NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 30, 2002

¹

1535

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.))

Professor Joel Sokolsky (Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada)

¹

1540

¹

1545

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville--Musquodoboit Valley--Eastern Shore, NDP)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

¹

1550

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Claude Bachand

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

¹

1555

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1600

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.)

º

1605

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1610

Mr. Claude Bachand

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Larry Bagnell

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1615

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

º

1620

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

º

1625

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1630

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. Leon Benoit

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

º

1635

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1640

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. John O'Reilly

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. John O'Reilly

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. John O'Reilly

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. John O'Reilly

º

1645

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. John O'Reilly

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1650

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

º

1655

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. John O'Reilly

Mr. Larry Bagnell

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Prof. Joel Sokolsky

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

---

NUMBER 052

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 30, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Tuesday night fights. Sorry, it's not Tuesday night fights, is it?

    I'd like to welcome Dr. Sokolsky.

    Our regular procedure here is a little opening, and then we'll get right to the questions. I'd just like to let everybody know that the doctor does have to leave at five o'clock today because he has to go out front and hitchhike all the way back down to Kingston. He is taking the train. So we'll see if we can get things through as fast as possible and get all the information we can possibly get out of him, and then let him go freely.

    We'll start off, Doctor, if you would give your opening remarks.

    Professor Joel Sokolsky (Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of Canada): Thank you, and thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee.

    The committee is looking into the state of readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces. I know you've heard from many expert witnesses about the details of the readiness of the armed forces. What I'd like to do today is to provide some perspective basically on what we should be ready for and how one measures this.

    In general, there's no doubt that the Canadian Armed Forces has a long list of needs in terms of military equipment. The Auditor General has pointed this out. It's been pointed out in numerous reports for the committee and in studies. I begin from the premise that I think it's realistic that the armed forces are not going to get most of what they say they need on that list of equipment. Defence spending is not going to go up dramatically over the next few years, although spending on national security may well go up in other areas.

    I'm not sure that is a situation that's going to necessarily be critical to Canadian national security. The reason is that no armed force is ready for all the contingencies that might confront it. Every government in the western world, with the possible exception of the United States government, has to make choices in terms of the equipment it buys, in terms of the scenarios it plans for. We will be ready for some things and we won't be ready for other things.

    At the same time, given the nature of the international strategic environment, there will be no shortage of places where the Canadian Forces will be able to make a contribution, despite the difficult state that parts of the armed forces posture are in. We are already making contributions to about 13 different missions around the world.

    As you conclude your study, I think it's worth reflecting on what we don't have, but also on what we do have and how well we're managing to leverage a small but a sophisticated armed force to further Canadian interests. Here I begin from the premise that the current international security environment is dominated by the United States and its national security agenda, which now is its war on terrorism.

    The most important fact in terms of what we get ready for is to recognize the overriding reality of the well-founded sense of vulnerability Americans now feel in terms of their security, and also the link between homeland security for the United States and its activities overseas. For no other country is this as important as it is for Canada. For this reason, I suggest that the core of our policy, the core of what we're ready for, has to be cooperation with the United States. It simply recognizes the reality of the present international environment. It's an uncertain environment in terms of the threat, but for Canada there are some certainties with regard to American perceptions of the threat and of its vulnerability.

    In some sense, for Canada this is a familiar world. Things have changed since September 11, but to the extent that the United States is now leading a global effort for its own national security interest, to the extent that it is enlisting allies to support that, to the extent that it defines the threat in global terms, even talking about the global terrorism threat and talking about a long twilight struggle similar to the Cold War, we have experience in dealing with relations with the United States in this context. For Canada, since 1945, it was the global character of America's Cold War policies that shaped Canadian defence policy, including our relations in North America.

    If the United States had not taken a leadership role in the Cold War and if it had not sought to extend its deterrent, then the defence of North America would not have been as important for Canada. We have been drawn into a global effort.

    In some sense this is actually more ambitious than the Cold War. We're not talking about containment here. The United States is talking about what used to be called rollback: it's seeking to roll back regimes and groups that threaten it. In this context, bearing in mind the deficiencies in many parts of the Canadian Armed Forces, the present defence policy of the government and the posture of the armed forces are largely conducive to current trends in the international security environment, with all their uncertainties. To the extent we are able to spend as much as we can on defence, we are ready for the likely scenarios we will be faced with.

    There will, as I say, be an infinite number of places in which the Canadian Forces may be able to contribute. The problem for the government in the coming years will be not to decide where to go but to decide which missions not to take on because of scarce resources.

    The reason we are well suited to coping with the environment despite deficiencies, particularly in readiness, is that we are drawing on half a century of close strategic cooperation with the United States. In some sense we and not they are in a better position to think in terms of continental defence. For the United States, the defence of the United States was always a strategic backwater, and we have been more focused on it than they have. In some ways we're better organized for it in terms of the emphasis on homeland defence.

    Second, since 1945 we have always moved out from North America to defend North America...developed through NATO and other coalition efforts, mainly under American leadership. As you know, the government Strategy 2020, which was brought out several years ago, made interoperability a central feature of defence policy, and as is evident now in Afghanistan, this was a wise decision. To the extent we emphasize this, again, the armed forces are ready.

    Third, while the Canadian Forces could use greater resources and more sophisticated equipment given the nature of the security environment, particularly the revolution in military affairs, to a certain extent our ability to participate in the full spectrum of operations will be limited by our capabilities and our lack of capabilities in some areas. This is something we share with many other allies in terms of not being able to keep up in all areas.

    However, I think it is worth noting that in a world of failed states in regional crises, the response requires a mixture of both high and low technology. Predictions about future conflict run from the least likely large-scale conventional clashes of RMA-equipped forces to the more plausible limited operations in a variety of combat environments. Even in limited operations the sophisticated communications of the RMA will be applicable.

    But as we now see in Afghanistan, armed forces will not just be used for combat. They will be used for a range of activities, and this applies not just to our own. The Americans also employ their armed forces in a range of combat activities. When we say that we are not ready for high-intensity warfare, that's true, but are we ready for a range of other activities that are going on all over the world? We are, but there is no country that is ready for every scenario.

