NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, October 23, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

Before we get into the established agenda, I have just been advised that a compensation package has apparently been—

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): I have a statement here.

The Chair: If you would, Mr. Stoffer, please go ahead, in connection with the Buchenwald vets.

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Mr. Peter Stoffer: A news release was put out today by the Minister of Veterans Affairs, stating that the remaining Buchenwald veterans—the survivors, the airmen, and their spouses—are going to receive $5,400 in compensation from the German government, through Veterans Affairs, as an acknowledgement of the wrong done to them during the war. Even though it has been delayed, has been long, and may not be all the money they asked for, at least it is recognition of their concerns. I offer my congratulations, and I'm sure the committee does, too, to Mr. Duhamel for that effort.

The Chair: Thank you very much for that update, Mr. Stoffer.

I have had a request from Ms. Beaumier to move up the issue of the report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure for the committee. She has asked that it be moved to the top of the meeting, because she is not able to be here for the entire meeting.

The subcommittee report is pretty straightforward. I think it's a very accurate reflection of the items that were discussed at the subcommittee meeting yesterday. Can I therefore have a motion to adopt the report?

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): I so move.

[English]

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I'll second it, Mr. Chair.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Bachand, Mr. Stoffer.

With that, we are very pleased to welcome Mr. Anthony Forster, who has been before this committee before. He is an independent research intelligence analyst, and he has provided us with the benefit of his thoughts on previous occasions.

Mr. Forster, on behalf of the members of the committee, welcome. We're looking forward to getting your comments. You have the floor.

Mr. Anthony Forster (Independent Research Intelligence Analyst): First of all, I'd like to thank the members of the committee for inviting me, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I can make a substantive contribution to the issues you have under discussion at this time.

The events of September 11 have acted as a catalyst for fundamental changes in the way western nations approach national defence and security issues. Potential adversaries display tactics that present numerous challenges to military planners. These adversaries have also instituted changes in their methodologies and structures, changes that can make them difficult intelligence gathering targets. However, along with these problems come opportunities for Canada. To identify these opportunities, we must answer some key questions.

Is Canada prepared for the type of combat that is possible in the new threat environment? What changes can be made to the structure of Canada's military and intelligence product creation groups to better combat the threats that we are now faced with? These are the questions bringing us here today.

Using the current conflict in Afghanistan as an example, we see some of the ways in which Canada and the Canadian Forces can expect to be challenged over the next decade. With its rugged terrain and intransigent foes, Afghanistan poses great risks to foreign military operations and personnel. It is also fairly representative of the type of environment, both in terms of terrain and politically, that military planners have to think about as their primary expected area of operations.

Fighting in Afghanistan is about minefields, brief, sharp firefights, and differentiating friend from foe in enormously difficult conditions. It is also about impassable roads, bitterly cold winters, and a foe who is largely inured to the extremes of combat, having been involved in conflict for many years. It is a special operations conflict, a conflict best waged by well-trained infantry men and special forces personnel. An armoured force bred to fight large-scale engagements will not do as well in this environment as a light infantry force will if the light infantry force is well trained, equipped, led, and most importantly, if the light infantry force has good intelligence.

In terms of operational readiness, Canada will need to further adjust and enhance its capabilities. The Canadian Forces are currently a homogeneous force tasked with being able to put into action a brigade combat team and its support elements, in accordance with its obligations. The Canadian Forces, by government mandate, need to be prepared for full-spectrum conflict. This would include low- to high-intensity operations in any setting in which Canadian interests are threatened. Canada has made some good choices regarding how to spend the budget given to the DND, but more needs to be done to ensure that Canadian Forces personnel are not placed at more risk than is necessary, and to ensure that the Canadian Forces continue to display the flexibility and élan for which they are so well known. A great deal of responsibility for the preparedness of the Canadian military will fall to the civilian authorities who control budget matters.

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Where should that funding fall? Special operators and intelligence would logically be the immediate beneficiaries of increased funding. In general, special forces units can be put into two categories. Some special forces units are primarily tasked with VIP protection, hostage rescue, and other duties that would fall to a primarily reactive force. Others are tasked with conducting deep penetrations into enemy territory for scouting, apprehension, and, potentially, combat operations. As such, they are more proactive in their approach.

Currently, Canada's special operations capability is led by JTF2. Without being a member of Canada's military infrastructure, it is extremely difficult to get a handle on what JTF2's training regimen is like, and rightly so. This creates difficulties for outsiders to truly assess how capable Canada is. However, I believe some basic truths can be addressed.

A good first step would be to fund an increase in the size of JTF2, as well as rewriting JTF2's mandate to perform more long-range, penetration-style missions. A manpower boost from 250 to 1,000 or 1,200 personnel would give the Canadian government a potent tool in the fight against terrorism. It is important to note that with a larger size and mandate, there must come doctrinal changes for the use of troops, as well as greater oversight over special operators and their activities. I believe it goes without saying that any changes that would be implemented must be done as soon as possible, as funding allocation and training will take time.

I do not believe Canada should abandon its vision of a multi-purpose fighting force. There exists now, as much as at any time in the past, the real possibility that Canada and its forces could find themselves embroiled in a high-intensity conflict requiring the use of tanks and other heavy and difficult-to-deploy weapons systems.

The greater likelihood is that Canada will be faced with more small engagements in built-up areas, more fights involving riflemen and Toyota pickup trucks with machine guns mounted on them. This is why I would like to suggest to the committee that a new defence white paper—one that takes into greater account the high probability that Canada can be involved in low-intensity conflicts and asymmetrical warfare—be drafted.

What else can be done? A good start would be to ensure that the provisions set out by this committee in its interim paper on operational readiness are implemented as soon as possible. I want to take this opportunity to commend the members of this committee for their insight and bipartisanship in the creation of that interim report.

Another area in which substantial changes may be required is in intelligence gathering and analysis. Two intelligence-related areas that I would like to address today are the areas of military and strategic intelligence.

Accurate military intelligence disseminated in a timely fashion is absolutely vital for the success of a deployed unit overseas. In the last defence planning guide, very little mention was made of the J2 Intelligence Directorate, the non-signals intelligence gathering arm of the Department of National Defence. Where intelligence is mentioned, it is primarily in terms of funding technical advancements.

While technology can be a great facilitator of intelligence gathering and dissemination, HUMINT, or human intelligence, cannot be ignored. An overreliance on SIGINT, or signals intelligence, can have a negative effect on overall intelligence assessment. This is not to say that a freeze in funding or projects currently falling under the CSE's control would be appropriate. On the contrary, it may be advisable that a commensurate increase in funding for CSE activities may be appropriate to ensure that CSE's capabilities and intelligence product are more Canadian-based, rather than relying on relationships with U.S. and western intelligence assets—that is to say, non-Canadian assets.

This bring us to the question of strategic intelligence. As with military intelligence, some Canadian intelligence product is based on data gleaned from non-Canadian sources. In the past, this has been a perfectly adequate arrangement. However, Canada, with its increasingly wired infrastructure, global economic ties, and international responsibilities, may well be ready for its own intelligence- and national security-focused ministry.

Currently, as you know, the Canadian government has no dedicated foreign intelligence gathering arm. Raw data is acquired by a variety of different intelligence-related groups, including CSIS, CSE, DFAIT, and DND's J2 Intelligence Directorate. While the Privy Council Office does an admirable job of providing synthesized intelligence assessments for the government to use, it has no budgetary control, nor does it exercise true policy control or oversight over these various groups. This can create an atmosphere of disjointed effort, with numerous pieces of intelligence product being created by agencies with their own mandates and agendas. This also can create an atmosphere that is not conducive to that most vital part of effective intelligence work, that being intelligence sharing.

Intelligence sharing is an absolute necessity. In terms of domestic security, to effectively control the passage of suspected terrorists through Canada, CSIS and Immigration Canada must have a formalized data-sharing system with technology that facilitates data-sharing, rather than creating a backlog of data waiting to be inputted.

