NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 15, 2001

• 1530

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We'll get this operation on the road.

First of all, I'd like to welcome General Campbell and his team. It's nice to see the chief warrant officer here, too, as the other part that we don't always see sitting at the table of witnesses.

I guess we'll let you get started right away, as that gives us lots more time for questions. I see there's plenty of interest, General, so you have the floor.

Lieutenant-General Lloyd C. Campbell (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen.

Let me start by introducing the team I have brought. You see I have come with some light-blue reinforcements here to help me out this afternoon.

I am here with Major-General Richard Bastien, who is the assistant chief of the air staff. You already noted our senior non-commissioned member in the air force and our command chief warrant officer, Chief Warrant Officer Guilbault, who is a busy guy when it comes to morale issues and what's happening out there with the health and welfare of our very important non-commissioned members in the organization.

I am also here with Colonel Angus Watt, who fulfils to some extent two functions for me but mainly, as the coordinator of the air staff, helps to make sure that, within the small staff that I have, we're actually meeting the mail and answering the questions that people like the chief send my way. So he provides me that kind of support and has been busy doing a lot of the staffing of issues over the last while, and I thought he might be a useful guy if there are some questions of detail that come up.

Now let me begin, then, by expressing my sincere appreciation to SCONDVA, and not only for the efforts that you're doing in this particular instance. Since this is the first time that I've had an opportunity to address you since the quality of life initiative, let me also compliment the members and your predecessors on this committee for what was some very useful and valuable work that was well perceived by our mates and our colleagues out in the Canadian Forces.

I've had the honour of commanding this air force of yours—of ours—for the last 10 months and before that commanded one Canadian air division, so I've had an opportunity through my travels across this great country of ours to see what is happening in the air force. I can report to you that, based on those observations, we have an air force that is not large by world standards—or at least not by the standards of our great neighbour to the south of us—but one which is very capable.

[Translation]

While the past decade has not been without its challenges, I believe we have successfully preserved much of our combat capability and, for the most part, met the expectations of Canadians. I also believe we are well-positioned to meet the challenges of the future.

In my opening remarks, I will briefly address three areas drawn from the Scondva workplan: first, what are the air force's commitments and how ready are we to meet them; second, what are the main challenges we face; and third, what actions we are taking to ensure we are ready for the future?

[English]

The 1994 defence white paper called for the Canadian Forces to maintain multipurpose, combat-capable forces to accomplish a wide variety of domestic and foreign tasks. And in the case of the air force, principally this talks about monitoring and controlling Canada's territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction; assisting other government departments in things like fisheries, drugs, disaster responses, environmental protection, and so on.

And of course the air force, as we hear on a day-to-day basis, does a great deal of the work in regard to our search and rescue activities across the nation. In fact, there were some quite notable ones just over the last day—the rescue of a couple of hikers off the east coast who found themselves trapped in an area where the tide would have drowned them had it not been for the response of one of our Labradors. It was excellent work on behalf, I think, of the whole system of rescue coordination and SAR.

• 1535

Internationally, commitments include, of course, the continental air defence work that we're doing with our colleagues in the United States as part of NORAD as well as other defence arrangements with the Americans. Then there are a variety of things in the white paper that deal with overseas commitments, contingencies, and so on.

One of the questions, of course, posed in the SCONDVA work plan and one of the things that has been the subject of some of the discussions here in front of the committee, of course, is whether we can fill those commitments that are outlined in the white paper. In the case of the air force, I would answer yes, we can. I would do so with a degree of confidence, because I think, for the most part, that we have been able to demonstrate over the last ten years, in a variety of contingencies that we've been asked to respond to, the kinds of capabilities that the white paper demands. However, quite clearly, the Canadian Forces have not collectively deployed 10,000 people abroad at any one time, nor has the air force deployed an entire wing of fighters.

Kosovo, of course, in the case of Operation Allied Force, was a sizeable chunk of that. In the Gulf War we deployed, at the end, about 28 aircraft, and, depending on your definition, that could in some countries constitute a wing. The kinds of operations we've done with Sea Kings on navy ships in the Arabian Gulf and elsewhere, in fact, are underway as we speak. We have Hercs doing airlifts around the world. Also, of course, about three years ago we had our KC-130s, the air refuelling version, providing tanking support to our allies in Kuwait, as you'll recall, and more recently than that, up in the Arctic to our own F-18s.

There's also the work of our Griffons—actually one of our most taxed resources these days—in Bosnia, in responding to the humanitarian support in Honduras, and so on. We have Auroras off the west coast, Airbuses around the world, and so on.

I would say that the air force, like our colleagues in the army and the navy, has been through the busiest decade since we lived the Second World War. Life in the Cold War was quite a different and in many ways more benign environment than what we've lived over the course of the last ten years.

As I said at the outset, I think in doing these tasks, we've done quite well. We've met the obligations and shown that, indeed, in most areas our ability to do so is even better than it was ten years ago. But I would say in that regard that we should not look at this and say that the reductions of the last ten years have not had an impact on any of us, nor should we confuse the question of quality with the question of depth. But the geostrategic situation in which we live has changed quite significantly in that same period of time.

So in our view—and I'll talk about this hopefully in the question period—my sense is that when we have to give precedence to quality or quantity, quality really has to be the defining guideline for us in this new environment in which we live.

The reality, as I say, that we can meet our white paper tasking commitments.... The reality is that we're smaller. We have some significant personnel shortfalls. Simply put, we're losing people in certain areas faster than we can produce them. My sense is that it's not because of a large degree of unhappiness around the air force. But it has to do with the fact that there's a tremendous demand out there for the kinds of people that we attract in the first place and then ultimately produce through our training.

Why people leave the air force or the Canadian Forces is a complex issue. As a career manager, I studied, certainly, the pilot situation to determine what the push factors and the pull factors were that were involved. We're in competition with industry for a talented group of people. Oftentimes, industry has more capability and more flexibility to create incentives to attract people to leave than we have the ability to create incentives to keep people in the organization.

While there's not a lot of solace in the fact, the reality is that the situation that we're facing, particularly when it comes to pilots, but not only pilots—information technology specialists, aeronautical engineers, and so on.... This reality is being faced by every one of our allies. We meet on a regular basis, certainly with the United States, with the U.K., with our European allies, and so on. They are all in the same situation as we are. That is, they have tremendous shortfalls of pilots and other trained personnel and are having to come up with the same kinds of means of meeting those.

I can talk a little bit more later, if you'd like, on what some of the reasons for those problems are.

• 1540

[Translation]

In the meantime, as this committee—having played a major role in the quality of life area knows—Canada has taken some significant steps towards improving conditions of service across the Canadian Forces.

In the case of the Air Force, we are actively working with our counterparts in the human resources group to develop options to encourage experienced personnel to stay in the Air Force - such things as more flexible terms of service, improved allowances, re-engagement bonuses and so on.

In addition, we are trying to mitigate some of the burden caused by frequent overseas deployments for our personnel.

[English]

I spoke earlier about the situation with our tactical helicopter forces in particular, and in this regard the CDS recently approved the two-year air force trial that we proposed, which would introduce a concept called flexible tour lengths for these tactical helicopter personnel in Bosnia. Under the policy individuals will help determine, within certain parameters, how long they will deploy. Rather than adopting a six-month deployment of everybody, we'll adopt a flexible program. Units will be responsible for making sure they meet their commitments and they've provided the continuity of command they need. This would not work in another theatre where you have to just go in and set things up, but in a mature theatre like Bosnia, where things are relatively stable, we believe this will really help to sort things out for people. In fact, the proposal came from the units themselves, and they're very excited about being able to get on and do it.

People's circumstances simply are different, and some, those who are single, are keen to get on and spend a significant amount of time overseas. Those that are new to the organization also are keen to get on and do that. Others who are more seasoned veterans or have commitments of a particular nature at a particular time are less so. This policy will allow them, we hope, to ameliorate the situation and improve morale, and perhaps even reduce some of the costs associated with these.

In the long run I think the programs we've brought in, whether we're talking about recruiting, retention initiatives, or some of these other policies, will ameliorate the situation when it comes to manning. But there's no question that in the air force we will have to live with shortfalls in the near term. So we'll have to do what we can to mitigate the effects of that. There are a number of things, like the policy I just talked about. Another is saying no when we can't perform the missions we've been asked to do, if they exceed our capacity to respond. In some cases we've actually had to do that.

On the equipment front there's both good news and bad news. The bad news is that many of our fleets are aging, you know that. Some of them, of course, will tend to coagulate around the 2010, 2015, 2020 timeframe, and if we replace these fleets, or if we replace the capabilities they represent—because we really shouldn't think about replacing one platform with another platform that looks a lot the same, as it may be something quite different that provides us with that capability—without doubt, it's going to cost us money, and it'll come at a time when there will continue to be other pressures that will affect us there. And whether the money will be there, of course, is an open question.

On the good news side, from an air force perspective, there's a lot to be positive about. First, of course, there's the government's approval of the contract to modernize 80 of our CF-18s, which will bring these systems up to again world-class standard. It's an excellent aircraft today, but we want to maintain it that way. It needs the kind of investment we're going to put into it. It's the same in the case of the CP-140 Aurora. We've got a similar modernization program under way there to update the sensors, the communications systems, and so on, to keep what I consider to be our only strategic reconnaissance platform capable out into the future.

