SNAS Committee Meeting
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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION
Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
EVIDENCE
CONTENTS
Tuesday, February 18, 2003
| Á | 1105 |
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The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)) |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier (Chair, Security Intelligence Review Committee) |
| Á | 1110 |
| Á | 1115 |
| Á | 1120 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance) |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Vic Toews |
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Le président |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ) |
| Á | 1125 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Á | 1130 |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.) |
| Á | 1135 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Á | 1140 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
| Á | 1145 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.) |
| Á | 1150 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Chair |
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Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.) |
| Á | 1155 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. David Pratt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. David Pratt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. David Pratt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Â | 1200 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Chair |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
| Â | 1205 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mrs. Marlene Jennings |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Â | 1210 |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Hon. Gary Filmon (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee) |
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The Chair |
| Â | 1215 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Ray Speaker (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee) |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Hon. Gary Filmon |
| Â | 1220 |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Gary Filmon |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Â | 1225 |
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Mr. John McKay |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Â | 1230 |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
| Â | 1235 |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Ms. Susan Pollak (Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee) |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Ms. Susan Pollak |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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L'hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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Mr. Robert Lanctôt |
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L'hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
| Â | 1240 |
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Ms. Susan Pollak |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
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The Hon. Paule Gauthier |
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The Chair |
CANADA
Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights |
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EVIDENCE
Tuesday, February 18, 2003
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Á 
(1105)
[English]
The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order. I see a quorum.
Colleagues, we're going to be hearing from the Security Intelligence Review Committee today. We're very pleased to have with us the chair, the Honourable Paule Gauthier, joined by committee colleagues, the Honourable Gary Filmon and the Honourable Ray Speaker.
I see, Madam Gauthier, you have an opening statement, as you usually do. I would start by saying that it's probably been a little bit too long since we've had an opportunity to meet with you. I may want to say a few words about that later, and my colleagues may as well.
Welcome, and let's begin with your opening statement.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier (Chair, Security Intelligence Review Committee): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and good morning to the other members of the committee.
My colleagues and I would like first of all to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I believe that since our appearance last year your committee has acquired a few new members. I will reiterate what I said a year ago: that I hope we will become better acquainted with all of you.
Appearing with me today are our review committee members, the Honourable Gary Filmon and the Honourable Ray Speaker. Also in attendance are SIRC's executive director, Ms. Susan Pollak; the deputy executive director, Ms. Kelly McGee; and senior counsel, Thomas Dastous.
To begin, I want to give you a brief overview of SIRC's mandate and operations before moving on to some of the substantive issues arising from our report to Parliament last October.
[Translation]
The Security Intelligence Review Committee was created to fulfill two distinct functions. The first is to provide an external and independent review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. SIRC members and personnel have the right to examine all CSIS activities, and to this end, have access to all CSIS files. Such broad access is critical to enable the committee to assure Parliament that CSIS activities aimed at protecting the security of the public and the nation are consistent with the law.
The second SIRC function is to examine complaints relating to security clearances, citizenship and other issues under investigation by CSIS. Under the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, any person has the right to file a complaint with SIRC regarding CSIS. As a tribunal, the committee examines all the facts--including any relevant classified information--to determine the merits of the complaint.
To fulfill its tasks, the committee needs to have an overall understanding of the many CSIS activities. Meticulous research and a sound judgment are, in our opinion, our key assets. Our examinations are carefully detailed and have a strategic impact. Each year, we present a non-classified annual report to Parliament, and through you to the Canadian population. This report presents the results of the conclusions we made after examining whether CSIS activities are irreproachable and are consistent with the law, as well as the recommendations we deem appropriate.
Á (1110)
[English]
It is important to note that SIRC is Parliament's instrument in a complex governance structure that regulates CSIS activities. SIRC's reviews are generally retrospective and analytical in nature. In matters of day-to-day management, CSIS continues at all times to be accountable for current operations through the existing apparatus of government, specifically the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the inspector general of CSIS.
I turn now to our most recent report to Parliament. The report addresses the issues that came to our attention during the fiscal year under review. As usual, it is a diverse collection touching on many different kinds of service activity. However, one topic from SIRC's latest report clearly stands out in terms of public concern, media interest, and Parliament's legislative agenda: the service's investigation of Sunni Islamic extremism prior to the events of September 11.
From the outset, the review committee was aware that the service's investigation of Sunni Islamic extremism was complex and longstanding. This fact dictated the nature of our inquiries. In order to conduct a comprehensive review of CSIS activities in this area, we first needed to understand the reach and focus of the service's investigation.
What was the scale of the service's efforts, how many targets were there, and how many federal court warrants? Who else in government was CSIS communicating with, and what did they tell them? What sort of information did CSIS share with the intelligence services of other countries, and what did they provide to the service in return? These were the questions we asked.
Last October we stated that the answers to these questions had laid the foundation for future in-depth inquiries by SIRC. I can inform you today that our follow-up examinations have been underway for some time.
Our inquiries encompass the months before and after the attacks in the United States. SIRC staff are examining service activities in several regions of the country, with access to all the files and CSIS staff involved. The results of our studies will be presented in our next report to Parliament, to be tabled in late September or early October.
The Sunni Islamic section of our most recent report is worth noting for two other reasons. The first is that it demonstrated that SIRC is a nimble organization. We recognize when it is appropriate to deploy resources if there is a clear and urgent need. In the aftermath of the attacks in the United States, my colleagues and I took immediate steps to review the role CSIS played in collecting and disseminating intelligence relevant to these events.
The second reason is less encouraging. SIRC's review in 2002 of the service's Sunni Islamic investigation took place at the cost of another long-planned study. We did not have the resources to do both.
SIRC's capacity to fulfill its mandate rests on being able to respond to unforeseen events and at the same time carry through its strategic plan and legislative obligations to review key areas on a regular basis. Absent the necessary resources, our ability to fulfill that mandate is at risk.
While the level of CSIS's activities is growing rapidly, resources available to SIRC to monitor those activities have not kept pace. As we outlined in our most recent report, the service's annual funding has increased by 30%. The effect will be to raise dramatically the scope of activity in areas where SIRC has not just a compelling interest, but a legal responsibility.
