and will have this homogeneity that I keep talking about. That would be ideal, but I'm not sure you can do it right now.

Mr. David Price: Well, we're looking at two different aspects here, I think. Your idea of a complete platoon coming out of the reserves is one side, but what I'm talking about is a pre-training of somebody starting in the reserves and wanting to go into the permanent force. They would have to spend a year in the reserves first. It's pre-training. They're not going to be trained going in. Obviously not. But this is what was presented to me.

• 1655

LGen Charles Belzile: If you have the legislation or if you have the conditions of service that make this person available for that one year's training, I think it would be a very good way. It would serve also as a selection process for people who perhaps haven't made up their mind whether they want a military career. I would not object to this. I think you would have to really rewrite a fair amount of processes as they exist now. Nothing is impossible if you really want to do it.

Now, as for the older people, we have such things as the supplementary reserve in the reserves. In fact it does happen to a large extent now that a lot of senior NCOs and some of the middle ranking officers do, when they wind up back in civilian clothes, take positions in reserve units and help that unit to a considerable extent because of their experience. You could probably keep them as trainers a little beyond the retirement age too. I wouldn't see any problem with that.

Mr. David Price: Do I still have some time?

The Chair: Actually, no. Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Henry, we've been told quite a bit about the praises of the LAV vehicle. Quite frankly, I've been getting the impression that this is the preferred vehicle our military should be concentrating on. I was very interested in, during your discussion, your encouragement for renewing our tanks for possible tank warfare. Is this meant to go to the next stage of tanks?

Also, along with that we know that there's great discussion around the world about using depleted uranium in modern tank munitions. If we don't have the latest munitions in our arsenal, would it be fair to send those tanks overseas?

Col Sean Henry: To answer the last question first, there are active investigations that have been going on among the western allies certainly for something to replace depleted uranium. Right now it's not there, but the Canadian Forces decided some time ago, even before the current controversy, to go with alternate ammunition, and that's what we have for the Leopards right now.

So putting that to one side for the time being, I'm glad you asked your first question, because I hope I didn't give the impression that the Canadian Forces, the army, are going to need heavy tanks ad infinitum. What I did say was that they do need a capable direct fire support capability to support the LAV III.

Now, what does that mean right now? The Americans are going to come out with something where they put a 105-millimetre low-recoil gun on top of a LAV III, which will see them through the next little while. The problem is that if you do that in Canada, we'll be stuck with that thing for the next 20 or 30 years. Meanwhile, as I mentioned earlier, the new technology coming down is going to be much better than a 105-millimetre low-recoil gun. It will be there, yet we won't have the money to afford it.

The solution I came up with respect to using the Leopards as an interim direct fire support vehicle I think is a good way to go, as it involves not going out and getting a main battle tank or a direct fire support vehicle at the current level of technology.

Mr. Peter Goldring: How long could you increase the life of the Leopard tank? How long is its effective use?

Col Sean Henry: Indefinitely, as long as you can get the parts.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Now, will this 105-millimetre piece be able and equipped to handle the depleted uranium munitions? Was the removal of the depleted uranium munitions from the arsenal a political thing, or was that a conscious safety effort?

Col Sean Henry: I would say it was partially political. Back when it was done, there was also a cost problem. Getting a sustainable amount of depleted uranium ammunition would have been very expensive. It was better to go with what we had and then investigate for something a little better.

There is active research going on to replace depleted uranium as a material. I don't know the state of that research right now, but definitely that research is going on. Even beyond depleted uranium there are technological applications out there that will no longer need explosive ammunition. There are rail guns that use electronic energy and lasers, and so on, so it would be wise for the Canadian Armed Forces to try to hang in a little longer to invest in that sort of solution.

• 1700

Mr. Peter Goldring: How much longer would that be?

Col Sean Henry: I would say certainly 15 to 20 years, but if you're not going to be able to get an advanced solution up to there, then obviously you'll have to look at something else.

LGen Charles Belzile: The modernization process that has been done on the Leopard tank recently puts it as a vehicle that will now, in our mass extinction, be good until 2015. I received the first one when I was in Germany. It was originally bought in 1978, and we now have it extended to 2015. The normal lifetime of that tank was originally from 1978 to 2005.

