SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

¹

1540

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Ward P. Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service)

¹

1545

¹

1550

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

¹

1555

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Mario Laframboise

º

1600

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Mario Laframboise

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

º

1605

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Bill Blaikie

º

1610

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

º

1615

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

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1620

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

º

1625

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Mario Laframboise

º

1630

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

º

1640

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

º

1645

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

º

1650

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

º

1655

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

»

1700

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

»

1705

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

»

1710

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

Mr. Ward P. Elcock

The Chair

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CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 005

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1540)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): Colleagues, we're reviewing the estimates of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, such as they are. We generally look at the block figure and then ask general questions.

    We have as our witness and guest today Mr. Ward P. Elcock, who is the long-serving director of CSIS. Our researcher, Phil Rosen, has prepared a short brief for members, which may be helpful in questioning and reviewing the estimates. We have Marilyn Pilon here with us today as researcher. Mr. Rosen is travelling with the justice committee out west today.

    I'll begin by asking Mr. Elcock if he has an opening statement. If he does we can begin with it and then go to questioning.

    Mr. Elcock.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I do have an opening statement. I'll try to leave as much time as possible for questions, so I will be brief. I hope the comments I make will be useful in the context in which we find ourselves.

    As the committee members are no doubt aware, the current global security environment is at a level of instability not seen for some years. The many tensions across the world have potentially serious consequences, and should they come to a head simultaneously the capacity of nations to respond to the military, political, and humanitarian demands would be tested to the limit.

    Events derived from the actions of Islamic terrorists have put western security resources, including those of CSIS, under extensive pressure. The escalation of tensions has increased demands from allies and heightened the effort required to meet national security requirements.

    Since war was declared on Iraq on March 19, 2003, the service has been operating in a heightened stance, and has increased its vigilance and operational activities against terrorism. I should be clear there, Mr. Chair, that Canada has not declared war against Iraq, but a war is taking place in Iraq. To date, there is no known specific threat to Canada or Canadian interests.

    In November 2002, al-Qaeda's Osama Bin Laden named Canada as a legitimate al-Qaeda target due to its participation, in large part, in operations in Afghanistan and its support of strong measures against terrorism. The assessment drawn from this announcement is that Islamic extremists may undertake terrorist operations in Canada or against Canadian interests abroad. The service continues to operate at a heightened level of activity and vigilance against al-Qaeda and associated groups.

    Although there is no information regarding specific dates, times, and methods of these attacks, al-Qaeda has proven capabilities in a wide range of terrorist operations, including mass casualty attacks with improvised explosive devices, aircraft hijacking, assassinations, kidnapping, and armed assault operations. Taken as a whole, it is judged that there is a direct threat to Canada and Canadian interests worldwide. The U.S. is still, of course, the primary target in North America. While we assess prospects of a chemical or a biological weapons attack as remote, particularly in a domestic context, there is now at least a Canadian dimension to the threat.

    Immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the Government of Canada took a number of legislative and policy initiatives to address the needs of Canadians with respect to their safety, and allotted substantial amounts of money to the public safety and anti-terrorism initiative.

    The current threat environment has dictated an increased workload for CSIS in several areas including immigration screening, security screening for government, research related to determining listed terrorist entities, and combating the financing of terrorist activities. The Government of Canada has recognized these increased responsibilities and the increased need for investigative resources by providing additional funding. As announced in the December 2001 budget, the service received a 35% increase in its base--$354 million over a six-year period. This has allowed the service to increase its workforce to 2,290 in 2002-03 from 2,097 in the previous year.

    These resources have been used to augment existing programs and have allowed the service to take important steps to improve and enhance its operational effectiveness through an accelerated recruiting program and the replacement of obsolete and dated technical and communications equipment.

    Even with increased funding, however, the very nature of intelligence collection is still a risk management enterprise. CSIS regularly assesses emerging threats, sets priorities with respect to those threats, and allocates its resources in order to best meet the challenges of the current threat environment.

    Safeguarding the public against the threat of terrorism remains the service's first priority, with Sunni extremism being the top priority within the counter-terrorism program. Covering the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, protecting Canada's economic security, defending against cyber threats to critical infrastructure, and safeguarding the confidential information of the Government of Canada from foreign governments and others who might threaten the security of Canadians remain operational priorities for the service.

    Counter-terrorism illustrates the service's efforts to use risk-management strategy to deal with the threats within available resources. Early in the 1990s, terrorism began to emerge as the greatest threat to Canadian security. Recognizing the shifting threat environment, CSIS moved resources into the counter-terrorism operational program, focusing on Sunni Islamic extremism. Over the last decade, the resources devoted to counter-terrorism have grown with the scope and complexity of the threat.

    There are other adjustments that the service has incorporated to accommodate the ever-evolving security environment. One is the creation of a counter-proliferation branch. The risk posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing concern, as both state and non-state actors seek those deadly weapons and the power that accompanies them. With this in mind, the Government of Canada has identified counter-proliferation as one of its security intelligence priorities.

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    CSIS responded to the increasing seriousness of the proliferation threat by creating a unit to bring together those elements of the service that were already investigating such issues. This unit therefore combines the expertise of both the counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism fields to address a growing threat that extends beyond national boundaries to include non-state actors.

    The counter-proliferation branch fulfills its role within the CSIS mandate by collecting information related to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons development programs undertaken by a foreign government, or indeed, terrorist organizations. Through exchange relationships with foreign governments and working closely with a number of federal government departments and agencies, the counter-proliferation branch has been able to expand upon and share its knowledge about threats and emerging trends in the area. With the information it gathers it develops assessments of potential weapons of mass destruction threats within Canada or against Canadian interests. These assessments can be distributed to the broader security and intelligence community and to other federal government departments and agencies.

    I turn to enhanced intelligence cooperation. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, have once again forcefully brought to the fore the necessity for security intelligence agencies to cooperate with one another both nationally and internationally. The transnational nature of several terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda being the most notorious, requires effective sharing of pertinent information among organizations involved in public safety and security. Provision of focused, timely, value-added security intelligence advice to other parts of government, remains a priority to ensure that individual security and intelligence requirements are met and to maintain an ongoing exchange of information between the service and its major departmental clients.

    In response to changes in threat activity, CSIS increased its exchange of intelligence with security intelligence organizations of friendly nations supporting Canada's commitment to fighting international terrorism.

    I'll turn to front-end screening. The provision of security advice on immigration and citizenship matters is crucial to countering imported threats to the security of Canada. The screening program serves as a first line of defence against those who attempt to penetrate the country to undermine Canadian security. Consequently, CSIS attempts to ensure that all requests in this area are processed expeditiously.

    Working closely with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the service's immigration screening program's primary task is to provide security-related advice to CIC. The objective is to prevent persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act from entering or gaining status in Canada. In the last year the most important change from a security screening point of view was the adoption of front-end screening for all refugee claimants to Canada.