Á (1115)
CSIS has hired more intelligence officers. It is launching more investigations. It will seek more warrants. And it is recruiting more human sources. These are among the most powerful and intrusive instruments the service has at its disposal. Knowing how they are employed is the essence of SIRC's mandate.
In spring 2002 we undertook to assess the implications of the rise in CSIS activities for SIRC's own operations. To this end, we asked for and received two classified briefings from the service to ascertain how CSIS planned to spend its new resources. As a result in September 2002, we made a formal request to Treasury Board for an increase in budget of 16% on an existing budget of $2.3 million, a total of $375,000.
We are a small agency with sixteen full-time staff. Our proposed increase would add an additional three persons and permit SIRC to retain current professional staff in a recruiting environment that has grown highly competitive since the events of September 11.
We have been assured by the Treasury Board Secretariat that our business case for an increase is sound. Indeed, the Treasury Board Secretariat could find no fault at all with our proposal. As yet, however, we have no indication that additional resources are forthcoming. This is in the context where the government allocated an additional $7.7 billion for security and intelligence just one year ago. My colleagues and I can only hope the government will soon rectify this matter.
Another ongoing challenge to our work is that since February 2002 we have been short two members of our five-member committee. This is a hard-working committee that deals with serious matters. We gather monthly to help direct the staff in its work and to make determinations of fact and policy. In addition, each member presides over his or her share of complaint cases. While SIRC can operate with only three or four members, it is always in the best interest of Parliament and the public that we carry out our duties with a full five-member committee. I remain optimistic that we will not have to wait much longer for new members.
Finally, I want to turn to an ongoing problem for which there is no obvious solution. Despite the problem's apparent intractability, or perhaps because of it, I'm going to share it with you.
Canadian law and simple prudence severely restrict the kinds of information SIRC can present in public. As part of our work, we are privy to a great deal of sensitive information that we cannot divulge. National security is not a shield we hide behind; it is an operational and legislative reality.
However, this fact also means that it is very difficult to refute false or misleading statements about SIRC or CSIS that find their way into the public domain.
As the chair of SIRC, I can tell you bluntly that this can be an annoying dilemma. More worrying, however, is the knowledge that left unchallenged, false information may undermine the trust that must exist between SIRC and those for whom we work--Parliament and the people of Canada.
The boundaries of public discussion of national security issues are set in law and policy. Working within those limitations, my colleagues and I undertake to be as open and transparent with Parliament and the Canadian public as we are able.
Once again, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today, and I look forward to our discussion.
Á (1120)
The Chair: Thank you very much for your fairly candid opening statement.
Colleagues, right off the bat I'm going to ask for your agreement that the committee send a letter forthwith to the Solicitor General noting the absence of a full complement of SIRC members for the last year and inquiring as to when the new appointments will come forward. Is that agreed?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: All right. Thank you.
We'll go to the first round of questioning--seven minutes to Mr. Toews.
Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much. Unfortunately, my presence here will be short because I'm required in the House on another issue.
I want to thank you for your presentation.
I also want to commend the chair on his initiative to suggest that we inquire as to where the other two committee members are. It is important, given the present climate and the increase in responsibilities that various government agencies have had in this context, that we also ensure that our oversight body is properly staffed and able to meet the challenges that are its mandate.
The one issue I want to raise very quickly is the last comment you made, Madam Chair, with respect to false or misleading statements. If these are statements being made in the House or elsewhere by opposition members, I think we need to know. We certainly don't want to undermine your efforts.
You realize, of course, that in the context of parliamentary debate sometimes allegations are made in an effort to elicit responses. I think if you could give us a little more detail--whether it's opposition or government members--we could be a little more sensitive to your particular concerns. Certainly I, for one, would like to bring it to the attention of my colleagues, if the blame rests with any of my colleagues.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: When I made this comment, I made it generally. I'm not focusing particularly on members of Parliament, the media, or particular books that are published.
Sometimes it can be frustrating for us, because we know what the allegations and the discussions are about, but we cannot come into the discussion to explain.
I want to reassure you that if it were of a very serious nature, of course we would not remain silent and do nothing. We would probably communicate with the Solicitor General, try to find ways to have the public know the truth about allegations made. After that, we could go through our annual report the next year. You know, we can find ways to rectify the facts.
Sometimes, when we don't find it of very high importance, we let it go. Sometimes the public does not have the real picture.
Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you very much.
I think in this context all of us are concerned about your ability to function properly. In the context within which you need to function, we recognize there are things you cannot disclose to the public. I think your comment here is appropriate, and certainly committee members and others should bear that in mind.
[Translation]
Le président: Mr. Lanctôt, you have seven minutes.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to point out that I am new to the sub-committee. Last week, I was appointed spokesperson for the Bloc Québecois. This has not prevented me, however, from reviewing your report.
I am surprised that CSIS is viewed as almost perfect. I have the impression that everything is not as good as you say. Are your conclusions the result of a lack of personnel or incomplete research on your part? In any event, I am very surprised to see in such a perfectible report what is normally seen in an inspector's report. I am amazed.
Is this organization that good? When I think of the anti-terrorist measures and the upcoming adoption of bills C-17 and C-55, I wonder how, after one year's review, you could conclude that everything is perfect. Am I wrong in assuming that certain elements were not reviewed, or is it really a perfect organization?
Á (1125)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I understand your surprise to a certain extent. Are you wrong? Yes and no. I cannot confirm this, but you need to know about the history of the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which is 15 years old, and which over time has improved its operational methods. It was given departmental directives, which are now well known, which must be followed and are followed. We can at least say that they were followed in the cases of the year we reviewed. It is rather restricted in time.
As I explained, each year, a certain amount of research is done. All the activities of the service cannot be reviewed, as this would be impossible. In much the same way as the Auditor General, a certain part is done one year, another the following year, and so on. So eventually, we have a good idea of the situation.
I believe that after 15 years, the service has improved its methods, is more aware of the rules of the game and of the law, and is aware of our existence. However, this does not mean that the service will always do everything right and that because of this, we should stop reviewing or assume that everything is always right. This is not at all what we say in the report.
The new laws that are currently in force affect the service in general, but only indirectly, as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act has not been amended. Therefore, the service has exactly the same mandate and is subjected to the same rules, but it will have more employees, more human resources, as well as more activities. So we believe that to efficiently and thoroughly do our work and review the service's activities, we will also need additional personnel.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Certainly. I will ask you more specific questions.