In other words, you're talking about 25 to 30 years in the life of a tank. Now, it's had at least a couple of updates since then—a much better fire control system, and better night vision equipment and targeting equipment. So you modernize the same equipment, but a tank hull is pretty durable unless it's bombed out. It's solid steel, armoured steel, and it will last a long time. You need to paint it, but as long as the innards—the electronics, the weapon systems, and the fire control systems—are updated with the available technology, you can keep that thing fighting.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Is the gun updated?

LGen Charles Belzile: The gun—

The Chair: I'm going to have to cut you off there, because you're well over your time.

Col Sean Henry: It's still a 105-millimetre gun, but they are investigating improved ammunition beyond simple depleted uranium factor. There are other aspects of ammunition that are becoming better.

There's what the Americans are going to get. The Americans, a few years down the line when the new technology appears, will just chuck these away or give them to the National Guard or something. If we got them now, we would have them for the next 20 or 30 years, whereas the new technology out there would supersede them very quickly.

The Chair: Mr. Regan, you're on.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to say that I'm pleased you have undertaken the effort of making the argument of how our country, for its prosperity, is dependent upon what happens in the rest of the world. It seems to me that all too few Canadians think about that very much and contemplate what the impact is of international peace and security on our prosperity in Canada.

Now, having said that, I think that's a view I share, and I share the view also that defence has to be a big part of our role in maintaining that. But I want to test the hypothesis and develop it further, so let me ask you this question.

In terms of the goal of international peace and the security and stability that you've referred to as being required for globalization and international economic prosperity to continue, we require those things. You say an essential component of this condition is the maintenance of modern armed forces. You go on to refer to some of the problems you face internationally, for instance—widespread poverty, disease, and ignorance.

As I consider the optimum ways to promote Canadian values in the world, and the optimum ways to combat poverty, disease, and ignorance, I ask you what are the other essential components of the condition of peace, security, and stability?

If we have an incremental $1 billion next year to spend, what proportion of that billion dollars should be spent on which of those components? Because of course, as you well know, that's the challenge that government faces.

Col Sean Henry: I think that is a very good question. Unfortunately, the answer probably brings ideology into the equation.

I think what you often have to do is provide the framework of stability out there by the use of armed forces and peace enforcement or even peacekeeping. But once you've done that, the solution to poverty and all the associated difficulties, overpopulation and so on, is, I'm afraid—and this is a personal view right now—in the hands of the people who are in those conditions.

• 1705

I think that sometimes is one of the mistakes we make in terms of foreign aid and so on: we throw it into a black hole. I would say that a large proportion of the money should still go to the armed forces in order that Canada can make a worthwhile contribution to international peace and stability, and perhaps not go in and out in six months and maybe stay there a little longer to make sure that conditions are stable enough so that the local people can get on with helping themselves.

The Chair: Do you have any other thoughts, General?

LGen Charles Belzile: I agree with that. There is no easy answer. I don't think military power is the answer to all problems, obviously, but it is part of it because it helps to establish stability. And the peacekeeping missions, such as the long-lasting ones, at least brought some stability.

But if the people concerned, as you are seeing now for instance in the ex-Yugoslavia, while the stability is established will not sort out a lot of their own ideological and social problems themselves, I don't think the military really will do that for them. Nor are we, for all intents and purposes, equipped to do that. But presumably we will at least allow a stability that will allow other people to come in to help them, whether it's a Canadian government initiative such as CIDA or things like this that can help in reconstructing something and bring certain technologies and work to the workplace for them or that sort of thing.

I agree with Sean: eventually, it has to come from themselves to a large extent. We can help in making the conditions such that this will be helped, if not triggered.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Let me ask you about what you refer to as the revolution in military affairs, which really, obviously, is the case. It's already in the pace of technological advancement and the challenges that creates for the military.

You say in your paper that it's a factor adding to the complexity of national and international security based largely on applications of the microchip, etc. It's assumed that the RMA will spread quickly around the world. I read that, and I think it is referring to it as one wave, whereas it strikes me that we are in fact talking about an ever-accelerating process.