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For the government to make policy decisions, it must have access to analysis generated from military, economic and home-security-related data sources. A controlling ministry for the collection of data, assessment of that data, synthesis, and dissemination of intelligence product, is in the vital interests of Canada. But there are pitfalls.

The first issue that will have to be addressed is how to create an effective intelligence gathering and assessment ministry or entity while, one, protecting the civil liberties of Canadians and visitors to Canada; and, two, ensuring that the agency or ministry in question actually facilitates intelligence sharing and product creation without merely becoming another level of bureaucracy that impedes the flow of important data to the government in a timely fashion.

The second issue that would have to be addressed would be one of focus. Current information sharing protocols with Canada's partners ensure that Canada receives a fair amount of good quality data, but U.S. intelligence has primarily focused on signals-related collection. Canada, with its less divisive role in the international community, has a unique chance to create a very credible human intelligence gathering capability that could enhance its role with its partners, while providing Canada with vital data that may not be available through the usual channels.

To address these issues, one approach may be to create two separate assessment bodies—one composed of internal personnel and one composed of outside experts—to conduct a study into the most effective manner in which to go about creating such a group or ministry. I do not believe a feasibility study is necessary, as Canada does have effective parts of the whole. However, opinions from two sources ensures broadly based coverage of issues from both the insiders' perspective and from the outsiders' hopefully more objective viewpoint.

Canada is faced with potential adversaries capable of rapidly forming and dissolving networks to operate against Canada and her interests. They are potential adversaries who can move quickly, largely unencumbered by the processes of democratic governance. Canadian efforts in terms of the military must reflect changes in the nature of the military threat, while efforts in intelligence must reflect this change in the operating patterns of intelligence targets and Canada's continued and growing role on the world stage.

I am ready for your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Forster.

For the first seven-minute round, we have Ms. Gallant, from the Canadian Alliance.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

While we're here today to discuss the state of readiness of the armed forces, for the sake of the safety and well-being of Canadians, I wish to raise the issue of our state of alert. The government broadcasting corporation has gone to great lengths to give Canadians the impression that CF-18s are in the air, guarding against terrorist attacks. Nuclear reactors have been identified as potential targets for terrorist attacks.

I ask you to please draw your attention to the map that is being distributed—and it is in French as well for our friends with the Bloc. I'm concentrating on the Canadian Nuclear Research Laboratory at Chalk River for reasons that will become momentarily evident. The blue circle denotes the no-fly zone over Chalk River. Although this zone has been in place for years, the airspace is constantly violated with impunity. As Canada's only nuclear research facility and the site where over 70% of the world's isotopes are manufactured for medical purposes, should one of our nuclear power plants be targeted for terrorist attack, we need this site for research to be continued in order to treat potential victims and to learn how to reduce the effect of nuclear fallout on the environment.

According to Mr. David Harris, the former head of strategic planning for CSIS, there is “`ample evidence' that terrorist groups have taken an active interest in nuclear capabilities.” I have been told that, from CFB Trenton to Chalk River, it is a six-minute flight for a CF-18 already in the air. However, at a low level of alert, a pilot may not even be on base. At a high level of alert, even if the pilot is on base, at least 15 minutes or more elapse by the time he or she is prepped and takes off.

This government should be more concerned about Chalk River than any other site. First of all, it's upstream from our national capital's drinking water and from the drinking water of a lot of other Renfrew and Pontiac county communities as well. Secondly, and more critically, unlike other commercial nuclear power plants, the research reactor at Chalk River was built without any containment facilities.

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The Chalk River plant was originally placed next to the former CFB Petawawa—which has now been been downgraded to an area support unit—for security reasons. Considering the fact that Chalk River is on the Toronto-to-Europe transatlantic flight path, that a change in an aircraft's flight path would allow for minimal warning for an air traffic controller to spot it, and that other countries have recognized that the only way to safely protect a nuclear power facility from air attack is with on-site anti-aircraft batteries, at what point should we expect to see the positioning of anti-aircraft defences at all of Canada's nuclear power sites?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Well, I don't have access to the CSIS data on the nature of the threat, so we're going to have to take their word for whether or not that is a realistic threat assessment. Typically, CSIS has had a pretty good handle on this sort of thing in the past.

The measures that can be taken to protect this particular facility would include not only the placement of anti-aircraft missiles, but also the rerouting of flight paths, which I imagine would have to be of course cleared through Transport Canada.

Given that this is the only facility of this nature, and given its geographic location, I would quite frankly be inclined to place some sort of anti-aircraft asset there now, to be perfectly honest with you. The flight time for a CF-18, that six minutes, is a reasonable response time. You're not also factoring into that the actual engagement range of the CF-18 involved. A CF-18's missile launch systems will put a missile into the air travelling at Mach 2, and that missile will be able to cover that distance a little bit more quickly, for sure. But ultimately, if Canada has the capability to take down an aircraft that's on approach, they should probably put something in place sooner than later.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

How are we for time, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: You have another three and a half minutes or so.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay.

My next question is a follow-up to a reference the Minister of National Defence made to this committee in responding to my point that it's time to remuster the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The minister made reference to helicopters being used to deliver troops, or what he referred to as “air mobile”. He even mentioned that the U.S. is using helicopters more, with the inference that helicopters have somehow made airborne regiments obsolete.

The minister's comments about the airborne/parachute units being obsolete in today's army are out of touch with reality. For the record, a few nights ago, 200 soldiers from the U.S. Army Ranger Battalion parachuted into southern Afghanistan to carry out a successful mission. The loss of life that occurred came when a helicopter crashed.

The Canadian Forces need a special airborne unit. My question for you is whether you agree with my assessment that there is a need for a special services capability in the Canadian Forces. If we got started today, in what timeframe could we expect the formation of such a unit to be headquartered at CFB/ASU Petawawa?

Mr. Anthony Forster: When you watch the video of Army Rangers paratrooping onto that airbase in Afghanistan, it seems to me that you should keep in mind that the target was probably deliberately picked with—I'm theorizing here—minimal resistance expected. Why? Because intelligence indicators and open-source indicators seemed to indicate that a Delta Force team was operating in the area as well, hitting another target. Having a highly visible paratroop drop onto an airbase would have drawn the attention of the Taliban forces in the area, allowing Delta Force to operate with impunity.

However, that being said, I believe very strongly that Canada needs an air-mobile element in its armed forces. A good start would be to increase JTF2's capability and its mandate, obviously putting aside the concern that they won't be able to maintain their functioning here. An increase to around 1,000 or 1,200 personnel would allow them to continue their VIP protection and crisis response capabilities here, and also allow them to be able to put a sizeable force in the field if necessary.

What about helicopters? Yes, helicopters are needed. But paratrooping is also a needed capability. You have to have both if you're going to operate effectively. On top of that, you have to have the support services that will make an air-mobile unit what it is. That includes fire support on targets, as well as armed helicopters and all sorts of other fun toys.

So, yes, I would say you definitely want to develop that capability, but the timeframe is of vital importance here. To create a true deep-penetration capability for the Canadian Forces, you're talking about years of training, years of infrastructure building, to get that force in the field as soon as possible. You can't act soon enough.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Would it be quicker, then, to remuster the Canadian Airborne than it would be to try to increase the JTF2 by 1,000 troops?

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Mr. Anthony Forster: I hesitate to say whether it would be quicker or not. There's certainly an indigenous paratrooping capability here in Canada that can be tapped. I think the appropriate first step would be to approach those professionals and ask them what their inclination would be. Not having helmet experience myself, I would have to say the way I would approach it would be to find those paratroop professionals, get them somewhere where you can talk to them, get their feelings on what the first capability would be—I have a feeling they're going to tell you to create a paratroop regiment, of course—and then proceed from there.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: My first question relates to JTF2. I wonder whether you don't know as much as I do about this rather secret force. You say that it would probably be a good idea to increase the force from 250 to 1,000 and provide appropriate funding. Just for a moment, I'd like you to try and put yourself in the position of Members of Parliament who are constantly told, whenever they ask questions about this, that this information is confidential and cannot be discussed because it could compromise their operations.

