NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 17, 2001

• 1531

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I would like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

In connection with our study of the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces, we have with us today Lieutenant-General Jeffery, who is Chief of the Land Staff. The general is accompanied by Colonel Stephen Appleton, Director of Land Force Readiness, and by Chief Warrant Officer Marius Dumont, Chief Warrant Officer of the Land Force Command.

General, on behalf of the members of the committee, I'd like to extend a warm welcome to you. We're looking forward very much to your comments today. You have the floor.

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery (Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

I certainly wish to thank the committee for the opportunity to address the subject of army capability and readiness. I would like to commend the committee for taking on such an important but in my view daunting task.

My task today is to provide you with a personal sense of the state of land force capability and readiness. Clearly, it is not possible to do so in the requisite detail in the time allotted. What I hope to do is give you a framework and an overall assessment. From this, I believe we can explore some of the details in your questions, and in subsequent sessions if necessary.

[Translation]

I will first speak to the subject of capability: what it is, how we measure it and how we keep it relevant. I will then try to address the matter of readiness; the challenge we face in assessing it, the factors that currently most affect it, my assessment of current readiness and what we are doing to improve it.

[English]

I must state at the outset that the subject of military capability and readiness is a complex one. Even professional military officers have difficulty fully agreeing on what it means. So much depends on professional judgment, and given the different experiences among soldiers, we all view readiness and capability somewhat differently.

Therefore, if you were looking for a consistent and coherent view from all commentators, I believe you will be disappointed. However, I will do my best to make my views clear and help you with the subject. Before going into detail, though, I must establish some context—and perhaps advise you of some personal biases.

First, although I sit here as the army commander, I am part of a team within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. This is not just rhetoric, for I strongly believe that we can no longer look at military operations only from a service or functional perspective. The operational environment increasingly demands that all forces work closely together, and we are building that interoperability into our capability.

Equally, as a nation we can ill afford to maintain capability that is not useful in a variety of different situations. Whatever the environment, future operations must be considered to be joint—that is to say, conducted by all components from a common perspective. When I speak of the army, that does not exclude the other services who are part of the Canadian Forces.

Second, I have some concerns—and frankly, not a little frustration—with attempts by some to place evaluations of capability and readiness into simple black and white terms. Too many people want simple answers: either we are capable and ready, or we are not. But truth in this complex world is a patchwork of grey, as we look at the many pluses and minuses of an organization.

• 1535

Of course, the details of assessment must ultimately boil down to an evaluation of whether we are sufficiently ready to do the job required of us. But this assessment must be based on the professional judgment of those responsible for committing forces, with due consideration of the risks posed by a particular threat and the type of conflict we expect to face. I will do my best to keep things simple, ladies and gentlemen, but you will get no “yes-no” answers from me.

Third, I believe we must bear in mind that capability and readiness must have a focus. Despite what some may wish, I have to meet the mission and tasks established by the government, and given to me by the Chief of Defence Staff. That means an army that can produce and sustain up to two units of battalion-group size, or a brigade-sized main contingency force. I am not expected to sustain a brigade for more than six months unless a degree of mobilization is authorized.

One battalion group must be ready to deploy within 10 days; a second must on 21-day notice to move; and the brigade must be deployable within 90 days. Of course, the army must be prepared to go further, and our force—particularly our reserve force—is intended to provide that depth. But our capability and readiness is very much evaluated on the assigned missions and tasks. While there may be many who want Canada to have more capability—indeed, I would like more capability—I am not responsible for producing that desirable higher capability. That is not the subject of my assessment today.

[Translation]

Finally, we must be cautious about undefined comparisons. The question is capability and readiness compared to what? Is it compared to the Army at some point in the past or is it compared to the potential threats likely to be faced today or in 5-10 years time? In reality, we should consider both, an historical comparison to see if we are making progress and a current comparison to ensure that we can do the job now and in the future.

[English]

I will return to these four issues later, as I try to provide you with my assessment.

Defining capability is a challenge. I will base my remarks on the foundation laid by Mr. Kasurak from the Office of the Auditor General. You will recall that he spoke of the five pillars defined by the U.S. Army: infrastructure, force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness. To save time, I will not speak about infrastructure—although that is an important dimension. But I will address the other four.

Force structure is really the essence of combat capability. Here we must consider the doctrine that we have in place—that is, the key organizational design, and how the force works. The key components of the organization are people and equipment. Assessments must be based both on the quantity and the quality of each.

I believe the most important element is cohesion: assessing the strength of the fighting team, how well it works together, and the collective level of effectiveness and experience. That is very difficult to achieve, and requires the development of trust between soldiers, and between soldiers and their leaders. In the final analysis, it is the critical element that ensures unit hardness and robustness to withstand the shocks of combat.

In assessing force structure, I would say that our doctrine is outdated. It is quite appropriate for today's requirements, but it must adapt for the future. Our equipment is generally good. We have some new and very good equipment coming into service, which will improve our capability. And, as you would expect, we have some older equipment that must be upgraded or replaced.

The quality of our people continues to be excellent. Indeed, the individual training and experience of the army is probably as high as I've ever seen it, and it is that strength that we currently depend upon. However, the quantity of people is a challenge. I must make the point, Mr. Chairman, that your numbers and the more accurate figures I'm going to give you are just slightly different.

• 1540

Overall, the regular army establishment stands at 19,500. Current manning is at 18,600—or 900 short. The reserve manning is now just 14,000. Effective strength at any one time will be less.

Our cohesion is adequate, since units have been together for a long time and have considerable operational experience. However, because the level of collective war-fighting training has been declining, cohesion too will decline over time if there is no change.

The dimension of sustainability is about maintaining sufficient force structure to meet commitments, and to keep the army healthy in the long term. An army must have sufficient robustness and flexibility to ensure sustainability. The less depth we have, the more flexibility is essential—since we can compensate somewhat for a lack of depth by managing resources better. However, all organizations have a critical mass below which they cannot fall without becoming inherently unsustainable.

In the army today, sustainability is the area that concerns me most. The current structure requires greater resources than there are dollars available; but at the same time, personnel demands continue to exceed personnel capacity. One consequence of this imbalance is an increased operational tempo, which leads to a high personnel tempo: soldiers are assigned an ever-increasing number of tasks. Resolving this imbalance between resources and people is my principal focus.

The aspect of modernization addresses the need to keep the force relevant to a changing world. Our LAV III armed fighting vehicle, the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle, our combat communications, and our current operational clothing are all world class. But modernization does not just mean procuring new equipment. It means evaluating the changing security environment, the nation's security needs, the direction of technology, and education levels, and also developing new concepts and capabilities to meet the changing national requirement.

Modernization continually competes with the other dimensions of capability. As with any organization, any short-term compromises in modernization, either in intellectual effort or resources, impose a long-term liability.

In looking at our modernization challenge, I believe we face a fundamental change in the nature of conflict and of operations. I do not believe that anyone has a clear or coherent view of what the future holds in terms of military operations. There are many evolving views to consider.

You have heard one such set of views from Lieutenant-General Dallaire. One thing is for sure: the likelihood of the massed armies we saw during World War II, and on NATO's central European front, is much diminished. That doesn't mean we won't see conventional combat operations; but we expect focused and precise applications of military power to achieve defined objectives within short periods—as was seen in the Gulf War.

In that context, we are seeing a growth in the importance of knowledge in all aspects of warfare, and in capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance that permit us to engage in information-based or knowledge-based warfare. They are increasing in importance.

As a consequence of this changing environment, modernizing the Canadian Forces is a priority. Based on the department's strategic framework, Strategy 2020, we are developing a modernization plan to ensure that we can meet the needs of the future. After a significant period of neglect, the army is dedicating much more of its intellectual effort to redesigning itself.

This is no small undertaking. Everything from doctrine and structure to the army's culture has to be rethought. While change requires resources, I also see the potential for such modernization to provide the opportunity for us to achieve greater levels of efficiency as we produce smaller, but in my view more capable, fighting organizations.

The final aspect of army capability is readiness: ensuring that the army can meet its assigned missions and tasks on a continuing basis. You may recall our assigned readiness levels from my earlier comments. Sustaining a level of readiness means that within the prescribed times, the unit or brigade must finalize its training and completely prepare itself for operations. Maintaining such readiness requires careful planning, which increases in importance as the demand on the force increases. Readiness reporting is an important aspect to this planning, as it is essential that commanders at all levels maintain a good awareness of the readiness of all units and address any shortfalls immediately as they are identified.

• 1545

The state of overall readiness in the army today is sufficient to meet the assigned missions and tasks. I say sufficient, for given current operational commitments, maintaining such readiness is not without its risks. Is the state of readiness today at the same level as during the Cold War? No. But we must first recognize the reality that during that period we faced a more immediate threat, and we had forces deployed in Europe within hours of their deployment areas. Today we have no assigned areas, and the threats, as I said earlier, are unclear.

However, that lower readiness is acceptable, since the threat is lower. Second, we need now to be ready to operate on a more global scale, in Europe, Africa, or Asia, and in a wide variety of climatic terrain and coalition circumstances. This increases the complexity of individual collective and mission-specific training. Third, the ratio of forces to tasks is lower. We have fewer forces to draw from in meeting the demand. This is further affected by the commitment of these forces to operations. In short, using our forces and expecting to maintain the same level of readiness with those remaining in Canada is unachievable.