    Also, I think that an important part of the readiness of the Canadian Forces has to do with whether or not there is support for what they do in terms of broader public opinion. Here the last decade has shown remarkably consistent support for the activities of the armed forces overseas, including and especially in the last campaign, as testified to by the overwhelming sorrow and pride over the tragic death of four Canadians in Afghanistan. It is a permissive public opinion environment in which the government and the Canadian Forces can participate in a range of activities.

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    If this were ever true in the past, it is all the more so for Canada today, given the uncertain nature of the international strategic environment. Realism in national security policy begins at home. And by this I mean not just the physical North America, but that in terms of an existential home security, relations with the United States must form the core of our defence policy both at home in terms of the homeland and overseas, and we must build out from there.

    In this ability, in meeting this core need, the Canadian Forces will, as I've said, not be able to participate in a full range of activities, but it's not the policy of the United States government to demand that its allies participate in the full range of activities the American forces are capable of. It's the policy of the United States government to seek out coalition partners to make contributions where and when they can. The more high-intensity the combat, the less likely other allies will be able to contribute, although at sea we are considered one of the high-end allies, given the interoperability of our surface ships with American forces.

    The United States is looking for partners in a range of activities, so we say we are not ready for everything but we are ready to make contributions in certain areas. We have to remember that for the United States, allied contributions are meant to serve a political purpose, to legitimate the operation in the eyes of the world and to garner support in Congress. To my knowledge, no Canadian unit has ever been sent home from an operation. The United States will find a niche for it.

    What this means is that while I think the committee will and should recommend areas of increased readiness, a failure to achieve the entire spectrum of readiness that we need will not undermine the ability of the armed forces to serve the interests of Canada. In particular we have a deficiency in the area of overseas deployment, but the Canadian Forces are not Federal Express, they do not absolutely, positively have to be there overnight. The way these operations are constructed, coalitions are built, and those forces that can get there quickly do, and others will come later.

    So my message is that in assessing the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces you have to assess it against likely scenarios and political realities, not scenarios of combat, for which few countries are capable. We are one of the few countries still capable of projecting force outside our own continent and one of the few that do. This is not easy, and it is not going to get easier, but there will be roles and niches for the Canadian Forces.

    Thank you.

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    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much, Professor.

    Before we get to the questions, I do have a couple of announcements, because I know some people might end up leaving a little early. So I would like to go through those now.

    The draft report: researchers have been working very hard, extra hard, from what I hear and from the number of pages, and we are going to be busy. It was sent today to translation, so it's going to be ready next Monday. We will have the report available, and we will have our first meeting on Tuesday afternoon; our second meeting on Wednesday from 3:30 to 5:30 and in the evening from six to nine if necessary, and we could follow up on Thursday if we aren't finished by then.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Mr. Chair, will you be faxing that information on--

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Yes, the details will go to your office. We start on Tuesday afternoon at our regular time and follow through Wednesday. Wednesday will be the special when we'll go from 3:30 to 5:30 and from six to nine, and Thursday if necessary.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): When do we get a draft report?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I just said Monday. So we will be going through it together. It has to go to translation. That is being done today.

    Peter?

    Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville--Musquodoboit Valley--Eastern Shore, NDP): As I mentioned to Mr. Pratt, as I am gone on Sunday for 12 days with the Princess Patricias, I was hoping to seek unanimous consent from the committee to have an advance copy so that I may be able to offer any opinions or recommendations before I go.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): You know the rules; we cannot put it out until it is done in both official languages. Sorry, Peter.

    The other announcement I had to make was that next week, at the request of the Swedish delegation, there will be a round-table meeting on Thursday, May 9, from 9:30 to 11. The delegation's interested in discussing with us the committee's role in the development of Canadian defence policy. And we'll send a note to all the offices on that. This is just advance notice.

    So we will get back to the regular run of things, and we will start off with you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: You can go to the next person and come back to me. I came in late.

[Translation]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Mr. Sokolsky, I have seen your CV. I see that you are a specialist not only in national defence but also in international relations.

    As I am sure you know, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are starting to talk about a review of Canada's foreign affairs and national defence policy. At the same time, there are a number of events that are currently happening. Some of them are old matters, such as Canada's participation in NORAD. This is something that has existed for quite some time.

    However, the Americans are now talking about a unified command, and you are talking about extensive interoperability. Furthermore, we have heard much said about this matter. I must remind you that interoperability is something that can be achieved more easily in the case of the Navy, but that this also exists in the Army and Air Force.

    You said earlier that Canada could project its power outside the country. There are many people who question that. When we decide to send people to Afghanistan, we have to wait for the Americans to have space on their aircraft to take them there. The last time, it became obvious that we could not take people there with the equipment that we have.

    This is my question. Given this whole question of interoperability, unified command and Norad, and Canada's inability to project its own power itself in theatres of operation, do you think that Canadian sovereignty is jeopardized by all the concepts that I have just raised?

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I will start in French.

    No, because the decision to participate is a decision of the Government of Canada. This is also the case for other United States allies. The situation is the same in NATO: there is a US military commander in Europe and in Asia.

[English]

    For most allies, this is the situation for us. There are two things. The Northern Command is something new. It's a combatant command, consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to create a single command. We make a sovereign decision to participate and send the forces we want to send. Having done that, we accept the fact they will fall under the operational command of an American officer, for the purpose of prosecuting the operation.

    That is what we have been doing in NATO since 1950, when they set up the unified commands. However, there is no question that these operations will be run according to American policy. They wouldn't be running if the United States wasn't running them. It's not as if some other country would be fighting the war on terrorism for us.

    Do we sacrifice our sovereignty? Once we participate, the scope for independent policy on specific issues may be limited.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: That is the next part of my question. You say that sovereignty is protected because the decision to participate or not is up to Canada. I understand that. Now, you admit that once the troops have been deployed under US command, it is the Americans who decide how to proceed.

    However, what do we do with major international treaties such as the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty if the US Army, in Afghanistan, decides to lay anti-personnel mines? What do we do at that point? It seems to me that there is a grey area here. I am not sure that Canada would get to have its say if ever it were decided...

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I agree. There is also a problem regarding the International Court.

[English]

     the International Court; the Americans don't feel they are bound by it.