The result is that as Members of Parliament, we are in the unfortunate position of practically giving a blank cheque to the government. If I were to say to the government that we need more funding for JTF2 and the force should be expanded from 250 to 1,000, it would probably want to know whether taxpayers' money would be well invested.

Try to imagine for a moment, if you were a Member of Parliament, how you would react under the circumstances? That's my first question.

Secondly, I'm interested in your approach with respect to establishing a separate department responsible for intelligence gathering. As I understand it, there are several organizations involved in intelligence gathering within the federal government. Intelligence is collected by a number of departments, so pooling that information gets complicated. It certainly seems complicated to me. The information controlled by CSIS and the RCMP should normally be passed on to the minister responsible, who is the Solicitor General. However, immigration is handled by a separate department. They also have intelligence. The Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency also has information that it passes on to the minister responsible for customs and revenue. Then there is the CSE, the Communications Security Establishment, that provides intelligence to the Minister of Defence. Perhaps you could try to elaborate on that.

Do you see all of these different groups coming under a single department, and if so, how would that department be funded? Would monies currently provided for in the budgets of the various departments be re-allocated to this one department? I think that you have actually put your finger on the real problem. In terms of intelligence, there are far too many sources and all are focussed on providing intelligence to their own department. I sometimes have the feeling that people have no idea what's going on from one department to the next.

So, after you've addressed my first point, I would ask that you elaborate on the question of establishing a single department with responsibility for intelligence gathering.

[English]

Mr. Anthony Forster: First, in terms of secrecy and JTF2, I am reminded of the British Special Air Service, whose training regimen is fairly well known, and whose members are the most efficient special operators in the world today. Their training regimen is a fairly well-known matter of public record, and they're able to operate in just about any part of the world, in just about any capacity in which you can imagine a special operator would be asked to operate. The recent actions of the SAS in Sierra Leone in the rescue of a number of British Armed Forces personnel is a prime example of the capability of a well-trained special operating group. They are not subject to the same secrecy that JTF2 seems to be subject. I submit that in this possible case, Virgilius' thoughts on this were that secrecy is a breeding ground for vice. In this situation, that may very well be the case.

If JTF2 is to be expanded, there is going to have to be greater oversight over their budget. There is also going to have to be greater oversight over their operations. That is an absolute, and it's going to have to be dealt with in the process.

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As for the creation of a foreign intelligence gathering ministry, if you will, intelligence is a funny thing. Data is not intelligence. Data is just what it is. It's data. It does not represent an intelligence assessment. The assessment is created after the data has been drawn in from a variety of different sources and synthesized into an intelligence product that is then given to the appropriate authorities for their review, so that they can make informed decisions. Without there being a single, dedicated processing and analysis capability in the Canadian government, you will continue to have a variety of different mandated groups collecting intelligence for their own purposes, and, I'm sorry, but it's human nature to want to protect your own group, your own clan, if you will. This creates an atmosphere that is antithetical to the sharing of data.

A prime example of this would be Immigration Canada and its access to RCMP or CSIS databases. In the course of preparing for this testimony, I asked Immigration Canada officials on a number of occasions if they would typify for me the intelligence sharing protocols that they have with CSIS. The only substantive response that I could get was that intelligence sharing is done at all levels. I asked if some committee has oversight over the intelligence sharing process, and the answer was that intelligence sharing is done at all levels. This bespeaks a certain reluctance to go into the details, and I'm wondering if that reluctance is based upon the fact that there are no formalized arrangements.

Now, let me preface this by saying that the way in which Canada now structures intelligence gathering and its intelligence capabilities is a direct result of what Canada is. Canada is a secular democracy in which human rights and individual freedoms are respected above all else. That's why the government has grown into what it is. However, unfortunately, necessary changes must be made to further facilitate the protection of Canadian people.

A good first step might be to ensure that data-sharing between the variety of intelligence gathering and processing groups is enhanced. I understand certain pilot projects are in place to increase the ability to communicate back and forth between different agencies, and I'd like to see that funded and increased as fast as possible. It's easier for me to pick up a phone and call somebody at Immigration Canada and to then call somebody in CSIS, than it is for somebody in Immigration Canada to call CSIS. That's because of a lack of secure communication lines, and it's something that has to be fixed as soon as possible.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Forster.

Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Wilfert, for seven minutes.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just responding through you, Mr. Chairman, first of all, with regard to the issue of intelligence, have you reviewed Bill C-36 and the implications it has under the National Defence Act?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I have put a start into it. It's a fairly weighty tome, but I'm working through it as we speak.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: In my view, it would address a number of those comments you just made with regard to the government's response to the issue of intelligence and to the issue of security issues. I would certainly recommend that you take a look at it, because in light of that, I think it's important that we look at....

One of the issues that I think we need to be looking at is the issue of the creation of a separate foreign intelligence service. I'd ask you for your comments on that and on whether or not you think it should be stand-alone, under CSIS, or under DND.

On the nature of warfare, in your comments you talked about how—this is my view, and I don't want to give the wrong characterization, Mr. Chairman—on the one hand we'll still need to use tanks and the deployment of other heavy weapons, while on the other hand we are looking at small engagements “involving riflemen and Toyota pickup trucks”. The question is, can Canada afford to be all things to all people?

Should we be looking at a review of the 1994 white paper, such as you mentioned? That white paper was created a few years after the end of the Cold War. Would it be safe to say that we should be looking at a specialized role for the armed forces, rather than trying to be responding to everything, such as Australia, for example?

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Mr. Anthony Forster: Two years ago, when I last spoke to this committee, I said Canada was faced with a choice, and it pretty much was the same choice that you just enumerated: either you try to keep a homogeneous force that is capable of going into the field and fighting in a high-intensity conflict against another nation-state, or you retool to create a light infantry force that is able to deploy quickly to an area of conflict and operate in a number of different capacities.

Budget-wise, can Canada be all things to all people? It doesn't appear to be the case at this point. Do I think we should be able to? Yes, I do. Whether or not it's in the budget is another question entirely.

More importantly, the question is whether the Government of Canada has the will, in the current environment, to fund the substantive changes that need to be done in either case. In the case of having a total war-fighting effort—being able to operate at a low level in a peacekeeping capacity or in a policing capacity or being able to go into a stand-up fight against another country—it's going to take some serious work to make the Canadian Forces more capable. If Canada decides to go the route of a light infantry force capable of getting in and getting out fast, again, you're talking about a lot of initial funding. Direction is going to have to come from the top on this one.

Personally, my view is that Canada should try to be ready for all spectra of conflict. But if you have to balance budgetary considerations, then I would have to say going with a well-trained, highly capable light infantry force would be the best possible second solution.

As far as intelligence gathering is concerned, you asked whether or not this should be a stand-alone ministry or if it should operate under the auspices of one of the other intelligence-gathering agencies. I have to say it should be stand-alone. I think any attempt to put it under the auspices of another intelligence-gathering entity of the Canadian government will, in essence, taint it and put into place people who perhaps are still inclined to protect their core department's interests. That can't be the case.

Intelligence analysis and synthesis, or intelligence product creation, must be completely devoid of clannishness, of emotional content. It must be raw intellect put to the task of creating assessments of threat. That means you have to have a stand-alone ministry.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Following up on that, Mr. Chairman, through you to our witness Mr. Forster, can you tell me what elements you would see in a stand-alone foreign intelligence service? What specific capabilities would it need in terms of, again, not being all things to all people? What things should we be designing it to do that would be in the national interest?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I submit that the Canadian government, in its intelligence-sharing relationship with its partners, and specifically the United States, is a very effective one for gathering signals intelligence. Everyone knows how effective the American government is at pulling in signals intelligence. In fact, it's so effective that it is overwhelmed with analysing its own signals intelligence data at the moment.

Canada can make a real commitment in terms of human intelligence, because the Canadian government, as I mentioned, is a less divisive influence on the international stage. As such, it can create a capability that will key very nicely into the intelligence-gathering capabilities of its partners, and also into open-source intelligence.