[Translation]

The state of readiness can and must be improved and two initiatives underway will help that. The first is the development of a readiness reporting system that will ensure we have a regular, clear and accurate assessment of the state of all units within the Army. While this system is already well along in development, it will be some time before the benefits are realized.

[English]

The second initiative is the institution of a managed readiness system. I'd like to spend a minute to explain what is meant by “managed readiness”. Historically, with adequate people, resources, and time the army was able to keep a larger number of its units at a higher level of readiness. This gave it a greater ability to respond to any task and still have the depth to share the operational and tasking load evenly across the army.

With the changes over the last ten years that depth has been significantly reduced, and while we have become more efficient, our management of army readiness is still not meeting our needs. As a consequence, we will be implementing a managed readiness system that ensures we maintain the requisite operational commitments and readiness levels by cycling units through a ramp-up of all arms training, high readiness and then lower readiness reconstitution.

Mr. Chairman, attached to your notes you will find one diagram in colour. I bring that to your attention just to explain what it is. If it is important to get to the issue of managed readiness, perhaps I can give you a sense of it using the diagram. What you effectively have on the centre of the diagram in yellow is the field force, the major fighting part of the army. That accounts for about 70% of the people within Land Forces Command. On the right in the three blocks of red, blue, and green you will see the major commitments that we are required to be able to support. On the left in green is the army sustainment base, which contains about 30% of the resources, and in purple the Canadian Forces, which have a larger role in supporting operations.

My challenge, the army's challenge, is to ensure that out of that yellow box we generate on a continuing basis the forces we require. That is the focus, and that red triangle entitled “regular force” is meant to show you the three sides of a training cycle. So we're basically keeping about a third of the army on any one side at any one time: a third operationally ready, or deployed; a third training for the next mission; and a third reconstitution phase so that we can actually ensure a reasonable quality of life for our soldiers.

I won't go any further than that. You may want to come back to that.

• 1550

That provides you with an overview of the capability pillars. Against that backdrop, how then would I assess the overall capability and readiness of the army? Are we more capable in absolute terms than we were ten years ago? Yes. While not without our weaknesses, overall the army, with its good and improving equipment, its quality soldiers, and the level of cohesion based on operational experience, is superior.

However, we must be cautious in assuming that such levels of capability can be maintained. Sustainability to the army is a real challenge, and we must get the army back into balance. As well, cohesion is a concern to me. In particular, the maintenance of a collective war-fighting capability, primarily through good collective training, is suffering, and we are living on our past efforts.

Today I can only afford to train four of my twelve battle groups to the level required for current operations each year, and have not been able to afford to train and validate brigade readiness since 1992. For this reason, I have put increasing collective training high on my list of priorities. That is not to say that I believe I must, or even can, train all parts of the army to the highest levels every year. Such an approach is expensive, and given the threat, unnecessary. However, such training must be conducted frequently enough to ensure the maintenance, over time, of critical war-fighting skills and to provide for the fundamental competency of the leadership of the army in directing large-scale forces in achieving complex missions.

We have also introduced, or have plans to introduce, a weapons effects simulator to improve collective training, and as part of that, an initiative to establish a Canadian manoeuvre training centre similar to the U.S. Army's National Training Centre. This would ensure not only improvements to training but also introduce objective measurement of operational capability. But we must not only assess capability and readiness in absolute terms. We also have to answer the question of whether we are more capable in relative terms—that is to say, relative to the situations we are likely to face today. This gets to the issue of whether, given the changing nature of conflict and the different threats or opponents we will face, we are up to the task. This is a much more difficult question to answer.

As I have already stated, that depends in part on the types of operations we face. Some would view the capability yardstick only in the context of an overwhelming conventional force such as we saw in Europe. If one assumes such a force with modern equipment, there is no doubt that we are not sufficiently capable to deal with that. Most significantly, we don't have a modern main battle tank, our artillery is lacking, and we lack an armed helicopter. I should state, though, that we've never, in my experience, had that level of capability and we do not today, or in the foreseeable future, face such a threat.

However, we must be cautious in such relative assessments. First, the probability of having to fight such a war is decreasing, and fewer and fewer armies have the capability at that high conventional end. That does not mean combat operations are not possible or that we should not be prepared for them. Our army, as a medium-weight force, can fight, and with planned improvements will be better able to do so in the future. However, because it is medium-weight, in some conflicts it can only operate with more capable allies.

[Translation]

However, we must also look at the nature of conflict and assess what type of operations we are likely to face. I would share, to some extent, the views of general Dallaire, that the nature of operations in the 21st century will see much less conventional combat and our capability must ensure that we can address the many other requirements.

[English]

General Krulak of the United States Marine Corps talks about the three-block war. He says that the demands for military forces will require them to be able to undertake combat operations, peace support operations, and humanitarian operations all at the same time, and all within a three-block radius. That is a daunting task. But it is useful metaphor for the type of world and indeed the type of conflict we're entering.

In my view we must have an army that can fight. I believe the dominant context is increasingly that three-block war. This does not negate large conventional conflict. We must be able to engage in it. The probabilities are fewer, and arguably we can accept higher risk in the forces we maintain. We are better prepared for the new type of conflict than most people I see.

• 1555

In closing, the Canadian Forces have faced a tremendous challenge over the past decade: resources and personnel reductions, an increase in operational tempo, a fundamental change in the nature of operations, and significant organizational and cultural change. Despite that, the army has come through this period well, and in some respects it is better able to face the demands of the 21st century. However, that experience and the continual expectation to live beyond our means has resulted in an institution that is fragile.

Are we better off than we were at the end of the Cold War? I believe we are. I have not in my service seen such capable leadership, such operational experience, such a focused and intellectually able institution. I believe for many reasons that this professional cohort capability provides us the potential to move the Canadian Forces and the army into a whole new generation of military effectiveness. Our challenge is to capitalize on those opportunities.

That does not mean all is well. Re-establishing balance and ensuring sustainability of the army in resource, personnel, and tempo terms is essential. I am working hard to achieve that, for that is my duty: to give Canadians the best army for the defence dollar that we can.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to try to answer any of your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, General Jeffery.

We have a number of questioners, starting with Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation, General.

My first question, General, deals with the aspect of returning equipment and delivering major equipment to some of these theatres. Presently we have an issue at hand of the equipment being returned from Eritrea. Up until recently DND contracted out some 22 companies that were on an approved suppliers list, an approved shippers list to be able to tender on shipping and removal of equipment and material.

Recently this has all been turned over to one company in Toronto by the name of Lewis and Clark Shipping Limited. My concern here is that we went through a shipping problem earlier this summer with the Katie, and all of the difficulties that posed. Is this not an area that is of great concern? Would you have a concern about a dramatic shift in your normal tendering process on this very important aspect of deployment?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Sir, I would start by saying that given the nature of the changing strategic environment—and I talked about the demands for forces to address a variety of risks around the world—strategic lift, both air and maritime, is an important dimension to land force capability. In short, we need to get where we have to go quickly and reliably. For that reason, the Canadian Forces are looking at improving, to some measure, their strategic air and maritime lift.

The reality in maintaining such capability is extremely expensive. All nations, not just Canada, have to rely on the shipping and indeed air availability in the commercial market. From my vantage point as an army commander, my concern is to ensure we have that. My sense is that there is adequate strategic and maritime lifts available on the commercial market to meet most of our needs, except perhaps given the requirement for a very short response time in the very short term.

The issue of contracting is really beyond my purview. That is an issue for the department more generally, and perhaps more appropriately for Public Works and Government Services Canada in terms of contracting issues.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Would this not be a very real concern, strategically, on deployment and retrieval of equipment? I would think this would go beyond a simple transport problem. You'd want to have some cohesiveness of reliability that certain things will happen in a certain time in a certain way. And I would think it would be of great concern to the military to be assured that you do have an understood method of transport so that you can have reliability.

• 1600

LGen M.K. Jeffery: “Assured” is an interesting term. Assurance costs a tremendous amount of money. And I don't believe we can afford to always “assure” everything. It's an issue of management of risk. By relying, for the most part, on the broader maritime and air strategic lift around the world, I believe we get good value for money. And for the most part, the risk is acceptable.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Do you not have a concern for a repeat of something like the Katie issue that would perhaps make you want to look more directly at having this lift capability within the Canadian Armed Forces itself, rather than relying on outside contractors and tenders?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: First, I believe that the Katie affair is a unique experience. I won't say it's a one-time affair, but the circumstances that generated it are virtually one of a kind.

As I've said already, we do recognize already the importance of having some strategic lift at a higher priority, but how much we can afford is really the key driver there. We have to rely on other sources for the majority of our strategic capability.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Do you have specifics on this heavy lift capability that you would like to see? Do you have a wish list for the military of actual equipment of reasonable lift capability that you would like to see?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, sir, it's not a wish list; it's a developed clear statement of requirement that we believe is prudent in keeping in line with the strategic objectives laid down within Strategy 2020. I do not have that information here, but I'm sure the department can provide it to the committee, or subsequent witnesses will be probably better suited to address those specific issues.

You'll appreciate, from my strategic lift point of view, I am the customer, and my colleagues in the navy and the air force are providing that lift.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But you work as a team, as you said.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Certainly so, but it's their area of expertise, and I think they are better suited to answer those questions.