• 1545

Mobility, you've heard and will know, is a key factor in meeting the things we need to do. So we've got some steps, first, to improve on the Hercules—that program is finished now—to replace the avionics systems in the airplane. We've got a couple of projects to try to introduce a truly strategic airlift capability for Canada, and I could talk about that. We're hopeful it will come to fruition over the next several years.

Search and rescue, as I mentioned before, plays a major role, and later this summer we'll take delivery of the 15 new Cormorant CH-149 search and rescue helicopters, which will replace our CH-113 Labradors. It is a first class aircraft, and there's no doubt in my mind it will serve Canada and Canadians very well.

In the maritime helicopter area, the outlook is also positive. The government approved the MHP project shortly after I took command last year—I told my predecessor there was nothing to this job, that all anyone had to do was just get there and it was approved. But it was welcome news, I can tell you, having travelled around the air force and the navy a lot before that, to have that project approved. I'm confident myself that despite the questions that exist about process and so on, the process we've embarked on will deliver us an excellent aircraft to replace the Sea King. In the meantime my job is to think about what we do with the Sea King. That's why we're putting a significant amount of money into the program, replacing the engines, the main gearboxes, hoists, communications, and so on, to make sure we can operate this aircraft safely over the next several years.

In the area of training, despite the fact that we have had a high level of operational tempo, I'm fairly convinced that we've been able to do the things we need to maintain combat readiness. In fact, if you look around at the aircrew, who I meet on a regular basis when I'm out there, they're a heck of a lot more combat ready than I ever was, at least in the context of real experience. They have been there, they have done it, for the most part, whereas we only trained to do it.

We have, however, continued to make sure we run major exercises. In fact, exercise Maple Flag, which some of you may have seen and certainly many of you will know about, starts next week out in Cold Lake. Exercises like that are the kinds of things that allowed us, when we went to the Kosovo air campaign and we operated with our allies out of Italy, to be able to do the missions we needed to do with the capability we had and to lead many of those missions.

Having said that, as someone with more than 35 years of experience in air operations, I know full well that readiness is perishable and what you did yesterday is old news. So we have to make sure we're continuing to carry on with that. It all comes with a price. In fact, it's not only a price, it's a question also of the availability of training areas and training aids, if you will, like submarines even, so as to be able to train appropriately. That is one of the reasons we're introducing new simulation systems into the organization. Not only will that allow us to offset much of the actual flying operations, but it will also make sure that the kind of training we're doing is actually of greater value to the crews, and we can talk about that too.

[Translation]

We have also recently stoop up a new pilot training system in Moose Jaw and Cold Lake, NATO flying training in Canada (NFTC). This innovative partnership with the industry has allowed us to retire our aging tutors and replace them with two modern, state-of-art trainers, the Hawk and the Harvard II. NFTC is a complex program, of course, and it has not been without its “teething problems”. However, I am confident in the end Canada will have the best and most cost-effective military pilot training scheme in the world.

[English]

In the area of infrastructure, we have concerns with rust-out, probably the wrong term, but in essence, the aging of buildings, runways, and so on. There are two things we're doing there. One of them is to reduce the excess infrastructure we've got, to reduce the burden by achieving a 10% reduction in our overall holdings, and of course, also to invest in the right areas there as well.

That then brings me to the issue of money. It's always a challenge, I find personally, and my family does as well, to live within one's means, and the air force is no different from individuals in this regard.

• 1550

For example, as you have all noted as consumers, the price of gas at the pumps has climbed significantly over the last while. Last year alone in the air force we incurred about a $24-million increase in costs for aviation fuel—that on a budget of, at the time, a little over $100 million. So it was a significant increase. While we received some compensation for this, at least in part I had to ask my subordinate commanders to absorb it themselves.

That is is not meant as a whine or a complaint that the vice-chief is not doling out the funds right, but simply to say that the defence budget is constrained. Every budget is constrained. Finding the right balance between investing in the future, which is fundamentally important to the air force—in fact, many of the programs that we're trying to push forward here are air force programs—and still having enough money to keep operating on a day-to-day basis is and will continue to be a challenge. We're coping, but there's no question in my mind that additional resources for both capital and operating expenses would be very welcome.

[Translation]

So what does the future hold? Earlier, I mentioned several of the major equipment programs we currently have underway and could go on to talk about other improvements we are pursuing—for tactical helicopter surveillance systems, new clothing, command and control systems, etc. But, the future is about more than just acquiring new kit. With this in mind, we have embarked on a process to better define the future and to develop a roadmap of where we see the Air Force going overt the next two decades or so.

[English]

By rigorously looking at missions, tasks, and the environment in which we live, we have recently completed operational capability objectives for all our core capabilities—that is, air combat, maritime air, and so on. The next step is to capture these capabilities into a document we're calling the Aerospace Capability Framework, which we intend will ultimately provide not only the air force but Canadians with a clear vision of the future with regard to aerospace forces. The ACF will ensure that we do take into account new missions, new technology, and new doctrine as we plan towards the future. If my staff here serve me well, which they normally do, we should have a first draft of that available some time this year.

At the same time, we are placing a lot of emphasis on the whole business of collaborating with our major alliance partner, the United States. I meet regularly with my United States counterpart, General Ryan. Collectively, we have established recently a strategic planning forum with the USAF with the intention of trying to have a better understanding of where the United States is going with doctrine and technology. While that's not to suggest that everything they do, we do, because of their pre-eminence in the world and their leadership in terms of technology and doctrine, we have to know what they have in mind so that we can decide where the niche areas are that we truly need to invest in.

So we're doing that, and we're also pursuing similar discussions with the United States Navy for maritime air operations. We talk to our other allies as well, the Australians and others.

Let me conclude the opening remarks, ladies and gentlemen, with some final thoughts with regard to the air force.

In our view, it has to be able to respond rapidly, which is what air forces are about. It has to pursue technological upgrades in a timely manner, because if we don't, we won't be maintaining relevance in combat areas. We have to maintain interoperability with our key allies, and in this regard, particularly the United States. We have to provide support to Canadians. Canadians do expect something for the $11 billion to $12 billion they spend every year on the organization; just being ready for World War III is not enough. As I said in my opening remarks, where there are tensions—and we can't do everything—we have to give precedence to quality over quantity in this environment in which we live, and finally, we have to look after our people.

I'm committed to these goals, and I think we're taking the right steps towards doing those things. I think the air force is a highly relevant part of the armed forces of today and of Canadian society. It's in tune with many of the things that Canadians hold of value, whether it's high technology, competence, performance, or excitement. My expectation is that having called on us frequently in the past, Canadians will likely do so again in the future, and it is my view that we'll be ready to respond.

• 1555

And in terms of response, I guess we're ready to respond too.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much, General. I guess that leads directly into the next part. So we'll start right off with questions, starting with Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, for your presentation.

I'd like to quote from a memo you wrote in June 1999 when you commanded 1 Air Division in Winnipeg, with regard to the flying hours of the Aurora. You stated: “There would be an unacceptable impact on CP140 force generation and force employment by the cut of YFR”—the yearly flying rate—“to 11,000 hours”.

Now the flying hours are being reduced to 8,000 hours. Is that an acceptable situation?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That reminds me of I think it was General Belzile, back when I was a major or maybe a lieutenant-colonel, who once told me about the joys of moving from one command position to another, and how you often had to respond unfavourably to your requests from a previous life, even though it was the same brilliant individual who had written them. I am brought to that, I suppose, myself.

But let me be a little bit fair to myself in this regard.

The situation in 1999 that I was referring to dealt with a very short notice adjustment to our projected flying hours with the Aurora airplane. The requirement there dealt not so much with the issue of simply would we have the hours available to meet all our operational commitments, whether to DFO or doing the kinds of operations we do on the west coast, the drift-net operations and so on, but also had to do with the force structure: the numbers of crews we had, the readiness levels those crews were expected to be at, and so on.

So my concern there with General Kinsman was largely based on being able to respond almost in an in-year nature to this. In fact, if I recall, that year, as a result of operational requirements, we actually did get some additional YFR thrown into the hopper.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So would we classify that as being less capable now, fewer missions now, less capability if we're looking at the readiness and capability of the armed forces, that we're doing less now?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We have made some adjustments in the levels of expectations of our Aurora crews—not all of them. We've adjusted, for example, what are called executive crews, which are largely the more experienced senior leadership in the units, to fly somewhat less than those who are new to the business and out there doing the job on a day-to-day basis. So, yes, we've made some adjustments, but that's reflective of the kinds of missions we've also had to do.

It will come as no surprise to anybody that there has been largely an absence of submarine, or at least unknown submarine, traffic off the east coast, largely a disappearance off the west coast.

Mr. Peter Goldring: General, I guess this is one of the difficulties we wrestle with, the seemingly changing statements and changing conditions, and the conditions may affect the changing statements too. But just yesterday we had a statement made in the House of Commons where it was mentioned that retiring generals all of sudden get a conscience when they leave the military.

This gives the inference here, once again, of not necessarily changing conditions, but changing statements. How do we wrestle with this and come to terms so that we can understand exactly what is happening when we see the statements and clarity changing in front of us?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I would hope that the statement is not true, and I would hope that my own personal integrity has been demonstrated very well over the past number of years, whether I've been in command at the wing or the division level, and so on. You get very smart when you retire; there's not doubt about it. General Baril is waiting for this to happen, I think.