I cannot stress enough the importance of open-source intelligence, the collection of open-source intelligence, and the assessment of open-source intelligence, to the process. Something like 90% of the intelligence gathered is open-source intelligence—that is, intelligence gathered from foreign newspapers, press releases, trade documents, etc. Those two areas would be where I would focus my efforts if I was to create an intelligence gathering unit.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: If I might, very shortly, Mr. Chairman—

The Chair: You have a minute left, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I don't want to abuse the chair here, but if I might, again—

The Chair: The chair is always being abused.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: And sometimes rightly so, but not from this side, I'm sure—and not by Mr. Stoffer, surely.

In terms of the establishment of a separate foreign intelligence service, can you suggest any timelines from start-up? What do you think are the greatest impediments currently to the establishment of a separate service, other than political will?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Clannishness. I think a lot of people in the intelligence field in Canada are going to want to protect their assets and protect their department. I think that culture is going to be one that has to be defeated at all costs.

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In the past, Canada has seemed to be reticent about creating a foreign intelligence gathering capability. No one wants to be seen to be prying, and no one wants to be seen to be violating the sovereignty of another country in the name of security. By the same token, it's a necessity. You have to have a proactive capability if you're going to have a true, good intelligence product. Timeframe-wise, then, you're probably looking at least at a couple of years before you can actually say you have some sort of dedicated ministry up and running.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: So we don't have any time to waste.

Mr. Anthony Forster: None whatsoever.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert.

Thank you, Mr. Forster.

Mr. Stoffer, for seven minutes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, sir, for your presentation.

As a personal question, have you ever been a member of the service, the armed forces?

Mr. Anthony Forster: No, sir.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Did you ever want to be at one time in your life?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, but—

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, those are personal questions.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I know, but he seems like a likeable fellow.

The Chair: The witness is here for his professional expertise. I leave it up to the witness if he wants to answer those questions. It's up to him, but I wouldn't say he's compelled to.

An hon. member: Don't let him ask you directly. Make him go through the chair. The chair can stop him.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: It's up to you.

Mr. Anthony Forster: I've never been one to shy away from a question, so I would say, yes, the inclination has been there to be part of an intelligence gathering operation or, more to the point, to be part of an intelligence analysis process. I ended up on Wall Street instead, spending about ten years operating as an executive recruiter, gathering data about Canadian, American, and European banking operations.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Excellent.

Sir, you mentioned that Canada should have a stand-alone agency when it comes to intelligence gathering. Can you give any examples of any other countries the size of Canada that have one? For example, does Australia have one? Does Brazil have one? Does New Zealand have one? Does Germany have one? Do all these countries have the kind of stand-alone agency that you're talking about?

Mr. Anthony Forster: For the most part, they do. In fact, some of them have multiple agencies that handle different parts of the foreign intelligence gathering process.

The real secret here is not so much the gathering process, because Canada has the parts of the whole, as I mentioned. DFAIT is capable of gathering foreign intelligence on economic conditions in another country. CSIS is very capable of providing domestic security-related information to a higher organization for synthesis into intelligence product. The real trick here is to create an agency that will take all the disparate sources of information and synthesize them into an intelligence product that is usable by the decision-makers.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: And you're saying a stand-alone agency is the only one that would be capable of or competent enough to do that.

Mr. Anthony Forster: I'm saying it's the best one, not the only one.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

You had mentioned earlier that it's easier for you to get information or make contacts with a particular department, for example, than CSIS could with another agency. But if you had a stand-alone agency and you had other agencies like CSIS, the RCMP, the Solicitor General, or whatever department, and you were trying to get information from them, wouldn't that also incur another layer of bureaucracy that could get tangled up in this web that we weave?

Mr. Anthony Forster: That is the danger, yes, and it will take a fair amount of work to ensure that it doesn't happen.

The timely dissemination of intelligence product is absolutely vital if you're going to make decisions that are going to affect national security. Technology can be a great facilitator of that, but we then unfortunately come back to the question of money. How much money is the Canadian government willing to put into a foreign intelligence gathering operation and an intelligence synthesis ministry that will facilitate that timely dissemination of data quickly and in a secure manner?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: As we all know, the current budget of the military is about $11.2 billion. I believe you had indicated that more resources need to be put in so that Canada can be a little bit more to all people.

Mr. Anthony Forster: That would be my preference, yes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: The CDA, for example, has said it would like to see an additional $1 billion per year invested into the military each year for the next five years. What's your recommendation on the amount that should go into DND in order to fulfill your recommendations, for example?

Mr. Anthony Forster: The CDA's recommendation is a good one. I would have to endorse it, as a matter of fact. In fact, if anything, I'm a great believer in technology as a facilitator and as a combat force multiplier. I'm firmly convinced that a combination of good training and technology can create a force that's small in size but able to deliver a great deal of violence to an opponent, if you will.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Right now, the troops are arguably between 53,000 and 58,000. It depends on to whom you speak, and on what day. The white paper says the level was to be 60,000, a figure that was to have been reached by 1999. How many armed forces personnel do you think DND should have, if indeed the government followed all your recommendations?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I'd like to at least see the armed forces have the appropriate force levels needed to fulfill their responsibilities as laid out by the white paper, first of all. I'd like to see a minimum of 65,000 to 70,000 as an initial number, but you have to keep in mind that if you're going to increase capabilities, you're not just talking about the pointy end, if you will, about the guys who actually go into combat carrying a rifle. You're also talking about a commensurate increase in logistics capabilities and in intelligence gathering, so you're probably talking about a number that's beginning to approach 75,000 or 80,000 at that point.

• 1615

As I mentioned when I came here two years ago, a freeze on the reduction of the Canadian Forces was absolutely vital, and it continues to be. As far as numbers go, though, I hesitate to put out a direct number and be called on it, but I would have to say a minimum of 75,000 to 80,000 would be a good first step.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, this is my last question for you.

My colleague from the Canadian Alliance mentioned concerns over Chalk River. If I may put my environmental hat on for one second, Mr. Chairman, we would like to see facilities like nuclear power plants in this country dismantled, so that we can get away from nuclear power in Canada. That's our party view and my own personal view, but I don't think it will be the view of my colleague from Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke. The fact is that the facility at Point Lepreau, New Brunswick, in particular has had hundreds of millions of tax dollars poured into it, and they don't even know what to do with it for the future. That's why we recommend the dismantling of these types of things while we resort to other forms of energy use.

But not just nuclear power plants are at risk. Many other facilities within the country are at risk as well. Even if we had the 65,000 or 70,000 troops that you had indicated, or even more, is it conceivable that Canada itself can protect all the installations? For example, we have hydro-electric projects, fuel facilities, Sable Island Gas, or you name it. Is it conceivable that we can do it alone, or must we have cooperation with our allies like the United States and Great Britain?

Mr. Anthony Forster: In a word, no. Even with that cooperation, it is not possible to protect everything at all times. Unfortunately, as much as infrastructure is a target, human beings are a target. To drive a truck full of fertilizer and explosives in front of the Château Laurier and blow it up is as much a threat as blowing up a hydro-electric plant is. So, no, unfortunately it isn't.

What you can do is to try to reduce the amount of capability that your opponent has. The best way to do that is to have a proactive and aggressive intelligence gathering and dissemination arm.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mrs. Wayne, for seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): Thank you very much.

Mr. Chair, my question is with regard to groups within Canada, as well as terrorists outside the country who can seriously damage Canada's critical infrastructure through cyber-attacks. Given the limited resources available at the present time, would it be better to concentrate on improving systems that are protecting computer systems against cyber-attacks, rather than increasing the capacity for intelligence gathering and analysis?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I don't think you can do one without the other.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: One goes with the other.

Mr. Anthony Forster: One goes with the other, absolutely. The money given to CSE for technology purposes—I believe $47 million was recently put forward—is a good start, but you can't throw money at the problem in the hope that it will fix itself. You have to have a holistic approach, and it has to come from every department to be effective. So, no, you can't have one without the other.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: In living in a city that does have a nuclear power plant and is close to the U.S. border, with the largest privately owned oil refinery in Canada as well, I get worried about what's on the Internet. We know through CSIS that we have about 350 of these terrorists right here in Canada. These people are watching the Internet. There's no question, no doubt in my mind, that they were part and parcel of what happened on September 11 in New York and Washington, and they're right here in Canada.