Mr. Peter Goldring: With that in mind, you had mentioned deployment capabilities at the brigade level, at the non-sustainable and battalion level too. I would think that this deployment, and here again your lift capabilities, would be all part of a training process of some relativity. Could you tell me if you have been having deployment training at the brigade level, or at what level you have had training and exercises?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The normal cycle we engage in is to ensure that the training is sustained to put out the battle groups that we largely focus most of our effort on in international operations. So there will be progressive training, from individual training through all the levels of collective training—section, platoon, company, battalion, and then putting the full battle group together, building the teams and the cohesion at each successive level.

A greater amount of time is spent at the lower levels because the building blocks need to be firm and then you can take more risk and spend less time as you go up. That's fairly normal.

If you refer to the diagram I spoke of in terms of the changing readiness cycle, we're trying to bring more disciple to bear so that we can ensure a balanced approach across the whole army.

The one element we have not been consistently able to achieve is the brigade level. We have done some training, notwithstanding my earlier comments, over the last eight to ten years in a brigade context. A few brigades have had that opportunity. By and large, it's battle group level training with an oversight.

We need to, at least periodically, engage in that higher level, and that's where my concern is that we haven't been doing enough. Does that impose an undue level of risk in the short term? I don't believe so, in part because of the threat, as I said earlier, and in part because in combination with our operational experience and the knowledge and the capability of most of the leadership, we can actually put that together.

Over time, as you start to run out of leaders who have that knowledge and experience, your risks go up. That's my greatest concern, and why I believe we must start reinstituting, at least on a periodic basis, the brigade dimension.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Bachand.

• 1605

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation. I am going to ask you a question which I often ask people in uniform who come and make presentations to this committee. First of all, did you write the statement you just made today or are you surrounded by a working group which debates the issue and someone who eventually drafts your speech?

[English]

LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, sir, I'm going to respond in English, because frankly it would be more painful to you than anything else.

Every word I spoke I crafted personally. It is rare, very rare, that I ever speak in any forum where I haven't crafted the words myself.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: O.K. Do you send a copy of your speech to the minister of National Defence out of courtesy before you make your statement?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, I'm not sure that type of a question is in order. We're here to deal with the issue of readiness, not the machinations that occur in terms of who gets to know what, and when, with respect to the General's statement.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay.

The Chair: I'm in the hands of the committee that way, but I'm really thinking that you're well off the subject matter here.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well, Mr. Chairman, but I will explain why I am asking this question.

I believe there is a clear discrepancy between what the general said in February and March and the statement he has just been making today. In March, I was the first to ask the question from the Minister of National Defence, because the general had just stated that he was going to make cuts in the ranks of the force because his resources were not sufficient. I also have here his statement to the Conference of defence associations. Listen carefully to what the general said:

[English]

Given a continuing shortage of resources and a high tempo of operations, sustainment of the army continues to be a concern. In short, I believe there are too many tasks and insufficient resources to maintain the army over the long term, as it is currently structured. This means the strain is felt in a number of areas. First we are demanding a great deal of our people and over and above the operational tempo we face a very high personnel tempo, particularly amongst our leaders. Collective training is not adequate to maintain collective warfighting skills and we are seeing significant skill fade in some areas. Finally, I am concerned given the turmoil of the past ten years about the moral health of the army. We face a sense of uncertainty caused by constant change and not insignificantly a sense of mistrust of the senior leadership of the army.

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, I regret to say that the general's presentation today is completely at odds with what he said a few months ago. I am beginning to understand. When people wear the uniform, they seem to have a different stand depending on their audience and I am having difficulty accepting that. People have come and told us that there is a sort of shroud surrounding the Army when issues are debated with parliamentarians. I have been feeling that for a while.

I believe my questions are in order. Why is the general's stand different today from what it was in March? Why is he giving us these definitions and telling us that the Army is ready because the context has changed, two months later? The Army would not appear to be ready. The general's presentation today seems to be light-years away from his presentation two months ago.

Maybe the general wishes to respond to my statement.

[English]

The Chair: The chair will not intervene, but I'm sure the general wants to respond.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Well, sir, the first thing I will say is that I wrote both of those and I spoke the words in both cases. I don't see an inconsistency. You may.

I would suggest to you that, in all cases, the context of any address is different. On that day I was speaking to a largely military or retired military audience on a broad range of issues, providing an overview. Today I've been asked to come here and speak to the committee on the issue of capability and readiness.

• 1610

I've tried my best, in the limited time I have, to lay a foundation that is clear and coherent. It does not contradict. Indeed, I'm prepared to address any dimension of the words I spoke during that earlier address, because they're all true.

The Chair: Any further questions, Mr. Bachand?

Mr. Claude Bachand: No.

Mr. Peter Goldring: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to table that earlier address so that we can all understand what is being referred to?

The Chair: Members should probably have received a copy of that statement, but I don't see any problem with having it circulated again before the committee.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: Okay, Mr. Stoffer, you're on.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentation.

Sir, I couldn't help but notice that you said here—I have to, when there are job opportunities available, go after them—that you're going to set up a national training centre, a Canadian manoeuvre training centre. Has that been set up yet or is it still in its infancy stage?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: It is, at this stage of the game, a plan. We have a major capital project that has been in train for some time. It has been approved departmentally. We are going through those elements between that and ultimately getting final approval before contracting and so on. That weapons effects simulator capability will form the technical base for a training centre that will allow us to do what we refer to as a “force on force” type of training, with a very high-tech evaluation system so that we know quite clearly and quite objectively the capability of the forces.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You obviously are very concerned about the qualify of life for the men and women of the army, so may I suggest that this centre be put in the beautiful Musquodoboit Valley in my riding. The people there will have a fine quality of life, I'm sure.

Sir, I couldn't help but notice a while back that the mayor of Toronto had asked the Minister of Defence to send in the army to help clear out the snow. I'm sure if it had warmed up and a flood had occurred, they would have had to call in the navy. But the aspect that concerns me here is that the army doesn't have to be operationally ready for just combat duty and fighting. They're also used in many circumstances for domestic concerns.

My question is, do you feel the army is capable of handling not only what you're referring to, the ready to fight position, but also the serious domestic concerns that happen within our country?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing I would say is that the size and the structure of the force are not based on conducting domestic operations. Their principal focus—and I personally believe rightly so—is on the missions and tasks and the defence capability. The question then is, how do we best bring the abilities of the Canadian Forces and the army to bear when a domestic crisis or emergency arises?

In the last few years there have been significant domestic operations—the ice storm, the floods in the Saguenay and in Manitoba, and not insignificantly the development and preparations at the turn of the millennium, with the potential for Y2K. The biggest thing the Canadian Forces and the army can provide here, I would suggest, is the ability to respond quickly in specific areas and to provide an overall level of command and control and coordination of a variety of different capabilities.

That is inherent in a military organization and in an army. I don't believe one would ever want to maintain an army or a military just to do that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I understand that, yes.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Am I confident that we can meet most of the requirements? Yes. But clearly there is an issue of size involved and also, not insignificantly, an issue of geography in terms of where the army and the Canadian Forces are distributed.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, in a recent magazine article, you were asked...and said that it's difficult for you to make the financial ends meet, and you're looking at ways to make drastic cuts in the ranks. There's a quote attributed to you that says, in the end, you're likely going to have to “cash in people to pay the bills”.

First of all, is that quote true? Secondly, if it is, what exactly does it mean?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: In my introductory remarks I said that we have more resource demand than we have resources to satisfy. In short, I am living beyond my means. If you did that for very long, your banker would come and knock on your door. He's not far from mine.

• 1615

So my approach to that problem is to look at a variety of approaches to see how we can change the army—and you've seen some of it, management readiness and some restructuring—to be able to live within that means. Some of that I can do on my own authority, and I'm making those changes. Some of those are clearly potentially issues that the government will have to consider. But right now I have to look at means of living within my means.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: One more question?

The Chair: You have about two minutes left.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Sir, in a speech earlier you stated that the army was not keeping pace with technological change. What are you or your staff doing in order to prepare the next person who may occupy your position, or others down the road, in order to advance the cause of technological change within a shrinking budget for the 2020 plan?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Again, as I said in my remarks, tomorrow always competes with today. We all want to be able to put money away, we always want to be able to invest, and we also have to live. We have exactly the same challenge.

Given the pressures of the last decade, and frankly, within the army the magnitude of change we've been engaged in, not a lot of thought up until about two or three years ago was given to a lot of that future. Since then we've done a tremendous amount.

The army in Kingston—the land force doctrine and training system is the intellectual core of the development part of the army, where we're looking at such things as the changing security environment, the changing nature of technology. We're spending a tremendous amount of intellectual effort on what type of army for what type of world in the future. Clearly, technology is a large part of that. Indeed, much beyond the time the committee has to spend on it, a tremendous amount of effort is being spent to go there.

The difficulty is it's not just a matter of equipment; it's a matter of knowledge and a matter of development and education of people. A tremendous amount has to change to prepare an organization as complex as an army for that future world. So we're well on our way to laying the foundation of it. Realizing it depends on a variety of different factors.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Wilfert, seven minutes.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, first of all, through you to the general, I'd like to thank you for your comments.

