Questions and responses 45th Parliament, 1st session May 26, 2025, to present

With regard to the government's announcement on April 20, 2026, about an increase in flights between Canada and China: (a) when was the proposal for an increase in frequency of flights of people and cargo between Canada and China first analyzed or considered by the government; (b) which country made the first inquiry about a potential increase in flights, and what are the details, including how and when the inquiry was made; (c) what are the details of any analysis the government conducted related to the impact of this increase, including, for each, the date, what was analyzed and the findings; (d) which departments and agencies were included in the decision to allow said increase in flights, and were any concerns raised; (e) what are the details of each concern raised, including how the government is addressing each concern; and (f) were public or private consultations completed with the general public or industry participants, and, if so, what are the details, including who was consulted and when?

With regard to government measures to stop the importation of goods made using forced Uyghur labour in China, since 2022: (a) how many times have such goods been intercepted or seized at points of entry by the Canada Border Services Agency; and (b) what are the details of each instance in (a), including (i) the date, (ii) the description of the goods, including the quantity, (iii) the estimated value of the goods, (iv) the point of entry or location, (v) what happened to the intercepted or seized goods, (vi) the charges laid in consequence of the interception or seizure?

With regard to Chinese-made electric vehicles and the Government of Canada's federal fleet: (a) have any departments, agencies, Crown corporations, or other federal entities purchased, leased, tested, or evaluated Chinese-made electric vehicles, and, if so, what are the details, including the costs, number of vehicles, and models associated with each; (b) has the government developed or adopted any policy, directive, guideline, or procurement rule concerning the use of Chinese-made electric vehicles in federal fleets; (c) has the government assessed any security, cybersecurity, privacy, data, surveillance, foreign interference, supply chain, or national security risks associated with the procurement or use of Chinese-made electric vehicles by federal entities, and, if so, who did the assessment and what were the results; (d) are Chinese-made electric vehicles eligible to be purchased, leased, or used under the Greening Government Strategy, the Greening Government Fleets program, or any similar policy or directive related to zero- emission vehicles or federal fleet greening; and (e) has the government issued any direction or recommendation to federal entities concerning whether Chinese-made electric vehicles should be purchased, leased, tested, evaluated, or used in federal fleets, and, if so, what are the details including the dates of each direction or recommendation?

With regard to the statement on CTV Power Play by the Minister of International Trade that "part of the agreements that we signed on the ground in China was law enforcement collaboration, cooperation with each other to keep our communities safe": (a) what are the specific details, including the terms, of all agreements the government signed with China related to law enforcement; and (b) for each agreement in (a), who signed it from (i) Canada, (ii) China?

With regard to drones manufactured in China that are currently owned by the government, broken down by department or agency: (a) how many such drones are owned; (b) what is the breakdown of (a) by make and model; (c) what are the drones used for; (d) what security assessments, if any, have been done by the government in relation to its usage of the drones, and what were the findings of the assessments; and (e) what steps, if any, are in place to ensure that information gathered as a result of the drones' usage does not end up in the possession of government or government-connected entities in China?

With regard to comments made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation at the Standing Committee on Science and Research on April 20, 2026, that "There are agreements to procure Canadian goods" in relation to trade with China: (a) what specific agreements was the member referring to; (b) on what dates were these agreements signed, and which parties are signatories; (c) do these agreements include binding provisions requiring the purchase or procurement of Canadian goods, and, if so, what are the enforcement mechanisms; (d) what reciprocal market access commitments, if any, has China agreed to under these agreements; (e) what conditions, safeguards or protections are in place to prevent non-reciprocal access to Canadian markets by Chinese firms; (f) has the government conducted any assessment of the risks associated with opening Canadian markets to the Chinese Communist party without enforceable reciprocity, and, if so, what were the findings; and (g) has any Canadian market access been granted or expanded in the absence of equivalent or enforceable commitments from China, and, if so, what are the details?

With regard to the government's 2026 automotive strategy and related agreements with international partners, including the strategic partnership with the People's Republic of China: (a) who was consulted by the government prior to finalizing the strategy, and what are the details of each, including when and how they were consulted; (b) what specific risks were identified by the government regarding the entry of Chinese electric vehicles into the Canadian market, and what is the government's plan to manage each identified risk; (c) what specific protective conditions were included in any Memorandum of Understanding or related agreements with Chinese state-linked entities, including provisions related to data governance, labour standards, environmental requirements, and protections for Canadian industry; and (d) what is the government's projected volume of Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles which will enter the Canadian market in each of the next five years and what protective conditions or policy measures are in place to mitigate potential negative impacts on Canadian jobs and domestic automotive production?