Many types of information can be used by these terrorists in planning their attacks. What I wonder is whether or not we will witness a dramatic reduction in the amount of military, government, and other information on the Internet. Or are the concerns exaggerated about the information available out there for the terrorists?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I don't think those concerns are exaggerated at all.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, I don't either.

Mr. Anthony Forster: My primary focus, as an intelligence analyst, is open-source intelligence. I gather that in one of two ways: by personal interview or by going on the Internet and gathering data. I've noticed that a number of DND and infrastructure-related websites have already been taken down. I think that's commendable, quite frankly.

• 1620

Ultimately, the use of technology by terrorist organizations is a two-edged sword. The more they use it, the more they expose themselves to the signals intelligence capability of the United States and its allies. This is why they're perfectly happy to go low-tech as well as high-tech.

You're talking about organizations like al-Qaeda, for example, which provide doctrine, guidance, and limited logistical support from the top, but which allow their operatives to operate pretty much on their own. That limits the amount of data going back and forth on the Internet, through telephone lines, and whatnot.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: This is my last question, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, you have a full five minutes left.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Oh, have I? Okay. Well, for this question that I'm going to put to Mr. Forster, it may take five minutes for him to reply.

Because of what has happened since September 11, we all know we really weren't on top of security. It wasn't a number one priority. Intelligence wasn't a number one priority for us. It probably wasn't for the U.S., although they were ahead of us, no question. What can we do now? We have the anthrax situation. Every day, there's something new, Mr. Chair, and it's a major concern.

Why weren't we doing this? How come we're all coming out of the woodwork now? We all have concerns—all of us from the government side and the opposition side, from both sides of the House. Our military is concerned. CSIS is concerned. Everyone is concerned. Where were we, Mr. Forster?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I've asked myself that question every single day since I watched the towers come down.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Exactly.

Mr. Anthony Forster: I spent a lot of time in New York, working on Wall Street. I worked a block away from those buildings.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Did you really?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, I did.

Unfortunately...actually let me not say “unfortunately”. When it comes down to it, our vulnerability was an admirable thing. We are not a police state. We are not a state that clamps down on dissent. We are not a state that monitors every form of communication all the time. I think our vulnerability was laudable, and something we should be proud of, as a matter of fact. But to quote the Roman general Quintus Sertorius, “Mutatis mutandis.” That means, “Necessary changes must be made.” In light of that, rather than continuing to ask myself that question, I ask what we can do now. That's the most important way to approach this entire problem.

You'll notice that the United States has not automatically asked for the head of George Tenet, the director of the CIA. Why? Because you have a capable man there. If there was a failing, there was a failing in that the United States has an aversion to risk, especially in the intelligence gathering community. They do not want to be seen to be making deals with non-official cover personnel knocks who are questionable or who may have human rights violations in their background. That may be something that has to be reviewed.

The United States has relied on signals intelligence. As such, they pulled in so much signals intelligence that they couldn't see the indicators as they came in. You asked where we were. Well, we were watching and we saw some things that were of concern, but because of the sheer mass of data that was coming in, because of the sheer numbers of different threats that there are to actually watch, we missed. We can fix that, but it's going to take time.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Ms. Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I'd like to thank Mr. Forster for confirming that it would take years to rebuild JTF2 to a complement of 1,200, as opposed to a matter of months to remuster the Canadian Airborne.

Mr. Forster, you mentioned that the SAS, the British special force, is not subject to the same level of secrecy as JTF2. My concern is that we're using the necessary secrecy around the JTF2—and are even expanding it—to cover up the shortcomings of our military and our capable forces from that standpoint. I would like to know if you would agree that the reason there is not the same secrecy around the SAS as there is around the JTF2 is that the SAS has a different mandate, in that it's doing different things than the JTF2?

Mr. Anthony Forster: If anything, the SAS mandate requires more secrecy, rather than less. The SAS mandate allows it to operate overseas in any capacity in which the British government decides to use them, either in intelligence gathering, hostage rescue, or any variety of capabilities that a special forces operation should be able to operate in.

• 1625

I can't address the mindset of those who say JTF2 must be protected in terms of secrecy. I will say the training regimen or the mandate of a special operations group should be a matter of public record. It should be a matter of debate, and it should be something that is brought before committees like this for review on occasion—especially their operations, otherwise you have the possibility of rogue operations taking place, and they're something no one wants. But I can't address the mindset of those who say JTF2 secrecy is necessary.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Are the SAS and JTF2 equivalent, in your opinion?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Look at special forces this way. There are two kinds of special forces—and I use the runner analogy. SAS troops are long-distance runners. They'll go off into the desert with a motorcycle and a handful of rice and will stay there for weeks. They are a proactive force, and they're given a great deal of leeway in their operations. JTF2 seems to be—and I stress “seems to be”—a more reactive force tasked with hostage rescue internally, tasked with protection of VIPs, tasked with that sort of thing. It's apples and oranges. You can't really compare the two. But do I think we should have a more SAS-capable unit? Absolutely.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: How's my time?

The Chair: You have two and a half minutes.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: I'd like to shift gears to the other favourite topic of the government. Canada has no heavy-lift attack helicopters normally associated with light rapid deployment forces. Should this be a priority acquisition of the Canadian Forces?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Two years ago, I said this, and I'll say it again now: yes, absolutely. I believe attack helicopters would be a great force multiplier for the Canadian Forces. In lieu of attack helicopters, I'd like to see enhanced close support capability for the Canadian Forces' air force units, either in terms of increasing the CF-18s' capability to hit targets on the ground, or perhaps in the purchase of retiring airframes from the United States. The A-10 Warthog is a very capable close-air support vehicle. While aging, it's something the United States has been looking at phasing out, and it would be easy to purchase it.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: On your favourite topic, is there any other G-8 country that has no national intelligence service?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Not that I know of.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: What do we lose by not having such a capability?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I hesitate to put it in terms of losing or winning something. I think Canada can be more capable with the creation of a stand-alone, autonomous foreign intelligence gathering capability—and I stress that such a capability will greatly enhance the government's ability to make decisions in times of crisis. More importantly, I think you have to be able to do long-term strategic analysis as much as short-term. A lot of what I read in the SIRC's reports indicates that Canadian intelligence gathering capabilities tend to be rather like JTF2, meaning that they're more reactive and more short-term. I'd like to see a lot more long-term intelligence assessments being done by the Canadian government, quite frankly.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Forster, I don't know where to start. I have all kinds of questions here, but one of the things you were talking about is the idea of our forces either being able to do all or being limited to one job only. I'd put in a third one there. What's happening with a lot of our NATO partners—and “partners” is the key word—is that they're ending up partnering their militaries. For instance, they're taking special parts, they're sharing. As an example, the Dutch are going to take care of the air-to-air refuelling for the Germans, while the Germans are going to do the airlift. Looking at the countries that are the seafaring countries involved with missile ships, they're adding them to their inventory and are basically setting up a perimeter around Europe. It goes on and on. Everybody is starting to specialize in a particular part. It's not that they're going to do that completely, it's just that they're taking in a partner, too, to complete the job. Would you say that might be a possibility for Canada?

• 1630

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, absolutely. Anything's possible, when it comes down to it.

As I mentioned before, my preferred outcome would be that Canada creates a military large enough and capable enough to do all the necessary things that a war-fighting entity should be able to do, with the national will, with the a government will behind it to deploy it in times of crisis. In lieu of that, a specialized capability with a light infantry force that can deploy quickly and put a lot of firepower into one place at one time would be the next best solution.

Interoperability, of course, is the big concern here, as well. We have to be able to interoperate with our allies.