To put my bias on the table immediately, which I always like to do, I'm very partial to the army. My father was an infantry soldier during the Second World War in the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders. He always told me they were the hardest fighting branch of the service, and obviously they were called to do the dirtiest jobs.

Having said that, I understand your comments, particularly when you talk about capabilities.

I have two areas I want to talk about. One is your capabilities in budget and the other has to do with the comments you made about a medium-weight force. I will deal with the medium-weight force first.

Increasingly we are calling our forces to serve in operations abroad, which we deem as peacekeeping but I consider to be peacemaking. I can give you many examples, whether it be Somalia, Eritrea, or Ethiopia. The fact is that we are dependent also on who we serve with.

In the statement you presented today, you said, “We can only operate with more capable allies”. I don't want to cast any aspersions on those other forces that we may in fact be placed with, but clearly we are often called upon to do things with others who may not have the same capability, equal to ours, in fact maybe less than ours, in comparison with your statement. We are having this discussion now about “early in, early out”.

I wondered if you could first comment on that, the comments I've made with regard to those situations we're called in to do and, although you've talked about upgraded equipment, etc., for the forces, about that dependency as a medium-weight force in comparison with those we also have to work with.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I said earlier, the very nature of land warfare is changing. There is great debate in many corners of this world in terms of what we need to maintain. Let me give you an anecdotal example.

• 1620

A German four-star general was in Canada a number of years ago and was asked by a retired senior military officer here in Canada a very pointed question about the replacement of their modern main battle tank. Germany, as you well know, has some of the best in the world. The German general looked at him and said, “In all seriousness, we know we need that capability; we don't know whether we'll get it from a tank.”

What he was reflecting here is a change not only in the security environment but the whole technology that is available to allow us to engage in conflict. When we're looking at where we have to go, the biggest and best tanks in the world are becoming less and less usable, because you just can't take them anywhere. Seventy tonnes is very difficult to move around in every dimension. The problem is anything less than that is also much less survivable.

So we're grappling with this dichotomy. We need big, but we can't move it. If we go medium or small, it won't survive.

We're in a transitory period, moving from that heavyweight to what many of us believe are medium and even lightweight forces, which through whole new approaches to the problem will have superior capability. The difficult part is we're in a high-risk era; we're in that transition.

The U.S. Army, as an example, is developing what they're calling their interim force, and they're going to put into service six or eight interim brigade combat teams—if you will, medium-weight brigades. Interestingly enough, those medium-weight brigades are based on the same LAV III we're bringing into the service. That medium-weight force is the stepping stone between the U.S. Army's current heavy force, the high-end fighters, and what they believe is the ultimate new high-tech force some time in the future. That's ill-defined, but it will be lighter and more in line with that interim force than the heavy one.

Intriguingly, that's where we are. Whether by good management or serendipity, we are going to end up, in about four years' time, in the same category as the U.S. Army's premier interim force, with three brigades equipped and basically trained and capable at the same level they are.

So for those who say we have it wrong, maybe we need to look into it further.

As to the element of this in terms of dependent on whom, my comments were specifically focused on the high end. I said if we're going to go at the high end, we have to go with someone else, but then again we always have. Anybody who thinks during our time in Europe, on the central European front, we were there in the front line all by ourselves is kidding themselves. We had the force and weight of our colleagues and our allies around us, and we will have to again.

What this newer capability, this medium-weight capability, and I believe a well-trained, and increasingly well-trained, army can do, however, is.... I believe we're also, for a variety of reasons, well prepared for General Krulak's three-block war, that very complex type of warfare in which there will be all kinds of forces. There will be the high-tech, well-trained forces, there will be the middle-of-the-road mechanized forces, and there will be some low-end sort of barely out of the agrarian age type forces all working together. If you go into any military operation in the world today, you're going to find that sort of mélange, if you will, of forces.

That's the nature of military operations, as we see it. Increasingly, and interestingly, the senior military leadership within NATO is grappling with that problem of how do you structure NATO and similar alliances to be able to capitalize on the best that those different forces bring to bear?

So we're not alone. I think the reality is we will always go with big brothers and little brothers to these types of operations. Our challenge is to ensure that when we go, we go well.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, if I could just take one other slant on that for a moment, it comes to the cohesion issue of the forces. There has been this discussion by others who have appeared here that in fact we're bringing together different units who have not necessarily spent a lot of time together. They are basically put together for a short period of time and sent over into theatres that obviously are in conflict. That, plus the fact that they're also operating with others who they are not necessarily used to being with, could cause significant difficulties. When they come back, they have been dispersed again. So you don't have a continued fighting machine.

Could you comment on that?

The Chair: Very quickly, General.

• 1625

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing I must say is that the term “task organization” is a tried and true military methodology. It's been used right back to the Second World War. That basically means we take the component parts—the companies and squadrons and so on—of an organization and we mix them up to meet the specific need. So to some extent that has always been done. It's a matter of degree and context.

The challenge and failing we've had over the last ten years is that we have in some cases resulted in actually breaking those basic building blocks and putting them together in too short a time. That doesn't really happen any more, and if it does, it happens only with a lot of preparation. The move to a management readiness cycle is meant to ensure that never happens. What you're seeing there is to ensure that what we do is to keep a unit together, complete, in a perfect world, for at least three years. And that's what we're moving. We're implementing many of the principles of this, although we can't get all the benefits until we put it all together properly.

So is there a risk there? Yes. Have we had some weaknesses? Yes. But we have solved most of them, and we'll solve all of them with this.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Benoit, five minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Good afternoon, General, and gentlemen.

In your presentation, General, you've said:

I have some concern and not a little frustration with attempts by some to place evaluations of capability and readiness into simple black or white boxes. Too many people want answers that either we are capable and ready or we are not. The reality of this complex world is that truth is a patchwork quilt of grey...

Now, you're saying in this comment, I think, that you can't give a definite answer to this question of capability and readiness. Yet isn't it your responsibility, when a government lays out what they expect of our military, that you can either say to the government, yes, we can deliver it, or no, we can't, and that some grey answer isn't good enough?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Yes, sir, and I have. The response I've given you and the committee is a yes to both of those. Are we capable? Yes. Are we ready? Yes. But for those who then take that and say that I am being dishonest and I am hiding the truth, which is implicit in much of the commentary around this issue, I say there are a range of factors in assessing capability. There are pluses and minuses and many shades of grey—similarly in readiness. At the end of the day, what you're hearing is my best professional judgment on both of those, given the tasks the government has given me and the readiness levels I'm expected to maintain. But does that mean everything is fine? No, it doesn't. That is what the intent of that comment is.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I want to assure you I wasn't questioning your honesty in any way, General, but I do want to ask you—

The Chair: Could I ask the interlocutors to address their comments through the chair?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I would like to ask you, General, this question. Can the Canadian army today fight and be sustained at the brigade level, as called for in the 1994 white paper? That is the demand that the government has put on the army. I don't think a grey answer is good enough, so I'm asking you directly. Can you sustain at the brigade level, as called for in the 1994 white paper?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing I must say, Mr. Chairman, is that the white paper does not require the sustainment of a brigade capability. It requires the commitment of a brigade capability for up to six months—and that is not sustained. So there is no requirement to do that.

But can the Canadian army fight? Yes, it can. Can it do so without risk? No. But then again, there has never been a conflict where we are without risk. At the end of the day, though, the decision of whether we go and how we go and when we go is an evaluation—a risk—that I, the CDS, have to make together and provide advice to the government of the day whether from a military point of view we can do the job and what the risks are.

• 1630

Mr. Leon Benoit: But can you meet the demands of the white paper? If you can't, then shouldn't you say so? Isn't it up to the government to redefine what your job is, or what they expect from you?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe, Mr. Chairman, I have said that I can meet the demands of the white paper.

The white paper demands that I achieve and sustain up to two battle groups and deploy up to a brigade within some specific timelines. I've said that the Canadian army, at present, is capable of doing that. Again, I've also identified a number of areas of risk.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In your presentation, you say—and I should be able to find it here—that the force structure is outdated: “It's quite appropriate for today's requirements, but it must adapt for the future.” Do you feel that it's necessary for the government to redefine what they expect from the military for the future before you can try to adapt to the future?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe a large part of the responsibility for that rests with the senior leadership of the military.

My comments there, first of all, Mr. Chairman, were focused on the very nature of the fighting organization. Is the doctrine—the very forced structure of the army as we have it today—adequate for the type of job we face? It will do the job today, but we have to modernize it. We have to change it. That's not just equipment; that's the whole nature of how you put the fighting team together. That's what my remarks referred to. That's the job the military gets paid to do.

The decision as to what that force is supposed to have achieved and the decision as to whether certain elements can exist—whether we can buy a piece of equipment—that's another matter entirely. But it's what I believe is largely a military responsibility.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Is it the second round? Is it my turn?

The Chair: Second round. Five minutes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Okay. So he's cutting off the Liberals. That's okay with me.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, at this point everyone has had their fair share of time.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: General, I would like to revert to two issues, including one which has just been raised by my colleague: greater sustainability. I do not know how those words translate in French. I guess I could ask the translators later. I would also like to talk about implementation of managed readiness. Those are the two points I wish to discuss with you.

This is what you said about greater sustainability in your statement to the Conference:

[English]

We must balance the army's resources demand against the resources available and, given the limited flexibility the army has, that almost certainly means a change in structure and probably means some reduction in Regular Force personnel.