Yesterday on Grands Reportages on RDI, there was a report in which it was said that the CIA was aware of, or at least should have been aware of, all the information from Sudan but neglected to seriously consider the information held in another country.
First, was this information provided to CSIS in Canada? Was it known that the CIA was aware of everything that was being plotted for September 11 and was even aware of the attacks on embassies in the other countries?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Your committee surely understands that we cannot review activities in the United States. You will see that in the United States, organizations involved in national security or in gathering information are very, very numerous. One can ask whether these organizations communicated with each other and shared information. The future will tell, but we are beginning to understand that each one may have kept their information to themselves. There may have been a lack of information sharing.
In our annual report, which the committee is currently reviewing, it is mentioned that a study was initiated on what the service knew, on the Sunni Islamic movement. As we said, the service had been involved in this investigation for a long time, and this was a major activity. We wanted to have a general idea of what they knew, but we did not go into every detail. We did not attempt to know what kind of information the service had shared with people and so on, because this is still under review by us. This investigation was too big to do all at once.
The part we completed shows that the service, as I said, had been aware of the activities for a long time and was highly interested. They were aware to a certain extent of the existence and scope of these movements. I cannot confirm it today, but we felt, during our review, that the service had not been aware of specific events that might have enabled them to forecast the September 11 events. But overall, they were aware of the activities.
Á (1130)
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Things that were being plotted were known but not the specific locations. In this case, will the Review Committee be able to make recommendations? We know where these people hit. They do not hit little things; they hit relatively big things. Why wait until September 11? If they had been working on it for a long time and knew these things were being plotted, why were security perimeters or barriers not established for major buildings? Why wait until September 11? The government only moved after September 11. If the security services had this information, why did they not enforce security at strategic places, which did not exist? Now, we spend a lot of money on this, but we do not see more security, except in airports. And even in airports, security is already more relaxed than immediately after September 11.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: That is easy to say now that the events have occurred, and I understand your questions. I am telling you that they were aware of the existence of these movements. They had notified the governments. Here, in Canada, we know that the service had given briefings on different occasions, but they could not say that anything specific would happen on September 11, because they did not have the required elements to arrive at specific conclusions. But the people were nonetheless aware of the activities of these groups.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Lanctôt.
Mr. McKay is next, for seven minutes.
Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): Thank you.
I too am interested in the subject area that Mr. Lanctôt was raising. I'm pointing to page 7 of your report, where you say the committee believes that CSIS
“...disseminated widely within government timely information about the potential for Sunni terrorism. Although none of the intelligence products or threat warnings we reviewed pointed directly to the events of September 11, the Service clearly was aware of the potential for Al Qaida-inspired terrorist attacks of some kind and communicated this to the appropriate bodies in government.”
Then you go on to say:
“In the Committee's view, however, none of the advice or communications the Committee reviewed warned of a threat sufficiently specific in time or place to have alerted government authorities to the events of September 11.”
I suppose my questions are twofold. Were there any points in your examination when you felt that CSIS could have issued either stronger warnings or taken a more proactive stance with respect to the terrorist threats that September 11 had produced?
Second, since that time the government and Parliament have authorized significantly increased resources for all these kinds of security activities and passed legislation that is arguably quite intrusive into the civil rights of Canadians generally.
In your view, have the activities of the government and Parliament enhanced CSIS's ability to respond to similar kinds of threats? What in your view would be different about a CSIS, security, or government response, given this new environment of legislative enhancement and resource enhancement?
Á (1135)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Your first question—could CSIS have issued a stronger warning—I cannot answer because, as I said, the first part of our review was of a general, very broad nature, and as you read, we did not go into all the specific data. Maybe it could have been stronger, but at the moment we cannot say. You will have to read our next annual report to learn more about this, and for us to be able to really ascertain things.
It seems that, as I said, they knew about the existence of a threat and about many of the activities, and they gave advice to the government on a few occasions, but I cannot say very strongly that, yes, they could have issued stronger warnings; I cannot tell you that.
To the second part of your question, concerning Parliament and whether stronger resources would enhance the ability of CSIS, I think the answer is yes. I remember that when we have appeared before this committee, for the last two years I think we have said we are concerned that the CSIS budget was not high enough to make sure they could do their work correctly. Nevertheless, we always asked the director about it, and he kept saying “Yes, yes, we can do our work”. But, as you said, with the new legislation in place and the new threats we now know more about, they need more resources.
They have received an increase of 30% in their budget. I think their ability to do their work has been enhanced by that. But for us it's a new challenge, because of more activities, as I said, and more review that is needed to make sure we abide by the act and they keep within their mandate.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay. Oh, you're still continuing, are you? I thought you were backing out here. Please continue. You have a couple of minutes left.
Mr. John McKay: Thank you.
The issue I see as critical... I apologize for phrasing this question in a general way, but I'm concerned that we have taken a number of legislative initiatives that security forces have argued they need in order to enhance the security environment for Canadians—that's been the rubric. Can you point to any specific legislative initiative that enhances CSIS's ability to be more proactive, to have better access to information, to be able to provide better advice to various authorities that you agree was absolutely necessary? Prior to September 11, this was the legislative environment; post-September 11, there is another legislative environment; and what is absolutely clear is that there is significant intrusion onto the rights of Canadians. But what in your mind, in the legislative documents, has in fact created a better security environment for Canadians?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: First of all, to answer your question, I want you to understand that our committee's jurisdiction is CSIS only. That's the first part.
The second thing is that the legislation concerning CSIS has not been amended, so CSIS is still doing its work under the same legislation as before September 11.
So how has CSIS been enhanced to do its work? As I mentioned before, first, they have an increase in their budget, which means they can do more work. The other thing is that after September 11, CSIS and the other organizations involved in collecting information, particularly in the terrorism field, realized that they would have to share information more and coordinate their activities. That's why CSIS is doing more exchange of information, first within the country with other police organizations and the RCMP, and also at the international level with foreign intelligence organizations.
But if you're talking only in regard to legislative powers, they still have the same powers; they have nothing new.
Á (1140)
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.