    These are questions we will confront when we operate with the United States. They are unavoidable. C'était la même question pour la guerre du Kosovo. The International Criminal Court and Carla Daponte looked at NATO for 11 months in deciding whether she was going to charge them with war crimes. These are things we have to accept.

    I am not trying to flatter the committee, but what I can say is that when we do these things, continual political oversight is important. It is important that the public understands, so that it suddenly does not discover two months later that they have laid the landmines. The worst thing that can happen is where you look like you are hiding something. If it feels that they are laying the landmines, then the Canadian Forces do not participate.

    C'est la même chose pour le Royaume-Uni, pour la France et pour l'Allemagne. All of them have signed the landmines convention. So we are not alone with these problems. Any participation in any coalition effort limits the choices that governments are going to have, unless they do not want to participate. I think this is accepted.

    I will just add one thing. For the United States too, participation in a coalition causes problems for them. Congress is always watching to make sure that American interests are not compromised.

    There is no way to get around it. It requires political oversight. But since we share the goals, then I think it is something that we are going to have to accept.

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[Translation]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Okay. Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Benoit

[English]

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Welcome, Mr. Sokolsky. It is good to have you here this afternoon.

    I want to ask some questions about NORTHCOM, the Northern Command. It is kind of in conjunction with NORAD, and missile defence, which the U.S. government has indicated is still on the table. They still intend to implement it. Canada will have an opportunity to take part, if we choose to.

    The Americans have said that they are going to implement this Northern Command by sometime in October, with or without Canada. They have said that if Canada wants to take part, they would like an answer at least indicating an interest by the middle of May.

    I will get into some more questions later. But first, on the issue of NORTHCOM itself, some people have said that if Canada becomes involved we will lose sovereignty. I guess some people then would have to say that Canada being in NORAD has caused us to lose sovereignty. I would like your comments on that.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: The late John Holmes used to say that the institutionalization of bilateral relations was in Canada's favour because it disciplined unequal forces--you created a structure. Others say that being a partner is like being a powder monkey, that it's just integrationally....

    In terms of NORAD, I think it gave us a larger role than we would have had. In fact, I find that most Americans do not realize that sometimes there is a Canadian in charge of American forces in the United States. It is the only ally in that position.

    When NATO sent its AWAC planes over after September 11, CNN announced that it was the first time foreign forces had protected the United States. Of course, that was forty years out of date.

    To that extent, I do not think there is a general compromise on sovereignty.

    In terms of NORTHCOM, it is a U.S. command. It is a combat command under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. So there is no place for Canada. It is like CENTCOM: there is a central command.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Just on that, have they precluded the idea of Canada having second in command ---

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I doubt whether U.S. law would allow it. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is a combatant command reporting directly to the national command authority, which is the Secretary of Defense and the President. It doesn't go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: And the Americans can't change that?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It's in the law.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: But the Americans can change the law.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, you have to change Goldwater-Nichols, and I don't think the Americans are in a mood right now to put anybody in charge of the United States. I think what they would ask is what we want to do.

    There are precedents for all of this. We have 60 officers down in Tampa with CENTCOM. You could have the same arrangement with NORTHCOM, where you have a large liaison staff. Forces are allocated to the combatant commanders by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when that decision is made. You may have a maritime component that looks a lot like the Atlantic fleet, and it would have the same relations. The Pacific Command is not getting its forces to NORTHCOM until it is asked. That is why Alaska is still with the Pacific Command.

    I read the transcript of the press conference with Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and Steve Cambone, and they were pretty vague on a lot of this. I think we have to express our interest and see where it is going. It may be that it won't require that.

    The interesting thing for us is that the combatant commander for SPACECOM was dual-hatted as NORAD commander. He's no longer SPACECOM commander. He's NORAD and NORTHCOM. The implication of that may be that space and missile defence may stay with SPACECOM. They may integrate that with Strategic Command, in which case NORAD won't have a BMD role, which is not clear, because that would be the natural role for that command. I think the Americans are working it out.

    You also know that they have taken away the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, and the allies don't know what that means. They have a real problem, because that would mean the separation of NATO from Europe.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: So there are a lot of unanswered questions and a lot of uncertainty.

    Isn't it better for Canada to be in on the discussions as the Americans try to sort this out? Aren't we far more likely to protect our sovereignty by being involved as much as we can in the discussions, rather than letting the Americans put this net over our country, along with their own, under NORTHCOM?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think discussions have already taken place. They will make their decisions. They will get Canadian representation, as they are getting allied representation, on the SACLANT issue.

    The role of the combatant commander is to command forces in geographic regions given to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to shape relations with countries in the region. So the commander of EUROCOM now has Russia, but he is not commanding Russian forces.

    One of the advantages I see for us here, and we could play it, is the lack of having one person in the U.S. military command structure deal with Canada overall. We dealt with the navy on maritime issues and with the army because there was not a maritime defence, and on the aerospace issues we dealt with the commander of NORAD.

    The CINCs in the U.S. system are not only the commanders, they are the champions for the countries over which they have certain responsibilities within the Washington bureaucracy. So this may help us. We already know General Eberhart. I am almost certain that they are getting from Canada an interest in what is going on.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: The resistance to NORTHCOM seems to be sovereignty. Again, even if Canada does not get a second-in-command role in NORTHCOM, which you say is unlikely, would being involved on a daily basis with what's going on in fact put us in a better position than not having that?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Many parts of the U.S. military do not think about Canada. If we're at the table, our voice is heard, and I think that is something.

    Remember as well that NORTHCOM is dealing with a lot of other things, such as the relations with civil authorities in the event of emergencies. NORTHCOM will have to deal with a whole range of things. In some ways we're in a better position, because our regional military commanders already have that responsibility in the event of civil emergencies.

    I don't worry about the sovereignty, because we just have to do it. We're the only people who can undermine our own sovereignty on this issue. They are waiting to hear from us. They'll take decisions according to their self-interest. But to the extent that NORTHCOM focuses U.S. attention on relations with Canada.... Some people get nervous over that, but I get nervous when they start doing things when we're not on their radar screen.

     Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much.

