NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 20, 2001

• 1540

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. We will be getting to Mr. Rudd shortly, but the first agenda item for which we have received notice is...we've actually had notice of several motions.

Mr. Benoit, how do you want to proceed with these motions?

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): I have two motions, eh?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Maybe we should first do the one pursuant to Standing Order 81(5), in regard to having the minister here for the estimates.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit—and I'll just mention this to the members of the committee—in terms of the motion I'm looking at in regard to the minister and the supplementary estimates, these are the sorts of motions typically dealt with by the steering committee. Would you like to have this referred to the steering committee? The steering committee is meeting tomorrow, by the way.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's meeting tomorrow? Well, I'll just go through it quickly. We may as well do it.

The Chair: So you want us to vote now?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I think we should. I don't see any problem with the motion. I wouldn't think there is one.

The Chair: On Mr. Benoit's motion, then, we'll hear from Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would vote that we put it to the steering committee. That's where it should be. It's out of order here. Why do we have a steering committee if we're not going to run things through the steering committee?

The Chair: This motion would effectively turn this committee into the steering committee, but is that a motion to refer it to them, Mr. O'Reilly?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Yes.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Can you deal with that?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): Are we getting copies of the motion, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: You should have a copy, Mrs. Wayne, but if you don't, we can get you a copy. As a matter of fact, you can even use mine.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, I don't have a copy.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't think he can make a motion to defer when this—

The Chair: It's not a motion to defer, it's a motion to refer.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's to refer it to the steering committee, and I don't think that should be done when we're considering this motion.

The Chair: A motion to refer actually takes precedence over the main motion. As I understand it, a motion to refer is not debatable either.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, if we deal with this at steering committee, it could just get lost in the shuffle. Besides that, Mr. Chair, you yourself brought a motion to this committee that was a similar kind of a motion—I think it had to do with the interim report—rather than bringing it through the steering committee, so there is an inconsistency here.

The Chair: After seeking some procedural advice, I've learned the motion to refer is in fact debatable.

In response to your comment, Mr. Benoit, the action that was taken by the committee in connection with the report was, I believe, taken with the unanimous consent of the committee.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): In the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, it's a fairly standard one. Supplementary estimates are coming out. It's a no-brainer to have the minister in. I can't imagine there would be a reason—

The Chair: I'm not saying that we would or would not agree or disagree with this. In the past, Mr. Benoit has put forward motions in terms of suggestions for witnesses. His track record is not too bad in that respect. In many cases, we have agreed to many of the witnesses Mr. Benoit has suggested. That's not to prejudice this particular item, but, again, it is one that is more properly dealt with at the steering committee.

Mr. Rob Anders: I'm going to boil it down, Mr. Chairman, in the sense that if this is a no-brainer, we might as well get it done and out of the way. We would like to have it dealt with, and then we can move on to the witness. That just seems to be the natural course. If the other side is amenable, we can then move on to the witness and it's done with. If not, then we can have a prolonged debate over whether or not we should have it. I would prefer just to have it done.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe there are regulations dictating some responsibility to the standing committee, and we do have to deal with estimates. I think this committee has clearly cut regulations to abide by. I believe the deadline is some time in March. Is that correct?

• 1545

The Chair: Mr. Dromisky, I didn't catch all your comments. Could you repeat them, please?

Mr. Stan Dromisky: I was talking about the regulations pertaining to the responsibilities of a standing committee. This is a recognized standing committee of the House of Commons, and I believe we do have to deal with the estimates. I think there's a deadline for that, and I believe it's some time in March, if I remember correctly.

The second point I'd like to make is that Mr. Benoit is assuming it is going to be lost in the shuffle if it goes to the steering committee. I disagree with him. It's not a question of it being lost in the shuffle. I think the responsibilities of the steering committee are clear. They have a much better idea than I do, as an ordinary member of this committee, about what the top priorities of this committee are, and about what direction we should follow in the next few months. I do think we must get on with the task, stick to our agenda, and go full speed ahead, instead of bouncing all over like a loose cannonball.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Benoit, and then Mr. Anders.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Pratt, if this goes to steering committee and it is not supported there, can I bring it to this committee?

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, you can't have it both ways.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's exactly why I want it dealt with in a public way.

The Chair: Let's try to focus on the issue at hand here, which is what the steering committee should be doing. The steering committee is tasked with the job of determining who comes before this committee. We can either get rid of the steering committee and deal with this on an ad hoc basis, or we can let the steering committee do the work it is responsible for.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Pratt, you did not take this interim report to the steering committee, through the normal process.

The Chair: In fact, Mr. Benoit, we passed a motion earlier in the fall that dealt with our work over the course of the fall. That touched on the sorts of things we were going to be doing in terms of producing an interim report. When the report was ready, it had to come before committee. I would say that was a natural development from the earlier motion, and it was entirely consistent with what we had agreed to as a committee. Unless you can bring any different arguments to this matter—and I haven't heard any thus far—I'm going to go to Mr. Anders and Mr. O'Reilly, and then call the vote.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, this could have gone really simply, because it's a pretty standard pro forma motion. We're not trying to slip anything passed anybody. It's pretty standard stuff. I'm also going to say—

The Chair: I'm not suggesting that.

Mr. Rob Anders: —Mr. Chairman, that during the press conference that we all held with regard to the interim report, even you talked about a billion dollars for the armed forces.

Part of our job in this committee is to get money for the armed forces. I'm sure Mr. Wood would love it for North Bay. Mr. O'Reilly would love it for some of his guys. The NDP member of the committee would love some for Shearwater, I'm sure. We could go around the table and find out who would like money for what. The opposition is proposing at least $2 billion. I bet members across the way, including Mr. Price—who used to be with the Tories and talked about more money for the National Defence envelope—and including even yourself, Mr. Chairman, would secretly like to see more money for the forces.

That being the case, I think it's entirely appropriate that we have the minister before the committee. I don't think anybody is pulling a snow job. It's part of this committee's job—not just the steering committee—to go ahead and ask questions and give direction to the minister in terms of how much funding the forces should have. It's perfectly in the ballpark. Frankly, for us to get a snow job from Mr. Dromisky, just as I used to get snow jobs from Mr. Dromisky on the transport committee, where he would try to direct the activities of that—

An hon. member: Oh, come on!

The Chair: Mr. Anders—

Mr. Rob Anders: No, it goes both ways.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, you're straying well beyond the question immediately in front of the committee.

Mr. Rob Anders: As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, the question is this: Mr. Dromisky said we have to deal with this in March. Indeed, we have our own people working here at the committee. We all well know it doesn't have to be dealt with in March. He was trying to go ahead and brush this matter under the rug, and I don't know the reason why, Mr. Chairman. I would assume Mr. Dromisky wants to see a little more money for the armed forces, as do we.

An hon. member: I have a point of order.

Mr. Rob Anders: We're only trying to help the minister in terms of the allocations and in the cabinet discussions.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, you're not bringing any new arguments to this. I'm going to have to go to Mr. O'Reilly, and then to Mrs. Wayne.

• 1550

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chairman, the normal course of action compels the minister to appear before this committee on the main estimates, not the supplementary estimates. The minister has appeared before us on the main estimates twice. This is not an ordinary motion. It's talking about supplementary estimates, not about the main estimates. Once again, if the steering committee wishes to deal with it, it can. If it doesn't, let's vote on it right now. Obviously, the mood has been created.

The Chair: I'm going to go to Mrs. Wayne, and then we'll call the vote.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chairman, we have a procedure, and we do have a steering committee. All of us want to make sure our military has more money in their budget in order to give them the resources they need.

The best thing for us to do is to follow the normal procedure. We should put it before the steering committee. We will deal with it before December 1, as is asked here, and then we will report back to the committee here as well. That is the proper procedure.

Right now, I'm embarrassed that we've invited this gentleman to come here to make his presentation, but have instead gotten into this kind of a debate.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

I'm going to call the vote now. Do you want a recorded division?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, please.

The Chair: Yes, I figured as much. All those in favour of the motion...?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is this on the motion to refer it to the steering committee?