We'll go to five minute rounds and we'll alternate. We'll go to Mr. Lanctôt for five minutes, then Ms. Jennings.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to get back to something in your report which seems very broad: contextual investigations. We have some idea of what it is, but we are not sure which group or people can create national security problems. In light of what we can read in your report, many investigations seem to be carried out in this way.
I would somewhat agree with my colleague McKay. We already have laws that allow for an even greater intrusion in privacy. If we are moving to this kind of investigation... It seems to me there are so many specific things. Why not concentrate on the existing problems we know, whether it be Al Qaida or something else? There are a lot of elements, a lot of groups already known, and it seems that we do not devote enough resources to try and prevent this kind of terrorism that has already begun. Why go into contextual, into something very vague, that does not exist, and waste amounts of money, while we need it elsewhere? And there seems to be several. Is this the case, or is it a false impression?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: What makes you say there are many contextual investigations?
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: In light of the investigations and your report, this seems to be a very important part of the service.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: In my opinion, we, the people of the committee, have never really been in favour of contextual investigations and have always told the service that we were against this idea. We have always said that if they did some, they should act with great care and limit this kind of investigation, and after a certain time, it should be restricted. We still share this opinion. I do not think that one could say the service performs contractual investigations as a general rule. It is rather the exception.
I can give you a few examples of the areas involved. For example, in the case of organized crime, including organized crime that could become a threat to Canada's security, the service was sometimes tempted to carry out a contextual investigation. However, after a certain time, they had to focus on individuals or groups; they could not continue in a contextual way, as you say. The impression that they act this way on a regular basis is false.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Another thing surprises me a little. It is the warrants, whether for a search or to have an authorization to follow up. All these warrants were accepted by the Federal Court. Is this a device like our health insurance card, where you just need to swipe and get it? I find this amazing, particularly when there are contextual investigations, and warrants are obtained so easily. I don't know, but it seems to me that it is part of your investigation to dig further, because according to me, this makes no sense. It cannot be perfect. This is why I told you earlier that I found your report so perfect that there must have been a lack of personnel or work somewhere. This is impossible, particularly in a case like this, where investigations are carried out. Whether it be at the RCMP or the SQ, things are happening that should not happen, and these are only investigations on specific things. So, imagine what the situation must be when warrants are as broad, unknown and hidden as those of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. But you tell us that everything is all right. Either you are hiding things, you find nothing, or they are hiding things. Something is certainly wrong.
Á (1145)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: To understand, you need to know how warrants are obtained. There are two levels. First, the service itself prepares its documents for presenting to the court. Therefore, within the service, there are several stages prior to presenting the warrant to the court. I assume that to begin with, the employees prepare their case and say they need permission to watch John or Jane Doe. Once they have done this, it goes through the Department of Justice, where lawyers review the case to ensure that the facts presented in the affidavit to support the warrant are the same as those in the file, that things are consistent, etc. This would be the first stage.
In the second stage, it goes to court, before the judge. Over time, certain rules have been established, because it's been around for 15 years. So over time, conditions were established and they must be met. For example, there can be no more than a certain number of devices. A whole series of conditions must be met, and the service is aware of these conditions. Finally, they go before the judge with a very well structured document, which was revised by them, which goes before the tribunal, and which meets the conditions established over the years. The judge does not redo the whole work. He does not review the files to see if the facts presented are consistent, etc. He does not do that. He makes sure that the case is complete, that the conditions established by the court are met, and then he grants the warrant.
As for us, we start the whole process again from scratch. When we review a warrant, we start again from scratch. So we go back to the files and look one by one at the facts that were established in the affidavit to ensure they are consistent with reality and all. It is a very, very long job. We cannot do them all in one year. This year, we did five or six, I think. Things went well. Of course, certain facts are sometimes inconsistent, and we tell them. If it is a fact that compromises the truth or the confidence in the request, that significantly changes the content, we start again from scratch. It happened before, but this year, there were none. You understand?
That is what I wanted to tell you. The law requires us to do this each year, and we are very careful about it. It is very tedious work.
[English]
The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Lanctôt.
I should say for colleagues, and for the record, the question and preamble took four minutes, and the answer took three minutes. So colleagues will take note of that.
Ms. Jennings for five minutes.
[Translation]
Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Merci, monsieur le président.
Thank you very much for your presentation. I have a few questions. There is already an inspector general, and in my opinion, some of his powers seem to be similar to those of the committee. Is there overlapping in the mandates of the two organizations? That is my first question.
My second question is about Bill C-17 and the new powers given to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It is still only a bill, but if it were adopted in its current form, according to the interpretation of several members of the committee or members of the legislative committee currently reviewing it and other Parliament officials, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service could have access to all information, all passenger lists of flights arriving in Canada and leaving Canada, and domestic flights. These are new powers. They will have to exercise their powers under an enabling law, but they are new powers.
Here is my second question. If Bill C-17 were adopted without any major amendments to the powers established in sections 4.81 and 4.82, do you think your Review Committee would have the powers and financial resources required to ensure that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service exercise their powers within the law and subject to the enabling law's restrictions?
Á (1150)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: To answer your first question about the inspector general, obviously, if we examine the situation coldly, in terms of legislation, one might think that there could be overlapping. However, we have always communicated with the inspector general to avoid, during a given year, doing a review or research on the same subject.
This being said, it should be noted that the inspector general's work is not the same as ours. It is said of the inspector general that he is the eyes and ears of the minister, and his work mostly deals with the service's day-to-day activities. Our committee, as we said, is a review committee. Therefore, we come in after the facts, analyse the situation retrospectively and make recommendations for the future, while he is more where the action is. Finally, we attempted to avoid as much as possible any overlapping.
As regards the new powers given to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, I understand what you explained about the passenger lists and all. As you said, the legislation under which was created the Canadian Intelligence Service has not changed. Therefore, if the service has access to these passenger lists, it will have to be for keeping the names of passengers in their records. To open a file on someone, for example, they will need to comply with the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, and this act says that the service must collect the information, but only to the extent it is required and if the person represents a threat to the country's security. Therefore, CSIS people will have to meet these obligations. The duties will remain unchanged as regards this new information.
Do they have the required resources?
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Does your committee have the resources?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes. As I mentioned earlier, what is of some concern right now is that, since the service will have broader activities, we will need, us too, to work harder to review them. We therefore feel that we will need two to three additional people to do the job.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Two or three member people?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: No. As regards the members of the committee, the law says there are five. I am rather referring to full time personnel. There will have to be two or three additional people, in addition, of course, to the two members. Obviously, it is better when we are five.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Jennings.