    Mr. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.): Thank you, Professor. I enjoyed it. I think I agreed with almost everything you said, except perhaps that the defence money would not increase dramatically over the next few years. I think it depends on what context you take that in. But if you take it in the context of many other things whose funding has been zero or gone down, all those other areas would be quite jealous of what they would consider a dramatic increase in defence funding.

    I am going to ask one question this round. I have some questions on RMC. You can make a long answer and use all the time. It is related to command structure. Following Mr. Benoit's question, feel free to say anything more related to command structure in general.

    To start off the question, as you know, Lloyd Axworthy was shepherding Professor Michael Byers around Ottawa last weekend. Professor Byers' paper and press release suggested about a dozen areas that Canada should consider carefully and work out policy on, before we joined in integrating command. You mentioned two of them already--the international court and landmines. I am sure you are probably familiar with this, but if you want to try to remember the rest of them.... Would you like to comment at any length on that? And if you run out, talk about Northern Command.

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: He had a range of things--gays and lesbians in the military, women. He talked about the environment. I think that some of it was confusion about the difference between operational command and command.

    Operational command is when you command forces for a specific purpose for a specific time--forces that are given to the operational commander. For example, when the Canadian admiral commands the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, American forces are under his operational command. All allies recognize that ultimately the final authority for their forces, whether or not they're serving under operational command, is their national government. If they are asked to do something or undertake something that is in conflict with their national policy, the national policy prevails. All allies have two phones--one to the commander, one to the national government. If Canadian forces are asked to do something that is in conflict with policy, they would have the opportunity to go back.

    We have to see what Northern Command.... Let me make a suggestion, since you mention Northern Command. I would suggest that in our liaison office at Northern Command we should have a foreign service officer representing the Department of Foreign Affairs or somebody from the assistant deputy minister for policy.

    All American commanders-in-chief have U.S. foreign service officers as advisers to advise them on U.S. foreign policy as they undertake their military activities. It would be in our national interest for the commander of Northern Command to have in the Canadian liaison office a Canadian foreign service officer to advise him, particularly to give him another voice. The military may say “Ready, aye ready, yes, let's do this”, but he has to hear perhaps from a Canadian foreign service officer that this is not exactly the policy of the Canadian government or there may be problems there.

    It is not disrespect for the military. It is not saying the military won't give them. If the U.S. commander-in-chief can have foreign service officers as advisers, we should have foreign service officers with our military liaison staff, so that the commander-in-chief gets a full spectrum of Canadian opinion. On the issues that Mr. Byers brought out, it would be precisely those issues that he could bring to his attention. You could see a relationship where the CINC has his foreign service officer and we in our liaison office have ours, and the two can talk to each other.

    We should have had one in NORAD for years. I think it would have avoided a lot of problems. Yes, there are going to be these clashes, but very often the CINC doesn't know that this is a problem in Canada because nobody is telling him.

    I would recommend to the government that it have somebody from the political side--the non-uniformed side--with the office to advise them that this is the way things are done. Even for something simple.... Let's say you want to have the northern commander approach the Canadian political officer about having an exercise in Quebec. We could remind the CINC that English is not the predominant language in Quebec. Americans do not always know a lot about Canada.

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    Mr. Claude Bachand: We are also very sensitive about armies invading.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It's true. The American CINCs are used to this. They are really political generals.

    Mr. Larry Bagnell: Okay. I have a second quick question.

    Sometimes some Americans do not agree to our sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Could you comment on it, please?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: They do not recognize the passage as Canadian sovereign territory. There was an agreement, though, I think during the Mulroney government, that they would give pre-notice of the transit of ships. I do not think the issue has been settled. I do not think it will be settled with Northern Command. However, it would be something we would want to bring up with them in the context of Northern Command.

    You could tell the CINC he is responsible for shaping relations with Canada now. Remind him of the issue that is on the table. “We are not getting any support from the U.S. Navy on this. You are not in the navy. Can you help us out here? It would go a long way to support your position and standing in Canada if the government resolved this.”

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much.

    Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you. Actually, it was my question. I was going to ask if there is American recognition of our Northwest Passage.

    Do any other countries recognize the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: For a while the Soviet Union did. It was a problem. I do not know whether others recognize the Canadian claim at the moment.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, you said something very important, I think--that any operations will run as per American policy.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: We are involved, for example, in Afghanistan. It is basically the result of American policy. Is that correct?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. I wanted to clarify it.

    Does national missile defence, or the pretext of NMD and what it all means, accelerate the arms race in the world?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It would only happen if the government of Russia regards the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in a way that would encourage it to build up its own arsenal.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: What about China?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I think, in the case of China, they will be dissatisfied with it. I don't think it will engage in a crash program of missile building as a result of the BMD system.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Today, on the American sites, they are indicating Russia will be given command. It's not EUROCOM. I forget what the actual call is. In their area, they will actually be given control of the command.

    What I am concerned about, of course, is the political situation in Russia is not always the greatest. They are not the greatest friends with China. China and the United States are looking at each other with a jaundiced view in many cases.

    My concern is, and a lot of people have been asking about it, the acceleration of the arms race will be a result of the NMD. Are you not convinced it will be?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: No. I think the states that were going to build missiles would build them in any case. I am not convinced China would engage in a crash program. I am also not convinced NMD is going to do what it is supposed to do.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Right.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It is more of a reassurance policy for Americans. It is the least likely threat against the United States. I believe, had the events of September 11 not happened, there would have been enough support within the democratically controlled Senate of the United States to end or delay the program.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: In the summary we have, you indicate that while Washington encourages and welcomes Canadian maritime contributions, such contributions, however tactically and operationally useful in a particular venture, are unlikely to afford Ottawa a greater voice or leverage in larger political or strategic decisions.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: What precisely do you mean by it?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I mean that the United States sets its national security strategy and discusses it with allies, but ultimately makes its own decisions, particularly in the current context.

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    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Understandably.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: While I believe we should build up our forces, we can't expect that whatever we can build is going to give us greater influence over these larger questions the United States undertakes in its national security.

    If you look at who influences the President, in the inner circle are his closest advisers, beyond that is the bureaucracy and Congress, and way out in ring nine may be foreign governments. So we're not alone here in terms of influence.