Mr. David Price: But in your second scenario, you're talking about a quick-in, quick-out force. I think we've seen in the past that this is not really possible. It's just not going to happen. And Canada has to look at the reputation we already have behind us. We're not that style. If we go into a place, we're going to be in there afterward to make sure the proper cleanup is done. So I don't really see that scenario myself. Anyway, I'll go on from there.

Let's look at the problem of intelligence gathering, which is definitely right up your line. In looking at banking transactions on Wall Street, I'm sure you've done quite a bit of intelligence gathering there. You didn't mention the difference between them, but you said data and intelligence are two totally different things. I'd like a little clarification on that.

The first problem that I see, however, goes right along with intelligence gathering. There is no problem in compiling data, but the compiling and the synthesizing usually go up to a certain level and don't come back down, as you said. Quite often, there ends up being a large puzzle for which pieces are usually missing. Most of the pieces get to the top of the pile, but other sections further down are missing a lot of other pieces.

You said yourself that we should have a formalized system of sharing—and this goes right across the borders, too, in terms of not just sharing within Canada, but sharing the information that we have from, let's say, our American friends. I know we want to hold certain information on our own. Maybe we can break this case, as you might say, by keeping this piece of information. It's unfortunate, but it's a standard practice. How do we break through that?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I hate to say this, but one of the things that needs to be done is to give SIRC some teeth. That committee makes pretty reasonable assessments of, for example, the capabilities of CSIS, but it really can't enforce them.

Intelligence has to be driven by the top. As such, it is a cooperative process between the intelligence gathering and synthesis capabilities, and the sitting government. There has to be an atmosphere of intelligence within the Canadian government to really facilitate the creation of a foreign intelligence gathering capability, and to increase the intelligence sharing that's currently taking place.

You asked about the difference between data and intelligence, and it keys directly into your second question. I look at the intelligence process as a cake. Data is just the pieces. Data is your flour, your eggs, your milk. Synthesizing that data into an intelligence product that is either short-term or long-term is the job of analysts. It's ultimately the job of, potentially, a foreign intelligence gathering body.

Now, you have to be concerned about creating an atmosphere in which people's assets are being taken away from them. By the same token, you also have to have a capability that's going to be based broadly enough to pull in all the different sources of data and to create one good intelligence product.

I hope I'm being specific.

Mr. David Price: But what about the intelligence part and the difference that ties in there?

Could I just have one quick second to get that clarified?

The Chair: Yes, very quickly, Mr. Price—with a quick answer, Mr. Forster.

Mr. David Price: You say you take the data and that it compiles into intelligence?

Mr. Anthony Forster: That's right.

Mr. David Price: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Forster, the Canadian military obtains much of its intelligence from U.S. and NATO sources. Is there a danger that Canada may depend too much on these intelligence sources when many of the peacekeeping operations in which Canadian soldiers are involved occur outside of the Euro-Atlantic area?

• 1635

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, absolutely.

Intelligence sharing is a two-way street. Simply by virtue of its size, America generates more intelligence than Canada can ever hope to generate. As such, there will be the inclination by western intelligence communities outside of Canada to screen what they send to Canada. They're going to screen it in terms of what we are going to use it for and whether the data is going to be secure. That's the nature of the beast. So, forgive me, but, yes, that would be true to a certain degree.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I understand you have worked in the competitive intelligence area of banking. Does our military have the same sophistication as what is there in the competitive world of banking in its intelligence?

Mr. Anthony Forster: The banking community has access to scores and scores of analysts who are highly paid and well respected for their opinions. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Canadian military. From the documents I have read specifically regarding Canadian military analytic capabilities, it appears there is a shortage of analysts. Certainly in CSIS, there seems to be a question about the career path for analysts, and that needs to be addressed as well.

If you'll allow me to refer to my notes for a second, I believe a military intelligence study is being conducted right now. The Chief of Review Services is currently carrying out an evaluation of Canadian military intelligence capabilities, mainly because of a Department of National Defence planning document that has stated that “unreliable and uncorroborated intelligence products” are being created, and that there is a decided lack of military attachés to gather intelligence.

That's something that has to be fixed.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right away.

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, right away.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, indeed, that's a very serious situation that really—

Mr. Anthony Forster: I would strongly suggest that you get your hands on the report of the Chief of Review Services as soon as it comes out.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay, thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, you have the floor.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for attending again, Mr. Forster. I think we met in April 1999, and some guy who was with you was selling helicopters or something like that. You filled in on a double hit, I think.

Every now and then, as I go along, I listen to some of the questions asked by the opposition and to some of the statements made by people such as yourself, and all I can tell anyone is that we have to think outside the box. September 11 changed everything—the way we think, the way we plan, the way we act—so I would advise you to read Bill C-36, particularly as it pertains to and refers to the National Defence Act. It does add a number of capabilities to National Defence that I think are worth looking at.

Now, the bill is still in committee, and there may be changes. There may be other things, too, but the government does recognize the need, and it has moved to strengthen and codify the role of the Communications Security Establishment within DND. That will be through amendments to the National Defence Act. Of course, when we comment on something that's before a committee, we have to wait to see if it's going to be amended and whether the amendments that are proposed under the National Defence Act.... After reading it, I suspect it will better enable the government to address what I would consider to be serious security issues, which you have mentioned.

It wasn't until we had terrorists and the towers coming down that everything changed. Up to that point, what we were doing in the military defence establishment was adequate for the times. Some may argue that, some may not, because once you get into intelligence, if you're on the inside, you don't want people to know what's on the outside, obviously.

I agree with you in a way, but I also disagree with you in a way on having a stand-alone agency. I think it is and has to be something that is now under a department that has the capability to act, and that would be National Defence. Maybe I'm a little biased on that, though, because I've spent a lot of time looking at it.

• 1640

I hear people talking about the diminished budget. The fact is that we can't match the U.S. budget. The U.S. budget was raised from $291.2 billion to $343 billion. That's a $52 billion raise. Our budget is $11.9 billion, although it could be $11.4 billion, depending on who you talk to and where the money is going. But that $11.9 billion is the largest budget in Ottawa.

The Department of National Defence employs the most civil servants. We are at 98% of capacity. In fact, our recruitment right now is ahead of the numbers that we need. I want to point out that the regular force target for this fiscal year was 7,000, and we're at 85% of that not quite six months into the campaign. So we're doing quite well. In fact, we hoped to add 3,000 reserves, and we already have 4,000 signed up. I don't want to be doom and gloom, but that is some good news.

The other thing I checked on is how many pilots we actually have, how many we are training, and so forth. We have more pilots than we need, so some of them are doing other work. Some of them could be brought on stream very quickly if they were needed.

I'm not adding you into this, but you have to separate someone who's here lobbying to sell military equipment or some organization trying to lobby to sell military equipment, from people who are here to actually add something to the discussion. So I appreciate your thoughts today.

When Turkey spends $7.7 billion, Greece spends $3.3 billion, and we spend $11.9 billion, I think we're doing very well in terms of military spending for a country of our size. When you look at the budget, it becomes a target for everyone in other government departments, obviously, so—

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, I think we really have to give the witness an opportunity to respond here, within a reasonable timeframe.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay, then I would like his comments on recognizing that we have strengthened things through Bill C-36, which is presently before the House. I believe it is something that....

Normally I don't make a statement, so I'll let you answer.

I have to correct some of these things that are out there, Mr. Chair. You seem to let them slip by, so I have to—

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, it's not my job to catch those sorts of things, with all due respect.

Mr. Forster, maybe we'll give you a couple of minutes to reply, because Mr. O'Reilly had quite a few offerings there.

Mr. Anthony Forster: Yes, I don't quite know where to start, as a matter of fact.

Mr. John O'Reilly: That's good. I didn't either.

Mr. Anthony Forster: Let's talk about “adequate for the times”. I think “adequate for the times” may not be the appropriate expression to typify the Canadian government's spending for the military. I think it was representative of the Canadian people's mandate given to the government to work on the economy, to provide social services, to provide all the things Canada is so well known for. Do I think it was adequate for the military, given the rapid changes that were taking place around the world after the fall of the Soviet Union? I'd hesitate to say it was adequate.