The Chair: Yes, that's right. I'm sorry. All those in favour of the motion to refer...?

Mr. Rob Anders: I believe it involves calling our names, Mr. Chairman, as opposed to a show of hands.

The Chair: Yes, and we're going to get that through a roll call.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 8; nays 2)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, did you want to address the second motion?

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes. We move, pursuant to Standing Order 108, that this committee start work on developing a new white paper on national defence, to be completed by December 31, 2002.

I agree with the comment made by Mrs. Wayne from the PCs that it is embarrassing that this witness has had to sit through that whole thing. A quick vote would have dealt with the issue very quickly, I believe, and I hope this one can be dealt with quite quickly.

All kinds of been defence experts—some before committee, some giving their own presentations—have been calling for a new white paper on defence. From what's happening now, it's clear we simply don't have the people to meet the commitments the government has made. We certainly can't sustain those commitments. We don't have proper equipment in many circumstances. It should be obvious that now is the time to bring forth a new white paper on defence.

A problem with just bringing forth a new white paper is that this government hasn't honoured the commitments of the 1994 white paper in many areas. We're below 60,000 in terms of people. Certainly, the money has dropped, with a decrease of 30% in real terms—as our committee report noted—since they took power.

It's important not only to have a new white paper, but to have an actual dollar amount built into the policy statements made in the white paper. This is what was done in the Australian model. I think we could take components from the quadrennial review that the Americans do on defence, from the New Zealand defence review done in 1997, and from the Australian white paper. We can learn from all of them, and we can have a process that will ensure long-term commitment to the new white paper.

• 1555

Australia had a public consultation in which the opposition parties were truly involved along with the government. The Commonwealth Department of the Treasury was involved through the whole thing, so the money was talked about as the white paper process went forth. In fact, the signature of their finance minister was on the new white paper, so the money was committed over the long term. Of course, because the opposition parties were a part of it and supported it, it will make it very difficult for an opposition party to renege on long-term commitments when one takes over government in the future.

I'm suggesting not only that we want a new white paper, but that it be modelled after parts of the three I mentioned, and particularly the Australian white paper. The government will then commit the money, because it will be actually committed to as part of the white paper, part of the policy documents.

I'm therefore hoping this committee will support the idea of a new white paper to be completed by the end of 2002. That gives us enough time. I think it's important that we do finish ensuring, right now, that we have what the military needs to deal with the current situation. We know they don't, so let's make sure we deal as quickly as we can with calling for immediate, short-term commitments to the military. But let's then have this white paper so that five years down the road, when the next crisis hits—and it could well be part of this same war against terrorism—we have the military we need to properly protect Canadians, and so that our men and women have the equipment and the replacements they need in order that they're not put in harm's way without what they really deserve. I don't think anybody would argue with that.

Mr. Chair, I ask for the support of this committee on this idea of moving as quickly as we can into preparing a new white paper; that we use a different model from what we've used in the past so that the government will remain committed, because the signatures are on it and the cooperation is there in its development; and that we move ahead and give Canada and the men and women serving in its military what they deserve, which is our commitment to rebuilding the military.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, Mr. Price, and Mr. Anders.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Although some of the rhetoric that's coming out of the opposition today is very interesting, the fact of the matter is that a white paper is started by the Department of National Defence, and it is normally then turned over to a joint committee of the House and the Senate at some point in time. There's no reason to think developing a white paper from only one source...it's from the wrong source in terms of the way white papers are developed, and we would indeed be way out of line on this. I would obviously vote against it for those reasons.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I find this kind of strange. We sat across the table from each other just a couple of weeks ago and you voted against a defence review of foreign affairs, yet now you're calling for a white paper.

The Chair: Mr. Price, I would ask you to direct your comments through the chair.

Mr. David Price: I'm sorry, Mr. Chair.

The member opposite voted against a review. It doesn't make sense. Mr. Chair, the report we just put out said very clearly that the government should initiate a major review of our foreign and defence policies. Mr. Benoit voted against that whole thing, and now he's turning right around and is saying we should have one.

The other thing is that if we're going to go to that, then as Mr. O'Reilly has stated, a process is in place. Actually, the first part of that process is to go through a foreign affairs review before we go through a defence review.

The Chair: That was certainly the expression of the members of the committee when we talked about it, when the report was under consideration, in that a foreign affairs review would be a first step.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: First off, I would like to address Mr. Price's comments in terms of that interim report that was shoved down our throats and delivered late.

Mr. Price, the one that we were promised, the one that should have had due consideration, and the one you voted to go ahead with and then shoved down our throats without us having time for due consideration? Is that the one you're referring to, Mr. Price? That's also the one that didn't mention anything about the Sea Kings. Not one specific mention was made about the Sea King replacements, and not one not specific mention was made about the split contract.

• 1600

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Rob Anders: No, it's my turn to talk now.

Nothing was said about that, yet it's the grossest, most egregious situation with regard to the rust-out.

No specific mention of dollars was made. As a matter of fact, Mr. Price, you could toss a loonie across the table here—that lean Liberal loonie that's down at the low that it is—and that would be enough to satisfy those vague projections that were laid out in an interim report that Mr. Pratt was so eager to push through.

On top of that, it had no specific mention of actual troop numbers, despite the fact that we have projections saying we're going to be down to 43,000 troops by 2003. That's a dismal state indeed. Indeed, it's less than half the number of troops we had when this government took power—the government you crossed the floor to join, Mr. Price.

As well, in terms of who should be initiating this, there has been some ignorance on the part of the department in the minister's portfolio. I think it's high time that the committee go ahead and show some direction with regard to that, because I think the minister is a bit of an “asleep at the switch” type—just like our Prime Minister is—and would love to brush all these things underneath the rug.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Mr. Chair, this is getting ridiculous. Let's just hold the vote on it.

Mr. Rob Anders: Well, I can tell the direction this thing's taking already, Ms. Beaumier.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Rob Anders: I started off this committee meeting with the intention that we were going to have some swift votes with regard to these things, and if Mr. Peric wants to speak, he can speak later on. He can add his name to the list if he so wishes. He's welcome to go ahead and raise his hand.

Lastly, in terms of foreign affairs, Mr. Chairman—

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Rob Anders: If somebody wants to challenge this and the chair wants to rule, then go ahead and challenge the chair. We can have a roll call vote on the challenging of the chair, Mr. Chairman, and that can take up as much time as we like.

With regard to foreign affairs, I'm going to say that I think we should be able to do that in conjunction with the foreign affairs committee in terms of call for a white paper review.

I'll leave it at that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Peric, then Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Janko Peric: Could you call the question, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: No, I have Mrs. Wayne on the speakers' list.

Mrs. Wayne, please be brief so that we can get to our—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I will.

An hon. member: Take as much time as Rob did.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chair, there is no question that I believe everybody here wants to do what is best for our military, but we have procedures to follow. If we follow those procedures, we may be successful in helping our military. There's no question that the white paper has been around since 1994. We tabled a document. Yes, Mr. Chair, perhaps we could have been a little more specific in some areas, but we have all been up to being very specific on just about every area in the House of Commons.

I think it is very important that, when it comes to the military, we take the bloody politics out of it and we do what's right.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I cannot believe what I'm listening to as I sit here today, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, could we please move on and do what is right here today? We have a special visitor who wants to present his feelings about the military to us, and I think it's time we listened to our special guest, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

An hon. member: I'd like a recorded vote, Mr. Chair.

(Motion negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: We will now hear from Mr. David Rudd.

Mr. Rudd, on behalf of the committee, I'd like to welcome you. I'm not sure you've visited us at the defence committee before. I don't think so, so I extend a warm welcome.

Your position, Mr. Rudd, is executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. We're very interested in getting your comments in connection with our report on operational readiness. You have the floor, and I'm sure members will have some questions after your presentation.

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[Translation]

Mr. David Rudd (Executive director, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before the committee. I am both pleased and honoured to be here. I also wish to congratulate you on the very fine work you have accomplished. I trust you will continue along that path.