• 1600

Circumstances certainly are changing in the environment we've dealt with. In fact, technology is changing, and when we look at where we think we'll be able to go with the Aurora—which is probably more important than where we are, because there has been a lot of concern about the 8,000-hour question, for example—you ask, how can you, General Campbell, propose that you're going to go to 8,000 hours when two years ago you were saying a cut to 11,000 hours was bad? Quite honestly, I don't know whether we can go to 8,000 hours, because we haven't yet introduced the high-definition simulator, and we won't make those changes until we do that.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So in the short term, our efficiency has suffered, our operational efficiency has been downgraded.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: But what we have to do here—and I think this is a point I made with the minister when we were chatting about this some time ago—is to look at these and....

YFR is a very poor and imprecise measure of performance. I can recall when I was a young pilot over in Europe that the Americans used to fly fighter airplanes on the weekends from one base to another base to another, filling in hours. There was no training value, but they certainly met their requirements, which were based on yearly flying rates.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But this is the subject of your letter and your explanation in 1999. You referenced YFR as a condition of some yardstick of measurement, so—

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Because that's the yardstick we were using at that time, and it's a yardstick we will continue to use in the context of, for example.... Where those limits are developed is in our relationships with, for example, industry or our materiel people, who have to have some basis on which to plan. So we utilize YFR as a measure to do that. But in terms of measurement of performance and measurement of what we're actually delivering to citizens of this country, it's not a good measure, so we need to figure out some better measures, whether it's what contribution we're making to the maritime picture, which Admiral Madison is trying to do—

Mr. Peter Goldring: What would you use as a unit to measure this with so that we could understand it?

The Chair: You're almost out of time.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Am I out of time?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I'd be happy to take this up with somebody else, though, if you'd like to do that.

Mr. Peter Goldring: We need a yardstick.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I tell you, I don't have an answer, because we are working on this issue. We've found some things that we can measure with more precision, but just measuring hours flown over vast areas of empty water is not a good measure of that performance. We need to find some better ways to be able to tell Canadians what we're accomplishing with the time we're using.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: I'm chomping at the bit, because as a chairman I can't get in here, and I want to get into this one. I have to let it go, but hopefully David will show up and I'll be able to get at it.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand, it is your turn.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): First of all, I have a very important question concerning the state of readiness of the Armed Forces. The other day, I was following a car displaying a sign which said: “Ladies love most the air force”. I want to know if this is true.

Some voices: Oh, oh!

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I have no idea.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Then you are not defending your blue uniform.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: What was that?

[English]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Did you understand my question? I was following a car, and it was written on the bumper, “Ladies love most the air force”. I wanted to know if that's true.

I'll be more serious.

[Translation]

I have some questions on the joint space program. I looked at the departmental priorities, and one of them was our joint space capability. As you know there are presently many concerns regarding the antimissile shield, this is what interests me in particular today.

I would first of all like to know if we have any figures, unless it is a state secret, on the membership—and I think it is your department that does this—of the Canadian Armed Forces in NORAD. How much does it cost, and do the funds come from the air forces budget?

• 1605

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The NORAD budget does not come under mine, but under the core budget.

Mr. Claude Bachand: The core budget?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes. I believe it is now approximately $360 million per year. But it would be best to check this with one of my colleagues.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well. And $360 million per year represents, I believe, approximately 10% of the total cost. I believe the Americans pick up the rest of the bill.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes, they do.

Mr. Claude Bachand: All right. Now, the same document sets out the government's priorities, the fifth being joint space capability. There is a $600 million budget of which the biggest amounts are for the years 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, which coincide with the peak of the aero-space shield that the American army must put into place. I would like to know if this is by chance, and why in 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, massive amounts will be invested in the space surveillance program.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Once again, this is not really an area that comes under the air force. This is not part of my budget. In a previous, I was responsible for the joint space project. It was in the past life and I can assure you that there is no connection between the defence system, and the American aero-space shield.

Mr. Bastien, would you have to add something?

Major-General Richard Bastien (Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Department of National Defence): First projects had been set up six or eight years ago, to my knowledge whose funds will now mostly be spent on projects dealing with communications and on a few other projects related to that, I believe.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes, to space observation, etc.

MGen Richard Bastien: Which are also related areas.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well. You are partly right in that regard, because the department's documents confirm what you are saying. On the other hand, we can also read:

—early warning and defence against space-launched ballistic missiles, with particular emphasis on sensing technologies and the C3I which is of particular interest to NORAD—

Therefore this is also part of the mandate of joint space capability, and therefore of these budgets. Part of the mission or definition of space systems is for early warning of ballistic missile attacks against Canadian territory and I would imagine, also against United States territory.

Could you confirm for me that in fact part of the budget will also be used for early warning and defense against ballistic missiles?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The space observation system is definitely significant for us, for the Armed Forces, as well as NORAD. Apart from that, there really is no other link with those other systems.

MGen Richard Bastien: My point especially is that you really should not establish a linkage between the space shield and observation investments.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Irrelevant, as we say.

MGen Richard Bastien: Well, it is not that it is totally irrelevant, as you say, but rather that within the scope of NORAD, we have been involved from the outset as regards observation and assessment of the ballistic missile threat for North America. That is precisely the purpose of the BMEW sites. That is the reason why these sites existed, to be able to warn us of an attach.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Ten or fifteen years ago, we had a system called Baker-Nunn camera, for example which... [Editor's Note: Inaudible]... and also near Moncton and Chatham, to be able to carry out these observations. At that time, it was very progressive. It was before there was any talk of an anti-missile defense system.

• 1610

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well. But is the early warning in aerospace surveillance system the responsibility of the air force? You seem to be saying that that is a completely separate budget.

MGen Richard Bastien: It is NORAD's responsibility.

Mr. Claude Bachand: NORAD's.

Is my time up?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Unfortunately.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Regan.

[English]

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you very much for coming today.

I want to raise a topic today that is near and dear to my heart and to the hearts of my colleagues Mrs. Wayne and Mr. Stoffer, who are also from Atlantic Canada, and that is the replacement of the Sea King helicopter. I've heard concerns expressed here and elsewhere about the question of whether they will in fact be delivered by 2005, as originally indicated. I'd like to hear your comments and your experiences in relation to that question and what you can tell us about that.

The other question we hear a great deal about is of course the division of the contract. What are your views on that matter?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I don't want to duck this question, but you'll have an opportunity to talk with Mr. Alan Williams, who I believe comes to see you on June 5. Mr. Williams is ADM Matériel, and in fact it's really his organizational and personal responsibility to deal with the whole business of contract negotiations and so on.

The air force perspective on this I suppose is twofold. One is when we are going to see an airplane delivered. Obviously that's of considerable interest to us, not only from the view of when we are going to see this airplane here, but how we handle the transition in between. I'm sure you well appreciate that one doesn't just roll it up and hop in and turn the keys and away we go. There's a tremendous amount of work that will have to be done in the context of training, of shore installations, of simulation, and all of the things that go with this.

We will have to transition downward, because we're talking about the same people ultimately who will be the experts, who will operate these platforms, who will have to transition the Sea King fleet downward at the same as we transition the new fleet upwards, so that they will kind of mesh in those capabilities. So understanding when dates are is of great interest to me as the commander, because we have to develop those kinds of plans.

We also have to, of course, continue to develop the plans to support the Sea King out to that point in time, although in that regard I feel more comfortable than I did a little while ago, two or three years ago, in fact having made the decisions now to replace engines, to replace main gearboxes, and so on. It's difficult to put in the context of vehicles, cars, because it doesn't really apply, but in terms of airworthiness of the platform, it's given us a tremendous leg up in being able to operate these airplanes out there.

I think the minister said in his own discussions that we're still hoping to meet the timeline. It really depends on who wins the competitions at the end of the day. You may find a particular match or that the winners of both the airframe and the avionics chunk here are very compatible and are prepared to be able to move forward quickly, or you may find that's not the case. So to try to prognosticate today whether it is 2005 or 2006, or even sooner than 2005, I can't tell you. We're prepared to operate this airplane until we get a new one delivered, recognizing that this transition I talked about will have to take place.

Mr. Geoff Regan: You mentioned the engines, about replacing the engines in the Sea Kings. To what degree is the technology in those engines the same as when the first Sea Kings were delivered in the 1960s?

• 1615

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Well, the basic engine design in terms of efficiency would be roughly the same, but in terms of materials, 40 years of learning, because we learn lots in those kinds of things, upgrades in horsepower and so on, those are all critical.

Angus, do you want to talk to that at all?

Colonel Angus Watt (Director, Air Review and Corporate Services, Department of National Defence): Basically, the engine in the Sea King in the sixties was an older version of the General Electric T-58. This newer version takes components of that engine. It keeps the same basic engine and upgrades things like the fuel pump, the stator veins, things like that, so it ends up being more reliable and producing more power. So it's an upgraded version using newer technology of the same engine. But it is, essentially, a new engine.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: And the main gearbox is another key element of that, because there have been in fact a lot of new technologies or new changes to technology associated with the new main gearbox, which, if you're a helicopter guy like Angus here, you'll know is the thing that actually holds your...that's your wings.