[Translation]

I would like to know if this still applies. Is it still true, in your opinion?

[English]

LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I said in an earlier response, Mr. Chairman, that's exactly what my focus is. How do I sustain the army? I'm living beyond my means. Personnel costs are in excess of 50% of the cost of the organization. So the solution to that, in my mind, as we're living within a certain budget, is that I have to reduce people.

I think we need to consider the question, though, of whether that means a loss in capability. Herein lies the problem. Because people say automatically, if you have fewer people, you're less capable. We have come to equate capability with numbers of boots and numbers of pieces of equipment.

I'd like to give you an example of the change that's occurring here in military capability. It is one that I have used before, including at the Conference of Defence Associations.

We have within the army what we call reconnaissance units—reconnaissance platoons. A decade ago, the reconnaissance platoon and infantry battalion was 11 vehicles. Those vehicles were Lynx, tracked armoured fighting vehicles. They had a 50-calibre machine-gun on each of them. The sum total of the surveillance capability was the binoculars the crew commander carried. That was a reconnaissance vehicle.

That reconnaissance vehicle, that reconnaissance platoon.... Any one vehicle could probably see a kilometre or two if the terrain was okay. That platoon could probably cover a front of, at best, 10 to 15 kilometres.

• 1635

We replaced that platoon, all 11 of its vehicles, with a Coyote. One Coyote can see 15 kilometres. Given its radius of operation, it can see a frontage 30 kilometres wide. It obviously very much depends on what the terrain is how many 11 of them can cover, but it's a significant piece of ground.

We replaced that one for what? There were the same number of boots, same number of pieces of kit, but that's a much different level of capability. My argument is, I didn't need 11. I can probably get away with ten or eight or seven and much fewer people, and I still have a quantum increase in capability. But as long as I'm dealing with people who only see capability in terms of how many soldiers I've got and how many pieces of equipment I've got, we have a problem.

So just because we are smaller in size, it doesn't mean we're less capable. Part of that balancing of structure is not just to reduce numbers, but it is to reduce them intelligently, in such a way that we build on technology and other things better ways of doing things, to maximize the size of the force. When one goes back historically, the area covered by the Canadian Corps in the First World War now can be covered, indeed more than covered, by a battalion or a battle group. Think of that.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I understand the answer. Let me deal quickly with implementation of managed readiness. In your program, you say:

[English]

With the changes over the last ten years, that depth has been significantly reduced. The army readiness is still not meeting our needs.

[Translation]

At the Conference, you said:

[English]

As the tempo of the operations has increased this has been more difficult to sustain. The result is a failure to achieve adequate collective standards in war fighting and an acceptable strain on our people as they are required to move from one high priority task to another. While with experience we have better managed the load, the army is still out of balance.

[Translation]

It seems to me that in your statement to the Conference in February, you went much further than you are going today. You even talked about a failure to achieve adequate standards in war fighting. Do you still stand by what you said in February?

[English]

LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, I made both statements, and I don't see them as being different. It is a matter of explaining a complex issue. I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to refer to the diagram on managed readiness. I'll talk to it as a touchstone, if you will, and try to deal with this complexity.

If you look at the size of that yellow box titled “Field Force”, that force is about 12,500 strong. As we speak today, Mr. Chairman, we have 1,934 people from the land force on operations somewhere in the world. If you consider rotating about that many people twice a year, that many people replaced on a sixth-month basis, you can see that a significant portion of that army at any one time is on operations.

The challenge for us is to ensure, considering the demands of looking after our people, that they're properly prepared, and addressing the needs of government, that we balance that and manage it well. Given the turmoil on a variety of fronts, we have had difficulty doing that. We have placed the load to a disproportionate extent on the shoulders of our people. I believe we must and will stop it. We have to bring the army back into balance. The intention of that approach is a much better management of the resources we have.

• 1640

I'd like to use an analogy to be clear about the transition, the change we're achieving here. In the Cold War we had a larger military, and its primary responsibility was to be ready. We were dealing with a type of warfare that was mass industrial age warfare. Today we're dealing with a much smaller military, in a much more dynamic world that has got more demands placed on it. It is like comparing the ability of a supertanker with that of a fast-moving speed boat. We have had militaries—indeed to some extent we were one—that were slow, somewhat more capable perhaps in some contexts, a body that could not be deterred, because it was a mass approach to things. But you couldn't move it quickly. What we're doing now is trying to turn that into a speed boat, much more manoeuvrable, much more able to deal with the many different challenges. And for my money, given the type of operation we face in the military, it is much more capable. But there's one problem. A big wave will not swamp the supertanker, but a big wave can swamp the speed boat. And there is no doubt in anybody's mind that with the lack of depth comes an element of risk.

But I have also to tell you that every army in the western world is going through exactly the same sorts of changes. I could talk to you at length about all of those armies, how much they're changing by way of their reduction, but also how they're changing the very nature of how they do business. They're turning themselves into speed boats, and we have to too. Are there risks? Yes, but I believe they're acceptable.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

It's a pleasure for me to welcome back to the committee former chair Pat O'Brien. Pat, it's good to see you back here. You have the floor.

Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be back, because I remain very interested in the Canadian Forces and the important work they do and in the work of this committee.

General, I thank you for your presentation. I just wish our colleague Mrs. Wayne had been here to hear it, because I think it's important. But anyway, we don't always get everybody.

I've talked to different retired military personnel and heard some very constructive criticism sometimes—this is a comment, I don't expect you to pick it up. But I was rather disappointed to hear from certain retired generals and others kinds of comments that I think fit your description and I imagine are the cause of some of your frustration. Maybe you could give that very good explanation about capability, the definition of it and the complexity of it, to some of these people who suddenly have all the answers. I think it's regrettable to hear those simplistic answers from people who served our forces, some with distinction and all with great honour, and really should know better. I just wanted to make that statement, Mr. Chairman.

I didn't see the inconsistencies Mr. Bachand is looking for. In fact, in the first round, I thought he was quoting from your remarks today. The first half of it sounded like a direct quote.

However, let me get to my questions, Mr. Chairman. I was fascinated by this three block analogy that is in your presentation, General, from General Krulak, and I'd like to explore that with you a little. He talks about combat operations, peace support operations, and humanitarian operations. Is that in some order of American priority, do you think? If you were to put those in order of priority for the Canadian Forces, what would that order be? Can Canada realistically strive to do all three of these simultaneously? I wonder if the Americans can, let alone Canada. Given the dollars the current government is prepared to devote to defence, is it even feasible to try to do all three of those things simultaneously?

And my last question is about the three block radius. Maybe I'm missing something, but I'm not quite getting the nuance there. Is he just talking about a shrinking location for operations in the world, or what exactly? I like his point, but why the three block thing? What exactly are you trying to get at there?

Thank you, sir.

• 1645

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to pick up on the comment, because I feel very strongly about this.

My comment on black and white was not meant as a criticism of anybody. This is an important debate, as uncomfortable as it may be for many people. I believe many of those engaged in the debate, if not all of them, are reflecting their commitment to the country and to the importance of the defence of this country. I believe sincerely that all of them are trying their best to help in the maintenance of a good military capability.

I sense what you're hearing from some corners is perhaps frustration over the lack of debate that has occurred in some quarters, and they're taking the opportunity to put their voices forward. The issue, though, is that we all have different perspectives, professional and amateur, those serving and those past. We are all products of our experience, and I'm not surprised by the different points of view. What I am concerned about is the attempt to oversimplify a very difficult issue, which serves no purpose.

A voice: Touché.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: If I may then move to the three-block war, it is, as I said in my comments, a useful metaphor. It speaks to the very nature of changing operations, the very complex nature of land warfare in the future. We no longer have, and increasingly will no longer have, the luxury of having a nice, neatly defined front line. There is no front line in warfare any more. Nor do we move non-combatants out of the way, moving the women and children, as they did historically, to the back. Indeed, many of the combatants are women, and will increasingly be so.

The Chair: And children.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: That is unfortunately so in some areas of the world.

When forces go in to deal with conflict, inevitably they're going in to halt the conflict. They're dealing with the combatants on one, two, or more sides. It's not just one side against the other. Often there are many competing forces. There are people requiring help. One force may very well have to fight certain factions, in some cases conventional military forces, and in some cases guerrilla forces. That same force may have to start to try to divide and separate opposing forces and try to bring them to peace, to negotiate with them, to get them to compromise, and that same force will have to look after people in humanitarian operations, maintaining security and bringing them food and water. That's the nature of the world we're facing, and that's the nature of military operations.

I don't think anyone has the luxury of being able to choose what they're going to do. That is the complex nature of it.

I believe I've never spoken to General Krulak. I've only read some of the things he has written. But I sense that what he's trying to talk about in three-block war is that you can't divide it. It's all that close together, so you'd better be able to figure out how you're going to put this all together. To be honest, we haven't yet. We understand the challenge, but it is just that: It is a challenge, and it's going to take us time.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you again, Mr. Chair.

It seems to me as a casual observer in this regard, having deep respect for our current military men and women and our veterans, that so many people out there with terrific military experience are really criticizing the state of our armed forces today. And even you, sir, have said that you can't keep up with the technological change, you may have to cash in people, there's a $200 million shortfall from this year compared to last year, recruiting is extremely difficult, post-traumatic stress is up, and morale is down.