[English]

Ladies and gentlemen, it would be idle of me to take up more of your afternoon by simply repeating what I know has been said before this committee over the past few weeks and months. In reading the interim report, I assume it reflects not only the majority views of this committee, but also the views of many of the witnesses who have appeared before you. I find myself in general agreement with the report, albeit with what I believe to be some important qualifications.

As I deliver my remarks, I would just like you to bear in mind that the remarks I deliver reflect my own feelings. They are not those of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, its board of directors, or its members. They're just mine.

I find myself completely in agreement with Mrs. Wayne, who wants Canada to do its best by our military. Certainly, our task is made all the more complex by the fact that the problems we were facing prior to September 11 now have an added layer of complexity.

I would also like to suggest to you that perhaps the driving force behind any review—either a wholesale policy review or a program review—is in fact going to be the size of the defence budget. I know this has been discussed many times around the committee table. What I'd like to do this afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, is invite you to consider what we may have to do if sufficient funds are not made available at the next federal budget.

I think it's quite likely that the government will throw a little more money DND's way, but I think it's very likely that these funds will be very modest, because the economy is slowing down and there are pressures to spend elsewhere. Therefore, I cannot help but assume that any extra funds put forth will be strategically placed, and perhaps be placed in response to the events of September 11. That is to say, there will perhaps be more spending on counter-terrorism, and it's therefore this committee's business to be able to separate what the Canadian Forces do in their general duties, in terms of what they did prior to September 11 and what they can bring to the table on the counter-terrorist side.

My first observation, my friends, is what we are going to do if insufficient funds are made available after the next federal budget. As you know, the Auditor General and the service chiefs have both outlined the budgetary shortfalls. They lie within the $750-million to $1-billion range. Assuming that this chunk of cash is not forthcoming in the next budget, do we actually need to go right back to brass tacks and take another look at defence policy? Do we need a new white paper?

Let me take respectful issue with what I believe to be the committee's conclusion—if I read the interim report correctly—that being that we do in fact need a new white paper. If you look at the history of Canadian defence policy-making, my friends, what you quickly conclude is that Canada's defence policy objectives really don't change very much or very profoundly over the years. The three major objectives that we have right now are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States, and participation in international security operations. These have really been the hallmarks of our policy literally for decades. I would suggest that Canada is too tied in with relations with the United States. It is too much of an active player on the international stage for those objectives to be reconsidered in any way, in any significant fashion.

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I believe our defence policy objectives are still valid, although they might be a bit vague. Full stop. The objectives might still be valid, but in terms of the cash required to achieve them as laid out in the 1994 white paper, for example, maybe that cash has not in fact materialized. So what can we do?

I'm going to suggest to you that because the policy objectives haven't changed, and because there's not enough cash in the kitty to recapitalize the armed forces along traditional lines, what we have to consider now—even though we might not like to do it—is a look at a reorientation of the force structure of the Canadian military. Our policy is still pretty much valid, but we might have to take a second look at the actual structure of the forces—the balance between the army, navy, and air force—and the capabilities that lie therein, if for no other reason than that the financial status quo will not permit us to do what we're doing right now.

If you don't believe me, I know you've had General Jeffery in front of this committee. He said we cannot finance the future of the army, because we cannot even finance the present of the army. If that is not a call to arms—metaphorically speaking, of course—I'm really not sure what is.

Before I present a list of appetizers to this committee, or a menu from which you might be able to choose and perhaps discuss, let me make one remark about September 11. It is my view that counter-terrorism requires the participation of the Canadian Forces. It is also my view that counter-terrorism does not require the Canadian Forces to be the lead agency. In fact, law enforcement agencies—RCMP, CSIS, and the intelligence gathering agencies—are the lead government organs in the counter-terrorism effort. Yes, there might be some, discreet military capabilities that we can talk about, such as JTF2 and nuclear, biological, and chemical defence, but generally you find in most western countries that the lead agencies discussing or concerned with counter-terrorism are not the armed forces. In view of that fact, my friends, I would suggest that September 11 really hasn't changed much.

The challenges we were facing and the challenges our military was facing prior to September 11 are still very much with us, of course. Again, we might be required to make some discreet strategic investments, but we're still left with a manpower deficit, we're still left with Sea King helicopters that we're having trouble with, and we're left with a lack of strategic lift. Regardless of whether September 11 had happened, these problems would be with us. What are we going to do? What can we do?

If the supplementary funds are not made available after the next federal budget, I believe logic does in fact require us to take another look. The only thing we can really do is take a look at the structure of the Canadian Forces. We don't need to mess with policy, but we do need to take a look at structure. Let me therefore give you four entrées that you can consider so that you can decide whether or not you would like to eat them. If they cause indigestion, my apologies.

If we assume—and I think this is a safe assumption—that in its next federal budget, the Government of Canada will give the military some extra money, but probably not on the scale of what the Auditor General has said is necessary, I think there are several options for, shall we say, downscoping our expectations of what the armed forces can do. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the options I'm going to give you still allow Canada to maintain its treaty commitments to NATO, to NORAD, and also to the United Nations, which, as you know, can call upon member states to provide armed forces for a variety of tasks up to and including combat.

• 1615

If we have to take a look at the force structure of the armed forces, we could retain combat capabilities, but we could do so only in two of the three services. Due to the manpower deficit and the steep price of replacing a lot of the army's obsolescing equipment, the land forces could conceivably be relegated to constabulary duties, including everything up to peacekeeping operations. Of course, this would not prevent the government from perhaps engaging in the current, robust humanitarian effort in Afghanistan. On the other hand, it still would allow the government to undertake certain international engagements, and it would of course allow them to send people to sling sandbags in Winnipeg next time the flood waters come—and they will.

The second thing we could consider doing is to avoid maintaining a force posture that is over-dependent—and, my friends, I'm choosing my words very carefully here; I'm not saying a force structure that is dependent—on elaborate equipment sets. I think you're all familiar with the revolution in military affairs that puts a premium on high technology and new organizational constructs.

I know some officials who have appeared in front of you have suggested that technology can replace manpower. That's true in some cases, but it isn't true in others. If you look at what the army has done over the past several years, its missions have been very personnel-intensive, rather than technology-intensive. Again, though, I don't want to overemphasize that too much, my friends, because a modern army, regardless of what it does, is going to need modern communications, night-vision equipment, and various things of that nature.

The third option is to re-role the Canadian army into basically the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's writ large. In other words, we would become essentially a light infantry force, with the two other services reorienting themselves in a direction that would allow them to provide direct support for the land force.

This has several advantages. It's going to result in a force structure that is less capital-intensive, and it will provide a focus for force development across all three services. This will allow the Government of Canada to avoid the pitfalls of having the three services basically tearing each others' throats out as they try to safeguard their respective budgets. What I'm suggesting, my friends, is a joint approach, perhaps not unlike some of the smaller, marine corps types of force structures. Other advantages are listed in my presentation, but I will leave those to you to read.

The fourth and final option is that we take a look at what our commonwealth cousins down in New Zealand are doing. The New Zealanders are in the same financial boat as we are, with steep costs of recapitalization and the need and desire to remain engaged internationally. But tough choices had to be made. The decision was to confine the New Zealand Defence Forces to missions that include everything up to and including muscular peacekeeping—meaning that if any combat was to be engaged in, it would be of very short duration.

Does this mean such a force would be irrelevant for Canada? Not necessarily. Peace support missions are what we've been doing over the past number of years, and there would still be sufficient combat capability in the navy, for example, to allow us to maintain our responsibilities to NATO.

Let me conclude, because I've taken up enough of your time already. Again, our defence policy objectives do not change profoundly over time. In and of itself, I think this fact precludes the need for a wholesale defence review. If it happens, though, I look forward to being a part of it. I will provide this committee with any assistance and support it asks for. I just don't believe it's necessary, my friends.

• 1620

Although the objectives are certainly reasonable, they provide very little direction on how much we can allow the Canadian Forces to shrink before those objectives become unattainable. We need to—and I believe it was Mr. Benoit or Mr. Anders who alluded to the Sea Kings earlier—actually quantify how much we're prepared to do, whether it's in dollar terms or by having some sort of timetable for completion.