Mr. Geoff Regan: And how beneficial are simulators as you prepare for the arrival? If it's a new machine, how long will it take to develop good simulators for that machine, and how valuable is it, therefore, as you prepare to train your personnel to fly them?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: It's critical. The best example of that is actually not the Sea King but the Cormorant, which we're bringing in for the search and rescue helicopter. But it's the same concept. We don't yet have our own simulators for that, but we've been able to take our crews to the U.K. and train on simulators there. So people can actually learn how to fly the airplane, and particularly all of the emergency stuff you need to know, which you can't actually practise in the air, in these simulators. I'm not sure if you've had an opportuntiy to actually see a modern simulator, but they really are such a tremendous leap ahead of where things were even ten years ago. They're very realistic. So they're very important.

The Chair: Thank you very much. You still have 20 seconds, if you think you can ask a question in 20 seconds.

Peter, actually, you've heard the news, the House is adjourned, so you don't have to worry. You can—

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): I wondered if the committee room where you go and make your votes votable is still on.

The Chair: Anyway, you're on.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today. I wanted to commend you on having one of the finest air force people in the country, Colonel Brian Akitt. Not only have I considered him of great service to his country, but he's also a good friend. And what he has done to the Shearwater air base, which happens to be in my riding, by the way, has been nothing short of outstanding. He's turned the morale of that establishment around in three years. Morale was pretty good under the previous commander, but he seems to have that very human touch.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I attributed that to the commander of the air division.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: One of the final statements, sir, of your opening statement was on the fact that you want to do you best for your people. There are 1,200 of your people who are attached to the Shearwater air base, and the Shearwater air base is under a constant threat of rumours of closure.

When the maritime helicopter program is finally done—I don't believe it will be 2005, I believe the date will be later, because when you talk to Sikorski and Cormorant, etc., except maybe for Eurocopter, there's none other that can get it done by that date at this time—there's a concern of where they are going to go. So my question for you, sir, is, in your military opinion, because it complements the navy and the navy is the one that supplements the budget of Shearwater, where should those helicopters go? Should they stay in Shearwater, or could they be moved to Greenwood and do just as an effective job from there?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Let me tell you where we are in that, because I think you're aware, sir, that we have a study under way with an old defence college classmate of mine, John Cody, who's doing the work.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Yes, sir. And we know there's a meeting going on today on the long runway as well.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes. And in fact it's precisely for the reasons you mentioned that I really do feel we need to come forward to the department with some recommendations on this very quickly, because it's not only bad for morale, it's difficult to just get on and do the planning you need to do. If we're going to stay there, let's stay there and get things; if we're not, then let's decide that, too.

• 1620

When the issue of Shearwater, Greenwood, Comox, and Esquimalt first came into question, it was really back in the days when we were looking at the maritime helicopter project and the Aurora incremental modernization project proceeding largely side by each and therefore with a degree of commonality of kit and technicians, and support equipment and test ends, and all of those things with it.

The things I just mentioned have not totally disappeared, but they've changed significantly in that period of time. We've started on the Aurora modernization, we're doing some things in that regard. We have the maritime helicopter project under way, obviously. Whether there's a connection in technologies and tests kits and so on, I don't know, which is why I've asked to have the study done, and I think it's due to me June 1. We'll look at it very quickly and make some recommendations to the CDS, the deputy minister, and to government. Hopefully, we'll get a decision to get on with life here.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Campbell, with all due respect, you haven't quite answered the question yet, sir.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I know I haven't answered the question, but I'd be prejudging John Cody's work if I did.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: It's okay to prejudge John Cody. I do it a lot.

I want to know what your opinion is. I've asked other military personnel, and they didn't seem to have a hard time giving the opinion of what they thought, militarily, for everything. It involves putting helicopters that are destined to be shipborne 150 kilometres away, and most military people who I've spoken to, on and off the record, say it doesn't make any military sense at all to move to Greenwood. The only reason you would move those helicopters out of Shearwater would be a political decision, not a military decision. Would you agree with that?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I can tell you, to ease your mind to some extent here, that first of all this was not a question that was raised to me by anybody at a political level. In fact, the minister has not raised this issue with me at all.

I felt, though, it was a thing that was hanging around. It had been here from back when we did the budget reductions and the base reductions and so on, as a continuing legacy, if you will, as to whether we were going to make these changes or not. I felt it was important that we put those to rest. To do so, I felt it was important that we do a study. I think if the issues are as clear-cut as you're suggesting here, and I don't disagree with your premise, then I think the study will demonstrate it.

There are other nations that operate in a different way. We get great advantages, I would agree, from the co-location we have with the navy, but if you look at how the royal navy operates, they operate in a different way from that, and others do as well. So there are different models that can be there.

I can assure you of one thing, and it is that there has been no agenda driven here coming my way. My concern is the same as yours, and it is that if we're going to look after morale, if we're going to give Brian Akitt and his successor who comes along some confidence that they can get on and do their job, then we need to be able to define where we're going.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I appreciate that. But as I was speaking to a whole group of them before I came to the committee today, I told them that I would try to get some sort of assurance from their commander, who they have great respect for, sir, that you would support them in their efforts to at least advise the people who are going to make this decision that in your opinion, Shearwater could remain and should remain a military establishment complementing its navy. You unfortunately haven't been able to say that, and I appreciate why.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: No, the challenge is that the guy I have to convince, first of all, is me, because you know—

Mr. Peter Stoffer: So you're not convinced it should—

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I have to get the study before I do that, but I'd suggest to you that the situation is not just Shearwater. I realize that's where your interests are, but we had a similar question on the west coast—

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Understandably.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: —and we've been seeking to get the input from the navy to tell us what their views are. I think their views are fairly clear. We've been seeking to get the input from the folks who operate Sea Kings. You've probably talked to them more recently and maybe even more than I. We have a guy who I think...I'm not sure if I can call John unbiased or not, but certainly he has the best interest of the maritime helicopter community in his heart. I'm anticipating that out of that process I'm going to get a recommendation of what I should do, and then I'll take that forward.

• 1625

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Excellent. Unfortunately, I do have to leave. I hate to be rude—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you. You ran out of time also.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you. Anything you can do to save Shearwater I would greatly appreciate.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: It's a great place. They have a great museum, too.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mrs. Wayne, it's your turn.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: We'll talk about that as well.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have to say, General Campbell, that what I'm about to ask you and to read to you comes from some research we've done. I have great respect for you, but I have to get some answers.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Okay.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Sir, two years ago you received a letter from a Major Richard Bouchard dated December 4, 1998. A copy of this letter was obtained through the Access to Information Act, and I do have copies here with me today. Now I will refer you to what Major Bouchard wrote. He stated:

A. Even though the Cormorant (EH-101) is politically unacceptable, (“political suicide” as you said), how do you ensure that it does not win an MH competition?

B. If the Cormorant were to win an MH competition on its merits, wouldn't we again be in the same position of being accused of tricking the government?

C. Do you think that the political unacceptability of the Cormorant will mean that an MH competition will have to be ruled out (i.e. Directed Purchase)? Or, do you think that the Cabinet would just opt to select the second-place finisher if the Cormorant were to be winner of a competition?

Sir, I ask you, did you tell Major Bouchard and/or others that the selection of the Cormorant to replace the Sea King would be political suicide?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: As a politician, I'm sure you sometimes have people who hear words that are others than those you say. Let me tell you what I did say to Major Bouchard and others, because I think it's important. In fact, this is the first time that anyone in a public forum has asked me that, and I'm pleased to have an opportunity.

The timeframe we were talking about here was when I was commanding the air division, and there was a lot of uncertainty and upset and angst, to use the German word, in the Sea King community about why this whole process of the statement of operational requirement, which was being worked on at the time, was so delayed.

So when I was in Esquimalt in this case, but also in Shearwater when I was there and in other places, I spoke to key people about why this process was taking the time it was taking, within national defence headquarters, particularly. I outlined for them some things that will be of no news to anybody around here—that is, that helicopters, particularly maritime helicopters, were an issue of some political sensitivity in this country, within the department and elsewhere, and that because of that there was need.... and because the SOR for the original EH-101 had actually been developed so many years before, back in the 1980s, there was a need to proceed with this thing with a great deal of thought.

That was why, also, we had utilized our operational planning scenarios that in fact were developed when I was director general of strategic planning—to try to enunciate, in a way that was not emotive or subjective, what the requirements were that we needed to put into this airplane so that, quite honestly, nobody could kick the legs out from under the stool of this statement of operational requirement by saying the requirement to operate, for example, in the middle of the Atlantic, or to do certain missions, is simply not supported by fact.

So I outlined to Major Bouchard and others why this process in fact was so thorough, and the fact that, indeed, there were political issues surrounding it.

• 1630

The reality here is that it is in the interests of all of us in the Canadian Forces, and certainly me as the commander of the air force, that we have all of the possible competitors in this competition that we can—the EH-101, the Aerospatiale airplanes, NH-90, Sikorski. Because at the end of the day that will give us the best opportunity of having an airplane that meets the requirements that we've articulated, and also that gives Canadians the best price.