As I see in other areas when you're looking at technology and trying to keep up with that technology, the challenge it presents to business or to government is to manage that ever-increasing cost. For instance, when you are buying a computer, you ask yourself, do I buy this one now that's pretty fast, or do I wait six months and buy the one that is going to be cheaper and a little faster? If you do that you'll never buy one, if you wait for the next, best one. When there's another piece of technology in defence in six months, and when you get to that point I'm sure there will be another one on the horizon that's much more exciting.

How should the government manage that challenge?

The Chair: Could we have a very quick answer on that?

LGen Charles Belzile: I have a very quick opinion, if you want.

I don't have any argument with it being an accelerating process, but it accelerates at different speeds in various places in the world because of their own technological advancements and those sorts of things. For every measure there is a counter-measure being invented somewhere, or a speedier way or a lighter way or a smaller way to do things. That sort of thing is inevitable. But there are still a lot of people in this world who are not really touched by that. I think the stability we're talking about may bring about the conditions where they can start getting involved in some of this.

However, as fast as things change for us, I'm sure that in some African countries they don't change that fast.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to come back to my question with regard to national missile defence.

You have stated on page 7, and it is in bold:

Canada's security policy will still need to be aimed at supporting and assisting US initiatives to maintain the international stability necessary for US prosperity and progress.

That sounds like common sense to me. I am wondering therefore whether you think the latest initiative with national missile defence is something that fits this objective.

• 1710

The second question I have—because sometimes you gentlemen run long and I run out of time, so bear with me—is with regard to some of the issues Mr. Stoffer raised: drug trafficking, people smuggling, some fishing issues, and what not. I realize that you're soldiers, and maybe your navy components would be the better ones to answer some of these things, but I wonder if you might be able to give us your thoughts with regard to how best to deal with some of those issues.

Col Alain Pellerin: I wouldn't mind addressing the first one, the issue of missile defence.

I must say I'm in a sense agnostic on whether missile defence is a good thing or a bad thing. I think the initiative for the missile defence is with the U.S. government, and obviously their perception of the threat to counter is very different from the Canadian perception.

We can identify certain capabilities in Iraq or North Korea, but it's not perceived as a threat by Canada, because we don't feel North Koreans will fire missiles against us if they have two or six, whereas the Americans have a world responsibility and therefore they need to look at protecting their forces deployed abroad, what they used to call “theatre missile defence” but is now over a larger umbrella of missile defence. And what is theatre missile defence to the Korean area, or Japanese area or Taiwan, is really their own national missile defence.

So for the Americans it would be impossible to justify theatre missile defence in these areas for their troops deployed without having protection of the national territory, the homeland defence. So therefore for them it has a completely different dimension from what it has for us.

All we've said in the paper is if the Americans decide to deploy missile defence, then for the allies they have to think seriously of the impact of saying no to the missile defence, the American system, because the impact will not just be on defence and defence issues, it's going to be much broader.

We mentioned, for instance, 85% of our trade is with the U.S. and growing. We saw the P.E.I. potato issue, which is really a small potato in the broadest scale of things. So missile defence I think—

The Chair: Don't say that in Prince Edward Island.

Col Alain Pellerin: Of course. No, I'm sure.

It's a very sensitive issue to the Americans. My gut feeling is they will go ahead with missile defence. So the government has to think very seriously about the consequence of not supporting missile defence. Essentially, that's what we've said in our paper, without taking a position for or against.

LGen Charles Belzile: With regard to Mr. Anders' second question, if I understand it correctly, you're talking really about some of these issues we call “asymmetrical threats”, and that sort of thing, and our capabilities to deal with them.

In those matters, such as the interception of drug passers, drug ships, and aircraft, and that sort of thing, the military really is in support of immigration, in support of federal police services, and that sort of thing. To us it's a by-product of having a ready combat-capable force, because that means surveillance capability. As a by-product of this, you have the ability to do that and be extremely useful to the Solicitor General and to every other department that is concerned with these things by spotting a rusty bucket that's coming in over the Pacific with a shipload of people who would probably enter the country illegally if they were left to their own devices. We also get involved in support by providing camps, and that sort of thing, for some of the people who are involved, such as we did for the Kosovars in the past.