So I'm going to ask you one very simple question: If I were a young 18-year-old man or woman in this country, why should I join the Canadian army? It's your chance to sell it.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: First of all, I have to say that I believe military organizations, armies particularly, have always faced challenges. Sometimes it's easy to forget that as we're grappling with our own. So I don't look upon it in some catastrophic sense. I think it's part of dealing with major change. The army, like society around us, is dealing with major change.

• 1650

Perhaps it's because I've been in this uniform for a long time, but I believe, and I would like to believe, this is still one of the most honourable professions in the world. As much as I and most people in uniform are committed to peace, as the old saying goes, it's not the soldiers that want to go to war. Indeed, they know what it's like, so that's not the motivation. But someone has to ensure the protection of society from those who are less peaceful than we are. Most Canadians have not had the opportunity to go into other areas of the world and see how frankly horrible much of it is and how fortunate we are.

I think this is a great opportunity for young men and women, young Canadians, to go out and not only serve their country, but indeed, help many problem areas of the world.

We have gone through a bad period because we've had some institutional failures within the military and we have been seen to be wanting, but I believe that has made us better, and I believe, for the future, this institution will be a very good place to serve.

As I say to my soldiers, the real question is, if someone were to come up to you and ask, should my son or daughter join the military, and your answer is not yes, with no reservation, then we within the institution have a problem. That is one of the mantles that I have in terms of ensuring this organization improves in efficiency and effectiveness, because I want all my soldiers believing with all their hearts in that kind of commitment to the organization. With that, lots of people will want to join.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: The reason I ask that is because, as most of you know, my parents and oldest brother were liberated by the Canadian military in Holland. My dad always remarked on the pride and the courage of the young man he had met, the soldier, when he had asked him, “Why did you come over here?” He said, “We had a job to do.”

It disturbs me, now that you move the clock ahead 56 years, that the state of our military is not what it was at one time. You said it very eloquently. It has gone through some major changes, major program review and everything else.

I want to thank you for your comments, because there are lots of young people in our area, especially in Atlantic Canada, who look at the military in a second light. It has good training, good trades, good camaraderie, but right now, what you read in the press and see on the news and what you hear outside is not good.

We know recruiting is very difficult, so my last question to you is, is it possible under this government, or any other government for that matter, to put pride back in the military so that young men and women will recruit or enter, knowing full well that if they run into any problems like post-traumatic stress syndrome, they will be cared for and well looked after, and their families?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The remarks were focused on the state of the military, and I will talk about really the state of the army.

There is a great deal of pride in this institution. Soldiers are very proud of what they do. They are somewhat frustrated, as I think everybody would understand, having gone through some of the events of the last ten years, and the institution denigrated, the comments about it, and indeed the failure that we the leadership have ensuring that they understand where we're going and what the changes are all about.

In short, what is the vision for the organization, how are we going to get there, and what is the role that everybody plays in getting us there?

With that kind of leadership, vision, and focus, soldiers will do anything you want them to do, and will continue to be proud.

Notwithstanding my comments about the challenges we face, I don't think the army is in a bad state. It is stressed, and I have some concerns, and I reflected on the challenges we face. But in terms of the quality and the commitment of the young men and women in uniform, the moral, ethical standards, the commitment to the job and to this nation, it is as good as it has ever been. Indeed, I believe the quality of soldier I am seeing, and particularly the quality of the leader, is superior to what I've experienced in close to 37 years of service.

• 1655

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you, General. You're a real breath of fresh air. I want to commend you for your patience and professionalism today. I'm sure you'd rather be in other places. I thank you for a very informative presentation.

On a personal note, I travelled with this committee from base to base across this country, and in Bosnia and Kosovo. Mr. Stoffer, I can assure you I didn't meet one member of the armed forces who didn't feel a tremendous amount of pride. Their frustration was with what Canadians thought about them, as opposed to how they felt about themselves. If there's a failing, it's perhaps from a government level, from a Canadian general population, that we don't show the appreciation they deserve. That's my own personal view.

When I travelled with the committee and discussed quality of life issues, one of the things the committee was told was there was great difficulty in retaining the professionals, engineers and such. Given we're moving to a more technologically advanced phase of operations, how are we going to sustain our deployments without also keeping our engineers, our highly trained personnel? That's one of the questions I have.

You've talked in terms of the technology gap. How quickly can we close the gap? Is it going to be affected by the lack of appropriate capital expenditures we're giving you?

I'll ask those two questions, then I have a final one.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing I will say, Mr. Chairman, is the personnel elements of this are fairly complex. My colleague, General Couture, the assistant deputy minister for human resources military, I believe is going to appear in front of the committee at some later date. There's a level of detail that probably is best to explore with him.

I will acknowledge, right up front, there have always been certain types of people, certain types of expertise, that are difficult to maintain and retain within the military. Engineers are one type, and a number of the technicians for a lot of our equipment is another area. We are having some significant stresses in those areas.

In part, it's because the skills are the same skills society demands. They are in great demand. While I don't believe people are motivated to stay just for money, there's a point beyond which people are not going to go. There are no easy fixes to it. A lot of the personnel policies are under review. Many are changing and focused on trying to retain as many as we possibly can.

Secondly, we need to recruit more qualified, better educated, and trained people at the outset to speed the process up. I am starting to look, from an army point of view, at the implications of some of the shortages potentially over the long term. I don't believe the problem is going to go away. Indeed, there's a potential for it to get worse. Are there other ways of approaching the problem? Let me give you one simple example to give you a sense of what I mean.

I'm in artillery and a gunner by background. When I joined the army many years ago, within our artillery unit all of the drivers were trained and able to do much of the maintenance on their vehicles. In fact, there were very few professional mechanics in the unit. As the vehicles became more complex and indeed as we changed the organization, we stopped doing it. We brought in more and more mechanics. I think we may actually have to change things back, in a way, and start pushing a lot of the responsibilities onto the drivers so we don't have to use as many mechanics.

It's a simple example that gives you a sense of it. Change the way in which you do business. Get the combat soldiers to be able to do more of these things for themselves, rather than rely on the expensive and hard to retain technicians. It's that kind of approach, those sorts of things. It's not just retaining people; we actually have to look at a whole new way of doing business.

• 1700

Closing the technology gap may not be possible when one looks at the tremendous explosion and growth in the technological sphere. Pick any example. Computers are probably the best one. We cannot close the gap. The question is, how do we deal with it? It means, in a sense, pegging key technological developments, ones critical to us in terms of a military force, and determining what we will invest in and when.

Let me again give you an anecdotal example. My predecessor, General Leach, when he was army commander, took a difficult but proper decision when looking at a replacement for an existing tank and our direct-fire support vehicles. A significant amount of money in our capital budget had been earmarked for the purchase. His recommendation to the CDS was not to buy. The reason for his recommendation was that the amount of increased capability we would get out of the purchase, whatever we bought, for the amount of money we were investing was not worth it. In short, there was no significant value added.

It's the kind of decision we must make. In short, if we're going to invest money in new equipment and new capability, we're looking for quantum increases in capability. We're not going to try to continually close the gap. We're going to accept gaps, try to figure out how we mitigate the risks the gaps impose, and buy key capability at a key point sometime in the future.

It's not unique to us. I believe every business tries to do the same thing. We have to think more in those terms. Closing the gap, in my opinion, is going to be one of the big challenges.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to ask our guest a question. He seems to be rather enamoured with the light armoured vehicle. Will there still be a place for a main battle tank in the type of combat force he envisages in the future?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'm sorry, I didn't catch the last part of the question.

Mr. Rob Anders: Your statement seems to indicate you thought the light armoured vehicle was a very good vehicle. In the future, do you even seen a place for a main battle tank? In other words, once the Leopards deteriorate ten years from now, do you even want to replace them? Are they obsolete? Do you want them any more?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I suppose I would start by going back to my earlier comments in terms of my anecdote of a four-star German general. We know we need the capability; we're just not sure we're going to get it out of a tank. In short, the nature of technology is changing at such a rate that a 70-plus-tonne main battle tank does not have a great capability except in very specific types of conflict. Indeed, in some respects, it's a liability.

It's a challenge for us. We're going to go to lighter platforms, not just us, every other army. How quickly? What are they going to look like? What will their capabilities be? This will evolve over time. The trend to heavier and heavier has to and will be reversed. It's already happening that way.

I'll give you a vision, if you will, a sense of what an armoured fighting vehicle of the nature we require in a tank may look like in 20-plus years' time. It will probably be wheeled and not tracked. It will probably be no heavier than the existing LAV III or those kinds of armoured fighting vehicles. One would say, how is it going to survive? What is it able to do?

First, it will have potentially a variety of weapons systems on it. The explosion in firepower technology allows us to do more and more with lighter weapons. We won't have to put 120-millimetre main guns on a vehicle to achieve it. We'll have other ways of achieving the objective.

We won't have metre-thick armour on the front end of the vehicle, which can be penetrated anyway. We will have different types of protection. The vehicles will be increasingly stealthy. There's an old adage in the army: if you can be seen, you can be hit; if you can be hit, you can be killed. The way to solve the problem is not to be seen.