With regard to the importation of commercial-grade truck and bus tires from China and the potential impact on Canadian industry and jobs: (a) for each year since 2019, how many commercial-grade truck and bus tires from China have been imported into Canada, how many shipping containers containing these tires have been imported, how many of these shipping containers have been inspected by the Canada Border Services Agency, and how many shipments, whether by container or other means, have been identified as potentially linked to the use of forced or slave labour; (b) since 2015, how many times has the government invoked section 53 or section 55 of the Customs Tariff to protect Canadian industries, what industries were affected, how many jobs were estimated to be protected as a result, and what criteria or thresholds were met for the government to launch anti-dumping investigations, safeguard actions, or retaliatory tariffs in each case; (c) what assessments has the government conducted regarding the impact of Chinese tire imports on Canada's retreading industry, including the estimated number of Canadian jobs at risk, any national-security or supply-chain implications if the domestic retreading industry were to close as a result of dumping, the potential effects on Canada's commercial fleet should the retreading industry close, and the regions, provinces or communities most likely to be affected by losses in this industry; (d) has the government received any representations, submissions or correspondence from the Canadian retreading industry or related stakeholders regarding tire dumping from China, and, if so, who submitted them, on what dates and what was the nature of the government's response; (e) what considerations, including trade or diplomatic relations with China, have informed the government's decisions related to this matter; and (f) since 2019, how many times has the Canada Border Services Agency self-initiated anti-dumping reviews or investigations concerning imports from China, broken down by year, and what are the details of each, including the industry or product involved in each case, the actions taken as a result, the estimated number of Canadian jobs protected and the considerations or thresholds that led to each self-initiated review?

With regard to the government’s assessment of electric vehicles manufactured by, incorporating components from, or connected to companies headquartered in, or subject to the laws of, the People’s Republic of China: (a) what assessment has the government conducted regarding the potential risks of espionage, unauthorized data access, remote interference, or other forms of foreign state influence arising from the use of such vehicles in Canada; (b) what were the findings, conclusions, recommendations, or warnings arising from each assessment identified in (a); (c) which departments or agencies are responsible for evaluating cybersecurity, data security, and national security risks associated with connected vehicle technologies, and what coordination mechanisms exist between them to share information about risk evaluation; (d) what safeguards, regulatory requirements, or security standards are currently in place to prevent the unauthorized transmission of personal, geolocation, biometric, or governmental data from electric vehicles to foreign entities; (e) how does the government plan to enforce the measures in (d) for new electric vehicles coming from the People’s Republic of China; (f) has the government imposed, or is it planning, any restrictions, prohibitions, enhanced security reviews, or procurement limitations relating to electric vehicles or electric vehicle components linked to foreign adversarial states, and, if so, what are the details; (g) what oversight mechanisms exist to monitor over-the-air software updates, embedded telematics systems, and data storage practices in such vehicles; and (h) what steps is the government taking to ensure that federal departments, agencies, Crown corporations, and critical infrastructure operators are protected from potential surveillance or cyber vulnerabilities arising from the use of these vehicles?

With regard to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada's analysis of Chinese-made electric vehicles, including any work undertaken by the Industry Sector, Automotive and Transportation Industries Branch: (a) since March 14, 2025, what are the details of all memoranda, briefing materials, and other records related to the analysis, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) title, (iii) subject, (iv) sender or author, (v) recipient, (vi) type of document, (vii) file number; (b) has the department assessed the potential impact of Chinese-made electric vehicles, including the decision to permit the importation of 49,000 Chinese-made electric vehicles into Canada, on Canada's automotive sector, including vehicle production, auto parts manufacturing, employment, investment, supply chains, consumer prices, and federal or provincial subsidies and incentives, and, if so, how was each analyzed and what were the findings; and (c) has the department assessed whether Chinese-made electric vehicles benefit from foreign subsidies, state support, non-market practices, forced labour, or other unfair trade practices, and, if so, what were the results of the assessment?

With regard to Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada's analysis of the impact of China's tariffs on the canola industry: what are the government's estimates or projections on the economic impact that the 76% tariff on canola seed and the 100% tariff on canola oil, meal, and peas will have (i) overall, (ii) on canola farmers, (iii) on the Prairie provinces, broken down by tariff?