But those are by-products, and the argument I always make is that the other by-product is our capability to be peacekeepers or peacemakers. This is what justifies to us as well, in a so-called quiet period where there is no high-intensity conflict going on for us, that it's better to have this kind of capability and be able to do these as a by-product than to do this as a sort of strange gendarmerie extra to the RCMP, and then when the need arises try to raise it to the other level, which would be a lot more difficult and in fact would be impossible to do unless you had a lot of time and resources.

• 1715

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, you've made a connection between international stability and national prosperity, but CDA has also been somewhat critical of the 1994 white paper's emphasis on the UN as perhaps somehow downgrading NORAD and NATO.

Given the international situation, what do you think the roles of NATO and NORAD are, and where should our emphasis be?

LGen Charles Belzile: NORAD, to start with, is a continental thing, and Colonel Pellerin's statement about the continental defence and the home defence that the Americans are facing.... With 85% or 86% of our trade being with them...I don't want to quote Pierre Trudeau on the elephant and the mouse, but basically sharing the hemisphere with them is going to dictate to a large extent how we are going to operate nationally, and I think it behooves us also to pay our share of things—i.e., whatever our proper proportion is.

So I think it is almost inevitable that whatever they do is going to affect us in one form or another.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: And that would apply to missile defence as well?

LGen Charles Belzile: That applies to missile defence.

Col Sean Henry: I'll let Colonel Pellerin talk about NATO, but I will interject on the UN. Certainly you've got to be able to cover the bases that are of interest within your interests, and I think all three of those agencies are.

However, up until now the United Nations has proven itself to be quite incompetent when it comes to military operations. To put all your military capability eggs into the UN basket would be a mistake, I believe. And that, then, lets Colonel Pellerin talk about NATO.

Col Alain Pellerin: Yes.

If we were critical in the past about peacekeeping, it wasn't so much about peacekeeping. I think it was more the concept of how it had been presented before—the concept of human security—and how it was pushed in some quarters in the past. I remember, as an example, going to a two-day seminar hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA, where the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke for half an hour about human security. Not once did he mention the role of the armed forces, or the RCMP for that matter, and at the time we had 3,500 troops deployed in the Balkans.

If the government sees fit to send 3,500 troops to the Balkans, there must be a reason for them to be there, and it is to provide that stability that Colonel Henry mentioned, which is essential if human security is going to happen.

Now, on the NATO issue, I think it's still essential that we keep that link to NATO. I think NATO is really the transatlantic security with allies with whom we have something in common. We tend to forget, when we talk about peacekeeping, that at any one time in the last few years more than 75% of our troops have been under NATO—the SFOR or the KFOR. They're not blue beret troops, and their role has been very different also from the traditional peacekeeping role that we've seen, for instance, in Cyprus. They're more peacemaking, and therefore the essential need is for these troops to be well equipped, to make sure that if....

I know people will criticize the military for planning for a worst-case scenario, but you have to plan for a worst-case scenario because if you plan for the best-case scenario, the worst-case scenario is bound to happen.

And that's why the link with NATO still remains important, and the peacekeeping that we do in the Balkans is still, in my view, essential to provide that security and stability in Europe which is an essential link to our security.

Col Sean Henry: There's another way of extrapolating it, because the NATO allies are not in the Balkans totally out of the goodness of their hearts towards humanitarian objectives, although those are important—don't get me wrong. They are there because of the traditional powder keg aspects of the Balkans, and if the Balkans suddenly become destabilized, it has all sorts of consequences, particularly on the Middle East. And what is in the Middle East? Oil.

• 1720

So that is the way that I think.... I'm sure the Canadian government has looked at it from that point of view, as did their allies in NATO. They say we have to snuff this out, or the long-range consequences could be very serious. By the same token, that's not to say I'm downgrading the need for the humanitarian aspect, but I am saying that there is a need for stability.

The Chair: Okay. Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, comments on the reserves have been made in the report here—on the Canadian rangers' role in the reserves, and how it's for surveillance, and it mentions the number in here. But in this other report that I have from the Department of National Defence, under “Children and Families”, it's stressing how it has been expanded, and it's been expanded from 50% of ranger personnel themselves, and for junior rangers there has been 100% expansion.