You have to remember that I don't come at this as a representative of an industrial group. I come at this strictly from the standpoint of wanting to improve the capability of the Canadian military to prosecute war in whatever capacity the Canadian government sees fit. Do I think the Canadian government funded the Canadian military appropriately to support its own policy objectives? No, I do not. I think a little more could have been done. By the same token, though, I think the Canadian government set its priorities, and the Canadian government has acted in accordance with those priorities. I think that's a laudable thing.

Mr. John O'Reilly: So you recognize that $3 billion in three budgets is not bad for a government that was cutting back.

Mr. Anthony Forster: It's not bad, but by the same token, I think a great deal more could be done.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Now, it's never enough. I recognize that, and I want you to keep pushing for more funding.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly, Mr. Forster.

Ms. Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Would you say an intelligence service is an important prerequisite to a capable special operations force?

• 1645

Mr. Anthony Forster: I would say you cannot create a special operations force without an intelligence capability.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay.

Elite rapid deployment forces such as the Dutch Marines, the U.S. Army Rangers, British paratroopers, and the Royal Marines, have high standards of training. If Canada were to establish such a capability, would we have to rethink our approach to training and raise the standard considerably?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Given the lack of information that's out there regarding JTF2's training regimen, I hesitate to answer in the affirmative, but I really would have to.

More importantly, you would have to create some sort of homegrown intelligence capability specifically tasked to support that special operations unit. You're talking about career intelligence professionals who have funding and support across the board, and who are able to tap into a variety of different intelligence products from the various different.... If you're not going to create a foreign intelligence gathering unit, you still have to have the ability to tap into whatever intelligence is necessary for the prosecution of the mission given to the special forces.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: In terms of oversight, would you say this would be a ministerial responsibility, or that of Parliament? You had previously mentioned reporting to Parliament. How do you see this fitting in in terms of accountability?

Mr. Anthony Forster: In terms of accountability for special forces or intelligence?

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Intelligence.

Mr. Anthony Forster: For intelligence, I would say it has to be on the ministerial level. I would not want to see oversight done by any individual group currently handling intelligence gathering for the Canadian government. I'd like to see an autonomous oversight ability that has real teeth.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Are you aware of any existing foreign policies that would provide the framework under which these special forces would act, or is there work to be done in that department as well?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I think direction for the use of special forces is going to have to come from the top. If you read a lot of the reports generated by the Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, a recurring theme is a feeling among the troops that there is a lack of ministerial direction during deployments. When I came here two years ago, I spoke about the need to work on doctrine, the need to address that particular failing. I think it continues to be a concern.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Our field battle groups use mostly portable computers for artillery, for many different targeting purposes, and for intelligence gathering purposes for that matter, with our recce units and so on, whereas the command and control centres tend to use desktop computers with a sealed internal Internet. Do you feel that's safe?

Mr. Anthony Forster: The only safe computer system is one that is in a locked room with a guard outside it, and even then you can't consider it safe. That's the bottom line. The U.S. government uses a variety of Windows-based platforms, some of which are not even given security ratings if they're attached to the Internet, according to the U.S. NSA's orange book, which is the book that assesses the vulnerability of a variety of different computer systems.

I think a wired infrastructure is a great force multiplier. Certainly, the U.S. military has been experimenting with that at great length at the National Training Center. They've had mixed results. When it works, it works great. When it doesn't work, it creates nothing but trouble. But that doesn't mean you shouldn't continue to try, that you shouldn't continue to grow that capability. However, I would be extremely hesitant to field any technology like that unless all the bugs have been worked out of it.

Mr. David Price: Getting back to JTF2, everybody seems to be talking about a larger unit for JTF2. My own feeling is that JTF2 could be enlarged, but more as a domestic unit. I think we do need another unit that is a little like what you were talking about in terms of a a rapid-in, rapid-out operation. It would still have to be followed up by a more conventional force that would go in to take over, but it would be used in order to quell things in the beginning.

Do you think JTF2 should be more multi-functional if enlarged, or do you think a force like that should be more specialized, like the ones many of our NATO partners have? If we look at the special forces within NATO right now, as I mentioned, there is a partnering of equipment. The same thing is happening in units. The Polish unit is very specialized in mountaineering, and there are many other groups like that. They do certain things really well, and if a particular need arises in a particular area, bang, that's the unit that will go in. Do you think we should be going in that particular direction with an offshoot of JTF2, or do you think it should be a separate unit, with JTF2 kept as the anti-terrorist domestic group?

• 1650

Mr. Anthony Forster: I'll give you my best-case scenario, if you will. JTF2 is expanded and given a mandate to operate not only domestically, but to operate in a special operations capacity overseas. The Canadian Forces would then have a dedicated light infantry force that is able to not necessarily come out very quickly, but one that is able to go in and deploy very quickly in a peacekeeping capacity.

It's a pretty well-known fact that peacekeeping operations tend to take the edge off a true war-fighting unit. Therefore, what I'd really like to see is a well-trained infantry force that is able to deploy quickly for a low- or medium-intensity conflict, in a peacekeeping capacity. Canada then retains another force that is able to conduct full-war fighting and is well trained for that.

So, yes, I think compartmentalization of skills would ultimately be the best possible outcome.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Forster, being a independent research intelligence analyst, have you sat down with our Minister of National Defence to go over exactly what you're presenting to us here? Is he aware of all of your research and what you have been able to come forward with in your report for us? Have you brought it to the minister's attention?

Mr. Anthony Forster: I don't think anyone is aware of it aside from you people, to be perfectly honest.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I ask that because I just left the justice committee—which is why I was late, Mr. Chair. The minister was there, and he was making a presentation on intelligence there as well. I think he'd be very interested in it, and it would be very good for you and our minister to sit down and have a cup of coffee.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, I think it's safe to say the minister is very aware of what happens in this committee. The Department of National Defence has dedicated people to watch what is said at this committee, so I think you can rest assured that the minister will be apprised of Mr. Forster's comments.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The only reason I brought it up was that I just thought that, based on information and research Mr. Forster has brought forward—which is very good—it would be wise for us to tell the minister that we feel very strongly that Mr. Forster should be meeting with him and discussing his concerns.

Mr. Anthony Forster: If I may, I don't really think I'm bringing anything particularly new to the table. I think a great deal of what's being said here has been said before in different form. I do think the context under which it's being said is different. Nobody could have anticipated the depth and breadth of what was brought down on us on September 11. Nobody could have anticipated the willingness of a terrorist group or, theoretically, the willingness of anyone to utilize a biological agent in the pursuit of whatever the aim is that these people mailing anthrax may have. It's all about context. Right now, we are faced with having to revise the context under which we look at things.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I think you'll find that, in the future, our military men and women, the resources they require, and intelligence, will probably be a number one priority in Canada. Hopefully, that's the way it's going to be, because we have seen something take place since September 11. As you have stated and as we all have stated, no one ever thought that would happen. We want to make sure we give the tools to our military so that they can look after us, take care of us.

We have children and grandchildren. They're the future of our country, and I have to say that I want to thank people like you, I truly do, for your interest in this. It is people like you, Mr. Forster, who really bring forth the information we require. On top of that, it's information that our minister needs. It's the support that he needs, because he has to have a lot of support when he goes into cabinet, because it's just us in this committee who keep pushing for the military.

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Mr. Anthony Forster: Well, I have three young girls—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: There you go.

Mr. Anthony Forster: —and I'd like to see them grow up in a place where we don't have to worry about planes crashing into buildings and whether or not they can open their mail. So my intentions really are not all that.... Let's just say I'm working from enlightened self-interest.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm pleased that you are, and I thank you very much, sir.

The Chair: Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wasn't going to ask this question, because it might be a little sensitive. You said that in a previous part of your life, you were collecting information on banking on Wall Street. As you said, I'm sure you got some pretty interesting information along the way in that job, a lot of which had to do with military and political information. What did you do with that information when you did get it?

Mr. Anthony Forster: The information gathered is driven by the people I'm supposed to create intelligence product for. They define it, whether it's a private client or....