So my sense there.... In fact, there was an e-mail that Major Bouchard sent to me. My response to him, I think, was by a telephone call. I did so because I like to make sure that people out there understand right from the commander what the views are.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: So you responded by phone, not by letter?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That was not a letter, unless you've got something different. It was an e-mail to my personal e-mail at the headquarters.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I know that you are aware that the Federal Court of Appeal pointed to this particular paragraph found in this particular letter as possible proof that there was political interference in the MH procurement process. They used that issue.

Now, I think that—

LGen Lloyd Campbell: They didn't ask me to come and speak with them at all.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But I will just say this: it was in the National Post, I think, or one of them, that I had lunch with the Cormorants. It wasn't the Cormorants; it was the people from Eurocopter that flew in to have lunch with me, and they couldn't really understand why I would want to allow—just like you have stated—all of the different groups being allowed to bid and put forth their proposal. Because with the Eurocopter, it meant some work in the maritime provinces, as you are aware, particularly in Fredericton.

With me, it isn't whether the work's in Fredericton or in Greenwood or wherever. It's whether or not you and the men and women in the air force are going to have the tools to do the job they have to do for us, and to give them the best tools they have in order to do that job.

So I don't fight that way, and I let them know that when they took me out because I told them I'd only take a bowl of soup because no one could buy me. Anyway, I said that—politely and nicely, but I mean it sincerely. I truly do.

You have to be allowed to have the tools to do your job. In order to do that, it should be an open competition, and you should be able to get the best—not necessarily the cheapest—but you should be able to get the best helicopters there are.

When it comes to.... I've seen the incidents right back in my own territory. As you know, one of the Sea Kings crashed, and a pilot lost his life, and so on. His parents came to me and said, “Mrs. Wayne, please, please”. Now that was way back—about four or five years ago or longer now. They said, “Please, will you get a replacement? We've lost our son, but he should never have been flying in it, anyway. They should've been grounded.”

One of the other fathers called me. He'd been a father. He'd flown the Sea Kings, and then his son was flying them. I don't want to get any of the sons in trouble, so I'm not going to give you their names.

I'm going to tell you right now, I really don't know how you can predict in advance when a Sea King will have mechanical problems, and if you can't do that.... I think that at the age of our Sea Kings...and we're still having problems, as you know. The problems are there. We were told that one of our helicopters that was sent over—I'm not sure if it was to Bosnia or Eritrea; it was one of them...when they got there, it wouldn't fly. They had to go ask another country to loan them a helicopter. Our people did, because they needed it.

To me, that's an embarrassment for Canada. It's not fair to you or your people. The sooner we can get these for you, the better.

So I want to know—

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Elsie.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: —can you tell me whether it's going to be the year 2007 and 2008 when you can replace them, or is it 2015? I'm done.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Price): You got two extra minutes.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Well, I think we talked to the issue of timing here, but let me talk to the issue of the Sea Kings. I'm a pilot myself.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I've lost friends in aircraft accidents. As a commander, I spent probably more time with the Sea King community than I did with anybody else—first of all, because my background is not from there, and I needed to get to know them. But they also needed to make sure and had to understand that their commander cared about them, too, and was out there supporting them.

• 1635

My sense is that, as we have said often, we don't fly unsafe airplanes. The age of the platform is one thing; the changes in the system, the engines and the gearboxes and all the rest of it, are another. The sooner we can get a replacement, the better off we're going to be operationally, because the Sea King has only a limited degree of operational capability today in comparison with what it had when it was a state-of-the-art platform. That's why we're replacing it.

But from safety perspectives, I'm not concerned. When we look at the accidents associated with the Sea King, the dozen that we've had, my reflection there is that half of those came within the first decade of its acquisition, when it was new. Of the ones that have happened since 1973, only two were attributable to matériel failures, and the others were more the failures of we human beings, who unfortunately, whether we're fixing or flying, don't always do the right things.

I understand the tristesse of these issues, and dealing with families and relatives is a very difficult thing and something no commander enjoys doing. All I can assure you is that from an air force perspective, we will continue to maintain these aircraft not only to the best of our ability, but to a sound capability for the period that we have to operate them. If there's ever a point when I or my staff tell me, boss, it's time to stop, I will have no hesitation about saying so.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Elsie.

Now we'll go to Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find myself in the position of having been unable to attend earlier, but I did read the general's written brief. I don't want to misrepresent what I heard the other week, but just for the record, I was told by a former general who appeared here that sometimes we politicians are told things because this is the political line, not necessarily the state of reality.

I would hope that what you've outlined today in your report—you indicate that you look after our people, so obviously the safety of your men and women is your number-one concern, your number-one issue—is not something to be viewed as a political statement, that somebody didn't give you notes in advance to say this is what you should say. Would that be a fair statement?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: It would be a fair statement to say that what I've told you today is the stuff that's in my heart.

To be completely honest with you, you would not expect that in my dealings around NDHQ on a day-to-day basis I wouldn't see position papers on a variety of different subjects. But if you're suggesting or asking me here if the minister sat down and looked me in the eye and said, Lloyd, what are you going to tell these guys, that hasn't happened. We all understand the issues of policy and civilian control of the military, which is important.

But my expectation here is that you're looking for a fairly candid view of the state of the union in the organization similar to what I gave to a bunch of retired air force generals last night here in Ottawa, which I have also done in a number of articles in newspapers, magazines, and so on in the last while.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I didn't expect that I'd hear a different answer, but I appreciate your statement, because I think it is important to ask if we're ready. Can we do the things that we ask of you, whether it is the protection of Canadian sovereignty in terms of patrolling air space...? Do you have the right equipment? What are the issues?

There's a whole myriad of things, but I don't know whether I can go into this, Mr. Chairman, or not. I'm sure you'll let me know.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Absolutely.

• 1640

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: We have some American individuals today who are trying to suggest that the national missile defence system is something we as a country should be involved in, particularly because of our relationship with the Americans in NORAD. I wonder if you would be able to respond, purely from a military standpoint, as to your observations with regard to NMD in terms of the advantages if we were to become involved, and what the drawbacks would be, particularly as a NORAD member, if we decided to say thanks but no thanks. How would that affect the air force?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: You're right, I guess, in the first bit, that this is not particularly—certainly not solely, but not even particularly—an air force issue. I think, as the chief mentioned when he appeared, it largely is an issue—at least at the present time—of a political dimension on both...I was going to say both sides of the border, but in fact it's much broader than that as well.

From an air force perspective, I think General Macdonald, when he spoke to this committee, I believe, addressed his concerns with regard to the potential ramifications for the NORAD relationship if we chose one route or another. Of course, as the air force commander I am concerned about those things, because our relationship with the United States has been very positive and very strong. In fact, when I look at it, I believe it's strong enough to probably survive whatever choices we make in this regard. But would it have an impact? I believe it would.

I'm talking here not about our Canadian relationships; I'm talking about air force relationships—

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I understand that, yes.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: —with our counterparts.

So yes, I think there are concerns I would have there. We get a tremendous amount of value from our NORAD relationship in terms of information, intelligence, expertise, doctrine, and so on. If something were to disrupt those, it would have a direct impact on the force.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I know that at headquarters there often are position papers that are presented, as they are presented to cabinet ministers on different issues. In terms of the NMD issue, we have the NORAD perspective and the sharing of information and what might or might not happen if we did not support it, versus also our relationship with NATO and our NATO allies in terms of this particular issue.

I won't get into the old discussion on whether or not I believe the rationale has been justified. Quite frankly, I don't. I don't think it has been justified at all. In fact, I have grave reservations about NMD. But I am more interested, in terms of an operational standpoint, in how you would see the impact on the technological side, the information that you receive. Would this be something that would inhibit, outside of NMD, our relationship in terms of military matters, particularly dealing with the air force, in the future?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I think the basic premise of our relationship with the United States Air Force, in our case, has been one of shared values, shared responsibilities, shared history, and so many other elements. As I said before, my expectation is that these would probably survive most anything.

The Americans treat us with tremendous respect professionally. They value our participation in operations such as the Kosovo air campaign and elsewhere. There are missions in the NORAD environment where they were talking about cruise missile defence or air defence that are also important.

• 1645

My personal opinion—and it's nothing more than that—would be to suggest that this will not be the guiding element of decision-making behind this. There are much broader and more important issues here, and valid arguments on both sides of the debate. As a military guy, obviously, I look at the idea of defending yourself as being one of those natural rights. We were talking about, for example, theatre missile defence in the Middle East context during the Gulf War and so on. But I can also see the other concerns, and I think these are things that politically, the government and others are going to have to walk their way through. There are probably much more qualified people than I talking even as we speak about this issue on the Hill.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): General Campbell, thank you.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you General, because even generals can have personal opinions. I do appreciate that.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Thank you.

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): Thank you for that answer.

Mr. Wilfert, we've let you go over time a bit there, so we're going to give Mr. Anders—

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: In fairness, because of Elsie, I'm sure.

The Chair: Mr. Anders is next. Mr. Anders, seven minutes.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

I'd like to know how many hours our individual pilots now fly per year.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: It depends on the airplane type. An hour is not an hour, when you compare say a transport operation to a fighter.

Mr. Rob Anders: Let's use the CF-18 as an example.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: About 179 hours is what we're aiming to fly on an average.

Mr. Rob Anders: Is that what you're aiming to fly or what they do actually fly?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That's what we're achieving in this last year. It varies depending on individuals. I couldn't categorically say that everybody gets that, because somebody may go away for a professional development course, on sick leave, or whatever, and we don't try to have them catch up in the rest of the year. We basically look at it as 180 hours divided by 12.