Thirdly, I'd like to suggest that the events of September 11 have actually not revealed shortcomings in the operational capabilities of the Canadian Forces, because these shortcomings existed prior to the attacks and because counter-terrorism, which we're all very concerned with, is very much a non-military function.

Second to last, the most likely budget scenario, sadly, is that additional financial resources deemed necessary by the Auditor General will probably not be forthcoming in the next budget. I think we really have to consider that as possibility, unpleasant though it may sound to this committee. If insufficient resources are made available, we are really obliged to re-examine our defence posture. There's no point in maintaining the pretense that we can continue on along current lines.

Finally, if sufficient funds are not made available, I would respectfully call upon this committee and its members to provide very strong and immediate guidance to the Department of National Defence on how it should proceed with its restructuring and on what the end product will look like. If I may use an analogy, I don't think any of us would go into an operating theatre and tell the surgeon on duty where he or she may make the incision or what instruments he or she cannot use. We would leave that to the professionals. Likewise, we should leave this to the uniformed military. But we must provide them with guidance, and we must show them that time is of the essence. If we simply leave it to the military, I fear we will simply see the re-emergence if interservice rivalry.

To conclude, let me once again thank the committee for its invitation. I'd like to compliment the committee—all of you—for the amazing work you have done, and I hope you continue this work. I would just like to point out that the continued relevance, credibility, and affordability of our armed forces is going to require tough choices, but it's not enough for us to keep saying we must make tough choices. We say that all the time; we've been saying it for years. This requires tough choices, and the future is upon us, folks. We have to start making those choices now.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd.

We have Mr. Benoit in the seven-minute round, followed by Mr. Price and Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much, Mr. Rudd. I appreciate your presentation, and I appreciate a lot of the good work your organization does. I've read a lot of it. I'm actually a member of your organization. I attended a meeting, and I will attend more.

What you said about September 11 is absolutely correct in terms of the military and its role in preventing terrorist attacks, but I doubt you could deny that the response asked for from our military as a result of that terrorist attack has had an impact and has shown the demands on our military. In fact, in this very unstable world—and we've seen it become more and more unstable over the last ten years—additional demands will be placed on our military. The government seems to want to respond, and I think the government is under some real pressure to respond to the calls it gets from our NATO allies, and from our great NORAD partner in particular. September 11 has changed things in that regard even though the military is a backup to the first responders—police, firefighters, and so on—here in Canada. There is that great, added need beyond Canada.

• 1625

Near your closing comments, you said the most likely budget scenario sadly won't fill the gaps that even the Auditor General has pointed out. On the other hand, you said you primarily support the interim report the committee did.

Mr. David Rudd: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you aware, Mr. Rudd, that not one single dollar is asked for in this committee report? If you read the recommendations, not one dollar is asked for, but the purpose of this report was to give input to the finance minister for his budget. How in heck are you going to expect any kind of response from the finance minister when nothing is asked for? Anybody who has done any sales knows you're not going to sell anything if you don't ask. This committee should have been doing a sales job to the finance minister, saying the military needs more money. For Pete's sake, our military's short. It's terribly underfunded. As a result, we don't have enough people, we don't have proper equipment, we shouldn't be sending our people into these operations with what they do have, and we can't sustain these operations, yet the committee never asked for a single dollar.

I just want to know how you square that with your call for more money. This document's purpose was to ask the finance minister for more money, but it didn't do it.

Mr. David Rudd: I'm not sure I explicitly called for more money. What I did point out was that two authorities on this matter—the Auditor General and the service chiefs—have articulated a dollar figure. If you're asking me for my personal opinion though, Mr. Benoit, I certainly would like to see more money.

You made a remark with regard to September 11.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It was on the fact that, in responding to terrorism here in Canada, the military plays a backup role to the first responders, but the threat has certainly caused a very large, increased demand for 3,000 troops if the 1,000 that might go into Afghanistan actually do go.

Mr. David Rudd: That's correct.

With regard to that, I hope I'm not the only person who has noticed that we can go after terrorists in many ways. To my knowledge, this is the first time any state or collection of states has waged a conventional war under the rubric of counter-terrorism. When we talk about counter-terrorism, we might talk about spies, special forces, or covert operations, but I don't believe a conventional war has ever been lodged before in order to go after terrorists. In this case, what we're doing is going after their sponsor, the country in which they resided and which would probably never be inclined to give them up, the country that hosts all these bases.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The fact is that this type of response is very likely to continue for some time into the future. The President of the United States, our Prime Minister, and almost all the leaders of various countries make it clear that this is a long-term thing that we're into here.

Mr. David Rudd: Conceivably, but that doesn't necessarily mean overt military action will continue over that entire time. This is a war that's taking place on many levels.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Should we build a military on the wish that this isn't going to expand, or that this type of war won't continue? Or should we build a military on the knowledge that we live in a very unstable world? We don't know exactly what we're going to need our military for, but I think it has certainly been demonstrated once again, even more clearly, that things are more unstable rather than less so.

Mr. David Rudd: I think the priority—and I did say this in my written presentation—is that we have to build a military that gives the Government of Canada options. We have to build a military in which operations can be sustained. My concern is that even small-scale operations cannot be sustained.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Do we need more people in the military?

Mr. David Rudd: Absolutely. There's no doubt about that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Then why would you not be calling for a white paper? The only way we're going to get more people in the military is if we have a new white paper. The only way we're going to get money actually attached to any recommendations in the white paper, to any policy positions in the white paper, is if we attach that money as part of that white paper, like Australia did. We've seen that from the 1994 white paper.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I would ask you not to argue with the witness, but to put questions to the witness.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm certainly not arguing, Mr. Chairman. I'm having a very nice conversation, back and forth.

The Chair: You're not supposed to be having a conversation either. You're supposed to be directing your comments through the chair.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Well, I'm enjoying it.

Mr. David Rudd: I believe that's a non sequitur. We do not need a white paper in order to recognize that we need more folks in the military, and especially in the land force. Perhaps we're having a friendly disagreement and can continue this over a pint of Guinness afterwards.

• 1630

On the last point that you made, you should be calling for more money, my friends, but I think one of the things that's more important than simple dollops of cash is actually a timeline for for the reform of our force structure. One of the things we have not seen in Canadian defence policy over the last few decades.... We see objectives, but the Government of Canada, whatever its political stripe, never assigns itself a period of time in which to complete that reformation or the achievement of those policy objectives. That is an omission that I would like to see covered in the final report, if I could make that pitch.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Rudd. I think it's quite important that we have people coming before this committee when they spend so much time delving into the bottom pits of our armed forces, because they're people who live, breathe, and eat it.

In listening to your comments, I heard some interesting points come up. Like you said, we don't need a white paper. But you also said something else that is very true, and that was that the mission hasn't changed over the years. If we look at it in that sense, yes, but if you look at the report we just put out, we talked about a review. Before we can do a review of our military, we have to do a review of our foreign affairs. That's what drives the military. I think you were at a particular place where we heard a minister—and I forget which minister it was—say the Minister of Foreign Affairs provides the job for the Minister of Defence. Of course, it goes back the other way, too.

I have a couple of other questions, but maybe you could start on that.

Mr. David Rudd: That's fine.

I respect and understand the committee's suggestion that a wholesale review of defence and foreign affairs is necessary. I would also agree—and I'm not sure whether or not it was Mr. Benoit who made this remark—that every few years, it's good to take a couple of steps back and to review what you're doing and how you're doing it, to put your finger on the pulse. Our British cousins, for example, have reviewed their defence policy no fewer than three times since the Berlin Wall came down—three times—and they might be actually undertaking a fourth.

Mr. David Price: I just want to make one comment on it.

They're reviewing it, but it's not a complete review. They're turning over the same one to try to get to the final point. When they did their first review, it was one they hadn't done in many years. All of a sudden, they decided to do a review, but then they found that it wasn't quite what they wanted, so they started rehashing. But there haven't been any major changes in those three—or four, since you say they're working on another one now.

Mr. David Rudd: Does that not prove my point that policy objectives remain the same over the medium term?