    Front-end screening is a government initiative to ensure that all refugee claimants arriving in Canada are checked against CSIS and RCMP records prior to Immigration and Refugee Board assessment. The initiative was implemented to identify and filter potential security and criminal cases from the refugee claimant stream as early as possible in the determination process. Prior to the introduction of this program CSIS was not asked or mandated to screen refugee claimants.

    There are, however, additional demands and pressures on the horizon. In the heightened security atmosphere since 9/11, the escalation of tensions has increased demands from allies and heightened the effort required to meet national security requirements.

    The current threat environment has dictated an increase in workload for CSIS in several areas including the utilization of CSIS research and analysis in listing terrorist entities as provided for in the Anti-Terrorism Act; the use of CSIS intelligence in moving against terrorist financiers; demands for security screening services, which CSIS provides to all federal government departments and institutions except the RCMP, but also now to nuclear power facilities and some provincial governments; increased requests for information from, in particular, American agencies, which rose some 300% in the first six months after September 11, a trend which shows no signs of abating.

    For CSIS, as well, already subject to review by CIRC and the inspector general, and to operational pressures at a time of heightened threat levels, an unprecedented interest from other governments and parliamentary institutions has also been a challenge.

    Despite this increased workload, it is important to note that our relationship with our American partners is considered both strong and paramount. This was reiterated at a March 2002 conference in Whistler, British Columbia, in which Louis Freeh, the former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, noted:

With respect to the Canadian and US partnership...in the areas of terrorism, cross-border crime, espionage, there is actually no strongerrelationship that exists in the world, at least in my experience, than between the lawenforcement (and) intelligence services of both countries, and I know from a first-handposition.

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    The war on terrorism will continue and undergo transformations as both sides in this conflict adapt to new world realities. While recent events have underlined the fact that Canada is not immune from acts of terrorism, CSIS will continue working with partner agencies toward disrupting support of terrorist financing networks in Canada and denying refuge in this country to members of terrorist organizations.

    I hope those comments are of some assistance to members of the committee. If there are any questions, I'll be happy to try to answer them.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Elcock.

    We'll go to seven-minute rounds to open. We'll go to Mr. Sorenson first.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you for coming again today. It's always a pleasure when you come and we then have the ability to question you and get some answers about a war we're all concerned about, and that's the war on terrorism.

    I have a couple of questions, but I'll save some of them for the three-minute rounds. First, throughout the presentation today you talked a lot about increased threats since September 11. I think about four or five times you talked about the heightened security atmosphere since September 11, the six months after September 11, a time of heightened threat level since September 11. But could you describe whether or not we've again seen another heightened level of security since the outbreak of the war in Iraq? It's not our war. We haven't declared war, but certainly our ally and our closest trading partner has. We're very closely tied to their intelligence-gathering agency, as we are to agencies all around the world.

    Have we seen an increased threat here in Canada specifically because of the war, because of the fact that our proximity to the United States could mean that some of the enemy who is at war...? We've seen them carry out terrorist attacks in the war: car-bombings, suicide bombings, and other things. If this were to broaden out to where it was happening in the United States or happening abroad, does CSIS recognize an increased threat since the war in Iraq began?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, Canada is not a participant in the war. That said, there have long been concerns that Iraq in the event of war would use or resort to terrorist attacks to carry on the war from its perspective. There's no question that has been of concern for all intelligence agencies around the world over the last period of time.

    The problem with terrorist operations, whether they're carried out by al-Qaeda or by the Iraqis, is that whether you are actually participating in the war or not, you can get caught in the way and may be seen as an opportunity to attack an American or British target. There's no question that in this context the reality is that with the war in Iraq there is increased tension around the world and there are increased risks.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Given the increased risk and the risk to our security since the war in Iraq began, have you made application to the government for more resources that could help you better meet the heightened security risk?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: As I said, Mr. Chairman, we received a large influx of resources in the December budget after September 11. At this juncture we would not see any need to seek additional resources to deal with the present circumstances.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Let me ask a question also about something for which you've been on record on in the past.

    When we had the former deputy clerk of the Privy Council here--I think his name was Richard Fadden--for questions, he made recommendations that CSIS take a look beyond our domestic abilities of gathering intelligence and perhaps broaden out and become more involved internationally. Our Deputy Prime Minister has in the past said that it was time to perhaps expand the foreign intelligence capabilities of gathering information. He was looking at a homeland security type of idea, but also being able to broaden out.

    Have there been any more discussions or any more consideration to expanding the role or expanding the abilities of CSIS to become more involved on an international stage? I fully recognize that we already can gather some information internationally using other agencies and going there if we're going to speak to other agencies, but have we had any discussions recently on having an agency working abroad to pre-screen people who would immigrate here?

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    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Unfortunately, the answer to your question is a long one. The reality is, in terms of screening, just to deal with that aspect, we do have officers abroad who do indeed already do that function. They're there as liaison officers but they also carry out a security screening role in the sense that they deal with cases of concern in terms of interviews abroad. They do that already, and have done that for years.

    In terms of our operations abroad, it has always been within the mandate of CSIS, and it has been, if you will, an evolution in terms of the kinds of operations we run that CSIS has the capacity and has the mandate to operate abroad. It has that mandate in respect of any threat to the security of Canada, and inferentially, any other information that CSIS may collect during such an investigation.

    We have in the past operated and will continue in the future to operate with other agencies abroad but also to operate ourselves covertly abroad if indeed we believe there is merit in doing so in any particular case. Not every case is soluble by that kind of operation, but indeed we already do, have done in the past, and will continue to do so into the future.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

[Translation]

    Mr. Laframboise, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to go back to something my colleague from the Canadian Alliance mentioned earlier. Let's be clear. He asked you if the terrorist pressure had increased because of the war. First, you said we were not at war. Therefore, theoretically, war should not have increased the pressure. But you also said later that it was increasing the tension.

    Were you talking about the American or British interests? I could understand about the embassies, but is it increasing the tension or is it true that, since we're not at war, there is no additional pressure due to the war? Terrorism is still there. We know there still is pressure due to terrorism and we realize you must do your job, but the question he was asking was about the war. Has it increased the tension?

[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think what I said, Mr. Chairman, is that while Canada is not a participant in the war, the problem with wars is that sometimes even innocent victims get caught up in the events of war. The reality is we are the next-door neighbour to one of the major participants in the war, and arguably American or British targets in Canada could conceivably be targeted by an Iraqi action. People could seek to get access to the United States by Iraqi agents. Among other things, those are the kinds of things that would increase the risks of possible terrorist action, and from our point of view they are in increased demand at this point in time because there is a war in Iraq and there are potential threats.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: But, if I understand correctly, it's against the American and British interests here in Canada. Otherwise, you would have increased the security level. Let's not scare the people who are listening to us, Mr. Elcock. Let's be realistic. I probably agree that the embassies could be subject... You are certainly more vigilant and more careful about the assets the countries at war have in our country, but for the rest, don't you think we should try not to scare the population more than necessary?