    What I'm saying is you can't believe that deploying the PPCLI to Afghanistan is going to give us great influence over American policy in the region. You have to believe in the overall objectives of the activity and believe it's in our interest for the Americans to do this. But actual leverage over presidential policy isn't something I think we can expect for the contribution.

    If the contribution isn't there, that is noticed. It's hard to say whether we pay a penalty. I have looked at a U.S. assessment on who is contributing now, and we're right up there. We're pretty good. At the same time, when it comes to softwood lumber and things like that, it doesn't necessarily matter.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: You've just brought linkage into the discussion. You said we would pay a penalty. What do you mean by that? Is it economic pressure? Say we basically told the United States, “Take your NMD and shove it where the sun don't shine and don't put your radar sites on our property. We want nothing to do with you. We want to form our own international policy with our other allies. To hell with you.” What would that mean to us economically?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: On economic issues, there are very specific interest groups in the United States.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: But you said we'd pay a penalty.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: We'd pay a penalty in terms of our defence relations, access to intelligence, access to senior members of the United States administration, and our standing. However, I'd also say that on NMD in particular, our European allies who may oppose NMD will not go down with us. That is to say, we're on our own. Canadians often feel if we can only get closer to the Europeans in opposing the Americans.... Europeans aren't in great favour with the U.S. government today, except for Britain, which may not be European.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: This is my last question for you, sir. You talked about landmines and other concerns. If we were in Afghanistan and the United States decided to lay landmines around Kandahar, as an example, if we were there with the PPCLI and we said no, they're going to do it anyway. In essence, by us being there, we actually condoned that action, right?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: If we did not withdraw, yes.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: So the only other way out of that would be to withdraw. Is that correct?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes, to find another mission somewhere else.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Wouldn't we want to ask these types of questions before we went over?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Yes, if you could, but they may decide that things are getting so bad protecting the Kandahar base that they want to do landmines. They may assure us that they're going to remove them. At least they will know where they are.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: According to your experience and your intelligence in this, which is very well done, by the way, if we're over there and they start laying landmines, what's the reality of us actually pulling out?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Unlikely.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Peter.

    Elsie.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Dave.

    I have to say, Professor, that I was once told by a political science professor that any similarity between anything you study in a political science class and what happens in the real world is purely coincidental. I say that with respect, sir, because you seem to be very well informed, and I'm not sure my political science professor was as well informed.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I was corrupted at American graduate school.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: We had a delegation that went down to meet with congressmen in the U.S., the military representatives. It was a few years ago.

    Were you with us on that one, John? Pat O'Brien was the chair.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton--Victoria--Brock, Lib.): I've been to Washington a couple of times, yes.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: We did note that the congressmen knew very little about the military, but they were very impressed with the presentations we made to them. In fact, at that time--I don't know what happened--they had asked me and Pat O'Brien to sit on a committee to continue the discussions between Canada and the U.S. That never continued, I think probably because Pat moved on to another position.

    You referred to the defence budget in your opening remarks and said you didn't think it would be increased substantially. I was in Ontario and out west and back east speaking with people, and from what I'm hearing, I think you're going to find that there is a tremendous amount of support now for our military, like never before. The grassroots people are saying we have to give them the tools and the equipment to do their job. I don't think they want us to be dictated to by the United States. There's a role we have to play when we go to the table. They want us to have strong enough voices there that Canada's position will be heard and they will not be dictating to us.

    How do you see this in the future?

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: According to the reports this morning, the Compass poll does show support for defence, but relative to health care and education, it's still low.

    In terms of the Americans, the United States has been asking for increased Canadian defence spending since the mid-1950s. For all those people who think the United States has influence over Canadian defence policy, one need only point to the budget to prove it doesn't.

    The Americans will always want us to spend more, but I don't believe spending more will necessarily afford us greater influence on decision making, particularly within Congress. I think we have to spend more on defence for our own reasons. We have to make sure that what we contribute can do the job it has to do. That means the ships can be interoperable and the planes have enough weapons. If we can't do the job to help them, we just don't send to that particular mission.

    The United States deals with so many other allies. Places like Uzbekistan are crucial to this operation. Who would have thought? Pakistan is very important.

    I think we have to decide what we need to do the jobs here in Canada. Given the budget, where should we put our emphasis? As I tried to suggest in my opening remarks, there will be no shortage of places where Canadian Forces will have some role to play. Our problem will be to say no, not to say yes, in the coming years. For example, do we backfill in Bosnia? That's a broad question. If we can't rotate another unit into Afghanistan, why are we putting a unit into Bosnia? That's the Europeans.

    Also, I think Canadians have a sense that we have to tell the Americans that we'll do this and do that. I think we have to tell the Europeans what we're going to do once in a while. Why should we go into Bosnia when we might have greater demands in North America? We are now scrambling to put another unit into Bosnia and one in Afghanistan. If we can't, we can't. What's the best for us? It may be Afghanistan. Certainly the Americans will notice that. Let the Europeans backfill in Bosnia.

    What impresses them is when you're there, you're doing the job, and you're doing it well. Given their armed forces, I don't think aggregate numbers are going to make them stand up, particularly in the Congress. They do appreciate our support, and I think many Canadians underestimate the extent to which that is the case.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I never pay any attention to polls, because when I was running for mayor the incumbent was supposed to be beating me two to one five days before the election, and I beat him two to one five days later.

    When it comes to the defence budget here in Canada, I think it is very important that we have the necessary equipment in order for our young people to be trained. Certainly the navy needs to have its ships; there is no question about that. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives thought it was wonderful to build our frigates here. We should be building the rest of our ships here. It has a tremendous positive effect throughout the whole of Canada, not just in the military. But at least they are being trained with the equipment and knowledge they should have.

    I spoke to a gentleman at Camp Gagetown. He had been there a long time. He said, “Mrs. Wayne, I'm leaving because the equipment I have to train the young people with is 60 years old, and that isn't good”. So there need to be strong voices from our military college and everywhere else that we need to have modern equipment for these young people who are coming from the military college. It has to be there for them.

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: You have the LAV III's and the Coyotes, which are actually able to operate much better than some of the heavier American equipment, and the frigates are world-class.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much. You've gone well over your time , Elsie.