I would also suggest—and this did not come out in my verbal presentation, but it's in the bowels of my written presentation, I assure you—that again our foreign policy objectives, as articulated by the Chrétien government, also are very valid. Do they provide adequate direction for defence? They could. We want to foster economic prosperity at home and stability abroad. Well, that's all we might get in terms of specificity, because in my experience, and again regardless of their political stripe, governments like to have a bit of wiggle room. Nothing gives you more wiggle room than making some rather broad policy statements, and that's not necessarily a bad thing.

My fear is that a wholesale review of policy, both foreign and defence, will take probably upwards of 18 months to two years, after Ministers Eggleton and Manley announce them in the House of Commons. In those 18 months to 24 months, much could befall our armed forces.

Let's review the force structure. Let's match the financial means to our enduring objectives. I think that's enough.

• 1635

Mr. David Price: But where we're going now, even without doing that review, we're still talking about doing a restructuring within the forces. You've brought out some good ideas and examples in terms of how we could go about it, but the ideas you brought out really still look very much like long-term ones. They're not really short-term ones. You talked about the land force being restructured for what may be a completely different kind of duty from the one being performed right now. That puts out a picture that we've changed completely, yet we haven't done a review of what we're going to be doing out in the world. That part bothers me, so maybe you could clarify that.

Mr. David Rudd: Of course.

Pick any one of those entrées from the menu that I gave you. Any of those four structures would allow you to fulfill your NATO commitments, which include not simply the defence of allied territory, but the fostering of stability on the peripheries of NATO. Any of those four structures would allow you to carry out your NORAD commitments.

Perhaps New Zealand was not the best example. It has retired its Skyhawk fleet.

Any of those four structures would give you sufficient personnel, or perhaps more personnel in order to take care of duties here at home, be they aid to the civil power, assistance to the civil authority, slinging sandbags, or shovelling snow, if you'll pardon the expression. Any of those four structures would allow the military to do what it has been doing on a macro level for the past ten, fifteen, and even twenty years.

I do take your point, but I do not think the adoption of any of those structural proposals would necessarily leave us open to the criticism that we are no longer able to honour our commitments. In fact, some of the reinvestments might allow us to acquit ourselves even better than we've been doing.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I want to thank you very much for being with us today, Mr. Rudd.

On November 11, a number of people who are in the military came to me and told me that some of the equipment they still have, that they're still using in training and so on, dates back to 1969. I had one officer who came to me and said he had been there seventeen years, but he would not be staying because they needed to have new resources.

Have you read Caught in the Middle, a report brought forward by General Belzile, Colonel Pellerin, and other retired officers?

Mr. David Rudd: I have read this report, yes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Their report is an excellent report. You were saying you don't feel there will be a lot of money for the military in this budget, but probably more for CSIS, the RCMP, or what have you, for security. I'm hoping to see a military budget on December 11. I think it's very important. In the interim report that we did table, we mentioned that more resources are needed, and that we have to make sure we also have more military men and women in uniform.

Around the world, Canada is seen as a country that has always been ready to reach out to areas having problems. We have to be able to do that, so I'm hoping we will see $1 billion put back into the budget for the military. That is what the retired officers have asked for. They've stated we need even more, but at least that would stabilize our military. And we need if for more than one year, of course. But with what has happened since September 11, with the debate we have been having, and given the fact that it has come to the attention of everyone on the Hill—regardless of which side they sit on in the House—our military needs our support.

• 1640

Why do you feel that when the budget is brought down on December 11, it will not be a military budget, but more of a security budget?

Mr. David Rudd: First of all, Mrs. Wayne, I have first-hand experience with the equipment deficiencies you have cited.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I noticed that.

Mr. David Rudd: I could laugh at them in training or while shooting targets, but it was not a laughing matter.

I did not bring these alternative options in front of you because I am a pessimist. Someone said I'm rather cynical for such a young man, but I am not a pessimist. Basically, I believe it's necessary to give this committee, the Government of Canada, all parliamentarians, and Canadians, some options that will see us through if we do in fact keep providing insufficient resources along the lines of what the Auditor General laid out.

Looking at the history of Canadian defence policy, I find our ambitions have been rather modest. They look doable, yet we can't even support the current structure in 2001, with the economy slowing and with pressure to spend elsewhere. The political groundwork has been laid for higher defence spending, partially because of the outstanding work of this committee and its members. But let's say we get $100 million extra per year. That's not going to do it. It will allow us to double the size of Joint Task Force 2 perhaps, or maybe hire some more reservists, but it won't allow us to do all we feel we need to do. It's therefore necessary to have a plan B. My intention was simply to give this committee some suggestions on what a plan B could conceivably look like, but I'd be delighted if the Minister of Finance proves me wrong.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I hope he will prove you wrong on this one, because there is no question about it in the minds of each and every one of us. I think the majority of the people in the House of Commons do feel very strongly that in order to support our military and give them the tools and the numbers to do the job, it is going to mean we have to make strong decisions. The only ones who can speak out for the military are the people who are in the House of Commons—mostly our defence committee members—and people like you. The more we do that...as you know and I know, members of the military cannot say anything.

I was surprised. On November 11, I was very humbled by the comments made at the different events I attended. They were very thankful for the fact that we do speak out for them. They said they need a whole lot more support, and I told them we're having hearings. I can tell you right now that they have tremendous support all across this nation, from different communities and from different organizations.

I appreciate your alternatives, but do you believe the land force can make a significant contribution to allied efforts in Afghanistan while still maintaining the peacekeeping commitments in Bosnia and elsewhere right now?

Mr. David Rudd: No, ma'am, I do not, but let me qualify my remark.

• 1645

When it was announced that there would be a deployment to Afghanistan, I hit the roof. When I came down, I found someone from the National Post asking me what I thought about it. I made a remark with regard to the overstretching of the army. I did that without knowing whether or not this would be an open-ended deployment, or whether or not it would be for six months. I think we could handle a six-month deployment just fine.

To its credit, the government has recognized the overstretching problem and is dealing with it in a very rational manner, in the sense that it is saying we will continue to contribute to national security, and we will take on six-month deployments. It's saying we will promise troops for six months in order to hopefully allow the United Nations or any other organizations to cobble together a force to replace us. We will be the vanguard. That is a very rational way of managing the resource deficit that we're facing.

I believe my concern is shared by this committee. For example, we talk about the army brigade commitment. I believe that with sufficient notice, we could in fact dispatch a brigade to a hot spot in the world and have it acquit itself well. The problem is that we have to attach too many qualifying statements in order to make that commitment credible. We couldn't deploy something in 90 days, let alone 180 days. We haven't trained in that area, and we have deficits on the equipment side. We could do it, but this is where we need to be more specific in our development of our force structure. That is to say, if we say we are able to deploy a brigade, we must add on to that in terms of how much time and how long we are sustaining it for.

The Chair: Mr. Rudd, can I ask you to wind up your answer? We have other members who want to ask questions.

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, I'm finished with that one.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your comments, Mr. Rudd. I think you're being as blunt and straightforward as you can be, given what you have to deal with.

On the second page of your report, you mentioned the defence of North America—and I'll list off a number of questions, and hopefully you can then go at them.

Mr. David Rudd: Certainly.

Mr. Rob Anders: First, given that you're mentioning the defence of North America—and I happen to be in favour of the whole Fortress North America concept—what are your thoughts on ballistic missile defence, especially if the United States says they don't want any money out of Canada on this, just a go-ahead?

You also mention in point 4 of your recommendations—and I get the sense, sir, that you have mentioned this many times...you're not crazy about these recommendations. In your heart of hearts, I think you would like to see billions of dollars put back into national defence in the way they should be, with a return to a glorious future. However, in point 4, you talk about retiring fighter aircraft. A policy balloon, if you will, was fired up a little while ago about actually getting rid of the Snowbirds. I would take it that you're probably a fan of the air force, and that you don't come to that easily. You're just saying this is something we're going to have to stomach, given the measly resources that are given out.

What kinds of resources do you think it would take to keep a seriously viable air force and, for example, to return us to where we were strength-wise when this government took power in 1993, while keeping modern capabilities at the same time? Can you give us a guesstimate of that.