With regard to Transport Canada's work on a connected vehicles policy, and the Government of Canada's decision to permit the importation of 49,000 Chinese-made electric vehicles into Canada: (a) what is the current status of the policy; (b) when did Transport Canada begin work on the policy; (c) what is the expected timeline, including the dates, for the policy to be announced, finalized, and implemented; (d) which departments, agencies, Crown corporations, or other federal entities has Transport Canada consulted in the development of this policy, and how was each consulted; (e) in the development of this policy, how has Transport Canada considered security, cybersecurity, privacy, data, surveillance, foreign interference, supply chains, or national security risks associated with Chinese-made electric vehicles or connected vehicle technologies originating in China; and (f) since March 14, 2025, what are the details of all memoranda and briefing materials related to the policy, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) title, (iii) subject, (iv) sender or author, (v) recipient, (vi) type of document, (vii) file number?

With regard to the government's planned importation of approximately 49,000 electric vehicles from China: (a) what are the details of any national security assessments, that were conducted prior to approving the importation, including who conducted the review and which departments or agencies were consulted or involved in the assessments; (b) what specific measures have been put in place to ensure that these vehicles do not compromise Canada's national security, particularly with respect to (i) data collection and transmission capabilities, (ii) cybersecurity vulnerabilities, (iii) potential remote access or backdoors, (iv) supply chain integrity, (v) any embedded technology that could be used for surveillance or intelligence gathering; (c) has the government conducted or commissioned any third-party technical or security audits of these vehicles, and, if so, (i) who conducted them, (ii) what were the key findings, (iii) were any risks identified; (d) what protocols are in place to (i) inspect these vehicles upon arrival in Canada, (ii) remove or disable any communication modules, tracking systems, or data-sharing capabilities prior to deployment, and (iii) monitor these vehicles once in use; and (e) will these vehicles be used by (i) federal government departments, (ii) the Canadian Armed Forces, (iii) law enforcement agencies, (iv) other public bodies, and, if so, which ones and in what quantities?

With regard to the trip by the delegation, including the Prime Minister and others, to China in January 2026: (a) what were the expenses paid for by the government in relation to the member of Parliament for Markham—Unionville's participation in the trip, in total and broken down by type of expense, including transportation, accommodation, meals or per diems, and other expenses; (b) did the government invite anyone or pay for the expenses for any individuals, including family members, to accompany or staff the member of Parliament while on the trip, and, if so, which individuals were on the trip and what were their expenses, in total, and broken down by type of expense; (c) is the government aware of any gifts provided to the member of Parliament for Markham—Unionville or any other delegation member by (i) the Government of the People's Republic of China, (ii) the Chinese Communist Party, (iii) any provincial, municipal, or regional government in China, (iv) any state-owned enterprise, (v) any United Front organization, business, association, foundation, or non-governmental entity, (vi) any individual or organization acting on behalf of any of the above, and, if so, what are the details, including the name of the recipient, provider, gift description, and approximate value of each; (d) is the government aware of any expenses related to the member of Parliament for Markham—Unionville's or any other delegation member's participation in the trip which were paid for by (i) the Government of the People's Republic of China, (ii) the Chinese Communist Party, (iii) any provincial, municipal, or regional government in China, (iv) any state-owned enterprise, (v) any United Front organization, business, association, foundation, or non-governmental entity, (vi) any individual or organization acting on behalf of any of the above, and, if so, what are the details, including the name of the recipient, provider, gift description, and approximate value of each; and (e) what direction did the government provide to delegation members in relation to accepting gifts from, or having expenses paid for, by any of the entities in (c) or (d)?

With regard to the visit by the Minister of Finance and National Revenue to China at the end of March and beginning of April 2026: (a) what were the dates and times of each meeting attended by the Minister on the trip; (b) what are the details of each meeting, including the (i) names, titles, and organizations represented by those in attendance, (ii) agenda items, (iii) terms of agreements made, if applicable; and (c) what are the details, including terms and signatories of all agreements signed or entered into on the trip, or as a result of the trip?

With regard to the Prime Minister's trip to China in January 2026: (a) what was the total amount spent on hotel accommodations during the trip by the Canadian delegation, broken down by city the hotel was located in; (b) in each city, what was the number of hotel rooms booked, broken down by how many nights; and (c) in each city, what were the room rates paid, how many rooms were booked at each rate, and how many nights were stayed at each room rate?