• 1705

So the stealth technology you've seen in aircraft and and now going into ships will also go into armoured fighting vehicles, technologies to ensure that in the broad spectrum, visual and otherwise, we will try to turn these vehicles, and maybe ultimately will turn these vehicles, into being invisible so they can't be seen, amd they can't be hit, and they won't be killed.

Secondly, in the same way as certain platforms like ships have active self-defence systems, you're going to find exactly the same thing on armoured fighting vehicles. So if someone is firing at a vehicle with a missile or a gun, on board that vehicle will be certain sensors and counter-measures to ensure that round or missile coming at you never gets there.

There's a vision for a fighting vehicle: it must have the same sort of capability, firepower, protection, and shock action that a tank has.

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: The last white paper indicated that sustainability for the armed forces in general, including all three branches, was about 78,000. Now it's at roughly 56,000, as I understand, and dropping. Your budget is going to be reduced next year and it's going to be reduced again. And that's just the projected budget. So you've had to deal with 14 budget cuts in the past seven years. Are you therefore justifying for us today...? What would your position be? Do you believe that 56,000 is a good status quo, or that it should be less, or that it should be more? Do you believe you're sustainable at 56,000 troops?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: The first thing I'd say, Mr. Chairman, is that I'm not sure where the 56,000 comes from. The Canadian Forces target is 60,000. We clearly are below that in terms of trained, effective strength, but it's still 60,000 that is the figure we're working on.

The second point I would make is that's a Canadian Forces figure, and I am here talking about the army. So I'm dealing with a figure that in fact is 19,500 established positions, albeit there are fewer manning it today.

As I think I've tried to make clear, with that figure of 19,500 I am not sustainable at the current demand in terms of manpower. That doesn't mean I cannot meet the commitments I'm required to vis-à-vis the white paper, but over time those demands have exceeded the commitment within the white paper. That's the issue of sustainability. So I can meet those tasks with that number as long as we're not being asked to do more than that baseline.

Obviously the modernization dimension of this will be a key element as to whether we can keep training people for technology and all those dynamics within that available resource base and available number of people to ensure that the force stays capable into the future. I can't answer that question today. It obviously is my challenge to do it.

Mr. Rob Anders: I have one last question.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, your time is up, but I'm sure we're going to be able to get back to you, because of the number of questioners we have on this side. So if you'll just be patient for a little while, we'll get to Mr. Wilfert and then back to your side.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: General, first of all I'm going to reread your comments on the plane tonight. My real question I'll get to in a second. But there seems to be—

Mr. John O'Reilly: We're open Friday, you know.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I know, but I have to be in my riding. You don't mind, do you?

The issue is messages. I get a lot of calls from people who in terms of mindset may have been like my late father in terms of their experiences in the Second World War or Korea. They ask, why haven't you done this? The forces are too low. We don't have this equipment, that equipment. You made some very interesting observations, and accepting the message that you have given, it isn't a message that seems to be out there either in the halls of this building or in the general public.

One of the things we need to do, in my view, in order to get more support for the armed forces generally is you need to have strong public support; you need strong public opinion behind you. Some of the comments you've made today I think are very salient comments that should be out there, and I don't think they're in some of the glossy publications that DND puts out. At least I haven't seen them. But that's just a comment. You don't have to respond to that, but that to me is the messaging issue.

• 1710

You talked of how we're moving towards a knowledge-based warfare, and that technology is changing so rapidly we have to be able to attract the best and the brightest. I would agree with that. And I won't get into the quality of life issue, because I think there's much more we can do and hopefully will do to attract and to maintain the best and the brightest, because when they wear that uniform I believe we want to make sure they have not only the support in the field, but the support at home for their spouses, their families, etc.

The question is if in fact we are seeing a decrease in the number of dollars you have.... You mention in your comments here that we can with a medium-weight force fight, and with planned improvements we will be better able to do that in the future. I'm presuming then that in the context of the decreasing dollars the army has, we're still able, in your view, to meet those planned improvements both in terms of actual capital expenditures and at the same time the other resources that are needed, human and other, to do the job.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: That is a question I cannot answer in a categorical sense. As I sit here knowing where we are in terms of current equipment coming to the service, much of the key core of that command-centric knowledge-based army we are actually introducing today—a lot of that command and control technology and capability.

Our armoured fighting vehicle fleets, with one exception, will be brand-new, top of the line. There are some areas where there's weakness, but we have plans to correct those. We have a reasonable expectation, given the capital budget we're planning, and within the context of the department's Strategy 2020, to be able to improve capital to achieve that. Certainly from an intellectual point of view we're putting a lot of intellectual investment into that to include a lot of experimentation in a simulated environment. So it's not expensive, but it can help ensure that we're wise buyers, wise investors, and solve a lot of the problems before we actually commit money. Again, we're trying to get as much as possible out of the dollar we have.

I am very optimistic and hopeful that we can achieve this. But if we can't sustain the organization today and get us into balance, and maintain that balance in the future, then I suppose in a sense all bets are off in terms of my expectation. I'm not saying we can't get there, but I really would have to go back and rethink it, because it requires that balance. It requires us to be able to move this speedboat around and deal with all these issues, and modernize. Those are significant demands, and while it doesn't mean you can't do them, you can't do them if you're going to be exceeding your capacity all the time.

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, what a small world we live in. Mr. Stoffer left, but I know that when my father landed in Normandy he went through Holland, and I have been there a number of times. Who knows, maybe it was the community his parents were at.

The Chair: You never know, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: You never know.

The Chair: Peter Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, when I was speaking about the transport procurement for returning military equipment, you mentioned that it was PWGSC's area of responsibility. Could you explain that, please? Isn't it PWGSC that tenders this, that handles it? Is that eventually billed to the military, or is it handled under Public Works? Could you tell me how that is arranged? Is it by PWGSC?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I'm really not the right person to answer that question. I wouldn't want to say categorically that I had the right. Clearly my understanding is that the actual contracting for such things is done by Public Works and Government Services Canada, and not by DND. Clearly DND initiates that, but I stand to be corrected if I'm in error there.

My point really is it is an issue that is certainly outside the purview of the army commander in terms of how the Department of National Defence, as part of the Government of Canada, contracts for support. It's certainly not something I am an expert on and in a position to respond to.

• 1715

Mr. Peter Goldring: My concern is that if it does lie outside the Department of National Defence, with Public Works, and if the costs are outside military purview, obviously that would be an incentive to transport by those methods, because you would not have to add in transport costs.

My concern is that this might detract from a real interest in having heavy lift-craft of your own. Why add them, when the costs are borne outside the department? Would that be reasonable?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe, Mr. Chairman, that while PWGSC does contract services out, in virtually every area it's the departments that actually require the services that pay.

Mr. Peter Goldring: All right.

I asked before what you thought about training and exercises at the brigade level, and you indicated that this would be a useful thing to do. Could you tell me when was the last time you had a full exercise at the brigade level? In the last five years, ten years? Obviously you can't have them every month or two, for practical considerations, but how often should they be held? Would it not be beneficial to have them more often, as you indicated?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: As I said in my opening comments, the last time the army had a full-scale brigade exercise was in 1992. Since then, we have had fairly regular training in a brigade context, where one or more battle groups actually train together. I believe the last one was out west two years ago, in 1999.

In terms of frequency, that's a much more difficult issue. From a viewpoint of capability and readiness, I would love the opportunity to do one every year—as would the army. But that is clearly unachievable in terms of resources, and even in terms of tempo: it would demand too much from our soldiers.

I think the minimum would probably be in the range of every three to five years. That's one of those issues, though—we're going to have to test it, and see how we go.

One of the key elements here is our implementation of a Canadian manoeuvre training centre that will have an objective evaluation capability. In that case, it wouldn't just be my opinion whether a battle group is ready for operations; it would be an assessed capability.

If, from that, we determine that our training regime is not producing the goods, then clearly this would be an indicator that we have to do more. That would drive improvement. But right now we don't have that—it's just best professional judgment, nothing more.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Is that modelled after any other countries of comparable military size, such as New Zealand or Australia? Do they reflect in the same way when analysing whether to have a brigade-level exercise? What do other countries do? Is that part of their ordinary readiness planning, or are we out of sync with those other countries in terms of brigade-level training? Do they have a readiness reporting system similar to the one you're trying to institute? Will ours be modelled after theirs?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I don't know what all armies are doing. But to my knowledge, we are certainly one of the leading countries in terms of this level of development and performance measurement. The model we're using, our level of development, is quite advanced.

The difficulty is that after getting the necessary conceptual framework in place, of technology and so on, you then have to populate it. That takes time. In terms of actually getting information in, you can't turn the clock back and get information from the past—you have to start today. We're building up that database, but there's a lag time for us to be sure we know what we're dealing with.

My understanding is that we are clearly one of the lead countries, or lead armies at least, in that regard.

In terms of brigade training, as I said earlier in response to another question, every army in the world is having exactly the same problem. So we're not alone, if there's any comfort in that.

• 1720

One thing I will say on the subject of who is training to what level is I know the U.S. Army does conduct periodic brigade-level exercises, but to my knowledge they have not conducted a division-level exercise in a long time, and I know they have no intention of doing so, because it's too expensive. They do that level of training in a simulation. So the command post and the commanders get the practice, but not all the troops.