This last question, my third one, ties into that second question. What do you think is a right number in terms of the amount of troops in Canada, both regular force and reserve?

Mr. David Rudd: With regard to ballistic missile defence, what type of missile defence are we talking about? Are we talking about theatre defences, the portable defences that we can take overseas to protect us from the Scud missiles fired by Saddam Hussein? Or are we talking about a national or continental shield?

• 1650

Mr. Rob Anders: For now, I think I'll stick with the continental shield, not something for the Formosa Strait between Taiwan and China.

Mr. David Rudd: Right.

I've done a lot of writing on missile defence. My conclusions were twofold. Despite the major and very numerous weaknesses in the arguments against missile defence—arguments that I don't think have been sufficiently been challenged—I believe ballistic missile defence along the lines of what you're suggesting—the continental shield—is unnecessary.

It's unnecessary for a couple of reasons. Firstly, be they countries or subnational groups who have access to ballistic missile technology, those entities most likely able to get their hands on this stuff and exploit it are the least likely ones who will use it. Conversely, those who might be the most likely to use this technology if they could get it.... Excuse me. Those who are most likely to use it are the least likely to get it. Let me repeat that to make sure it's comprehensible—and I'll use an example.

Mr. Rob Anders: If I may, a nation that has the resources to do it—China, for example—would be less likely to use it than, say, the Taliban, which would have great difficulty in trying to develop it. Is that what you're getting at?

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, that's what I'm getting at.

Mr. Rob Anders: I understand your position, then, with regard to Fortress North America, for example. Does your position change if it moves to theatre missile defence, when you're guarding allies?

Mr. David Rudd: Theatre missile defence is absolutely essential. Absolutely. I don't know that the Canadian Forces have the resources to actually make a contribution to that though, Mr. Anders.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would prefer that we spend our money on the basics. We need new jeeps in a big way. We need new AOR vessels. We need new choppers to replace our Sea Kings. Let's get these things out of the way.

Even though I would say theatre defences are critical in theory, Mr. Anders, I'm not sure we need necessarily to look at them seriously. They are critical because.... Take the example of Taiwan, a democratic, responsible country. Taiwan is a threat to nobody, yet it's a country against which a larger neighbour—one that still has an authoritarian government—threatens to use force. Unless Taiwan actually provoked a fight with China, I cannot conceive of a situation in which the United States, for example, would leave Taiwan undefended. With a democratic, responsible, economic powerhouse, it just wouldn't happen.

The Chair: Mr. Rudd, at the risk of cutting you off in mid-flight, we're over our time for Mr. Anders. I'm going to have to go to Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll continue on a little bit with theatre missile defence.

I wanted to talk a little bit about our NATO commitments. If we look at NATO right now, Europe will have a theatre missile defence system ringing, let's call it Fortress Europe. The study will then be starting very soon—if it hasn't started already—on the next layer. That will be interesting to see. Give me just a quick comment on what you think of the next layer.

Mr. David Rudd: The next layer in Europe?

Mr. David Price: Yes.

Mr. David Rudd: I'm sorry, but I wasn't aware the Europeans have serious plans to go beyond the theatre type of defence.

Mr. David Price: If you had a contract to study the next layer, that's—

Mr. David Rudd: To study the next layer?

Mr. David Price: Yes.

Mr. David Rudd: One can let out as many research contracts as one likes without politicos having to make a decision. I can only idly speculate on that, but I'd prefer not to take up your time by doing so.

Mr. David Price: Okay.

On our NATO commitments—and this brings in theatre missile defence—if we look at them, our commitments to NATO are laid out. We need to have so many people, so many pieces of certain equipment, and so on. That's changeable, and that's what's happening in Europe right now. Our European partners in NATO are specializing. I've talked about this several times before. Certain countries are saying they're going to eliminate a particular part of their forces, and they're going to use their neighbours next door for that particular part. In exchange, they'll do another job for their neighbours. Theatre missile defence actually comes into that. The Dutch, for instance, are building five frigates—one of them is on line now—and those frigates will be strictly for that, with one coming out each year.

• 1655

I guess I'm getting at wanting to hear your thoughts on Canada redoing our commitments to NATO and specializing more in particular needs that we could supply better than others.

Mr. David Rudd: Without turning this into a big academic exercise, what few hairs I have on the back of my neck tend to stand up when someone says we should do what we do best, we should concentrate on what we do best. Ladies and gentlemen, any time that statement is invoked, it infers that we do things poorly. We don't. Some people say Canada has the best peacekeepers, and that's what we do best. Well, we have a long history of being good combat infantrymen as well, and I'm at a loss as to why Canadians pretend otherwise.

I like your suggestion. Again, the budget might push us into that. But who do we consult with when we decide where to specialize? If we do in fact specialize, there's going to be the expectation on the part of our partners that we will bring that capability to the table when they ask for it. If we specialize in strategic air-to-air refuelling for our NATO partners' F-16s, the Government of Canada would have a very tough time if, for a Kosovo II or a Gulf War II, we said we were not going to play. So that's a dicey proposition. But the rhetorical question I have for you is who we would consult with. Who would we fill in for? I don't have an answer for that.

Mr. David Price: I don't have a definitive answer either, but there's no question that the whole setup of commitments for NATO is being looked at right now anyway. Spots are opening up in which one country is saying it will no longer be able to supply this particular commitment, but it will fill up by doing that one. Holes are opening up all around. Granted, we're not at the stage of making that kind of decision, but one thing would be very clear: whatever decision we make, it will be tied to American decisions, because they're too close to us and our commitments would have to interact with theirs. Do you agree with that?

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, and with our treaty commitments to NORAD, for example, unless we're prepared to ditch NORAD—in the wake of September 11, I don't think we are—we're going to keep a fighter capability for quite some time.

Here's a suggestion. Regardless of what the international situation is, Canada and the United States are both going to have to come to terms with the strategic lift challenge. Our European partners are already on the front lines. They were during the Cold War. Kosovo and Macedonia are right next door to them. Strategic lift is an option for them. It is not an option for us, given our geographical position. Perhaps that is one reason why we should take a good, hard look at investing in those capabilities. Those capabilities are like platinum; they're better than gold. My concern, though, is what we have to give up if we try to acquire them on a fixed budget, an inelastic budget.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Rudd, what are your views of Samuel Huntington's theory that conflict is now driven by the clash of cultures, not nations? We have already been caught completely off guard because our thinking structures are international rather than intercultural. Are we in for a major overhaul of our approach to national security because of this?

• 1700

Mr. David Rudd: I think that's a very reasonable assumption. As we know, some have tried to paint the conflict in Afghanistan as a clash between the west and Islam. Whether it is or not might be irrelevant. The perception that it is obliges us to think in different terms. Just to show you I'm not afraid of eating crow, folks, that point alone lends weight to this committee's recommendation for some sort of foreign policy review. In other words, it's not simply what the causes of the conflict are, but how the conflict spreads. It doesn't spread down national lines, for example, like it did during the Second World War. You see various communities gel together, so I think that's something we definitely have to come to terms with, yes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: In watching just exactly what has happened, our current federal security and intelligence has hinged on a so-called community approach to handling the new threats of terrorism. A thinly staffed office within the Privy Council—and it is very small and currently overwhelmed—deals with our response to the unpredictable day-to-day events of the current war on terrorism. How can such a loose structure truly deliver in a time of need like this? What do we do? We're going to have to do something.

Mr. David Rudd: The passage refers to the size of the bureaucracy, saying that because of its small size, we're unable to do that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

Mr. David Rudd: One of the things the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies is going to examine at its seminar in Toronto on December 6—the seminar is called “Fortress North America? What `Perimeter Security' Means for Canada”—is the desirability or the utility of creating either an “office of homeland security” or a superministry that can bring the various security organs—law enforcement, intelligence, armed forces—all together and coordinate their efforts. In other words, some serious bureaucratic reform might have to take place.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Thank you. Since I heard our guest say he didn't mind eating crow, I'm going to ask him to speculate on some of the things happening today.