    You're on, Leon.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    You made a comment about the recent poll where Canadians said that if you're going to pick either military or health care, we pick health care, and if it is a matter of putting more money into either the military or education, we pick education. But that's a bogus choice, really. That's what the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet do quite regularly, say it's either/or when in fact there are a lot of other areas of spending.

    Our party has identified many billions of dollars that could be better spent on the military. So we can increase funding to health care, education, and the military and still not increase overall spending. I don't think Canadians were given that choice in the poll. So that is a bogus choice.

    When we're looking at a new white paper or a major review of our defence policy, we need to consider first what we need here at home to deal with natural disasters, civil unrest, and so on. We need to deal with what we need to ensure sovereignty, especially in the northern waters, and what we have on our foreign affairs agenda that will require military involvement.

    The minister promised we would have a white paper or a major review done by the end of the year. Now we're told that we should wait for the Department of Foreign Affairs to come out with some kind of statement before we go ahead with the review. That makes some sense, I think.

    I think many Canadians feel that we need to define our military before we determine how much money to put into it. Part of that is the whole matter of NORTHCOM. Are we going to be involved with the navy and army in a new North American arrangement? What is going to happen with missile defence? Are we going to continue overseas? As you say, there will be no shortage of demands overseas. It's probably going to increase on the demand side rather than decrease.

    With all this taken into account, what do you think about a major new policy on defence, and what do you think that might be?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I don't think you need a white paper. It doesn't take a white paper to tell you you need helicopters for the navy. I would rather see Parliament and the government focus on getting the equipment that should have been bought a long time ago.

    The other point is that once you open the debate to the public on this, it may not end up where people who support the armed forces want it to go. You've seen what happened and the attention Mr. Byers' paper and Mr. Axworthy's comments got. This could be derailed, especially if the campaign in Afghanistan bogs down. It's true that public opinion supports increased defence spending, but a lot of the vocal public, apart from the CDA, apart from other defence groups, have other agendas for the armed forces.

    I think the outlines in the white paper are basically sound, but we need to make decisions on equipment. What is the priority for helicopters relative to fixing the submarines? I agree with you that we're running a surplus. There is enough money.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm talking about reallocating without going into the surplus. There are lots of ways to reallocate.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: There's a great deal of money. Rather than a white paper, I would like to see DND produce a priority list of equipment. My view is that the Canadian Armed Forces exist to support the foreign policy of Canada in places where the real or apprehended use of force is a policy instrument that can be employed to further our interest.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: That's the issue. If we don't know what we're going to do in terms of the foreign affairs agenda, how can we make a decision? Helicopters is obvious. Supply ships is obvious. Destroyers is obvious. When it comes to strategic airlift, do we buy C-17s? I think to answer that question we have to have an idea of how often the Canadian military is going to be asked to deploy overseas. That's not entirely true, because we need to move them to the next flood, the next ice storm, the next earthquake in British Columbia too.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: That's my argument. I agree with you that we have to make a decision on strategic airlift, but that discussion will be derailed by a broad.... Mrs. Wayne just left. I don't agree with a broad, vague policy about Canada's place in the world. It's fairly obvious to me; we're going to go over there. Given the likely scenarios, let's talk specific equipment rather than talk about whether we should be going. Who would have thought a year ago that we would be deploying to Afghanistan?

    Even though there's more money, I think it's safe to assume.... Predictions are always risky, but I have no doubt that the Government of Canada will deploy Canadian forces overseas again.

    From the standpoint of Parliament and DND, I would say do a tweaking on the white paper, but let's get down to what exactly we need. Let's discuss the merits of more Hercules over C-17s. Let's discuss real issues, not vague concepts of world order. We're going to go. We know we're going to go. No matter what we say today, we're going to go.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Professor.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I want to talk to you about the culture of secrecy in the Department of National Defence, as opposed to the open-minded approach of our US allies. I thought I understood you to say that it was very important that MPs be well informed about all the ins and outs of an operation.

    Just a few months ago Mr. Price and I went to USCENTCOM in Tampa Bay, and US servicemen gave us four or five hours of briefings involving classified information. Here, in Canada, we are light-years away from having classified briefings on the state of operations.

    When I compare the US decision structure with our own, I note that the US Congress and Senate have to decide on any intervention that is contemplated in one country or another. In Afghanistan, it was not complicated: the Congress and Senate were entirely in agreement with the President, but I think that this nonetheless required an official vote in Congress.

    I also saw how the US Congress liaised with the Department of Defense. There are direct liaison officers who explain all the operations. I think that it is the Senate Committee or the Committee of the House of Representatives that decides the budget, whereas this is not the case here.

    BQ MPs have repeatedly indicated that they deplore the fact that in Canada, it is the executive that decides. It is the Cabinet that decides that we are going to Afghanistan, and we learn two days later that troops are on the point of leaving. Here, we have a take-note debate in which we do not even have the right to vote.

    If I ask the Department of National Defence for a classified briefing to determine whether our special forces will be in Afghanistan tomorrow, I will be told that it is not my concern.

    In your view, do we have any means in Canada whereby the Department of National Defence can be made dependent on the people's elected representatives so that we really do have our say and so that this culture of secrecy between Parliament and National Defence is changed?

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: As you know, the US Constitution gives Congress very specific power over issues involving defence and foreign affairs. According to the Constitution, the Congress has more power than the President over these issues but, in reality, in cold wars and in the current situation the President has most of the power.

[English]

    But the difference for us is, and I think it is important, Congress does have the power. It has the power of the purse, it has the power of investigation. But more than that, there is in the American political culture, particularly after Vietnam, a notion that you cannot send forces abroad unless the public understands why; and you cannot build support for the armed forces in the legislative branch unless they are properly informed.

    The greatest problem I see with it in Canada is that the public does not know enough. I worked for this committee, its predecessor, in 1986 as a researcher. When we went to get a briefing on NORAD down the street, we got nothing. When we went to Colorado Springs, we got a whole day, including a welcoming band and limousines.

    American general officers are politicians. They are there to sell defence, to inform, and there is a close relationship.

    I believe that if we are going to continue to be active abroad it is necessary to explain to members of Parliament, because I think in a way the government is almost afraid that the press will get it and distort it. But the best way to distort it is to keep things secret that should not be secret.

