Committees / Committee Proceedings

Conduct of the chair: meeting adjourned for lack of quorum; resuming debate on a motion

April 1, 2019

Debates, pp. 26495–6

On February 28, 2019, Michelle Rempel (Calgary Nose Hill) raised a point of order regarding the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration during its meeting of February 25, 2019. At this meeting, when the debate on a motion was interrupted by votes in the House, the chair of the committee indicated that the meeting would resume following the vote. However, after the vote, the number of members needed for quorum did not return, and the chair left the committee room without resuming or adjourning the meeting. In response to a point of order raised at the next meeting of the committee on February 27, 2019, the chair of the committee, Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West), confirmed that in keeping with a 2013 precedent, the meeting was deemed adjourned for a lack of quorum and, upon appeal, the decision was sustained. Ms. Rempel charged the chair with unilaterally adjourning the meeting, thus circumventing the powers granted to committees by the House and Standing Order 116(2). The Speaker took the matter under advisement.^[1]

Resolution

On April 1, 2019, the Speaker delivered his ruling. The Speaker explained that Standing Order 116(2) safeguards committee debate from being permanently ended prior to its natural conclusion. After having reviewed the events that transpired on February 25 and 27, the Speaker found that the adjournment of the meeting due to a lack of quorum was procedurally sound and that the motion being debated at the time of adjournment could be taken up again at a later date. Accordingly, the Speaker found that Standing Order 116(2) did not apply. Noting that committees are masters of their own proceedings and that Speakers resist involvement in committee matters absent a committee report, the Speaker concluded that the evidence presented in this case did not show that the circumstances were exceptional enough to warrant an intervention.

Decision of the Chair

The Speaker: I am now ready to rule on the point of order raised on February 28, 2019, by the hon. member for Calgary Nose Hill concerning events that occurred at meetings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on February 25 and 27, 2019.

I want to thank the hon. member for Calgary Nose Hill for having raised the matter and the member for Don Valley West for his comments.

In her intervention, the member for Calgary Nose Hill explained the circumstances that gave rise to her point of order. That is, on February 25, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration was debating a motion when the chair of the committee suspended the meeting to allow members to vote in the House, indicating at the time that the meeting would resume after the vote. However, as the member stated, when they returned, they “waited [for] some time for the quorum to be met, which never occurred.” The chair then left the room without either resuming or adjourning the meeting. Consequently, in response to a point of order raised at their next meeting, the chair confirmed that the meeting had indeed been adjourned. Upon appeal, that decision was upheld.

Contending that the adjournment was a unilateral and prohibited decision of the committee chair, the member for Calgary Nose Hill made it clear that the premise of her objections was twofold. That is, committees do not have any authority to act beyond the powers granted to them by the House and, specifically, they cannot circumvent, even indirectly, Standing Order 116(2).

To answer these objections, and in fact determine the authority of the Speaker in this matter, a comprehensive understanding of not only the words found in Standing Order 116(2) but also of its scope and applicability is important, particularly since this is the first instance in which this Standing Order has been invoked.

Standing Order 116(2) states:

1. Unless a time limit has been adopted by the committee or by the House, the Chair of a standing, special or legislative committee may not bring a debate to an end while there are members present who still wish to participate. A decision of the Chair in this regard may not be subject to an appeal to the committee.
2. A violation of paragraph (a) of this section may be brought to the attention of the Speaker by any Member and the Speaker shall have the power to rule on the matter. If, in the opinion of the Speaker, such a violation has occurred, the Speaker may order that all subsequent proceedings in relation to the said violation be nullified.

While the language of this rule is unambiguous, the Chair must, as always, understand and consider carefully the meaning, and even intention, behind the words. In other words, what was the purpose of adding this standing order to our rules or what new expectations or parameters does it bring? Essentially, it seems to the Chair that this new rule is intended to safeguard debate in committee from a procedural hijacking, so to speak, that would permanently end debate on a motion.

Before its introduction, members could have, for example, forced a debate on a debatable motion by moving the previous question, which is not procedurally permissible in committee, thus requiring committee chairs to rule it out of order. A challenge of such a ruling could have resulted in its being overturned, thereby forcing the chair to put an end to debate and depriving members of the opportunity to further deliberate on a question.

At the very core of this new provision, then, stands the desire to allow committee members to participate fully in their deliberations without being unduly stopped from debating matters until their natural conclusion. Defence of this mattered to the extent that it was, in fact, fortified with a recourse, and a new authority for the Speaker, in the event of a clear violation.

However, this is not to be interpreted as being applicable in all instances of debate ending in committee. For instance, on occasions when a committee adjourns before deliberations are concluded or agrees to a motion to adjourn debate on a question, a permanent end to the debate is not triggered in the matter outlined in Standing Order 116(2); rather, debate on the matter is still permissible and may come back before the committee at a future date to be determined by either the chair or the committee.

To answer whether the matter now before the House is one which Standing Order 116(2) was intended to address, as Speaker, I have scrutinized the evidence and minutes of the February 25 and 27 meetings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.

It is my view that the manner in which the meeting of February 25 was adjourned was procedurally sound as it was due to a lack of quorum, a fact avowed by the member for Calgary Nose Hill. This is a pivotal factor since the debate on the motion did not end permanently in consequence. In fact, the motion being debated at the time by the committee remains unresolved and may be taken up again at a later date. Accordingly, Standing Order 116(2) does not apply in these circumstances and, as Speaker, I am unable to intervene as provided for in this new standing order.

The remaining question then is whether the committee’s proceedings strayed outside the powers granted to it by the House, the sole body able to grant them. The fact that committees are generally the masters of their proceedings is in no way diminished by Standing Order 116(2). Consequently, barring a report from a committee, the Speaker will not usually intervene in committee matters. From the evidence presented in this instance, the Chair is unable to conclude that the circumstances are exceptional enough to warrant an intervention, without the House having been seized of the matter by way of a report from the committee, as is the usual practice.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.