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[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I wasn't referring to any specific targets. We don't have any specific information about a specific threat. What we do is investigate potential threats in order to identify them before they happen. It would be for the police and others to protect embassies and diplomatic institutions, but there are a lot of other institutions. The reality too is that there are a lot of the other institutions, corporations, other entities that could be the focus of an operation, and obviously our concerns in that respect would be very broad.

    We continue to investigate to ensure that nothing like that occurs within the country, but it is an increased demand, an increased threat on top of existing threats.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: Except that that threat has not caused you to increased the security level. You haven't sent a message to the public saying you were raising the public tension a notch higher. It's more or less what it was before the war. Since September 11, 2001, you have done a good job and you are continuing to do so. You are saying there are more requests for surveillance; it's fine, and I'm very conscious of that. But, about the work you're doing and the risk or the level of the threat to the population, it's been the same before and after the war. I don't want us to scare the population today.

[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think I'd have to say there is an additional threat level in the mix, but we're talking about apples and oranges. The issue of threat levels is one where we provide advice, to the police and to government, on what the nature of the threat is. It is for governments to make decisions as to what level of response is necessary to that particular level of threat. In some cases, it may be that it will require additional action, that you may see guards placed around additional embassies or something like that.

    For the most part, that's a decision that would be made by the police or law enforcement officials around the country on the basis of whether there was a specific threat, not whether there was a general increase or drop in the level of threat.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: Until now, it's still reasonable for the public; we can agree on that.

    I will ask you a second question. Bill C-17 will probably be adopted. Personally, as you know, I wish it were amended considerably. But if it's adopted as it is, do you have sufficient budgets to create the stream of data required in the bill? Do you have all that in your budgets or would you need additional amounts to be able to reach the goals set in Bill C-17?

[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The expenditures under Bill C-17 will be essentially related to building the necessary search capacity to run a stream of data past a list of names, the names of terrorists. It's an additional expense, but I think we can probably manage that particular expense. At this point, we don't believe that is going to be a problem.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: In your analysis, have you gone as far as examining what the airlines will have to pay to try and create that stream of data, or is it outside your jurisdiction and, therefore, you haven't examined it? Of course, with the new work methods prescribed by Bill C-17, you will have to coordinate with the airlines. Have you examined the possibility of additional costs for businesses or is this outside your ambit?

[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: On the issue of the airlines, there has been some discussion with the airlines, and that will go forward. From our point of view, we're not looking to the airlines to establish a database. We're simply looking to the airlines ultimately to provide us with a stream of data.

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    The Chair: You have seven minutes, Mr. Blaikie, and then we'll go to Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I have just a few questions of Mr. Elcock. I noticed that on a number of occasions, I think twice, you referred to “Sunni Islamic extremism”. I'm wondering why you would use that rather broad category, which is both broad in a sense of including a lot of people who perhaps shouldn't be included and excluding a lot of people.

    Obviously, for instance, I think it's a conventional concern that Iran is seen by some as a country that sponsors terrorism, or at least has been accused of it, yet unless I'm wrong, that's a Shia Muslim country.

    So why just use that phrase? I guess that's the thing that struck me. Isn't it more the case that there's a particular branch within Sunni Islam that is more connected to terrorism than others?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think the reality of the expression “Sunni extremism” has come about....

    There's no question that there are Shia terrorist groups as well. The problem, I think, with Sunni extremism is that there are a large number of groups, some of them scattered and with national affiliations. There are indeed Egyptian groups, Sudanese groups, Somali groups, Chechen groups, and others. The reality is, all those groups operate in a much more interchangeable way than most other organizations--Shia groups in particular, for example--do.

    They have cooperated to the extent that I think it has become that the reference tends to be to Sunni extremism rather than trying to give an endless list of all the groups associated in or coming under the banner of Sunni extremism, led in large part by al-Qaeda.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: Would you say also that you're lending help to various government departments and institutions, but now also to nuclear power facilities and some provincial governments? Is that something you do, then, on request? Is that what you're saying? Why some provincial governments and not others?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: At this juncture, some provincial governments have asked us to undertake that, and the federal government has agreed to do that on a cost-recovery basis to provide security clearances, for a provincial security clearance to specific provinces. We have a couple of agreements in place, and I think a couple of other provinces have expressed interest.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: So it's just upon invitation or pursuant to agreements that you would provide that.

    Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: There has been a lot of concern in the post-September 11 context about racial profiling, targeting of various groups. This has come up in some discussion previously, and obviously you can't go into too much detail, but given what we've just talked about, for instance, with respect to Sunni extremism, does this mean that the Sunni Muslim community is getting more attention than other communities from CSIS, or how does that work?

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    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No, it doesn't. It simply means that, as regards targets, from our point of view we largely investigate specific groups and specific individuals. We're not looking at the Sunni community as a whole--or the Shia Muslim community, or the Irish Catholic community, or any other community from which, on occasion, terrorist organizations may draw some support or may exist within.

    At the end of the day, we're in the business of investigating specific individuals and groups, and that's the same for the Sunni faith as well. We're interested in those elements who are members of terrorist organizations who are also Sunni, but it's not a focus on Sunnis broadly or the community broadly.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Blaikie.

    Mr. Pratt, for seven minutes.

    Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to welcome Mr. Elcock to the committee. It is good to see you again. I must say, of all the committees I've appeared before or participated in, you're one of my favourite witnesses.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's because my answers are so fulsome, I hope.

    Mr. David Pratt: Yes, absolutely, and then some.

    You're going to think I'm a bit of a broken record on this issue, Mr. Elcock, but I'll take another stab at it, because I found your responses last time pretty interesting.

    On the issue that was mentioned earlier by Mr. Sorenson, of gathering intelligence in other countries, foreign intelligence, obviously CSIS does have, from a legislative standpoint, some capability to gather information through covert activities in other countries, information based on a potential threat to the security of Canada. Also, it would seem to me that there are probably some limits in terms of what you're able to do through exchange relationships. Some countries, I'm sure, would be very cooperative from a security standpoint; others will give you just the information that they think they can get away with in terms of what they provide to you, not providing much in the way of depth, I would think.

    But in terms of some of these operations that have been conducted, covert operations outside of Canada that would be based on a threat to the security of Canada, in this interconnected world of ours, would we or could we see ourselves doing operations that have been requested by, let's say, some of our closest allies, to assist them where they may not be able to get information in a foreign country, in the sense that when we're talking about threats to the security of Canada, threats to the security of our allies in some respects can be in fact threats to the security of Canada? Is there that broad a construct that might be given to covert operations abroad?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We do operations abroad with other organizations. We do enter into what we call joint operations with a wide variety of other agencies.