Mr. Rob Anders: When will we need to make a decision on the replacement of the Aurora, and what's the life expectancy of the Auroras?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: With the upgrades we're going through right now, the Aurora, from the point of view of airframe and the technology we're going to put into it, will certainly be good out to about 2020, maybe in some aspects beyond that. Will we have to do some airframe repairs in that period? We may. We don't see that right now, but having been around airplanes for 35 years, I can tell you that it wouldn't be the first time we've discovered cracks or had to do something. But about 2020 to 2025, I would think, we'll be looking at replacing it with a totally different surveillance capability, which may still involve some manned or uninhabited air vehicles. But I suspect we'll have much different sensors and cueing.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

My understanding is that the CF-18s will be requiring replacement by about 2017. Is that correct?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes, it will be around 2015 to 2017. Again, as in my answer to the issue about Sea Kings and MHP, in one case we'll start to draw down at the same time we're rounding up on something else.

Mr. Rob Anders: And is the joint strike fighter going to likely be the replacement for that? Is that the thinking, if you will, at this time?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: It's certainly the only development currently on the horizon that would, I think, fit Canada's needs. I say that because it's the only platform designed with cost in mind.

Parenthetically, aircraft costs, particularly for modern fighter airplanes, have been escalating out of control, and the whole design philosophy behind JSF is not only to provide capability, but to do it at a cost that's affordable.

Mr. Rob Anders: When you say it fits our needs, would you say that's a best fit?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Of the airplanes that are currently out there, yes. Who knows by 2017 what the situation will be? The number of aircraft manufacturers has been declining over the years, and so the choices are things like Eurofighter, joint strike fighter, modernized F-18, the F-18 EF, and so on.

• 1650

We haven't actually in the air force even got a project yet in place to look at options for replacements. What I'm talking about here is just that it is an airplane that is, I think, going to be produced—that's not even a certainty—and because of the way the design is going, in respect of cost, it would certainly be one we would have to look at.

Mr. Rob Anders: Out of curiosity, how many flights do our Auroras make over the Arctic every month?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That depends on the need. The frequency of flying over the Arctic has been relatively constrained. If you think about 16, 18, or 21 airplanes and the size of this nation, if we had all of them in the air every day, we wouldn't be able to cover even a very small part of it. So the focus of our surveillance with this platform is largely based on where there's a perceived threat. For example, during the migrant operation that we were involved in, that's where the focus was, likewise on the east coast during certain parts of the fishing season, and in the Pacific during the hunt for illegal drift net fishers, and so on. So we don't have a regular surveillance pattern over the Arctic that would guarantee a certain number of flights.

Mr. Rob Anders: So what's the average then? You say you don't feel the need, but what's the average? They still fly, I would hope.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Basically, they've flown a couple of times a year in the last couple of years.

Mr. Rob Anders: Interesting. Okay.

I have a question with regard to privatization. I'm generally a fan of privatization, but I recognize that in the case of our national defence it raises some problems with regard to civilian contractors and their strike ability, striking during times when we don't want them to strike. So my question is with regard to the whole idea of privatizing maintenance. Do you feel we have adequate safeguards in place to prevent labour strikes, if civilian contractors choose to strike when they have privatized contracts?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The focus of maintenance in the air force has been, of course, not on our core combat capabilities. Those areas, like F-18s, transports, tactical helicopters, and so on, have been supported by blue-suit maintainers, although I would have to say, even in that regard, for probably as long as there's been an air force in this country we've also been supported by industry at our third-line level of maintenance, the heavy maintenance that Bombardier, Field Aviation, or others provide to the service.

Do we have the right regimes in place for this in an area like, for example, Goose Bay, which is one of those areas where in fact we have experienced labour strife? Perhaps we do not, in that we did have a strike.. It did have a disruption on our operation there, but we have to understand that the operation itself was not one that was vital to Canada's national security. It's a training operation there, and in fact, although it was very inconvenient, particularly for our allies, and also for the people who were living there, it was not critical in the long run.

Do we need to have those kinds of assurances in place? I think we probably do.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll start by looking at state of readiness and what's happening with our NATO partners. They're starting to look a lot more at specializing. For instance, with the Dutch and the Belgians, as far as their navies are concerned, certain ones are going to be concentrating on minesweeping, and the Dutch are now building four frigates that are going to be part of the missile defence system for Europe.

• 1655

If we look at the air force, they're looking at air-to-air refuelling as being a specialty for one of the countries, and the other one would be looking at the strategic airlift. Are we looking at any of those types of situations with our American partners?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Indeed, and not only with the Americans, but also farther afield than that.

Both of the current projects that we're running—the strategic air-to-air refuelling project, which will replace the capability we lost with the 707 when we retired it, and the new strategic airlift project...neither of these are approved departmentally, but they're approved in the context that we're doing option analysis. The option analysis runs the gamut from renting to collaboration with our allies to, obviously, the more traditional buying it and operating it ourselves.

We have looked in the area of strategic lift, for example. In the past, as you know, we've rented those kinds of aircraft abroad. We're looking at whether there are means that we could enter into an agreement with the commercial operator to provide those capabilities as well. I think the key, from a Canadian perspective, has to be always, though, for the money that we're going to invest, what is the assurance that we're going to have the capability there?

For example, do we enter into some agreement with the United States if there's something that our government wants the aircraft to do that may not be something that the Americans are involved in? We need to assure that we have the sovereignty control to use the resources when we need them to carry out the missions we have.

That, to me, is the critical—

Mr. David Price: That also, of course, is a problem. The Europeans are having a bit of a problem.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: They are.

The other problem with sharing, the way things happen in the world, is that generally, when somebody needs it, everybody needs it because something has taken place, whether it's a natural disaster or a conflict, and so on. For everything, there's a trade-off, I guess.

Mr. David Price: Actually, that's a good item. When we're talking about strategic airlift and our DART team, how prepared are we to really move them around the way we should be able to?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The DART team themselves, I think, are very prepared to move. The ability of the air force to move them is extremely limited. When we did move the DART down to Honduras to deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, that was a major, major operation for us. I was commanding the air division then, and we really had to set up a kind of a bridge down to MacDill in Florida and then from there down to Honduras.

The problem is that the Hercules, although it's a wonderful aircraft, just bulks out very rapidly. So we just didn't have the capability. Turkey was even worse because of the distances involved. In that case, had we not gone out and rented Antonov capabilities to help move the equipment into the theatre, we simply would not have been able to do it. It would have taken every Hercules we had and more.

Mr. David Price: How far are we into really looking at our own airlift capabilities to advance and to improve and to get to a point where maybe we should be specializing more in that? Personally, I think it is one field that we could go into.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We have a remit from the department to bring forward options this year. I've briefed the minister on a couple of occasions on where we're at in this option analysis. It's going through the departmental processes.

As I said to the minister when we spoke about this last, how quickly we attain that kind of capability—we're not obtaining it, obviously, for the air force—really depends on what the nation thinks is appropriate and when they think that we ought to have it. We will have options available within the next six months or so on a variety of different possibilities.

Then it's a question of how quickly do you want to pursue this? Speed will dictate to a great extent what solutions might potentially present themselves, since some of the aircraft—or at least one of the aircraft—that might ultimately be in contention are a fair ways away, from a time perspective.

• 1700

Mr. David Price: If I can go back to the MH project, we looked back at the original plan with the EH-101, which was basically a platform with a group of modules. The modules were supposed to be off the shelf at the time, so if we think back, we were really looking at a two-stage contract at that point then. I don't understand why everybody's getting excited about it now because, in actual fact, I think personally that a helicopter should be set up like that because times are changing so quickly—equipment is changing so quickly—and we see what's happened.

That helicopter was originally designed to do sub search, which is almost not needed today—I say “almost”; there's still some need out there. But the mission systems were supposed to be a module unit to go in. The search and rescue was supposed to be a set-up you could put in and remove to go to another operation. Yet we're hearing all these complaints today about going after a platform, which, by the way, is a question that I had asked more than a year ago in this committee, and at that point it was said, no, there was no problem to go to two contracts.

Now, what do you see wrong—you've touched on it a bit, but you haven't gone into it too far—with having a two-part contract? Because the platform is one thing—we need to get that ordered; we need to get that coming in. But the rest of it, being modular in the sense of...equipment is changing; technology is changing so fast that by the time...let's say we get two years down the road and are starting to build the helicopter, we're probably looking at different missions and needs that you'll need equipment for. I'd like to get your thoughts on that.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Well, again, Alan Williams will be, I think, probably the right guy to ping on here, but I would—

Mr. David Price: But he's not going to talk about your needs. I'm looking more at the needs.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: From an air force perspective—and I would say from a naval perspective as well—how things get delivered, and how the machinations of government competitions and contracting and so on take place, don't much matter. We're concerned about what's the bottom line; when is it going to be delivered; is it going to have the capability that we asked for in the statement of operational requirements; and then is it going to be properly supported through the lifetime of the airplane?