My counterpart in the U.S. Army told me that they try to get as many of their brigades through the National Training Centre as they can, during the tenure of a brigade commander. So in any brigade commander's two-year or two-and-a-half-year tour of duty, a brigade would go once. But they can't achieve that; they physically cannot get all their brigades through in that time. I can't give you an exact percentage, but some percentage of that army does not get training within that period.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make sure Mr. Anders has time—I don't want to cut him off. I believe a parliamentary secretary shouldn't take up the committee's time, even though I'm on it.

The Chair: We're all equal here, Mr. O'Reilly.

If I could just interrupt, I'd like to take this opportunity to tell Mr. Anders that this is a war room. And in the immortal words of Peter Sellers in the movie Dr. Strangelove, “Gentlemen, you can't fight in here—this is the war room!”

Mr. John O'Reilly: I believe I've changed the level of debate in the committee by the comments I made in the House of Commons. Those comments were directed mainly at three retired generals, who came here and basically indicated that as a country, we were not ready for war—that in fact we were less than ready to do anything.

However, General Baril had said that we are ready, and I commented that maybe generals who are currently serving don't speak as openly as retired generals. Other comments have also been dragged in by Mrs. Wayne and others.

When General Dallaire was here, dealing with post-traumatic stress syndrome.... And just to digress, that was pretty brave of him. I thought him a true Canadian hero for doing it, and for pointing out that it's okay to ask for help. I appreciated his coming here. But that visit by General Dallaire was when the level of questioning changed—as seen by the questions you're being asked now by our friend from the Bloc. Now everyone who comes before the committee in uniform is questioned as to whether they've been muzzled, or whether anyone else has any input into how they answer questions or what their comments should be.

So I guess I'd like to reiterate my question whether in fact your comments are your own, and whether you're being influenced by other people.

You know, I also admire the retired generals for their bravery. Our whole purpose is to strengthen the military, to make sure that its budget is increased and that it's in proper readiness for whatever it's getting ready for. I think we're all working together on that, whether we're government, opposition, critics, or parliamentary secretaries.

Sometimes our questioning gets a little out of line, but I want to clear the record regarding my comments. Regarding the two different viewpoints we're faced with, my intention was to say that once senior officers retire, their opinions seem to change dramatically. Or do we still have generals who want to fight the Second World War?

The Chair: General, any comment on the comment?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I believe, Mr. Chairman, I spoke to that in part earlier, in my comments about not wanting to be misinterpreted. I won't repeat them. Clearly it's a difficult issue, and a sensitive one.

• 1725

Like all people in uniform, I'm here with a very specific function. But what drives me more than anything else is that I'm responsible for the soldiers in this army—the young men and women who have to go into combat. And if, after I've been in uniform this length of time, anybody thinks I don't take that responsibility seriously, then I'm sorry to say that you have not taken the measure of this soldier very well. I will not sit here and tell you anything but the truth, because the lives of my soldiers may depend on that.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I was recently in Petawawa to see the contingent off to Bosnia, and I saw a great spirit of pride and camaraderie, with fathers and sons serving together in one unit. So I don't see the negative stuff except in the press—I don't see it in the uniform. I see a lot of pride, a lot of camaraderie, a lot of togetherness. So I'm happy to comment on the fact that the negative stuff in the press is really only in the press—it's not in the military. I salute you for that.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Given the cuts in the operational budget, how many live-fire exercises can regular and reserve units conduct during one year?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: I don't believe I can answer that detailed a question, Mr. Chairman, though we can certainly provide that information. One difficulty is the variety of levels of training.

Mr. Rob Anders: Would it be fewer than ten?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: No, no. But it's a matter of context. Training is conducted at section, platoon, company, and battalion or battle group level, with some degree of live-fire training going on at all levels—in some cases, more than once a year. There are three brigades and 12 battle groups across the nation, so it would be difficult for me to tell you exactly what that number is off the top of my head.

The Chair: General, perhaps you could undertake to have your staff provide our clerk with a written answer to that question.

Mr. Rob Anders: As my last question, how many bullets would a sex-change operation for a soldier buy?

The Chair: Mr. Anders, that question is well beyond the purview of this committee.

Mr. Rob Anders: A sex-change operation costs a couple of thousand dollars. At 78¢ a bullet, that would be what, 2,500 bullets?

The Chair: Mr. Anders, I'm ruling that question out of order. If you want to put another question to the general, you can, or we can go on to another questioner. Your choice.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Pratt, I know you're not happy about it, but I think the army does sometimes have to make decisions on how it spends its money—and I realize the political masters tell it how to do that. But I think there are times when the level of political correctness on this committee affects what people appearing here say. I think there's a huge difference between what they do say and what they would probably say if they had their druthers.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, are you going to provide us with another question? That's it, okay.

Mr. Goldring, any further questions?

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in terms of range firing, there is a tendency now to rely more on electronic range firing. I visited a base in Edmonton that had such an electronic range, but it's missing something. I think live firing is very important. It's not just the recoil system, it's being out on the range in all weather, winter and summer, in rain and in snow. All those things affect the training of soldiers to fire under real weather conditions.

• 1730

I think it's very important to know not just how many rounds are fired, but in comparison, how much of the firing training is done in outdoor, real range conditions. What percentage of it is done in that way?

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Again, Mr. Chairman, if the committee is looking for a specific response, I certainly can't provide it here. That is also, I would suggest, a very subjective issue, trying to determine how many outdoor exercises we have, what sort of conditions we have them in, and so on. I'm not sure what the thrust of the question is, though we can provide that information.

Let me perhaps talk about the changing nature of training and the reasons for it. In times gone by, by and large, soldiers went to the range and they fired their weapon, a rifle, a machine gun, or whatever it happened to be, at targets or predetermined points, and they came home. We've gone from that level of rudimentary training to a very complex series using weapons at the medium and higher levels in a variety of field firing environments. That progressive type of training is extremely important for building the cohesion of the combat team.

We face a lot of challenges. Resources, obviously, are one of them, but there are others. One of them is that as the effects of these weapons increase, there are fewer and fewer places we can fire them. Added to that is understandable concern about environment. There are all sorts of environmental issues surrounding the use of these weapons. So resources, danger, and environmental challenges have to come into account in gauging what we do here. Also there are the issues, as I said, of time and training transfer.

Simulation offers us some great opportunities. Even at the present stage of development, while they are, in the long scheme of things, probably fairly rudimentary, they are already, compared with what we had in the past, quite sophisticated. The training transfer from the simulator to the actual weapons system in some cases is at or close to 100%. I'll give you one example.

The ATADS—anti-tank air defence system—has a built-in simulator, so that the operator firing the weapon literally does not know the difference between firing live and firing in simulation. To that individual it's all the same. That's the objective, because if we can get there, we can actually train any time we want, anywhere we want, more cheaply and without all the peripheral issues. Do we still need to put soldiers in the cold and the mud and the rain? Of course we do. We will always try to do that, we intend to do that, it's a critical part of training. But do we need to have all the live firing in there? No. And for a variety of reasons, we're going to try to move to less and less.

The Chair: Very quickly.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I would agree with you, the better the training and the better the simulators, certainly, some day they can be replaced. But I was a little disappointed with the firing range, even though it was a very interesting process. I do come from the background of hunting and fishing and military myself, back in the 1960s with .303 rifles, but I was a little disappointed in the sense, the tactile feel, of what happens on the range. To me it wasn't truly simulative. Even the CO₂ kickback just wasn't the real kickback. Maybe I missed the smell of the cordite.

What I really wanted to know here is, what percentage of your firing is on the actual outdoor firing range and what percentage. If you could have that information along with the number of live rounds fired, it would be very helpful.

LGen M.K. Jeffery: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to add that we are going through a transition, and part of that transition is also a cultural transition for the army. A lot of my soldiers, in fact probably most of my soldiers, much prefer being out on the range and doing all of that, and to some of them the simulators are a necessary but not particularly well-received dimension of that training. Part of the problem and part of the dynamic of getting them to maximize that is, in fact, embracing the simulator as an approach. Not only do they actually improve their training, but we find that when that is done, some of the things to which you refer are actually overcome, because the soldier is the best person of all to improve the system, and once I can get them educated and committed to using it, it will get a lot better. The technology will help us get there as well.

• 1735

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, General. At this point I'd like to thank you for your comments today. They've been very helpful in terms of our study. I'd like to thank your colleagues for being here as well. You've certainly given us a flavour for the complexity of the issue we're dealing with.

At this point, for committee members, I do have a few announcements that you may want to hear. On Tuesday, May 29, the committee will hear Ms. Margaret Purdy, Associate Deputy Minister of Defence. She's accepted to appear before the committee but her agenda is such that she can arrive here only at four o'clock on May 29. You will have a choice at that time to extend the meeting to six o'clock if you feel that's required. I'm not going to be in the chair. I believe Mr. Goldring may be in the chair at that point. I'm away in west Africa. So that's something the committee will have to deal with.

With respect to the Washington, Norfolk, and New York trip that was planned, again in connection with the readiness study, that has been postponed until the fall because of the general consensus surrounding when Parliament is likely to wind up. It would appear that our Bosnia trip, originally planned for July 31 to August 9, is not looking like it's a go at this point either. So some of this stuff is just going to have to be pushed back to the fall. We'll deal with that and keep members posted in terms of other details.

Unless any other member wishes to raise a particular item, we can adjourn.

Thank you again, gentlemen, for being here.

The meeting is adjourned.