With regard to Canada's participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: (a) what are the details of the current legal status of Canada's membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, including (i) the date on which Canada formally notified the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank of its intent to suspend activities with the bank, (ii) the effective date of Canada's suspension, (iii) if Canada intends to withdraw fully from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, (iv) the total financial obligations that remain outstanding following Canada's suspension, including capital liabilities and current total value of Canada's shareholding in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, (v) any continuing legal obligations Canada has to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, (vi) whether any Canadian nationals remain employed at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and, if so, how many, (vii) the total amount of funds transferred from the Government of Canada or its agencies since June 14, 2023, (viii) whether Canada designated alternate representatives following the suspension of activities, and, if so, the nationality of are those representatives; (b) what are the details of any assessments, analyses, briefings, or intelligence reports any government department or agency has received since January 1, 2017, regarding connections between the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Chinese Communist Party including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) title, (iii) author, (iv) recipients, (v) type of document, (vi) summary of the contents; (c) have any Canadian ministers or senior officials been informed of any allegations or findings related to undue influence, direction or control exercised by the Chinese Communist Party over the governance, staffing, or operations of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank since January 1, 2017, and, if so, what are the details, including which ministers and officials were informed and on what dates; (d) has the government conducted or commissioned any internal or external reviews, audits, or investigations into allegations that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank operates as, or in coordination with, a Chinese Communist Party front organization, and, if so, what are the details of each, including (i) the titles and dates, (ii) who conducted them, (iii) whether national security agencies were involved, (iv) the key findings and recommendations, (v) any security, governance, or foreign interference concerns identified, (vi) if the government will table the full findings, and if not, why, (vii) which of the recommendations will be implemented; (e) what due diligence was conducted prior to Canada becoming a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank regarding risks of political influence or financial benefit to the Chinese Communist Party or its members; (f) since January 1, 2017, what information does the government have regarding any funds, contracts, loans, or procurement issued by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that directly or indirectly benefited (i) the Chinese Communist Party, (ii) entities owned or controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, (iii) individuals identified as members of the Chinese Communist Party; (g) what monitoring mechanisms are in place to (i) monitor Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank activities, even through partner countries, (ii) ensure Canadian taxpayer funds associated with Canada's shareholding in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are not used in ways that benefit the Chinese Communist Party or its affiliates, (iii) monitor whether Canadian funding provided through other multilateral institutions has been co-financed with Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank projects; (h) what measurable economic benefits, including job creation numbers, contracts awarded to Canadian firms, or investment returns, has Canada received since March 1, 2018, as a result of its participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and (i) what considerations, analyses, or recommendations has the government made regarding maintaining, divesting, or withdrawing from Canada's shareholding in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?

With regard to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the government's response to foreign governments recruiting retired personnel from the Royal Canadian Air Force: (a) what is the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness' policy with respect to retired personnel from the Royal Canadian Air Force accepting contracts or other paid work from foreign governments; (b) is the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness aware of any former Royal Canadian Air Force members accepting contracts or other paid work from the People's Republic of China since January 1, 2016; (c) if the answer to (b) is affirmative, (i) what is the nature of that work, (ii) what is the total (dollar, contribution) value of that work, (iii) how many former Royal Canadian Air Force members are involved, (iv) how many former Royal Canadian Air Force members were CF-18 pilots, (v) what national security steps, if any, have been taken to prevent sensitive information from being divulged to an adversarial foreign government; (d) are the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness aware of any attempts by diplomatic staff from the People's Republic of China or other officials to recruit former members of the Canadian Armed Forces; and (e) if the answer to (d) is affirmative, (i) what steps has the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, or the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, taken to prevent such recruitment activities, (ii) have any diplomatic staff from the People's Republic of China been expelled from Canada as a result?

With regard to the trip by the Prime Minister and others to China in January 2026: (a) what was the total amount spent by the delegation on hotels during the trip; (b) which hotels were used by the delegation; (c) what is the breakdown of the amount spent at each hotel; (d) how many rooms were rented and for how many nights at each hotel; (e) broken down by hotel, what were the nightly room rates, and how many rooms were booked at each rate; and (f) what is the breakdown of (e) by type of room, if known?

With regard to the trip by the Prime Minister and other ministers to China in January 2026, and broken down by minister, including the Prime Minister: (a) what was each minister's detailed itinerary on the trip; (b) what are the details of all meetings attended by the Prime Minister, another minister, or anyone else representing the government on the trip, including the (i) names, (ii) titles (iii) company or organization represented by each person in attendance at each meeting, (iv) agenda items, (v) results of each meeting; and (c) at which of the meetings was the subject of (i) human rights, (ii) foreign interference, brought up by the Canadian minister in attendance?