I haven't been on the committee very long, so my questions are going to probably seem pretty shallow. However, I think it's one thing that we're participating in Afghanistan. You read in the newspapers that the war is almost finished in Afghanistan, and that we have done as much damage as we need to do before moving on. The papers are talking about the prospect that our next target may be Iraq or Somalia. Do you think we follow in all of these just for the sake of going?

Mr. David Rudd: No, we don't follow just for the sake of going. If someone is on his way to hell, you're not going to follow him just out of the sake of fellowship.

We have to be clear on a couple of things here. Firstly, Canada has signed onto a counter-terror effort that is centred on Afghanistan. That has included the waging of a conventional war in order to get at the sponsors of Osama bin Laden and to destroy the infrastructure he depends on in order to carry out his operations. Canadians have been generally supportive of that. I think it might require potentially another atrocity in order for us to do the same—in other words, wage another conventional war for counter-terrorist purposes—for us to actually go along with a similar campaign in Somalia or Iraq. The Americans might have their gunsights on them, but that does not necessarily mean we will go along with the U.S.

• 1705

Lastly, keep in mind that when we say we're going to turn our attention to other countries on the list, it doesn't necessarily mean we're going to call out the armed forces or that we're going to see more air strikes. What it does mean is that the counter-terror effort, which is, again, primarily an intelligence matter, a law enforcement matter, and an accounting matter—show me the money!—will be deployed against these countries. It doesn't necessarily mean the conventional war will be taken on the road.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: However, the United States has really never stopped bombing Iraq, and only three nations still feel the humanitarian sanctions should be kept in place along with the military sanctions, those being Britain, Canada, and the United States.

Mr. David Rudd: And Kuwait.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Well, Kuwait's trading with Iraq. Kuwait's playing a double game. Perhaps that's a careless thing for me to say; however, a lot of evidence within Iraq itself shows that life is going on as usual for the rest of the countries.

If the United States has decided where to next attack in this anti-terrorist war, or that they have some information that...we're saying bin Laden is no longer in Afghanistan. How much evidence do we need before we go in with them and continue bombing Iraq?

Mr. David Rudd: First, with regard to the bombing of Iraq, ma'am, I think the bombing is counterproductive. If I had been in the position to do so, I would have supported the British resolution, which ironically was co-sponsored by the United States back in June. That resolution would have lifted most of the sanctions on Iraq while keeping the military sanctions in place. But I believe the sanctions issue is somewhat different from counter-terrorism. We're not arguing apples to apples here.

But your question was specific. How much information, evidence, or intelligence do we need before we start doing something? Keep in mind that although the United States could conceivably act unilaterally, it has been terribly concerned about international opinion. There's a hypersensitivity to civilian casualties. That's why I think information alone would not constitute grounds, even in Washington's eyes, even in Washington's opinion, for the expansion of the conventional war to include Iraq. I would think there would have to be yet another atrocity in the United States, and then the link would have to be made.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Beaumier, Mr. Rudd.

Ms. Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If the interim paper gets exactly what it asks for in the budget and it is a stagnant budget for defence, one the options in your paper says to “Re-role the Canadian Army into a strategically-mobile light infantry force”, blah, blah, blah. Can you compare and contrast what the army itself would look like in your proposal with how it appears now?

Mr. David Rudd: Certainly. In my fictional proposal, the army would probably be larger than it is right now. Resources that would have gone into, for example, the replacement of the Leopard tank, the M-109 Self-Propelled Howitzer, and various related systems, could go into other things. They could go into making sure the infantry battalions were finally at full strength, because they currently are not.

I'm not trying to suggest to you that our army would be naked in a fight. What it would be able to do is engage in all sorts of operations, from peacekeeping all the way up into combat. On the combat side, though, an army that does not have armour and artillery support would be most useful only in certain terrain conditions. It wouldn't be useful in the flat desert, because there's no natural cover. It would be useful, for example, in the mountains of Kosovo, in the mountains of Afghanistan, or in beating the brush in Sierra Leone in order to try to get those RUF people who are chopping people's limbs off. It would still be a very strategically useful organization.

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What I'm suggesting—

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Are you suggesting something like the Mountain Rangers?

Mr. David Rudd: The Mountain Rangers? I'm not familiar with them.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: The U.S. Rangers.

Mr. David Rudd: The U.S. Rangers are a special forces unit tasked with certain specific jobs.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Is that what you're saying we ought—

Mr. David Rudd: No, ma'am, I'm not saying this is a large special forces operation. This will be a conventionally configured army.

What I'm suggesting is that since we would not face the financial burden of replacing elaborate equipment sets, we would keep that money. I wouldn't want to see it drained off into other programs. The money that you had been intending to spend on replacing those pieces of equipment would be put back into increasing personnel levels and into basics like new jeeps and side arms that don't jam after ten rounds are fired—and believe me, I've been there. We would be able to redirect those resources into giving our new model army the basics that it currently does not have. Once we have done that, the new army would still be very useful for a whole range of operations. We wouldn't be losing out.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: One of the ideas the minister has put forth is expanding JTF2 from its current complement to perhaps 1,000 troops. What are your thoughts on that?

Mr. David Rudd: I would support that, certainly.

I stand to be corrected on this, but my understanding is that JTF2 currently is mostly a hostage rescue organization that only recently has been given conventional field military tasks. I know it was deployed in a strategic reconnaissance task in Kosovo, for example, acting as a forward air controller bringing in the aircraft to hit targets on the ground. This is what the U.S. special forces are doing right now.

I would like to see JTF2 tripled in size, with part of the unit dedicated toward conventional hostage rescue—be it in a building, an aircraft, or whatever—and the rest of it dedicated to the field tasks that we associate with other allied elite formations, such as the British Special Air Service and the U.S. Delta Force.

So, yes, I would certainly support the expansion of that unit. It think JTF2 is a highly useful unit, but I don't think we're quite getting our money's worth.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: I'll continue along in that vein for a little bit.

In most of your scenarios, you talk mostly about land forces. Let's go back to basics here. We're talking about not being able to follow the white paper. We're in another scenario now, in terms of the scenarios that you've presented.

If we look at Canada, we're a huge country. We have a huge amount of sea coast, so we need our navy. I don't think there's any question about that. We have to have something in that area. And we also have a huge amount of air space to cover, so we need an air service.

In your scenarios, you've cut back in some areas, but you haven't mentioned any cutbacks in these areas. Would your feeling be that you would keep them intact as is, or should they be reinforced more? I then go along the line that I was talking about before, that being to reinforce those particular areas more so that we can service our commitments.

Mr. David Rudd: In force option 3, I believe I did make some remarks regarding the “restructuring” of the air force and the navy.

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Again, keeping in mind that a stagnant budget may require us to look at where we should make investments, I think it's reasonable that we devote much more attention to the land force. If this requires taking some resources from the other two services, I think that's something we can do without jeopardizing our treaty commitments.

To answer your question and Mr. Anders' second question about how big an air force we need and how many fighters we need, post-September 11, I'd say we need more than we otherwise might have needed. Eighty fighters would not be a bad number, but we could probably make do with sixty. This would allow us not only the training squadron, but two squadrons for home defence and one squadron for expeditionary capabilities. The personnel and financial resources that are freed up by that could conceivably be thrown into strategic airlift.

On the navy side, I appreciate the desire of the navy to maintain its ability to deploy a task group—that is to say, a formation of three or four ships under Canadian command. I appreciate that very much. It's like deploying at the brigade level. If you go below that, you're lost in the political shuffle.

I believe we could do that and still perhaps safely retire the four air defence vessels. The command and control equipment on the four air defence vessels could probably be grafted onto the frigates, and the personnel and the financial resources saved from the retirement of those vessels could jump-start the program to replace the support vessels.

I may be on very thin ice in advocating decreased capabilities in those two services. My suggestion stems from the fact—and I believe it is a fact—that when Canadians ask themselves why Canada is spending money on defence and what's in it for them, well, their homes and their families are in it for them. Recently, those who have come to their rescue are really the land forces, such as in the floods and whatnot. And we have also gotten much use out of our land forces overseas—and that's not to denigrate the contributions made by the other two services, which are arguably where our combat capabilities lies right now.