So from our perspective, that's what we've been focusing on, and I am convinced that the statement of operational requirement is robust, and any airplane that meets that capability or with the systems on board that meet that SOR will provide us with what we need. There are advantages, obviously, to one over another. I suppose the advantage of the two- or the split-contract program is that it's allowed a wide variety of manufacturers and capabilities to put in their proposals or bids. The advantage of a single aircraft manufacturer doing the whole thing from the get-go is that is reduces the integration issue.

So it's like almost any other debate we enter into—there are pros and cons to both sides. But my expectation is, based on what Alan has told me, that we will have an airplane that meets the SOR delivered, and hopefully about on time.

The Chair: Thank you, General Campbell.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, believe it or not, I have a very short question.

Going back to the e-mail we referred to from Major Bouchard to you, as you know, it's been out in the public for about seven months. My only question to you, sir, is were you ever asked by the CDS or the vice-chief or National Defence to provide an explanation, either verbally or in writing, with regard to that comment that was referred to by Major Bouchard to you?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: No.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You were never asked by anyone?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: No.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay, that's fine. That's all I wanted to know. Thank you very much.

The Chair: That is an awfully short question.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That's the shortest answer I've given today, too.

I was a bit surprised, actually—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: So was I.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: —but no.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Nevertheless, that's it for me.

The Chair: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: We have to leave.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, gentlemen. I apologize for leaving for a while. Private members' business was moved ahead in terms of deciding which bills were votable, and I have a motion I was trying to lobby to have made votable.

• 1705

I want to start by saying that I certainly do appreciate having the Cold Lake base in my constituency. I've gotten to know a lot of men and women who are serving in the forces and working in the civilian sector there. They're doing really good work. It's a well-run operation in Cold Lake, I think.

Before I get into my line of questioning to General Campbell, I would like to start by asking—and I'd like you to really think about the answer—do you feel as free to speak out as you'd like, especially at this committee?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I gave a response a while ago.

By the way, let me also say I share the view about Cold Lake, having spent three tours there myself. It is a great place.

I said earlier to a question on the other side here that, yes, I feel very comfortable about answering questions in front of this organization. We talked briefly about the issue of policy and civilian control of the military, which I think are concepts nobody has any difficulty with. But in the context of whether I've been given any marching orders that say here's the party line and here's where we're going, no. So I hope I can respond to your questions in a forthright manner.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You don't feel at all limited in what you can say? You don't think it might have an impact on either your ability to serve or on some job you might get after you get out? You don't feel any kind of restraint in that light?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I wouldn't be frivolous in my response, but with 35 years of service of working for about 30 cents on the dollar now, no, I'm not too concerned about whether I lose my job or not here.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Does it bother you, as it seems to bother Mr. O'Reilly, that retired officers seem much more willing to speak out once they've actually walked through the door and received their conscience, as Mr. O'Reilly has said? Are you concerned with the way the retired officers seem to speak out a lot more freely and quite differently from when they were in the forces?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: How can I put this delicately? You are looking at a guy who is wearing light blue, and I don't think you've had a parade of senior air force officers coming and talking to you about issues.

I spent last night at the RCAF officers' mess with a group, a rather daunting group, actually, because it included General Manson and about three or four retired three stars, and more stars than you can shake a stick at. These are all guys who were big cheeses when I was a fairly small fry in the organization, so I have a lot of respect for them. My sense is that they understand precisely the situation we're in. They recognize there are always resource constraints and we're trying to deal with them in the best way we can. The situation in the world is different from when they were there.

The words I get from folks there are “How can we help you? How can we make Canadians understand where the pressures are? How can we help all of you, collectively, who are trying to do the best there is for Canadian defence?”

I don't want to denigrate our army friends, because I know a good one of mine is in the background here, but I haven't had that same kind of response from air force folks.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I think that's a fair comment. There doesn't seem to be the same degree—

LGen Lloyd Campbell: They use my e-mail a lot, too.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Right.

In terms of your statement that our air force is—I don't know if you really came out and said it—more combat-capable than ten years ago, you made the comment that you could deploy a wing. In the United States, a wing is 72, I think. In Canada, isn't it generally considered to be 36? Yet during the Kosovo war, we had 18 out, and when the air force was asked for more, the minister said we just can't possibly provide any more. So isn't there a conflict?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The challenge we're faced with today is not in the number of airplanes, interestingly enough. The challenge we were faced with in the Kosovo campaign was really in the changing nature of that kind of conflict.

• 1710

Normally, in the environment I grew up in in Europe, where I commanded a wing, we would have anticipated that each pilot would have flown at least a couple of sorties a day in combat operations. In Kosovo, we had roughly one pilot flying every second day. The reason for that was the complexity of the operation, the amount of mission planning time, the length of the sorties, all of those things together. We could have put more airplanes there, had we had real estate.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Exactly on that, if I could just follow up on that, is the issue of pilots. In Kosovo, just that short time ago, you had a lot more experienced pilots than you have right now. I think I was told at Cold Lake that you only have two pilots with more than two years of experience—something quite extreme like that. It was unbelievable, the loss to the private sector. That's why I'm wondering if you could explain your comments on being combat-capable when you have such a lack of experience when it comes to pilots, compared to what you had such a short time ago when the Kosovo war was going on.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Well, the situation is serious in terms of pilots, and as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we are not alone. This is not a unique Canadian phenomenon we're facing here. The United States, the Australians, the Brits, everybody is doing this. The numbers are not quite so catastrophic, as only two experienced people left, but experience is a significant issue.

This is not, by the way, new to our time. I can tell you that when I was on my first tour in Europe in the height of the Cold War, I was a mass attack lead after two years on squadron, which is the ability to command 12 or 18 ships in a major coordinated program. Well, it wasn't just because.... I hope I had some pilot capability, but it was also because that was the norm. We were in another one of these cyclical losses of people, and we're always going to face those.

The challenge we have in a place like Cold Lake is to keep our operational activity levels under control enough that these new guys and gals who are coming into the system have the ability to develop. But they develop very quickly. In fact, many of the people who flew in the Kosovo air campaign were first-tour pilots, and they did very well.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In terms of losing this experience, to me that seems—and it's cyclical, as you've said—to be an extremely serious problem. If we were asked to go back to Kosovo or somewhere else in the very near future, there'd be a problem that wasn't there that short time ago.

Part of the problem, as I've been told by pilots, some who are still in the forces, some who have gotten out.... I'll use one example to explain what they see is a real problem.

I know personally a young fellow who went into the forces with a commercial licence. He went into the F-18 program, and they cut the program, so he flew Sea Kings. He didn't mind that. He enjoyed it until he got married and had a family. Then he was concerned, because there were problems. But then he wanted to get back—now that there was room—into flying F-18s. That's what he wanted to do. That's why he had gone in. A year and a half or so before the end of his contract, he started making it very clear that's what he wanted. He wasn't accommodated. This is someone who has all that experience on a twin-engine craft and went in there with his commercial licence, started the program, and they said nope, they didn't want him. So he's gone.

That's just one example. There are others like that, a considerable number. I don't know how the forces can afford to lose people like that, particularly at a time when they know there's a problem with experience.

• 1715

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We could go onto this for a long time because it's a complex business, both the whole thing of transferring from one element of operations, Sea Kings to fighters, and so on.

We do a certain amount of that every year. There are people who make that transformation from one to another. I can tell you that having commanded at Cold Lake, 419 Squadron, which was our fighter lead-in program, that it's not always successful. That is not to talk about pilot skill or anything else, but once you grow up in an environment, say the transport environment, for example, to transition then to the fighter operation, which is significantly different, is not an easy transition at all times. There's an element of that. We do bring people from one environment to another, but we have to do so in relatively controlled numbers.

The other element is the dichotomy that exists that at the same time we're short of pilots, we're also short of the ability to actually absorb new ones. I know that may sound difficult to understand, but where we've taken our shortfalls is largely in the headquarters. We've been filling headquarters positions that normally would be filled by pilots with others, and we have a limited number of people we can put through the operational training unit at Cold Lake. So it's a fairly complex bit. The solution therefore is not just greater production; it's really trying to come to grips with the retention issue—the why are people leaving and what we can do about it and so on.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In terms of the statement you made in your opening comments that you could deploy a wing if need be, do you feel this is an accurate statement?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: That is doable.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How long could they be sustained?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: The commitment in the white paper for a wing is essentially a one-time-only commitment. There's a vanguard component, which is sustainable indefinitely, but the wing essentially says you do that.... We're talking about operations here, I presume. If we just deployed them, we could support them for a long time, but if they were employed in combat operations, clearly with a force structure the size of ours we couldn't sustain them for more than that one shot. That's understood. That's part of the whole construct of the white paper and where we are.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Again looking at the issue of readiness and looking now to munitions, I understand that our stocks of some different munitions, for instance, GBU-12 guidance systems for 500-pound bombs, ran out extremely quickly, and there were other munitions I've heard of too that we are really running bare bones on. Do you see that as a concern? Would you prefer to have a stockpile?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: As a commander, I'd love to have more of everything here. We made a pretty conscious decision here following the Kosovo air campaign in our replacement bit not to just go out and buy some more of the same thing we had, because we thought we learned some lessons there. We also know there's a requirement to acquire not only precision-guided munition but something with an all-weather capability because of the limitations that apply themselves to simply laser-guided munitions and so on.

So the philosophy we've adopted is to take a slightly longer-term view and look to acquire some munitions that have some longer-term benefit for us, rather than just filling up the bins again.