    American General Franks is what The Washington Post has called a proconsul, like in the Roman empire. He is a proconsul. They are used to dealing with politicians. So that is important.

    And if I may make an advertisement for my own business, we have started programs at the staff college in Toronto for senior officers, and the one thing we want to make them able to do is to feel comfortable in the political environment and to recognize the importance of these political questions, that they do not go off to the mess and grumble about politicians. It is important to bring them in, particularly when force is implied.

    Having said that, the President can still deploy forces. He does not need Congress, except to declare war. And once the forces are in the field, Congress has very reluctantly cut off the funding, except in Vietnam, après la guerre.

    I know the Canadian military would like the support of Parliament, and they point to the American support given by the Congress, by the House and the Senate, to the American forces. But the Canadian military would also have to recognize that along with that support comes oversight. So when you bought those submarines from the British, that would have been reviewed very clearly in Congress.

    Now, you do have the Auditor General to report here, but the Canadian military are used to a lack of close political oversight, in some cases political inattention, until one embarrassing moment comes up and everyone scrambles around trying to explain what everybody should have understood before--particularly now that we are deploying forces overseas in dangerous situations.

    For example, I don't know, Mr. Chairman, whether you had hearings, but if this had happened in the United States, if the 101st Airborne had been bombed instead of the PPCLI--which could have happened--the next day the chief of staff of the air force would have been up before Congress answering questions. That's what you need--you need continual oversight, because Parliament serves as a legislative body, as an investigative body, as an educative body.

    So when Mr. Rumsfeld announces NORCOM, the next day you should have the chief up here, not to question him and ask “Why are you selling the country down the river to the Americans?”, but “Can you explain what a combatant command is? Can you explain...?”

    My experience with the press is it's looking for the dodge; it's looking for the hidden thing. And usually there's less there. Usually it's very boring, a lot of this stuff, to most people.

    But I agree with you: if we're going to be active internationally, Parliament has to, on a continuing basis, not every so often.... It's more important that you know what is going on day to day than that you contribute to a white paper every seven years.

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    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Professor.

    John, you are on.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Professor Sokolsky, for coming here.

    There are a few things you mentioned that I would like to touch on, but first I have a problem with the way this meeting is held. You show up and give us a good report, but before you started the chair told you the report we are doing is already in print. I hope this slap in the face will be overlooked, and that I have some assurance from the chair that this will be added on.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Let me correct that. This is a draft report that we will be going through, and it has space for alterations. I can guarantee you there will be changes made to it.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: I am happy with that, because you are a particular specialist who we should probably have had here very early on. As long as I know your recommendations are going to be added, then I am comfortable in questioning you on some other things.

    You actually worked for this committee at one time. That tweaked my interest, because it indicates that you have some expertise in how committees operate. Also, I notice that the civilian specialist at the college in Toronto has a doctorate in maritime warfare tactics. It would appear that you are also a naval defence policy specialist.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Is this Dr. Mitchell?

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Is there some connection there?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I was his thesis adviser.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay. So now we that is where he got all his good material.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: He survived me.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay.

    There are two problems that bother me. One is the budget. The reason it bothers me is that it is $12 billion. It is the largest budget in Ottawa. It is a target for every other department and the envy of every other minister. When ministers are trying to get their own few dollars out of the overall spending, they always look at the defence budget.

    I wonder, sir, if you would be in favour of targeted budgeting, so that this committee could look at areas where the budget should be targeted for an increase or a decrease--and not just the overall purse being reduced, leaving it up to the military. Because there are things that could be considered: the Sea Kings are going through the procurement process and will be on line by the end of the year. We all agree they should have been done years ago. There is no argument there.

    So the first thing I wanted to touch on is the specific targeting of budgets, because we are sixth in NATO, and when you deal with the defence budget, every other minister has budget envy.

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    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I tried to suggest to Mr. Benoit that, yes, it would be useful if you could get a consensus behind a weapons system--a consensus targeted on specific priorities--rather than on overall priorities. Despite the fact that we have a unified armed force, we do not have unified budget requests. It would be useful if the committee could indicate where funding should be going and perhaps where it should not be going--and where you want to reduce it.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: The other point you touched on about politics is troubling to me. I have been in politics for many years. In fact, the first campaign I worked on was Leslie Frost's last campaign in the 1950s. So I go back a long way. I'm old.

    You touched on a problem. If you take the scenario of the bomb being dropped recently. The first call the President of the United States made was to the Prime Minister of Canada. The Prime Minister's first announcement was in the House of Commons that day. We were all there. All the leaders of the various parties made statements, and so forth. Yet the biggest problem that day seemed to be that the President of the United States did not say anything else. So if he did not say anything else, and it was not on CNN, it was a slap in the face to Canada. I found that very troubling.

    Would you not think the President of the United States, when he calls the prime minister of a country, would believe his message would be conveyed through our media? Why was it not conveyed through our media?

    It was not something the Prime Minister ignored. It was conveyed almost immediately to all of us in the House of Commons and to all the media. Yet President Bush was criticized because he did not say anything until he was confronted. I did not understand that.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, I didn't understand that either. The President did what he would do in these circumstances.

    One of the things that makes the making and the conduct of Canadian defence policy difficult in Canada is the media tends to invest every issue with a do-or-die sovereignty question: if he did not call us, that means he doesn't like us or he is not.... In this instance, we do it to ourselves, because I had condolence messages from American colleagues, not that I didn't convey them. And if you look at Secretary Powell's testimony before Congress a few days later, it was very heartfelt.

    We can expect the Americans perhaps to notice us more. We can't expect them to fall over themselves praising us all the time. In a way it is our own insecurity coming out, not their disrespect for us. In a way, it is a reflection of our own insecurity, which doesn't look very well.

    I know many Canadians are worried that the United States does not take.... Look, when you are on the top of the American security agenda, you are usually in trouble. In a sense, there is a quiet confidence in Canada that I think we have to accept. We just can't expect them to run up the maple leaf every time we do something well or every time they make a mistake. But it has to do with the Prime Minister and our own insecurities here.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Cheryl, you are on.

    Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Professor, for coming today.