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    Mr. David Pratt: It's my understanding as well that these operations are fairly limited in terms of the number. I think it goes back to the issue of the establishment of a separate foreign intelligence agency for Canada. You yourself have indicated that, for instance, requests from American agencies have risen 300% since September 11. There are more requests for information coming to us from our allies. Yet, unlike our allies, we've constrained ourselves by not having a foreign intelligence agency that is able to get out there and not just deal with threats to the security of Canada, but also with the myriad of other interests we may have, whether it's from a political standpoint, a military standpoint, or a commercial and economic information standpoint. We've deprived ourselves of the ability to collect that information by being the only G-8 country without a foreign intelligence agency.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Your question ventures into an area where ultimately the decision is a policy one for government, whether or not it wishes to establish a foreign intelligence agency. There have been debates about that over the years.

    There is no question that CSIS's ability to collect information abroad is not unlimited in terms of a legal mandate. The reality is that because of the size, unless you're a huge organization, the number of operations that any organization would do abroad would be limited. Operations abroad are by definition more risky, more expensive, and so on. So even if you had a foreign intelligence agency, the number of operations that such an agency might run might also be very limited and might not even exceed the number that CSIS would do now.

    I think there is one considerable advantage in the way we function in terms of threats to the security of Canada. It's a bit of a disadvantage, I suppose, for the committee, but the reality is that the definition of threats to the security of Canada is quite a broad one and goes quite a long way. It does provide quite a broad mandate for the service's investigations. The fact that the service carries out those operations both within and outside of Canada means that there is no gap between us and some other organization collecting outside of Canada. Whatever we collect outside of Canada is part of the investigation we're doing inside Canada. So there are some advantages in the way we do it in terms of threats to the security of Canada. If one were to create a separate agency, then arguably, I suppose, that advantage of being able to pass information straight through, rather than trying to pass it between two separate agencies, would be lost.

    The other reality in the short term is that the primary concern at the moment for us as a country and for a number of other countries around the world is the war on terrorism. If one were to create a foreign intelligence agency tomorrow--and this isn't to express a view on whether it is a good idea or a bad idea--you would be looking at 10 to 15 years before you got any real return out of that organization because it takes that long to develop the kinds of skills that allow that organization to do the kinds of operations that get you any valuable intelligence. So that's a long-term commitment if one wants to go down that road. In the present circumstances, given the war on terrorism, the only way you could speed that up would be to take people from CSIS and put them into your new organization. As the director of CSIS and given the war on terrorism, I would argue that would be a mistake at this juncture. It would not be wise, in my view, to create a separate agency at this juncture that would partition CSIS resources in a way that would impair our ability to function effectively.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Please put me on for another round.

    The Chair: Sure.

    Now we'll go to three-minute rounds. We'll go back and forth. Your chairman has a question or two himself.

    Mr. Sorenson for three minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

    I have a couple of more questions that come out of the discussion we've had. Just to get it on record, when we talk about gathering intelligence abroad, what organization do we rely the heaviest on?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: What do you mean?

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Which intelligence-gathering agency abroad? Is it the British? Is it the American? I don't even know. Are there intelligence-gathering operations in countries that we historically wouldn't ally ourselves with? Do we work with China, for example? Or do we work with intelligence-gathering agencies in some of those countries that we don't have really close ties to? Who do we rely the heaviest on?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We have relationships with some 250 services around the world, both security intelligence services and foreign intelligence services, and in some cases signals intelligence services. Those relationships are often important in specific cases in terms of being able to check information, obtain information, or seek some assistance.

    I think I've said before, and it would be true, our closest relationships are obviously with our American partners. We're part of the same North American space, and the reality is we work very closely together.

    That said, we do have relationships with a number of other services. Some of them are also very close. Some of them, I suspect, would be surprising to most people. But we have a wide number of relationships.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Another question, which is off the subject of foreign intelligence--well, maybe it isn't--is the response from CSIS when we receive, say, a threat. I'm thinking of a refugee who poses a threat to our security, and we deny their access to the country. Given September 11, there were many people who were questioned in Canada as to whether or not they were a threat.

    Is it CSIS's role to disclose to Canadians that this threat is here in Canada or that there were people who were trying to get in, just to enlighten Canadians that this is happening and CSIS is on top of it?

º  (1620)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think over the last few years, as an organization, we have tried--indeed we were under considerable pressure--to be more open in terms of what we did and didn't say. But at the end of the day, the reality is our legal mandate is to provide advice to the Government of Canada.

    Generally speaking, certainly in terms of specifics--specific threats and any more detailed explanation of threats or threat levels--we would provide that information to government, to police forces, to law enforcement agencies, and to the RCMP, who are actually charged with the responsibility of delivering security or deciding what level of security is an appropriate response to a particular threat.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: On television yesterday we all saw flashed across the bottom of the screen that CSIS has deemed Zundel to be a threat to Canadian security. CSIS is the one that has clamped down on this. I would certainly agree that people like that shouldn't be coming into our country, but how do you determine whether or not he is a threat? Was there a threat that he would organize, or is it just his message that was a threat?

    How do you go about assessing the level of security threat to our citizens?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: In that case, I think it was a witness from CSIS who testified at the hearing. I know roughly what he said, but I don't want to get into a detailed discussion of what he said, because I don't have it in front of me at this point. But that was part of a presentation we would have made to the Immigration and Refugee Board in respect of Mr. Zundel.

    The same sorts of things would occur in section 77 of the immigration and refugee protection legislation--I've forgotten the exact title--replacing the old Immigration Act. The section 70 certificates we do are the result of our investigation--and it's the same thing with the Immigration and Refugee Board--of a specific individual or group that provides us with enough information to allow us to make a judgment, given the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, that the individual meets the test of being a threat to the security of Canada.

    I don't have the specific document in front of me, so I can't, unfortunately, take you through that in detail at this point, but certainly his testimony is there on the public record.

    The Chair: The chair wants to get in an issue here. I think I'll just do it now.

    In the circuit court, Mr. Elcock, there were references to the challenges presented by issue-based targeting. If you're targeting an individual who may be a threat, that's one thing. If you target an issue or an issue-based group, you inevitably have to focus on people who may themselves not be threats, but on whom you may gather information.

    SIRC has pointed out that as CSIS has gathered information, in some instance it may have been gathering information that was not strictly necessary for the purpose intended. They've mentioned this twice in their last report, once at page 23, I think, and once at page 77.

    So are you able to help us in terms of civil liberties, and to describe how the service is able to gather information about threats? Can you do so in terms of when CSIS focuses on issues, as opposed to when it focuses on individuals, and in terms of how we manage to protect the civil liberties of individuals who are not actually threats themselves but who may come under surveillance, because they've become associated with an issue or a group issue?

º  (1625)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I think, Mr. Chair, that there's a certain amount of mixing of apples and oranges here.