In light of the cutbacks of the Aurora surveillance patrols, do you feel that the rangers have a logistical role of surveillance that could have benefit? Can it surpass the range of patrol of the Aurora aircraft? I'm thinking here that one aircraft probably from 20,000 feet, or whatever they do the patrols from, has a swath and a patrol range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles. It would be, in my mind, really unrealistic to expect that people on skidoos on land base could possibly ever approach the type of range of patrolling that one aircraft could. Is this a practical way to approach our Arctic surveillance and Arctic sovereignty issues?

LGen Charles Belzile: If they portray it like this—and I haven't read this—I can assure you that this is not the intention of the rangers. The rangers are monetarily a very cheap organization. I'm sure you've travelled around the north all over the place, and you know that any strange face that appears, for whatever reason, in a small settlement...the people around know it, and they have the RCMP to turn to if they don't know what these guys are doing and who they are and that sort of thing. It's the kind of surveillance they're expected to do. They don't replace an aircraft, and nobody will ever think they would replace an aircraft.

We give those people just very basic bits of clothing, a rifle, and about 200 rounds of ammunition, and that's the payment. And this is what we also ask them. We allow them to use that ammunition to hunt for their living.

I can speak to the junior rangers very specifically because it's a program that we supported in 1995, on the basis that the settlements were too small to have army, air, or sea cadets, which are organized in a little group. We always felt that the critical mass was about 30 cadets, so that you can put instructors there to.... So we used that, really, for the aboriginals mostly in the north to have their young people, aged 12 to about 18, do something similar to what we do with the army, sea, and air cadets in our latitude, but based on their own geographic environment. That was really the intention. They have no other function, except a little bit of citizenship training and teaching them what it is that is strange about strange people in the north that are doing things they shouldn't be doing. They will not replace an aircraft, and it's never been the intention.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Well, that's understandable, and I recognize that it's very, very economical. But I'm seeing it here as a very substantial growth area. At the same time, when we're cutting back the physical aircraft patrols, what are we replacing the aircraft patrols with? Is it the intention at all to expand this ranger program? The numbers now are quite significant, up to 8,000 or 9,000 people. It's very significant.

LGen Charles Belzile: Yes. But if you're counting the junior rangers in this, it's like the 60,000 army, air, and sea cadets in the country. They don't enhance the capability of the armed forces. Their training is not intended to do that, although we must admit that most of the young people that join the forces have had cadet service in the past as their first exposure, and they've developed a certain amount of respect for their instructors, and they've taken to advance their training in something that's interesting. So we get a lot of them back. But junior rangers do the same thing.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But the 4,800 rangers are considered the equivalent of the reserve forces.

LGen Charles Belzile: They are a part. They are a reserve component. In the reserves in the Canadian Forces, you have a sea, air, and an army reserve, or the militia, as what we call the primary reserves. You also have the cadet instructor cadre, composed of CIC officers, which is also a component of the reserves.

• 1725

The rangers are a component of the reserves, as indeed is the supplementary reserve, which are often retired people who, with no pay, just keep their name there, saying “If you ever need me, call me”. That's the kind of reserve that it is.

Col Sean Henry: There's another factor here. If you look at the map, there are not very many rangers in the high Arctic. Most of them are on the mainland. There are some in the high Arctic, but not a heck of a lot.

So what you need for sovereignty purposes and surveillance purposes.... Don't forget satellites. Satellites are your primary means right now. The trouble with satellites is that they have a limited footprint, and they go around every so many hours, but they are good for general surveillance, and Canada is making more use of them.

If you see something with a satellite, you do need to send something up there in terms of a surveillance aircraft to check it out. Then, if it lends itself to such a solution, you might want to send some rangers out there to do something about it.

There is a report that was done by Colonel Leblanc, the commander of land forces, northern area, about two years ago. It is available, and you probably saw some reference to it in the newspapers within the last six months. It goes into some detail over the problems with maintaining sovereignty in the north in the face of cutbacks. It might be useful for committee members to have a look at it.