Mr. Pratt, for five minutes.
Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I haven't been able to go over the report in detail, but I was drawn to one of my traditional hobby horses, which is the issue of the collection of foreign intelligence. I noticed you indicated that it appears the government is using the provisions of section 16 more and more. I also noted that you found no instances of non-compliance with law or policy.
My question is whether or not you think CSIS may be moving into that area, albeit in compliance with the policy at this point, but slowly moving into more and more foreign intelligence work without the legislative structures, shall we say, that potentially would be provided by a separate statute involving a foreign intelligence agency. There is also, I think, from some of the literature that's out there, a concern about the contamination of the service by virtue of using certain methods for the collection of foreign intelligence outside the country that may not be permissible within the country.
As well, I would ask if you're prepared to offer an opinion on whether, if you were to find CSIS bumping into some of the restrictions that exist, it's time for us to begin discussions at this committee or perhaps elsewhere in Parliament on the need for a foreign intelligence agency. Do you believe a foreign intelligence agency would add value at this point to Canadian security and intelligence requirements?
Á (1155)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: To answer this question we have to be sure of what we're discussing when we talk about foreign intelligence.
If you talk about foreign intelligence collected under section 16, this kind of information or intelligence is collected in Canada. It's collected after a direction by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence.
So the section 16 collection of foreign intelligence is an entirely different category of intelligence from that intelligence collected under section 12. Do you understand that? And the section 12 intelligence is the security-related intelligence collected outside of Canada.
Mr. David Pratt: Right. I'm sorry, I think I mixed up the two.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I think it's important to differentiate between the two.
Mr. David Pratt: It's also important, I think, to differentiate signals intelligence, which you refer to as foreign intelligence here from time to time, as well.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Exactly. So in your question you're not talking about what we call foreign intelligence collected under section 16. You're talking about foreign intelligence collected outside of Canada under section 12, within the mandate given to CSIS that it has to be necessary and that it has to be collected because there is a threat to the security of Canada.
Are you asking me whether the time has come now to have a specific body to do that kind of work?
Mr. David Pratt: The first question was whether or not CSIS is becoming essentially a domestic security intelligence agency, or whether or not it's moving into the area of foreign intelligence in a significant way that would justify perhaps having a debate on this issue.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: This question would be better answered by the director himself. And we all know that on a few occasions he has told you and he has been telling us that so far CSIS is doing just fine and they have the necessary powers to do the work they want to do. On some occasions, of course, they go outside Canada, and most of the time when they do that they do not do that covertly. The other organizations in the country they visit are aware of CSIS activities there because sometimes they do share joint operations and so on.
So I'm not in a situation to tell you that yes, it is time now that we try to get another body to do that kind of work. It seems so far that CSIS is able to do that work itself. My group is very concerned about these activities. We review these activities and it seems to be working at the moment.
I understand your concern. It's an open question, let's put it that way.
 (1200)
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.
This issue of the foreign intelligence functions of CSIS is one that will likely come up again. It can be pursued here today in five-minute rounds, but it's something the committee may wish to look at more intensely at a later date.
Mr. Lanctôt, for five minutes.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you can see, I am very interested in this subject. I know there is a great deal of information sharing between the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Is this information also shared with the Sûreté du Québec? Is there frequent sharing or is it very rare?
My second point is about security screening and the Citizenship Act and Immigration Act. Obviously, this seems to represent a large part of the research and investigations carried out by CSIS. The problem is the following: given the new discussions on the mandatory national identification card, what are the issues relating to privacy, once again? What is strictly necessary, if it is at hand, will probably not always be necessary, and this card and other information may then be used.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: First, they do frequently share information with the RCMP and all police forces across the country, depending of course on the activities and needs. They also share information with the Sûreté du Québec. One can imagine that during the Québec Summit, sharing was more frequent than during other periods. Sharing is usually easy, but it may sometimes be more difficult, because people have different opinions. It is therefore difficult to say that it is always perfect, that things always go well. The idea is that it should always go well. They have their ways, they know each other, etc. But sometimes, all of a sudden, a new person comes in and differences in personality create problems. We have seen it before, and I assume it will happen again in the future.
As for the second question, security screening obviously takes a large part of CSIS time. This is a very important part of their work, as it is a way for our country to protect itself against individuals who should not have access to our territory, to documents, to our research, and to all kinds of things we want to keep to ourselves, that we do not want to share with individuals who should not know about them. So this is very important work for them.
As for the national identification card, I cannot answer you because it is not yet clear, even in our minds, what the limit will be and how far they will go in this work before allowing a person to have an identification card. One can assume that for certain people, it will be very easy to obtain the card, while for others, it will be more difficult and CSIS will need to intervene.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Okay, thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.
Ms. Jennings for five.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to discuss the authority of SIRC in its role as a tribunal. In your statement, on page 2 in the second paragraph, you talk about how you have the authority to examine complaints that are tabled on security issues, citizenship issues, and other questions that were investigated by CSIS. You say that:
 (1205)
[Translation]
| As a tribunal, the committee reviews all the facts it has--including all relevant classified information--to determine the merits of the complaint. |
[English]
Do you have the authority in this particular area of your mandate, as you do in the independent oversight of CSIS, to examine all files regardless of their classification and to make the determination yourself if that particular file, or information in the file, regardless of its classification, is pertinent or not?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes, we do.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Has it ever been challenged by CSIS?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes, but after discussions and tenacity—
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: In the courts?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: In the courts, I don't think it ever went that far. I don't think so because it's so clear in the act that it's hard for them to say no to us.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: The reason I'm asking is because I'm aware in another--
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes, I know what you're referring to.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: --law enforcement agency there appears to be a dispute as to whether or not their oversight board has the authority to gain access to reports that have been deemed confidential. To my knowledge, it is now before the courts.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: We are not in that same situation, and the legislation is very clear that we have access to all the files.
Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you. That was the only other question.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. McKay for five minutes.
Mr. John McKay: Thank you, Chair.