    You conclude in the IRPP news release here that “as long as Canada wishes to play a role in world affairs and as long as the navy can be a useful tool”, and so on, it can be interoperable with the United States, and the conflict or the friction is “not a new situation, and it is one that can be properly managed with close political oversight”.

    And therein lies the problem. We have no checks and balances. It was during the Thanksgiving break, during the holidays, when we found out that Canadian forces were going to be deployed to Afghanistan. No discussion beforehand--it was just boom, an announcement.

    What I would like to hear from you.... First of all, precisely in this sort of circumstance when we are going to deploy, it is rather an urgent situation. You mention what they do in the United States, but let's put it to our parliamentary system. In your opinion, in order to keep the military from taking the blame for whatever goes wrong, should it be discussed in Parliament before cabinet just makes a decision?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: It should be brought to Parliament. But even in the U.S. case, the President can deploy; he consults, but he doesn't ask for permission to deploy.

    When I talk about political oversight, I don't mean it should only apply to Parliament. The minister should know what the navy is.... It should be transparent to the minister and other members of cabinet what is going on there.

    It requires that once a decision is made, you can debate it and explain it in Parliament. The committee should have called the chief of the maritime staff before them to explain simply what interoperability meant, what was going on, and what they were going to be doing. The government should allow that because that's the best way to dispel misconceptions. So when I say political oversight, I mean in the full range of things, so you know what's going on.

    The President and Prime Minister both have the power to deploy, without resort to the legislative branches. The Congress of the United States can cut off the deployment by simply cutting off the funding, but is unlikely to do so.

    When the government decides to deploy, it should provide members of this committee or Parliament, in general, with the background so you can answer constituent questions and find out exactly what is going on within the grounds of security, with as much pre-notice as the government can give.

    We don't have that habit here of informing. I know many Canadians believe it's different in the United States, but when Ronald Reagan went into Granada he told Congress he was going in; he didn't ask for their permission. Sometimes we exaggerate the power of the U.S. Congress vis-à-vis the President.

    As I was explaining here before, it's true Congress has enormous powers. It's also true the President is still the lead person on these military issues. I'd simply like to see more information on these. What I meant there was political oversight by cabinet. You should know what arrangements the navy is making and what their rules of engagement are if something happens.

    Strategy 2020 laid it out very clearly. It was pretty clear what they were going to do. Just on a continuing basis, Parliament should be kept abreast of these operations. This is in the armed forces' best interests, so we can have champions in Parliament to explain and understand what's going on.

º  (1650)  

    Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

    My colleague was asking about a white paper, but you said we should first itemize a list of priorities, in terms of equipment. Are you really saying that our foreign policy, at this time, is determined by our resources?

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: Well, no. What we can do on defence is driven by our equipment. But that is the same for everybody. We are not the only country. Many countries have a strategy-driven defence policy--what you can do. In our case it is more difficult, because to tailor a defence policy to meet a security policy that is at risk anywhere in the world is infinite. You could ask, where is Canadian security at risk? Was it at risk in Rwanda? Was it at risk in Haiti? Was it at risk in Bosnia?

    What I am saying is accept the fact that the government will use the armed forces to support its foreign policy on a number of occasions. Accept the fact that the major priority is North America. What equipment can we buy that will give us the maximum flexibility for the missions we are likely to undertake? This is why the navy is good. You need a navy here and you need a navy there. Navy is not very good at chasing people through the caves of Afghanistan, but maybe somebody else should do that.

    As an example, should we re-equip our armour with heavy tanks? The Leopards are not going to last for long. They are all over here in Canada. We can't get them over there. Should we buy something to get them over there? What's the likelihood of major armoured warfare? I would say less likely than being able to use the Coyote. There's a decision. Do we re-equip the Leopards again? Do we buy airlift to move them overseas, or do we say we're going to have to get out of the intensive armour warfare business because we can't do it? Not only can we not do it, we don't think that's the likely scenario. These are the real questions, rather than debating whether we should have a global combat capability.

    We are active globally. The point you raised at the beginning, which I mentioned in the paper, is that we choose on our own as a sovereign country to be engaged globally. That's the basis by which.... We could choose to do a number of things: we could say we'll take care of the western hemisphere or we'll just take care of North America. But Canadians demand a global foreign policy.

    In the present international circumstances, if we want to go abroad to be very active, it very often means in military terms dealing with the United States. That's just the reality. But they are not demanding that we buy the full spectrum of equipment. If they ask for the Coyotes, it's because they don't have them. They are buying the LAV III's because during the 1980s and into the 1990s the U.S. Army was emphasizing heavy armour, not what we had. These are the real defence questions. What the world is going to look like in twenty years, I don't know. But from a non-political-science point of view, I would say that a few more Coyotes would probably not hurt.

º  (1655)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Professor.

    Mr. Bagnell, last question.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: I defer to my grandfather, who has a very short question.

    Mr. Larry Bagnell: Thank you, son.

    My question was dealing with the strategy of the United States and Canada trying to be interoperable with them. Interoperability is great in some cases, but if you take the F-18s and the United States wanting us to have F-18s and to be interoperable with them, when they had the William Tell competition, which is supposed to be a showcase of United States superiority, the fact is Canada won it. The top gun was a typical Canadian. He is from my riding, trained in Cold Lake, Alberta, and learned his languages in Quebec--a typical Canadian. But they have never had the competition since, because they know we will beat them again. I wonder sometimes if that doesn't enter into some of the policies. They want us to be good, but they do not want us to be better than they are.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: I don't know if they're worried...maybe the air force. I think they want us to be good. They don't want us to think we're better than they are. I don't know. I think they'd be happy to see more Canadian top guns. They'd probably be happy to see more Canadian aircraft to do it. There is enormous respect for the quality of the officers we send out--more than in some parts of Canada.

    Mr. John O'Reilly: You still have time, Larry. No? Okay.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): We will put it off then, because the professor has a train to catch.

    I want to thank you very much, Professor. This has been quite illuminating. And be assured that the report is not yet closed.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: That's okay.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): The parliamentary secretary seems to be worried about it.

    Prof. Joel Sokolsky: That's fine. Thank you very much. If you would like to come and visit the college, let me know.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.