    The issue of retaining information that is strictly necessary to an investigation is one that we occasionally have with SIRC. I don't think that the two instances you mentioned had anything to do with issue-based targeting. They were simply SIRC's view that certain information we had retained, which I think was in a warranted investigation or one that would not be an issue-based.... That wouldn't be an issue-based case at all, because we wouldn't get or have a warrant in an issue-based targeting situation. But I think that they had some concerns about information we had retained, which they believed might not be strictly necessary. In our view, it was necessary, because it was related clearly to intelligence possibilities that were important to us.

    We occasionally have these differences with SIRC. Sometimes we agree to disagree, and sometimes if they have real concerns, they would make those concerns known to the minister in perhaps stronger terms. In those cases, we would ultimately have to have a discussion with the minister, who is ultimately responsible for making the decisions, since SIRC makes a recommendation, not a decision.

    With respect to issue-based targeting, it is usually something we do when we really don't entirely have the scope of the problem, and don't necessarily have any specific...or when we're not sure who the specific individuals are who we should be concerned about. We may have a general idea of the problem, but it allows us.... It gives us discipline in managing those investigations. For example, if a new subject were to come onto our screen, somebody we knew nothing about, but who we suspect may be productive of a threat to the security of Canada, it gives us an authorized way to ensure and await a disciplined investigation, which might take place into that new and potential threat, to ensure that there is no improper investigation.

    Usually those issue-based targeting situations are at a lower level of intrusiveness than the most intrusive level. For obvious reasons, one would not have a warrant in those cases, in any event.

    The Chair: In approximately 1990-91, the predecessor of this committee reviewed the ministerial directions on targeting in a secure environment at the CSIS offices. So I'm going to ask you if it might be possible to do that again—on the assumption that the members are so advised. The question came up before SIRC at the last meeting. SIRC was cooperative at the time, but eventually wrote back to us that they weren't in a position to turn over the ministerial directions. So I'm asking you if we can do it again.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I've checked that—backwards, sideways, and up—with all of the people who were involved, from the highest level in the service down to the people on the desk. Everybody reports that to their knowledge no such opportunity was provided to the committee. There was an in camera discussion or briefing with the committee at the time; but from having talked to the previous director and to all of the officials who worked there, my understanding is that no such incident took place, that the committee was not provided access to the ministerial directions. Unfortunately, everybody seemed to be at home this afternoon, so the telephone....

    Further, I guess I would have to say that it's not up to me, in any event, to provide those. They are ultimately the minister's direction, not mine. So it would be a decision for the minister whether or not to provide access to the directions.

    The Chair: Okay. You operate with the directions; the committee may have a desire to see them. My memory of the review of the directions is very clear. Unfortunately, it was an in camera proceeding without notes, so we don't have a transcript.

    In any event, I'm now going to distribute to members a draft order that would allow us to proceed on that, if the members are so advised. It can be taken as notice of an intention to move this later.

    I'll pause there and go to Mr. Laframboise, for three minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It's interesting. I will pursue your questioning, Mr. Chairman, because when Bill C-17 was examined—which is the bill covering security and, among other things, collecting information about travellers—, you have been asked questions, Mr. Elcock, mostly concerning the role of the privacy commissioner and the information commissioner, who would be practically excluded from the audit by the bill that has been tabled. Because, as you know, Bill C-17 is about gathering personal information and the length of time that information will be retained. And the Chair's question was about the retention period and the targeting of information.

    You know, Mr. Elcock, we are here to ensure transparency, to try and demonstrate to the public that the work done by the police and the information services is not against public interest. I'm surprised you're having the same reaction you had before the committee, which is that you don't want additional texts that would ensure, for example, that the privacy commissioner could check if the information you are retaining is really useful and does not go against civil liberties.

    It's the same thing for the information commissioner, who is saying it doesn't make sense that the personal information can't be accessed under the access to information procedures, that it's completely excluded from the Access to Information Act. But you have maintained that those people practically don't need...

    I'm concerned, Mr. Elcock. Try and reassure me about the fact that, when you obtain information, you don't want other organizations to come and tell you... Try to reassure the public that the information you are retaining does not go against individual interests, or against civil rights and liberties.

º  (1630)  

[English]

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I think that's a slight mischaracterization of what I said in the committee. Since neither of us have my previous remarks here, I can't recall exactly what I said. But let me come back to the issue and say that everything that CSIS does is subject to the review of SIRC, and anybody who has complaints about the activities of CSIS has the ability to make a complaint to SIRC about those activities for SIRC, indeed, to carry out an investigation. As well, the privacy commissioner has access to CSIS material, and can come to inspect to CSIS files, etc.

    At the time, I think that I was simply responding to the question of whether something needed to be put into Bill C-17 to ensure there was the necessary transparency. In my view, there really isn't. I'm sure that everything we do, and would do, in respect of Bill C-17 would be more than adequately reviewed.

    Mr. David Pratt: Going back to your comments, Mr. Elcock, on the fact that CSIS is involved in the covert collection of intelligence abroad--I suppose you could call it foreign intelligence in that respect, and I say this partially tongue-in-cheek--in some respects I think you might be the guy the McDonald commission warned us about. This is in the sense that when the McDonald commission made its recommendations, it talked clearly about the dangers of contagion between the two agencies, one involved in collecting domestic security intelligence and one involved in collecting foreign intelligence.

    I think in connection with some of the recommendations, and I'm quoting here from the McDonald commission, “It would be unwise to combine very different intelligence collection responsibilities within a single agency.” They talked about, as I said, the dangers of contagion. In another section of the McDonald commission, “...there is a danger of creating a security and intelligence monolith in a democratic state. Demarcation lines between the two services, dealing with foreign and domestic overlap of the two, would have to be carefully drawn.” There is definitely an issue there as far as one agency involved in both foreign intelligence and domestic security intelligence is concerned.

    I appreciate your comment with respect to where do you get started on something like this--do you take resources away from CSIS in order to create a foreign intelligence agency? My answer to that would be that you probably have to start somewhere, and that it probably wasn't easy back in the early eighties when CSIS was separated from the old Security Service of the RCMP.

    But ultimately, in terms of a foreign intelligence agency providing Canadians with the best possible protection against acts of terrorism and serving Canadian interests in the widest possible sense, whether it's information relating to politics, the military, commercial activities, etc., given that we're the only G-8 country without a foreign intelligence agency, maybe we should actually have that debate in this country sooner rather than later. Would you agree with that statement?

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Just for the record, Mr. Pratt, I don't think Mr. Elcock said that CSIS was collecting foreign intelligence. He said CSIS collected security intelligence in a foreign location.

    Mr. David Pratt: Covert activity is essentially foreign intelligence, though. Would you agree, Mr. Elcock?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The problem with the latter part of that question is it depends on what you mean by “foreign intelligence”. If you mean by the definition of foreign intelligence that anything collected outside the country is foreign intelligence, whether it's related to threats to the security of Canada or is simply information that's important for the government to know for other reasons, then that's one case. If you think that foreign intelligence in the CSIS Act ultimately means not all intelligence collected outside the country but intelligence that is not threat-related, which is maybe collected only inside Canada, that's complicated and it turns on all the legal language. But if you believe it's the broad definition, then there's no question that we are collecting foreign intelligence when we operate outside the country to collect threat-related intelligence.