Does that put us at a bit of a risk today if a similar event were to happen? Yes, to some extent, although I think our contacts with the Americans and so on would help us there. But with resources at a premium, we have to make sure we're investing in the right stuff. My view is we have to invest in stuff that's going to have a little longer duration. We're doing the same thing with replacement for our targeting pods.

• 1720

Mr. Leon Benoit: How much money has been allocated to replenish these stockpiles?

MGen Richard Bastien: I don't have the figure offhand right now.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But it's one thing to say you're targeting something and something might happen in the future, and another to know that the money is going to be there, is there, to do it.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: My sense there is that the funds for replacements of the war stocks we're talking about will not be a significant problem. We're not going to run out and buy huge war stocks, nor is there a requirement to do so in the due strategic environment in which we live. But we do have the resources available to do that.

We're also looking at the need to replace air-to-air munitions over the next number of years as well. There are programs in place to do that as well. We have a plan to replace the pods I was talking about. We currently have, and you may have seen them, the Nighthawk pods that are on the F-18. Their technology is rapidly becoming obsolescent, and we need to then replace those with a better capability. We have a project in place to make that happen.

Angus, do you have any figures on munitions?

Col Angus Watt: No.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We can certainly provide you with some specific inputs on the whole business of air-to-ground munition replacement if that would be of use to you. But what I've given you here is the philosophy that says rather than replace what we dropped, we recognize that in regard to some of what we had originally acquired we probably need to look at moving to a better and newer and more capable technology.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You kind of—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I have to cut you off there. You had a long run because I didn't have any other members who were looking to ask questions.

Mr. Price.

Mr. Rob Anders: I'm always willing.

The Chair: You have to catch my eye.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You mentioned in your presentation this flex program for the Griffons, the flex and support. Roughly how long are you looking at? I know you're just looking at the program, but are we talking of a year, or two years, actually in theatre, something like that?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: No, I think six months is probably where we'll end up—maybe in some cases, a year.

Mr. David Price: You are at six months now, though, are you not, on a rotation basis?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Yes, and the whole bit is rotating there. There are some people who I think will stay for longer periods. But what I think you'll see more in this proposal.... In fact, what the squadron who had proposed this up through the system did is they conducted an exercise, if you will, of really just dealing with their own people and trying to figure out how they would match this off.

I think for the shortest timeframe you're probably talking a month. But if you have someone who's already been to the theatre, they're experienced and so on, you can do that.

I have to caution, this is not something you could ever do in a theatre where you're just going in for the first time, because continuity and unit cohesion and so on are so critical. And I'm not suggesting this is something that may have applicability elsewhere. But within our technical helicopter units, since it is the same squadron that is deploying the people—

Mr. David Price: In a routine type of operation.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Exactly. And this will become even more useful, or at least more likely to work well, if we actually do have a drawdown in Bosnia of the number of helicopters we have there, which is what we anticipate will happen, although we don't know that yet, because it would make it an even more constrained operation.

Mr. David Price: In terms of training simulators, I know you mentioned earlier in response to Geoff's question that there was an advance. I'm sure there's an incredible advance compared to what we had.

I'll refer back to the question Mr. Goldring had asked you on what you'd said in the past. I'm sure if we referenced the state of simulators today, that in itself would make a big difference to the answer you'd be giving to that same question.

I'm wondering how far we've moved in simulators. You mentioned that there probably is more value in the simulator training because of the fact that it's not just routine, going from point A to point B. I can well see that, but how realistic is the simulator training? What's the real value there, now that you've had a chance to use some of the newer simulators? I imagine the SARs have simulators for the new Cormorants. What are the pilots, the people who are actually in them, saying? That's what I'm coming down to.

• 1725

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Let me give you two measures there. I suspect most people here know that when they hop into an airline airplane, the guy sitting in the right seat who is a brand-new pilot didn't do any of his training in the airplane. They do all their training in the simulator. The first flight you take is a paying trip. If we put that in an air force context, that means more of the resources that we have in things such as Auroras will be in customer service, to use that term, versus training the crews that operate it.

The United States Air Force, which obviously tends to be a world leader in this area, estimates that the value of simulation is about 1.3 times the value of a flying hour. So for every hour you spend in the air, you get about 1.3 hours' worth of value in the simulator. The reason for that is with the new simulation systems, there is an ability to network these things so that you aren't just flying alone in a box. It's interconnected with lots of other capabilities, from AWACS to other fighters and so on in the fighter context. The realism is quite incredible. In fact, it allows you to do mission rehearsals on the terrain you're probably going to be going against and so on. If it sounds a bit cosmic, it is. I've flown our CH-146 simulator in Gagetown, and although it's a generation before what I'm talking about here, the realism you have in the cockpit is quite incredible.

In the case of the Auroras—

Mr. David Price: That really was my next question. As a pilot you've tried it out, and you find the realism to be quite good.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: I've not seen the Hawk up at Cold Lake, but I have flown the Harvard II simulator at Moose Jaw. You can see every little town, building, and house. The normal landmarks a student pilot would fly over are all there. It's extremely realistic.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, General Campbell.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you.

Some of our C-130 aircraft are getting pretty old and require a lot of maintenance just to stay in the air. We had a bit of a situation with deploying the aircraft back in East Timor in 1999. I believe that Colonel Michael Ward wrote in the Canadian Military Journal, “Spring 2000 was a near catastrophe”. Those are his words. When do decisions have to be taken to replace our older C-130s, and how many aircraft need to be replaced in the medium term? Also, are heavy transport aircraft such as the C-17 heavy lifter your preferred option?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We're operating three models of Hercules: the E model, a couple of versions of the H model because we have the tankers, and we bought two new stretched airplanes about four years ago now. All of the airplanes have been modified with the new avionics kit to make the cockpit the same and to provide them with modern avionics equipment. The E models, the older ones, clearly are old airplanes. I flew on one the other day, actually. It doesn't look old, because the loving care our techs put into them keeps them looking pretty fine. Nevertheless, the maintenance man-hours per flying hour start to build up, and these airplanes will need to be replaced.

• 1730

What we've started to do in the context of the strategic airlift program I talked about just a little while ago is to examine if we bring online a capability.... Let's use the C-17 as a notional type of platform. We've started to examine what the impact would be on our overall air transport fleet——the Polaris, which is the Airbus, and the Hercules—if we were to bring into service half a dozen of that kind of airplane, whether we leased them, bought them, or rented them.

I think what we would see is an ability to divest ourselves of some of the older model Hercules in concert with bringing on this new capability. When is that? Hopefully, that would be over the next five years or so. If that doesn't happen, if we don't acquire a strategic airlift capability, then we're looking at having to replace that part of the Hercules fleet by about 2009 or 2010, somewhere in that timeframe.

Mr. Rob Anders: What is your requirement with regard to the strategic jet tankers? My understanding is that we lost our last tankers when we retired our 707s. How many large tanker aircraft do you think we need, and can we expect a decision in the near future?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Again, we have a study in that regard, Mr. Anders, and I'm anticipating options coming forward soon. The options will be everything from converting probably two of our A-310s to a tanker configuration, which would then be similar to the 707 we used to use, to a collaborative program with a NATO ally or some other ally. There are also commercial options out there. I'm not sure how assured they are and whether they will operate in the places we think we need to go. I think we're looking at five different options in that area.

One of the things that has happened with regard to strategic air refuelling is that the Germans have decided to go ahead and modify some of their Airbus A-310s, the same airplane as ours, to a tanker configuration, and that will significantly reduce the non-recurring engineering costs associated with that particular option. Is that going to be the recommendation? I won't know until the team finishes their study, but it certainly is one of them.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, I think we're going to have to wind this up. We're at the end of our time here.

I would like to, if I could, beg the indulgence of the committee to get in one quick question myself, which relates to the role of the air reserve, General Campbell, with regard to operational readiness. I understand that quite a few of our air reserve members are used, for instance, in a regular maintenance role with the forces. If we were to have a situation where the operational tempo expanded significantly, where would we draw the necessary people from? Can you respond to that in about two minutes or less?

LGen Lloyd Campbell: We have a study under way right now with regard to the overall role of air reserves. Currently most of the reserves we get tend to be ex-regulars, and particularly on the air maintenance side of things it's important they are, because then we don't have to train them. Training people in air maintenance ab initio is a complex business.

What we're really examining is whether there is a role for flying air reserves, that is, pilots, in the organization—what are the areas where we can best make use of the kinds of talents that already exist out there in the public, such as in the administrative and financial areas, and how do we integrate them?

The air force is a total force organization. When I walk around my own headquarters, I can't tell you who is a reservist and who is regular. They really do work side by side, and we're glad they do.

I will have a better answer for you on what we see as the future for our air reservists hopefully by the fall, when we finish with this study.

The Chair: General Campbell and the colleagues you've brought with you, thank you very much for your presentations today.

I must apologize to the committee. I was not able to make the first part of the meeting because we had a major announcement, which some of you may be aware of, with regard to LeBreton Flats and the new war museum. I'm sure all of you would agree that it's important not just to support the serving members of the Canadian Forces but also to remember the contributions of previous members of the Canadian Forces.

• 1735

General, once again, thank you very much.

LGen Lloyd Campbell: Thank you.

The Chair: This meeting is now adjourned.