I take your answer that CSIS didn't need any legislative enhancements, and it's since got more money. And a final point you raised was with respect to cooperation. One of the major venues of cooperation has to be with the RCMP. In your report you say that the letters of exchange--and I don't quite know what these things are--actually declined, but there's a memorandum of understanding with respect to secondment.
When we've listened to testimony about security in the past, it's been cooperation, cooperation, cooperation. That's the message. It's about as plain as plain can be, and it had some pretty nasty consequences in September for the Americans. I'm assuming that would have to be a very significant focus for your inquiry, the relationship between the RCMP and CSIS. Can you tell the committee in specifics how that relationship has been enhanced, improved, and deepened since September 11?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I think the two organizations are more than ever aware and understand that it's very important for them to cooperate. Maybe they had some doubts in their minds before, but now I think it's very clear.
But in saying that, I'm not saying it's going to work all the time, because, as I mentioned, there are rules. There are ways to work well together, but sometimes for various reasons, personalities and so on, it doesn't work well. We have examples where it worked very well. We have the—maybe this is an easy one—visit of the Pope. We have the summits, the various summits, such as in Calgary. So there are examples.
More and more they have learned how to work well together, but we have to keep in mind that for the RCMP their role has been increased with the new legislation. SIRC hasn't changed, but the RCMP has more powers and things. So we can maybe see that there will be some adjustments to be made so that they work together.
There is a group they call the INSETs where the RCMP, CSIS, and various other people involved in terrorist activities are working together. I would say it's still too early to say that it's working well or it's not working well. It's premature—
 (1210)
Mr. John McKay: You'll pardon me if I say your answers are not giving me great comfort.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I'm trying to--
Mr. John McKay: I understand what you're trying to do. What concerns me is there are institutional and almost cultural barriers between the two organizations that preclude a level of cooperation that is significantly improved over September 11. So I would be interested in knowing how you, as a supervisory body, are riding herd on CSIS to make sure that the cooperation that's necessary to actually enhance security is... You can have resources all over the place, you can have legislation all over the place, but if you don't have cooperation, it's virtually useless.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I agree with you, but you'll have to understand that our group is not reviewing RCMP activities. Keep this in mind.
Mr. John McKay: No, you're a one-sided group, I understand.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes, just on one group.
I understand your point, and I would not say yes, everything is fine. That's not what I want to say. But you mentioned the culture and the culture can be changed. It's taking a long time, but any culture you can change. With the events we all went through, I think these organizations today are more aware that it's important that they cooperate. That's as far as I can go.
Yes, Gary.
The Hon. Gary Filmon (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee): Perhaps I can add to the comment.
There isn't a meeting that we have with CSIS officials in which the question is not asked as to whether or not there's a level of cooperation with the RCMP and other law enforcement agencies and what they are doing to ensure that it is strong and it's improved. I can say that this is a question the chair has on her agenda at every single meeting. I can't recall, over the last year and a half that I've been on the committee, that this question hasn't been asked of those officials.
I think the response has been positive in every case because of the fact that there has been the scrutiny of the public and the allegations in the United States that there was a failure of cooperation between the FBI and the CIA as part of what they consider to be the responsibility for September 11 having happened. So I can say that they're well aware of the need to continue to enhance the cooperation.
We've had occasion to ask the same question of the leadership in the RCMP, with the same response, that they are doing everything they can to enhance the level of cooperation. Whether or not the INSETs will continue to enhance and promote that I can't say. But one would have to think that if they're working together in integrated units, that would also have a direction to improve their cooperation and their working together.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Filmon.
Colleagues, your chair has a couple of comments and questions, if I may.
First of all, in terms of SIRC's budget, the estimates for the upcoming fiscal year will be tabled within days, so we'll soon see just what the government has in mind in terms of the SIRC budget. Hopefully, it will move in the direction of more resourcing.
Also, the term “Sunni Islamic extremism” is now generally used in the intelligence community. I have friends who are of the Islamic faith. They're not the problem. I have friends who are Sunni Islamic and they're not the problem. The problem is the extremists. My friends and I are, from time to time, if not all the time, uncomfortable with the lexicon, the use of the phrase “Sunni Islamic extremism”. I'm not really seeking an answer from you, because it's not SIRC that generated the term; it is the intelligence community. I'm urging upon you sensitivity to the continued use of the term.
If there are any creative writers in the intelligence community, I would urge upon them to take on the challenge of rewriting the phrase that describes what we're dealing with here, which is really a bunch of ugly, murderous creeps, irrespective of their religious faith. I'll leave that with you.
 (1215)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I understand your point, and it's well taken. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Ms. Jennings referred earlier to Bill C-17, and there are elements of this buried in your report. Bill C-17 authorizes the RCMP to gather information in relation to “threats to the security of Canada”. The term is drawn explicitly from section 2 of the CSIS Act.
This has nothing to do with CSIS and nothing to do with SIRC. However, given the explicit references in your report and the ongoing close and extensive cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS, we will now have police in Canada explicitly authorized in law to collect information in relation to threats to the security of Canada.
We all know, around this table, that CSIS does that work under close statutory and SIRC scrutiny and inspector general scrutiny. Now what's going to happen is this RCMP agency, with whom CSIS has a very close connection, is now going to be gathering information on the same subject without the protections of the CSIS Act.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Exactly.
The Chair: There is all kinds of potential for subcontracting from CSIS to the Mounties. In fact, it's a statutory invitation to do so. As a member, I am unnerved about that.
I know that SIRC won't want to comment on legislation, at least not too much, because if it's a policy decision you'll leave it to the government. I invite you to take note of it and make comments now, not only in relation to the RCMP.
In your report, you refer to relations between CSIS and other agencies and joint operations in and outside Canada. The other agencies presumably include international agencies from other countries. I invite you to make a comment on the threats to the security of Canada, relations with the RCMP, and relations with these other agencies, all with reference to the civil liberties of Canadians.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I understand your question. The question of subcontracting is very important and very accurate at the moment. We've been concerned with subcontracting CSIS activities to CSE, for example.
It's not new. Maybe it's something that, because of the new powers given to the RCMP, could be put in place. We are concerned about that. It's something we monitor and will continue to monitor. We thank you for raising it with us today.
Thank you.
Mr. Ray Speaker (Member, Security Intelligence Review Committee): If I could say, Mr. Lee, in terms of the questions you've raised, I think one of the things you should be looking at, possibly in a policy matter, is the oversight agencies that currently do their job, RCMP, CSIS, and SIRC. Under the new circumstances, do we need to adjust them and look at different formats from what we have at the present time?