    Mr. David Pratt: But do you think the McDonald commission was off-base in terms of making the comments it made with respect to separating these two agencies and the debate we need to have in this country as far as the two agencies are concerned?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm not going to comment on the policy issues, Mr. Chairman. I think at the end of the day that's an issue you gentlemen and Parliament may ultimately have more to do with than I will.

    I would simply say in response that I think there's no question that the McDonald commission said that. Having said that, I think the McDonald commission happened a long, long time ago, and a lot of water has gone under the bridge since then. That's not to say the McDonald commission was wrong in what it said, but I think the McDonald commission took place in a world where no intelligence agencies really had much in the way of review. I think the revolution in the intelligence business, whether it's in this country or in other countries, has been the degree of review of intelligence services that essentially didn't exist prior to that time. That, I think, can arguably make a difference in the judgment you make one way or the other. The reality is that everything CSIS does is reviewed. Whether we do it inside or outside the country, wherever we do it, it is subject to review. Arguably, that can change the equation.

    The only comment I'd add as well is that in respect to CSIS as it started in 1984, CSIS started with some 1,900 members of the Security Service from the RCMP. In other words, it started with a core of experienced investigators. It really took us ten years to get to the point where we had created a coherent and effective organization, and that was starting with professionals.

    The Chair: That's time. Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. Sorenson, you have three minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Maybe a lot of my questions are off the wall, but this one might top them all.

    Initially CSIS had about 2,800 workers, 2,800 analysts, agents, whatever you call them, personnel. You went down to about 1,900, and then there were extra moneys made available after you recognized that the attrition rate was going to be huge, that we were coming into a time when we were going to lose a lot of analysts. I was just wondering, how is it going with our personnel numbers right now? What are we at--are we at 2,200? I know the idea was to get back up to about 2,400, wasn't it?

º  (1640)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The service never actually had a number of 2,800. It was 2,700-something, I think. Full service actually started at about 1,954 members. The service will likely rise to something, I think I said, like 2,290 at this point. The service will ultimately rise to probably something like 2,390 or 2,400, depending on which day of the year it is, how many people have retired, and how many people are in the process of being hired.

    In terms of retention, indeed, I think some consultants said at one point that in terms of their experience in private industry, we had an enviable retention record, and indeed that largely continues. There was a blip around September 11, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, but I think certainly in the recent past we have not seen an excessive rate; we've seen a very low departure rate from the service.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: The reason I ask, and the part that might be a little.... I'm just asking because I have a legitimate question, in that I want to know the role of CSIS.

    This week I was in Toronto, and when I was at the airport I saw people wearing masks all around the airport, obviously for the SARS concern they had there. I got to thinking--I don't know whether it was a movie I had watched or what it was years ago--about that type of terrorist attack, whether it was biological or--I don't know if there is such a thing--viral terrorism.

    Would we have, just given the concern right now with something that isn't terrorist-related, but given that in a war and given that with the war on terrorism, with the war in Iraq, and with all the talk we've heard about weapons of mass destruction, are you...? First of all, is there anything CSIS does with the listing and with people who are coming here even in a legitimate way? I know the World Health Organization.... And it's more of a Canadian health concern, but is there anything CSIS can do in identifying, targeting, and questioning people before they come here, or is that completely up to health...?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: In terms of trying to identify people who might or might not have SARS, I suspect that Health Canada and others abroad would have more capacity than we do. We do obviously target terrorist groups and we do obviously target nations that seek to develop programs of weapons of mass destruction, whether those are chemical, biological, or nuclear. In that respect we would be looking at some of those same issues to ensure that--not necessarily in this case--there was not an element of that in any particular event. We do perform those kinds of investigations, but the specific issue of, for example, SARS and whether or not somebody who is coming to Canada is healthy or not healthy, we would have neither the expertise nor the mandate to do it.

    The Chair: That's time. Thank you.

    Mr. Pratt, you have three minutes.

    Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Elcock, I attended a very interesting conference in January of this year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and one of the guest speakers was former senator Sam Nunn, who was talking about the nuclear threat initiative. He said a few things that really made me sit up and take notice, one of which was that in October of 2001 top U.S. government officials received a highly classified intelligence report warning that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and planned to smuggle it into New York City, where it could, according to reliable estimates, kill a million people. That intelligence report was later judged to be false, and I think we all thank God that it was.

    Do you find yourself working on projects, shall we say, that end up being what could be described in the vernacular as wild goose chases?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The whole premise on creating an intelligence agency is that you're seeking to find out what you don't already know. So, by definition, some of the things or some of the leads you chase down turn out not to be true. Obviously it's of concern to us sometimes when there is a plethora of wild rumours and a plethora of reports that simply don't pan out, and which nonetheless you have to follow up, because if any one of them proved to be real and you hadn't done it, the results could be catastrophic.

    It's an inevitable problem in managing an intelligence service. I think the reality is, however, that like most intelligence services, it's like anything else in the world: you get to be more experienced in what you do if you do it for long enough.

    We depend on a cadre of very experienced people. We look at them as being career people in the service. We're looking at people who ultimately will spend 30 years in the intelligence business. Those kinds of people have, if one has trained them well and they've had the right kinds of experiences as they move through the service or any other intelligence agency, a capacity through training and experience to make judgments and are going to have to make judgments from time to time about what is real and what is not real.

º  (1645)  

    Mr. David Pratt: Was CSIS drawn into that particular investigation?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I don't recall. I remember the specific threat. I don't recall whether we were specifically involved in it or not, but we've been involved in similar cases where there have been potential threats that didn't pan out. It happens, unfortunately.

    I'm just going to make one other comment, going back to one of your earlier questions. That is, I think there are at least two or three intelligence services around the world or countries that have, in the last ten years, in fact opted to create an intelligence service that is both domestic and foreign.

    I think in particular of the Dutch. There's one other that escapes me at this point, but there are a number of countries--a couple of countries, at least--we deal with that have in fact created one agency to do both. In part, I think the reality for them was cost and the reality that those organizations are thoroughly reviewed.

    The Chair: Mr. Elcock, your budget estimates for the fiscal year starting today apparently total $261.5 million. Because of the nature of the ways these documents are produced for us and the fact that we don't go into detail on the specifics of CSIS spending, could you just flip back the calendar one year and tell us what the budget was last year, roughly, so we can get an idea of the increase?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Off the top of my head, I don't know the answer to that question. Sorry.

    The Chair: We can probably dig it out. I'm sure we can, because we would have had it last year.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: If not, we can certainly provide it.

    The Chair: Okay.