Certainly—and again I'm expressing a personal opinion—I don't think two Aurora patrols per year fill the bill in Canada's north, especially when you look at the sort of things that are happening up there. You have Russian icebreakers coming in as cruise ships. These things appear. Nobody knows they're there, and suddenly they appear in northern settlements.

You have all sorts of people from European nations and Japanese people coming in by aircraft that can land up there and taking off into the wild. There is definitely a growing need for surveillance and sovereignty.

The Chair: Colonel Henry, I'm going to have to cut you off and recognize Mr. Grose at this point.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I'm wondering if it would serve our purpose to receive a copy of that report so that we could be apprised of the difficulties of northern Arctic surveillance. I think it would be very informative to us.

The Chair: We could certainly look into it.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: Our researchers have taken note.

Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Thank you.

General, being a director of the Air Cadet League of Canada, I appreciate your comments about cadets.

I guess I'm one of the few that has any military experience, but, in view of today's technology, it would be marginal at best and a long time ago. Of course, it was in the air force. So I'm in favour of huge transport aircraft to transport your huge tanks.

The problem, and you've mentioned it yourself, is that we buy military equipment in chunks. We never think at the time about how long they're going to last, or we don't depreciate them. Somewhere, in what I read here, you advocate an extra $2 billion a year. To the Canadian taxpayer, that's another chunk.

Couldn't you, or someone other than you, prepare a tentative budget for us within $2 billion or $3 billion of what we're spending now—I would suggest $2 billion or $3 billion more, and I would certainly vote for it—but including such things as depreciation? You have a truck fleet, and most of them are unserviceable, and there was never any provision made to buy any new ones.

I had five trucks, and every year I had it in the budget to buy a new truck because the five-year-old one was costing me too much to maintain. It was just part of the.... People realize this. They buy a car; they know it depreciates. But this is not done.

The Canadian people have no idea what they're getting for the $10 billion, $11 billion, or $12 billion that they're spending now because it comes in these bloody chunks. It has an alternative budget.... If you're willing to circulate it, I certainly would circulate it to my constituents. Could it be done?

LGen Charles Belzile: I think we can certainly do something like that, but I would like to point out that, to a certain extent, the depreciation of the equipment and that sort of thing are figured into the buys now.

I don't agree with the bulk, lump purchases, but this is not a system that also.... I'm sorry, I'm waffling a bit here, but don't forget also that we have created here in government a procurement system that really bypasses National Defence to a large extent. It involves National Defence but the same organization buys for all government services. They have set up their own system of rules under guidance, presumably from Treasury Board and people like this. National Defence has very little option but to live within this kind of envelope.

• 1730

We have a paper here, which we didn't have a chance to give you. A retired colonel in Toronto who works for the Atlantic Council of Canada made a specific point of preparing a thing like this. I referred to it a couple of times when I was talking about 2015 as the expiration date for a certain piece of kit where he pointed this out and follows it.

I don't know whether right now in the current system with government services you'd be able to create a system like this, but there's no doubt in my mind that it would be a better system than what we have now.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Well, that's our job.

In case you go away feeling too good, I agree with Mr. Wilfert that 92% of people want the combat-ready brigade or brigades. The trouble is that 92% of that 92% don't want to pay for it.

LGen Charles Belzile: That's right.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Is there anything further?

Col Alain Pellerin: I should comment on that. I think the general mentioned the point before.

The Australians went through that process with their recent white paper. The government committed itself not just to that white paper but to fund it and increase funding over a 10-year period. I think that is what we should be striving for. That is the basic problem with the current white paper. There was never any serious commitment of funding what is in the white paper. It's an ad hoc approach to major purchases, for instance, because there's no long-term commitment for capital acquisitions.

Col Sean Henry: To be fair to government, I think the white paper just got out of the starting gate and was hit in the face by program review. I think that had program review not occurred between 1994 and 1996, there might have been a somewhat different outcome. That was just very bad timing.

The Chair: We've reached the expiry time for this committee. Every member has had an opportunity to ask questions.

At this point, I'd like to thank our witnesses for their illuminating comments on this very large and important issue. We certainly look forward to getting your report at some point in the fall. We look forward with anticipation to having a look at that. Once again, thank you for being here.

The meeting is adjourned.