Again, if you want to adopt a joint approach, we might be able to shave the air force and the navy ice cube just a little bit more in order to free up resources for the land force, which desperately needs those resources. But if this is a defence budget, as Mrs. Wayne has suggested, then that precludes the need to do so.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I just have one question, Mr. Chair.

When you get young people into the cadets, they usually move on to the reserves, and some go on to be part of the military. Do you not agree that it is important that in all our communities across this nation, we continue to grow with our numbers, starting in cadets and in the reserves, and finally in the military, because it is a certain quality of life? You've been there. You know the training is wonderful. I see a lot of little lost souls in the community. If we could reach out and if we could increase the number of people who are involved, starting with cadets, then we could turn a lot of those lives around. We truly could.

I don't know if they did it in every community, Mr. Chair, but the Department of Veterans Affairs had a candlelight service in Saint John on the day before November 11. We brought the cadets. We had 350 cadets from the region who came. We took them into the Imperial Theatre, which is right next to King's Square, and we had a colonel speak to them. The questions those young people had with regard to Afghanistan and what's happening were just heart-wrenching. It truly was. So I think it's very important, and I'd like to have your opinion of what you think we should be doing with our young people in that way.

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Mr. David Rudd: As an ex-sea cadet, petty officer second class, I can vouch for the value of the cadet movement. I would like to also point out that the value of the cadets and the reserve forces in our urban areas—those areas in which the Canadian population is concentrated—is absolutely critical to the future of the armed forces.

I do appreciate your remark with regard to lost souls. Cadets does offer a certain degree of structure and predictability, while also—and I can't emphasize this enough, ladies and gentlemen—helping to cultivate leaders. Again, if we had to make a decision between kit and retaining people, I would retain the people not simply because the missions we are currently undertaking require it, but because we need to cultivate good leaders not only in the armed forces, but for those who will leave the armed forces after their term is over. They will be corporate leaders, civil servants, and simply community leaders. The cadet movement is a method of reinforcing citizenship in a country with precious few opportunities to do so.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Just to continue on a little bit with what we were talking about before, particularly on the navy side, you were talking about eliminating some of the equipment we have. If we're going to do that, we still have to keep bringing new equipment on line.

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, absolutely.

Mr. David Price: In that case, should we be looking at equipment in terms of roll-on/roll-off equipment, such as what the Dutch just built with their command and control centre and their roll-on/roll-off unit? Also, the three supply ships are our big need. They are a multi-functional type of equipment.

Mr. David Rudd: I'm not advocating cuts simply made willy-nilly. If I advocate a cut, I do so only because the resources should be redirected to other endeavours.

In the case of the navy, I suggest it is possible—whether or not it's desirable, I will leave that up to other people—to transfer those personnel resources—the sailors and the money used to operate and maintain those four air defence vessels—to build a strategic sealift capability. Secondly, we can probably use a few of those sailors to crew the twelve frigates we will still have. That will still allow us to maintain treaty commitments. But I'm not simply advocating cuts and that's all. They're cuts to free up resources that can be reinvested.

If I could just add a rejoinder to that, I'm really saddened by our failure as a nation to do precisely that. Successive governments, again regardless of their political stripe, have been unable to resist the temptation to pocket money that is freed up when cuts are made. It's my hope that this practice will cease, especially now, because it brings no credit on this country.

Mr. David Price: We bring up the Sea King. We look at the original replacement, the mission system it had in it, and what it was designed for. It was basically for subsurface searches. The mission system was the most expensive part of the system that was going to be put into it. Is that type of mission system still required today on all of the Sea King replacements we order, or should it be more modular so that we're able to move back and forth from one unit to another? Do you know what I mean?

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, I know exactly what you mean, but I think that requires a level of knowledge I'm really not sure I have. I will say, however, that—

Mr. David Price: Just give me something on the strategic side, as far as the general role of the replacement is concerned.

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Mr. David Rudd: The role of the replacement should retain some degree of subsurface search capability and surface search capability. It also must have sufficient supplementary power and payload to function as either a troop or cargo transport in order to support our troops ashore.

Mr. David Price: In other words, it has to be a multi-functional unit.

Mr. David Rudd: Very multi-functional, yes.

Mr. David Price: Therefore, can we say modular would probably be the nicest way to go because it makes them multi-functional?

Mr. David Rudd: It's conceivable. If, by “modular”, you mean an arrangement whereby we can remove the electronic guts in the back and make room for cargo, yes, I think that would be a great idea. Whether or not industry can actually satisfy that requirement, I have no idea.

Unlike our American allies, we have to buy one helicopter and use it for everything, whereas they can buy ten helicopters for ten different jobs. If industry can read the requirements of not only Canada, but so many other countries thinking as we do, I hope it will find a way to satisfy that requirement. Otherwise, it's not doing its job.

Mr. David Price: Do I have any more time?

The Chair: You still have 45 seconds.

Mr. David Price: What are your thoughts on the interoperability of the Warsaw Pact countries trying to move into NATO. Will their equipment be interoperable with NATO equipment? That's a large question.

Mr. David Rudd: Yes, it is a large question.

I think the most important question is political, not military. For very good reasons, countries are invited into NATO once they meet certain performance criteria. Those criteria are political ones, such as the settlement of any outstanding border disputes, firm civilian control of the military, and a constitutional, liberal-democratic style of government. Once those are satisfied, we can talk about kit issues.

The most important interoperability issue has nothing to do with equipment. It has everything to do with learning English.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Rudd.

Mr. Anders, you're on a three-minute round at this point.

Mr. Rob Anders: I knew you wanted to get back to me, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to follow up with the third question, because I think Mr. Rudd dealt with the air force. He talked about having eighty fighters, which I think is a good number. Two squadrons is fair enough. He might want to touch on the second question just in terms of laying out a ballpark figure for what's needed or what it would take to do the right thing. That was part of my second question.

The third question that I asked before was on specific troop numbers. Since he was involved with cadets and whatnot, maybe he could comment on not just the regular force, but the reserves as well.

Mr. David Price: Objectively, I don't think there is any right troop level. Our problem is that we seem to be writing cheques that we can't cash. We do not have enough troops to sustain all the missions we want to undertake. If, for example, we went back up to 60,000 or 65,000, that wouldn't necessarily solve the problem. As you know, we might then be tempted to continue to write cheques we have trouble cashing.

The important things are that our rhetoric matches our resources, and that the commitments that we do freely undertake can in fact be sustained. Therefore, the first answer is not necessarily more troops. The first answer is a recognition by the current government and all future governments that there is a line over which we cannot cross.

I would like to give you a figure, but as I said earlier, if we get some more money, let's buy the basics. If we get some more money, let's just get ourselves back to 60,000, and then we'll go from there.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Rudd, I respect what you're talking about in terms of a line we don't cross. Maybe you want to make it inflation-proof or something like that. I realize it was 78,000 once upon a time. Some people have talked about 75,000. I would love 100,000. What do you think about tying it to GDP, for example? Some of the other NATO countries, for example, have much more of a contribution for their armed forces than we do.

• 1730

Mr. David Rudd: I'm not sure that would help. Again, there is no objective level of defence spending in Canada, or any objective troop level. And by “objective”, I'm not talking about a goal, I'm talking about a level at which everybody will be satisfied. The dissatisfaction doesn't stem from the fact that we spend very little as a percentage of GDP. Most Canadians think it's probably about right. The dissatisfaction lies, and should lie, in the fact that our ambitions outstrip our resources.

What I would therefore suggest is that we should simply make good on the shortfalls. After that, we can decide where we want to go. I say that knowing that if we do in fact make good on those shortfalls, our ambitions might simply be inflated as a result, and we might then be back in the same boat.

I'm sorry, Rob, I'm not trying to be evasive by not giving you numbers and whatnot. I just don't think any numbers can be given, except those that have been given by the Auditor General.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, thank you very much.

Mr. Rudd, on behalf of the entire committee, I'd like to thank you for being here today. We got off to a bit of a slow start, for which I apologize, but I think we had a good exchange of views and questions. We'll certainly take your comments into account in terms of our final report.

Mr. David Rudd: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.