    I'll refer you to the SIRC report. It refers to a new ministerial direction that created four new operational policies in the last year. One of them focused on the service's investigative activities in operational assistance outside Canada. The second related to joint operations and operational assistance with foreign agencies in Canada. So I'm pleased to see the roughing out of policy dealing with these things. But my question is, how is SIRC, on behalf of Canadians, to grapple with the civil liberties issues related to operations of foreign intelligence agencies in Canada, even when they do operate under ministerial direction or under an MOU?

    These agencies could be from any country, but it would be under an MOU. CSIS would be aware of it. There might even be a joint operation. How can we be sure that those agencies, while they are here, are operating strictly within the law that governs CSIS? And it is pretty strict; the rules are pretty strict. How can we be sure about that, and how can we be sure there isn't going to be some subcontracting and corners cut in relation to civil liberties?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of comments, one being that the policies or the directions you're referring to are simply a consolidation into one specific ministerial direction of a number of ministerial directions that existed before the consolidation. So all that SIRC was referring to was the consolidation of a number of areas that pre-existed that consolidation.

    In terms of operations here of any foreign intelligence agency, any foreign intelligence agency that was operating here without our approval and under our control--and therefore subject to all the rules and the laws, and so on, that bind us--would be essentially operating in an unfriendly manner and would become a counter-intelligence problem rather than a joint operations problem.

    The Chair: Okay, I understand the good faith; it's in your reply. But how do we know agent A from service B, working with CSIS here, is operating under the same strictures and scrutiny that your agents are?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: They only operate under our control if they're operating here; otherwise they're a counter-intelligence problem.

    The Chair: We know this because you tell us it is so--and I'm not disbelieving it.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: No, Mr. Chairman. It's ultimately up to the committee whether it decides it knows it or not, but the reality is, all our activities and all our joint operations are reviewable by SIRC. On the same basis as the actions of a CSIS officer are reviewable by SIRC, something we do with a foreign agency and a joint operation is reviewable by SIRC, and we are ultimately accountable for that joint operation, since we control it.

    The Chair: Okay, so all the joint operational activities hit the file at some point. You're telling me that. Nothing escapes the file record. Is that a fair way to put it?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's right.

    The Chair: Okay. That's good. Thank you.

    Mr. Pratt, for three minutes.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    On the issue of cell-based terrorism and proliferation, you were talking earlier about, I'm assuming, extremism. Obviously there has been a lot of discussion over the course of the last six or eight months in terms of the connection between al-Qaeda and the events of September 11, and al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime itself.

    I guess I believe you can't necessarily draw a straight line between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government as far as the events of September 11 go, but is it your understanding, Mr. Elcock, that in fact the connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime, or elements of the Iraqi regime, is in fact there, that there is a connection? Is that your understanding at this point?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: That's a difficult question to answer. There is some evidence of contacts. Whether or not those contacts mean anything more than contacts--and I think that has been widely reported in the American press--whether that means there is any relationship is a matter of considerable debate.

    Mr. David Pratt: Okay, but would it be a relatively safe assumption, based on what happened with the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, that there was probably an evacuation of many elements of al-Qaeda to various parts of the world, whether it be Pakistan, Iraq, or maybe Syria--I'm just guessing here--or maybe former republics of the Soviet Union, that it's probably reasonable to believe al-Qaeda has made its way into Iraq at this point?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I wouldn't characterize it as an evacuation. There clearly was, as a result of what occurred in Afghanistan, a dispersal of a number of elements of al-Qaeda--that, too, is well reported in the press--and those who are associated with other groups who were together with al-Qaeda, if you will. They are scattered around the world. I think we've said that before, and it's evidently true.

º  (1655)  

    Mr. David Pratt: Going back to this business of the intelligence report related to New York, I presume it's safe to say that sort of incident is the worst nightmare of any intelligence agency in terms of trying to cope with the problem of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.

    Going back to this conference I attended, what became evident to me was how many tactical nuclear weapons there are out there that were never really accounted for in the former Soviet regime, how many biological and chemical stocks existed in the former Soviet Union, and how many former Soviet scientists are on the market with their expertise, whether it's nuclear, biological, or chemical. Is there any effort by allied intelligence agencies to track the whereabouts of these people?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The simple answer to the question is yes. All of us have considerable interest in identifying anybody who was part of any of those programs. I should emphasize that in the case of nuclear weapons, I'm not aware of any of what I would regard as credible reports of any organization having obtained a nuclear weapon. There certainly have been rumours from time to time. You described one. But so far there has been no credible report of any group obtaining such a weapon.

    In the context of terrorism, I think all of the members of the committee will have seen the reports of information seized in Afghanistan and elsewhere suggesting that al-Qaeda and groups associated with it have made attempts to build chemical or biological weapons of one sort or another. Anybody involved in that is of considerable interest to any intelligence service.

    Mr. David Pratt: From your standpoint--

    The Chair: Your time is up. I suppose you have a short follow-up.

    Mr. David Pratt: I have one final follow-up question.

    The Chair: I see the two fingers pinched very closely together. All right.

    Mr. David Pratt: We're all thankful, obviously, that didn't happen in New York. But is it safe to say, Mr. Elcock, that from your vantage point and based on the information you have seen, those sorts of situations are neither impossible nor implausible as far as the activities of various terrorist groups and their attempts to acquire these weapons are concerned?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: To nuance it a little bit, some of the chemical and biological weapons are somewhat more difficult to create and use than is generally known. That said, all intelligence services are clearly concerned about the possibility that some organization will develop the capacity to build a weapon that will allow it to get a much bigger, if you will, bang for its buck than with conventional explosives. But so far most organizations have stuck with more conventional forms of terrorism. A chemical, biological, nuclear event is in some respects of enormous concern because of its catastrophic nature, but the probability is relatively lower than somebody using regular everyday C-4.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: You're welcome. You've had a great double round, Mr. Pratt.

    I want to ask about the threat of transnational crime. Over the years CSIS has lent some of its resources to that envelope, and I understand the basis of that. Could I ask you to confirm that CSIS continues to devote resources to the challenge of transnational crime? Could you describe the efforts you may have to take from time to time to protect information you generate from disclosure in the criminal court process, where sometimes the criminal courts will require disclosure before they'll proceed with a prosecution?

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Those are really two separate issues. In respect of the latter issue, that's one that arises no matter what we do. It can arise in a counter-proliferation case where somebody is trying to take something out of the country illegally. It can arise in a terrorism case. It can arise in a counter-intelligence case. It really doesn't matter what the origin of the case is. It was for that reason precisely that the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act were included in Bill C-36, to try to ensure that we had a broader statute in Canada to deal with the issues of protection of information before the courts. That is a problem not only for us, but also for law enforcement from time to time, and both of us believe those provisions ought to provide, in the long term, better assistance in terms of protecting information in those cases where the sources of the information need to be protected--human sources, for example, or whatever.