The Chair: Okay. Thanks.
Madam Gauthier.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Mr. Chairman, I think my colleague would like to tell you about a small difference.
The Hon. Gary Filmon: No. I wanted to make one other comment that I forgot when responding to Mr. McKay. He referred to us as a supervisory body. We're not, of course. We're a review body.
We don't supervise their daily activities. We don't look over their shoulders during the course of their actions. We can review any and all of their activities on a post-hoc basis to see whether or not they complied with legislation and whether or not, as in the case Mr. Lanctôt raised, they have gone through all of the steps, checks, and balances in applying for judicial warrants for surveillance and all of those things. It's not on a supervisory basis, it's on a review basis.
I think we don't want to misrepresent what powers we have or what our role and function are.
 (1220)
The Chair: For clarification of the record, would you confirm for us that CSIS now, from time to time, does open files and carry on investigations jointly with foreign intelligence agencies, both outside and inside Canada?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: As you know, we don't want to reveal operations. Let's say that generally, they can have joint operations inside or outside Canada with other organizations.
The Chair: Most Canadians would think we're being stupid if we don't collaborate with other intelligence agencies around the world.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Exactly.
The Chair: We'd be head-in-the-sand stupid. But it raises issues for you as a review body.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I think in the opening statement of our annual report we mentioned that indirectly. We mentioned the fact that Canada has very strong, cherished values that Canadians like, and we don't want to be pressured by foreign powers to do things that Canadians would not like our service to do.
The Chair: Colleagues, I have another question, but--
The Hon. Gary Filmon: I also would add that it is fair to say they've ventured into more agreements for relationships with foreign intelligence agencies, so there is a greater effort to collaborate with foreign intelligence agencies.
The Chair: This committee has not yet had the benefit of seeing or reviewing any of the existing MOUs between CSIS and other agencies. That might become important to us at some point.
I'll leave that and go to other colleagues. I certainly have other questions, but...
Mr. McKay.
Mr. John McKay: We've seen the United States form a new body, Homeland Security, and I think at root the real reason Homeland Security exists is to basically bang heads between the FBI and the CIA to make sure everybody is on the same page and that the information on threats to the security of the United States is coordinated and the agencies cooperate.
I take Mr. Filmon's point on the difference between review and supervision. I wonder whether from time to time you give thought to whether the role of SIRC should be enhanced to something greater than merely a review body, to something more akin to the role Homeland Security takes on. It wouldn't necessarily be SIRC, but should there be an entity like that? It would be there to make sure that whatever cultural barriers there might be between the institutions are reduced, whatever cooperation needs to be taken into consideration is done, services aren't duplicating or falling over each other, and there are no institutional fights as to whose turf is whose.
I'd be interested in your comments as to whether we should pursue a parallel course to the Americans on that.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: We're ready to do whatever work we're asked to do. But having said that, I think this kind of work is more for elected members of Parliament and the cabinet. It's the government's responsibility to do that kind of work, at the first level. I think it's coordination with--
 (1225)
Mr. John McKay: That's a careful bureaucratic answer to respond to.
You folks think about this, presumably. You're involved in the review of CSIS and security issues on a daily basis; I'm not. And I dare say even Mr. Lee, who has made this a bit of a significant area in his parliamentary life, doesn't deal with it on a daily basis.
I'm extending an invitation to share with the committee your thoughts, on the record, as to whether this is not such a bad idea that the Americans have.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Of course, any measure to improve the way all these issues and policies are prepared and implemented is something we are in favour of. I'm sure it's the same for you. We're never completely satisfied that what is done is the best way to do it. There is always improvement. While we see that in the States they have created this Department of Homeland Security, we should not overreact and put too much into it. It's a balance. We're a part of it; the Solicitor General is there.
Coordination is the name of the game today. We must be sure that at the cabinet level it's done properly, that there is no overlapping.
I agree with you; it's a concern. To tell you that SIRC itself should be doing the work or participating more in this process—we're not ready to tell you that today.
The Chair: I'd like to focus on one of the micro-details of the report, at the risk of boring everyone. It has to do with warrants. It's notable that SIRC twice mentions the issue of the integrity of the warrant procedure. It's mentioned twice; clearly, it has caught your attention. It is mentioned on page 77 and on page 23.
The issue you've raised in both cases is the collection of personal information that you believe is not directly relevant to the purpose of the warrant. You've flagged it twice. Your words are “The committee felt it was of questionable relevance to the target's threat-related activities.” In both instances, you indicate that CSIS has disagreed with you. You made an assessment that the information collected was not strictly necessary for the purpose of obtaining the warrant: you, the review body, have drawn the line; CSIS has disagreed.
As a review body doing the work for Parliament, you have my attention. The security agency has declined to accept your advice, which you offer on behalf of Parliament. I need some clarification, because if members wish to take this up further, we need to be possessed of as much information as you can provide us. We will carry on this issue with CSIS. What can you tell us about this warrant procedure?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: There are two things I can tell you about cases where we say the service disagreed with our observation. Maybe for the first year, when they say that to us, we will just keep it in our mind and review it the next year to see if it's a trend in that direction. If it's only one case, and maybe it's not of importance—it's there, it's not good, they should not do it, but it's not terrible—we would wait to see if such a way of doing things is becoming a habit and getting some importance. That's how I would answer you.
If it were to develop into something important, then of course we would not just tell you the service disagreed. We would say that we found the service is doing things in such a way, we disagree, and we recommend they do this or that.
 (1230)
The Chair: Do you think it might be healthy for us to take this up with CSIS, or should we just leave it for another year?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Well, you could...
The Chair: We could leave it. We would be happy to leave it if you think we can.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Okay. Leave it for the moment.
The Chair: All right. Another issue has to do with CSIS providing advice in relation to security clearances.
You've raised in your report, on page 39 of the English version, the issue of loyalty to Canada. This is a judgment that the granter of a security clearance will make. The granter is not CSIS; it is the department.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Exactly.
The Chair: CSIS collects information in relation to threats to the security of Canada. The decision made on the security clearance is based on loyalty to Canada.