    The issue of transnational criminal activity is an area where we have some investigations. It is a relatively small area for the service. For us, it has always been an area in which we have only participated where we believe we have some value to add. I'd suspect there is probably not much we could add to the investigation of the Mafia in Canada, or motorcycle gangs, and so on, but there are some other groups that we know better, know something about, know something about their origins, and where we can be of assistance to the police and provide them with some information that may be useful ultimately in a prosecution.

    The Chair: I know how tough it is running an intelligence service to deal with public issues that come up, because of the constraints in making disclosure, but there was a recent case that I think involved--I'll just use the name Jabarah--Mohamed Mansour Jabarah. The individual was brought back to Canada from Oman--at least this is what the report was--and then his movement to the United States was facilitated by CSIS.

    I know it might have been difficult then to comment publicly, but some people have expressed concern about that, just in terms of bringing a person and shuffling him or her through countries and over to the Americans. Are you in a position where you could make a comment on that now, which might shed some light on this and how the service did its job properly?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Mr. Jabarah returned to Canada voluntarily and went voluntarily to the United States.

    The Chair: Okay. That's short and sweet.

    I have another question. It's technical.

    When the service obtains warrants, they obtain them from the Federal Court. The service and SIRC, in outlining the warrant application activity, distinguish between an urgent warrant and a normal warrant. Are you able to clarify the basis on which a court would respond on an urgent basis and provide a warrant? And if they do, do they go back and look at it later in more depth?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We don't distinguish. We get warrants under section 21. Sometimes it takes less time to prepare the warrant and the process is faster. In some cases it's a more routine process.

    Since our warrants generally last for about a year, in some cases if the warrant is obviously going to continue in the following year, it's a routine process to prepare the warrant. In other cases, you may have to do something on a more urgent basis. But from our point of view and the court's point of view, they're exactly the same document.

»  (1705)  

    The Chair: Okay.

    The Federal Court hasn't turned down a warrant application in quite a while. That means the service is really good in documenting its warrant applications, and probably it's quite skilled in doing that. But the average person is curious about the batting average, a one thousand batting average. Is it possible that the statistic, the batting average, is a thousand because in some cases the court won't turn down a warrant but simply asks the service to go back and provide more information? Is that one explanation, or is it just simply a matter of fact that the service has been successfully obtaining warrants without being turned down by the court for a couple of years now?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We haven't been turned down very often in terms of warrants, and not because we're often sent back to review a warrant. In some cases that might happen, but it's relatively rare. It's very rare.

    The Chair: You just have a great batting average, or you have a very--

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: The process of preparing a warrant in the service, Mr. Chairman, is very onerous. They are extremely long documents, numbering in many cases 80 to 100 pages. They're very thorough documents that require a long process--a lot of people and a very stringent process.

    We have a pretty good record, but we work very hard to get it.

    The Chair: Do you personally always chair the warrant review committee?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: In some cases, if I'm not there, it would be the deputy director of operations acting as director in my stead.

    The Chair: Does the justice department still act de facto as devil's advocate in those procedures?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Yes.

    The Chair: That concludes my questions, colleagues. Are there any follow-up questions?

    Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Going back to the nuclear threat initiative, Mr. Elcock, obviously there's been a change in the relationship between the west and the former Soviet Union--Russia--in terms of NATO and the extent to which the Russians have been brought into certain NATO activities and various partnerships. Has the same thing applied in terms of intelligence cooperation? I'm thinking about these former Soviet scientists, for instance, tracking some of their activities. Have we been doing more work with the Russians over the last number of years than we would have, let's say, in the early nineties?

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: We have long-standing relationships with some countries that are very close. We have newer relationships with other countries, some of which a few years ago we would have counted as enemies, or potential enemies, at the very least. Obviously those relationships take some time to develop.

    The intelligence business is built on knowing each other and working together over a long period of time. It's trust. There needs to be a fairly high level of trust, even if that sounds somewhat unusual for an intelligence agency to say. But it does, at the end of the day, necessitate the building of trust between organizations in order to get to the point where you can either share information or indeed go even further and carry out joint operations. Those processes are slow ones. It takes a long time to build the right level of trust.

    Mr. David Pratt: But would you say we're doing more than we've probably ever done with the Russians in areas like transnational crime, the Russian mafia, and this whole business of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

    When I look through some of the documents from this nuclear threat initiative and I see the 20,000 or so nuclear weapons the Russians had and the fact that some of them at this point are protected by nothing more than a chain-link fence and a poorly paid security guard, it would seem to me to be in our interest to cultivate some of those relationships, not just with the Russians, perhaps, but also with some of the other former Soviet republics.

    Again, it seems to me the proximity of those former Russian republics to central Asia is very critical in terms of the threat of terrorism and the myriad issues related to security.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: I'm sorry if I'm being a bit oblique, but perhaps it will be a sufficient answer to your question.

    I think the reality is areas such as terrorism, where everybody's interests are clear or much clearer than they are in some other areas, are easier for people to cooperate on than some of the other areas you mentioned. In some other cases there are tensions that prevent or are very much in the way of effective cooperation with a number of services around the world.

    But certainly in the case of terrorism and with respect to the possibility of terrorists procuring weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, or biological--there are a lot of services around the world that a few years ago we would not have cooperated with, which we now share information and have had discussions with from time to time.

    Moscow is a beautiful city.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: We've come to the end of the wonderful set of questions we've had here today. I think we covered a lot of territory.

    I just want to indicate to Mr. Elcock that I don't know when the subcommittee is going to report the estimates back to the main committee, but it may be that we'd like to deal with the issue of the ministerial directions before we do that.

    I will ask our long-time researcher, Mr. Rosen, to obtain the particulars of the meeting I referred to earlier, which you couldn't find evidence of. Not that it will be of great assistance to you in determining what will happen, but it's my view at this point that if the members are so advised, we would order the production of the document from CSIS, and if there are difficult issues extant behind that, they can be taken up in discussions between members and the Solicitor General. If there are no obstacles, then we'll report the estimates back in the normal fashion. If there are obstacles, we may take a different view.

    You may have a comment there.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Just on your first set of comments, Mr. Chairman, I'm aware of the meeting having taken place. I was the coordinator for security intelligence at the time. Everybody I've talked to today is also aware the meeting took place. But regardless of what you may have thought you saw at the time--recollections after a period of time can, unfortunately, be faulty, and even mine sometimes are--the reality is everybody I have talked to is clear that the service did not provide access to minister's directions.

    The Chair: Then they must have spent an awful lot of time typing those hundreds and hundreds of pages of briefings I read through.

    Mr. Ward P. Elcock: Well, there were extensive briefings provided, and we've provided briefings since then to committees periodically. In fact, the ministerial directions are relatively short.

    The Chair: We can talk about it later, but I have a very clear recollection. If the chair is wrong here, I certainly stand corrected. We'll go do our homework, and it may or may not be helpful to the evolution of this issue.

    Seeing no further business, we can adjourn to the next meeting the subcommittee next week, and the record will take note of the draft motion the chair has tabled with the clerk.

    The meeting is adjourned.