Can you connect the dots for me on the public record whereby CSIS and/or the agency involved is able to extrapolate from threats to the security of Canada to loyalty to Canada? What allows the department to reach a conclusion that loyalty to Canada is a concern, when the information collected by CSIS is all focused on threats to the security of Canada? Who makes this judgment about loyalty, and, to the best of your knowledge, what is it based on?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Well, I think the criteria for loyalty to Canada is different from when they collect information under section 12 on threats to the security of Canada. So loyalty is, as you can imagine, a wider criterion. CSIS is not the one at the end of the day who decides. It's the department.
I'm told that the definition is in the government policy. It's not CSIS. CSIS will bring to the attention of the department some activities, some defaults, things the person might have done, and then it's up to the department to decide.
The Chair: I guess my focus is on whether CSIS itself raises the issue of loyalty when providing advice to the department. Or does CSIS just provide the basic facts, what they have gathered from an investigation, and leave it to the department to impose the loyalty to Canada framework based on Treasury Board GSP--government security policy?
 (1235)
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I think they would give all the facts, but I don't think they would make judgment on loyalty. They would say a person is reliable or unreliable. They don't use the same terms.
Ms. Susan Pollak (Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee): Reliability relates to loyalty as well in the government security policy. They will flag it if they think an individual is problematic, but it's always up to the deputy head of the department to decide whether the information that he or she receives warrants granting or not granting the clearance.
The Chair: I think you can see what I'm getting at. The question is the fairness of having CSIS, which collects information in relation to the threats to the security of Canada, making a judgment about loyalty and communicating it to a department.
I'm hopeful that you'll tell me CSIS doesn't mention the word “loyalty” at all, that CSIS provides information about the person that legitimately comes from the security review that they do, and then the department uses the concept of loyalty to Canada. Am I right in that?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: That is my perception. That's what they do.
Ms. Susan Pollak: And this is what's required under the government security policy.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Yes, because as they mentioned to us, there may be other reasons, which CSIS does not even know about, that would be a part of the decision from the department. So CSIS will bring one perspective, its side of the picture, but there could be other criteria or facts that would make that person not loyal to Canada.
The Chair: Yes, okay. So as long as we're clear on that, you're saying that from the best of your knowledge now, it is the department that makes the decision about loyalty to Canada, and not CSIS.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Exactly.
The Chair: What I don't want to hear, what I'm hoping doesn't exist is a sheet of paper or an electronic page where the CSIS officer has a checklist on loyalty to Canada criteria and they prepare that. They do their quick investigation. They search the indices and then they check off “good”, “bad”, “good”, “bad” on the loyalty to Canada page, and then send it on to the department.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Oh, no, they don't do that.
The Chair: They don't make judgments about loyalty directly. Good, okay. That's what I wanted.
I've monopolized the time.
Monsieur Lanctôt.
[Translation]
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: The answer somewhat worries me, because it must absolutely be Citizenship and Immigration Canada who do the screening. For example, a person who has been a landed immigrant in Québec for 15 years and who wishes to have his brother come over, and this brother knows the other guy is a sovereignist. I am not sure I am the most loyal person to Canada today, but I am however loyal, in a democracy, to the idea that sovereignty can be promoted in a country...
L'hon. Paule Gauthier: There, you said the magic word: “in a democracy.“
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That is correct, but a service must not screen on the basis that there will be a new sovereignist in Québec.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: No, not at all.
Mr. Robert Lanctôt: There must absolutely be a distinction.
L'hon. Paule Gauthier: Absolutely.
[English]
The Chair: Okay. Now I want to tackle a larger issue of issue-based or event-based targeting, which has been raised before. That's shown in the English version on page 11 of the SIRC report. In any event, it's almost impossible to escape issue-based or event-based targeting post-September 11. I think I understand that.
The concerns expressed by SIRC previously have indicated that by following the event or issue approach, the net or the scope of the investigation is much wider and it can involve many more persons than if it were just a personal focus.
What exists now in the ministerial directions or in the CSIS procedures that would constrain the use of this issue-based targeting that both SIRC and the inspector general have indicated concern about?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I cannot give you the exact ministerial direction. I would have to check for that, if there is one.
What I can tell you is this. Because we've been monitoring this very closely with them for a long period of time and we have made recommendations concerning that issue, today it's easier for us and also for them to implement. When they go for a warrant, with event-based targeting it's for a very short period of time. They cannot go on and on with that like that. If they want to continue, they have to justify that it's still an event-based targeting and then they have to focus on one person, two persons, if need be, but that's it. It's not going on forever.
If there is a ministerial direction, I don't know.
 (1240)
Ms. Susan Pollak: There are policies.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: So we could provide you with the policies. Okay?
The Chair: That's good.
I will just comment on the issue of pop-up security experts in the public, who are all too quick to advise the public about what's happening. Thereby, it makes it difficult for CSIS, and I suppose for SIRC, given that in many cases it's difficult to respond publicly to some of the allegations without revealing elements of files that are secret.
I don't have a solution to that, but I would love to see the evolution within CSIS of some function that would allow a spokesperson to deal with public issues like that. Right now, they don't appear to have a vital function performing that task.
Do you know if CSIS is devoting any resources to public information or public relations, or let's just call it the media firefighter, after something comes out in the press?
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: I cannot answer for CSIS. As we all know, they have a public relations person. They have a person in charge of dealing with the media. They do that on a regular basis.
Apart from that, do they want to increase the role? Do they want to educate?
In a sense, when you go public, what you try to do the most is to educate the public on the dangers of revealing information. It's an education. I see it in that way, in the sense of education.
Informing is very important, too, but sometimes the public doesn't want to know. They would like to be reassured and to understand more than they would like to know the name of a particular person.
The Chair: Okay. Thank you.
If there are no further questions, on behalf of all my colleagues on the committee, I want to thank each of the members of SIRC and their staff for their work on behalf of Parliament and Canadians. Most of it goes unnoticed for most the year.
Your report this year was a very good one. I look forward to your upcoming report in the fall.
The estimates procedure of the House of Commons will likely allow us to invite you back prior to June. We'll be in touch in due course. I do hope that by that point in time we'll have some clarity on the appointment of the two members you're missing on the body.
Thank you for coming.
The Hon. Paule Gauthier: Thank you very much.
The Chair: We're adjourned.