I run a website that carries open-source intelligence data, as well, and I invite you all to visit it at some point in time.

The Chair: Could you give us the web address?

Mr. Anthony Forster: It's http://osi.theofficersclub.com. On it, I usually post a once-a-day intelligence assessment that is culled from a variety of open sources, usually the large news services. It also has a forum for discussion to which anyone is perfectly welcome to post. I welcome you visiting it and taking a look at it. Obviously, it hasn't been updated in the last day or so because I haven't been home.

Mr. David Price: As you got sensitive information, was there any kind of protocol to pass that on? I guess what I'm getting at is that you're not there any longer. What's going on right now? Is there a protocol to pass on information, particularly with what has happened?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Let's look at what I was doing on Wall Street. I was working with an independent recruiting firm, providing data for the recruiters to target people. My open-source research consisted of going through trades publications and newspapers, looking at websites when they started coming up, and pulling out the names and personal histories of people who might be potential targets for recruitment in terms of getting them to move from one firm to another. In the course of that, especially because I was working with oil traders and sales people, one had to be aware of the political environments of a variety of countries.

As for access to data that would be deemed sensitive, most banks consider their personnel lists to be sensitive.

Mr. David Price: It's that little piece of the puzzle that is quite often missing.

Mr. Anthony Forster: Exactly. My job was not only to gather those pieces, but to synthesize them into an intelligence report that I could give to the recruiters to act upon. Names, phone numbers, and personal backgrounds were the extent of it. I didn't feel it was necessary to pass on any internal data. Of course, there's no oversight for people like me. Those people are expected to adhere to the protocols of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals.

SCIP has a set of protocols that people are expected to adhere to, including not misrepresenting oneself and not accessing anyone's personal data. Those are protocols that I adhere to very strongly. At least in my capacity as an open-source intelligence analyst, I don't believe it's necessary to violate anyone's privacy. I'd be extremely hesitant of anyone who is willing to do so.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much.

I was in another committee just prior to being here. I would like to ask our guest something this afternoon. He mentions that fighting in Afghanistan is about minefields. Canada embarked upon what I think was a foolhardy measure to go ahead and ban the use of anti-personnel land mines.

The first question I'd like to ask is whether or not our witness today has any opinions on whether or not trying to ban land mines is, in some respects, unachievable and naive. What are his thoughts on that, since they're going to exist anyhow?

The other thing he mentions is

that Canada and her forces could find themselves embroiled in a high intensity conflict that would require the use of tanks and other heavy and difficult-to-deploy weapons systems.

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We have debated many times in this committee with those in favour of the government's position that says frankly that light armoured vehicles are enough. I don't happen to think that's the case. I happen to think that if you put our forces into harm's way against an enemy that does have tanks, light armoured vehicles frankly don't cut it. If I were a trooper, I wouldn't want to be in a light armoured vehicle when everybody else is cruising around the field in tanks.

Anyhow, I'd like to get his thoughts on those two things, and on one final one. He has mentioned that we have no dedicated foreign intelligence gathering arm. I imagine he has touched on this with some of the other questioners before, but maybe he could touch on what he thinks is needed for a foreign intelligence gathering arm.

Mr. Anthony Forster: As far as land mines go, land mines are just part of the problem. A fairly commonly used weapon of war is the CBU, the cluster bomb munitions that are dropped in large numbers as an anti-personnel weapon. Some of those are set up to detonate when they contact a target, and some of them are set to detonate later on. Some don't detonate. Given that they're about the size of a softball and they look like something fun to play with, you run the risk of somebody picking one up and blowing themselves to smithereens.

I think it's very laudable that Canada tried to do away with land mines. Quite frankly, I'd like to see it happen. Whether or not it's a realistic goal is another matter entirely. Unfortunately, the use of land mines is doctrine for a number of militaries around the world. Convincing those militaries not to use land mines would be a Herculean task, to say the least. Is it a fight worth fighting, though? Absolutely. Is it possible? Maybe not.

As far as your opinions on tanks are concerned, I'm a big proponent of heavy armour. I believe nothing is quite as compelling for a rifle-armed foe as seeing a Leopard tank sitting at a crossroads. But tanks are vulnerable. Tanks are especially vulnerable in built-up areas where people can expect to get into fights. Tanks are vulnerable in rough terrain, where a single man with a rocket-propelled grenade can take out a tank just by hiding, waiting for it to pass, and shooting it in the grill.

Yes, I'd like to see Canada continue to have an armoured force. This is in keeping with my view that I'd like to see Canada have a multi-spectrum-capable military. But as I said, in lieu of that, perhaps the light infantry and light armour way is the way to go if the budget simply can't be found for tanks. I'd like to see Canada have them, but I don't know if that's going to be ultimately possible.

And with tanks, of course, come all the necessary logistics trains for fuel and for ammunition. Just transporting them requires heavy equipment movers and a fairly large logistics train.

So it's a problem I'd like to see resolved in favour of an armoured force, but if they're not going to be used, then I would strongly suggest that they be gotten rid of, quite frankly, with the budget allocated somewhere else.

You also asked about intelligence gathering and about a foreign intelligence gathering group. To summarize, I basically would like to see all the disparate intelligence and foreign intelligence gathering capabilities of Canada re-funded with greater oversight, preferably at the ministerial level. Ultimately, I'd like to see a branch of the Canadian government that is dedicated to nothing but getting up in the morning and going out to get foreign intelligence on matters affecting the security of Canada and its interests, with that branch having oversight over all the different intelligence gathering assets.

Mr. Rob Anders: The last point I'd like to make is that, right now, we're undergoing an exercise in which the budget of National Defence is being evaluated. I happen to think it could be significantly increased, while other aspects of government could be significantly decreased. I'm going to ask you, though, what you would like to see as an ideal budget for the Department of National Defence. What would you like to see it spent on? Basically, it's how much and what.

Mr. Anthony Forster: How much is a funny question. In terms of doing a long-term study of where I'd like to see the money go and how much it should be, I would hesitate to put out a number because any number I put out will probably come back to haunt me later in life.

Given that, I would like to see the Canadian Forces be capable at the level at which the government expects them to operate. The government expects the Canadian Forces to do a great deal. I'd like to see them have the equipment, the training, and the intelligence capabilities to do that. Those things require a significant increase in funding.

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We're not talking about $10 million here or $20 million there, we're talking about millions and millions of dollars that are going to have to come from somewhere. Where is that money going to come from? That's up to you guys. But the money has to be spent, and it has to be spent sooner rather than later.

I hope that's at least a partial answer to your question.

Mr. Rob Anders: Partial.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Anders?

Mr. Rob Anders: No.

The Chair: Mr. Forster, I'd like to ask you a question related to a proposal I made last year, contained in a paper called “Fostering Human Security”. The point made in that paper was that perhaps we should attempt to revive the First Special Service Force in Canada. It was intended to address some issues like interoperability, the need for special forces, and the whole issue of training and rapid reaction.

When that paper came out, some people looked at me like I was a thing with two heads. In some quarters, it was not all that well received. However, given the events of September 11, it seems to have attracted a little bit more attention from some people who are continuing to write to me. They say they've had an opportunity to look at the paper, and they don't think it's altogether a bad idea. It also got a bit of support from the U.S. Airborne Magazine, which provided some editorial endorsement.

You were kind enough to send me your thoughts when the paper initially came out. I'm just wondering if you have any further thoughts on that whole issue, from the standpoint of training with, for instance, an organization like Delta Force, the Army Rangers, the Navy Seals, or with the British SAS, the Paras, or the Gurkhas. Do you have any thoughts on that at this point?

Mr. Anthony Forster: “Interoperability” has to be the buzzword of the day. As far as cross-training with other special forces assets is concerned, it's absolutely a good idea. Not only does it give you the ability to enhance your training regimen, it allows you to deploy in different areas of the world where you might have to deploy and become acclimated to the environment. Between members of the military, it also fosters ties that will, in the case of a deployment, facilitate that deployment.

Interpersonal ties, especially among special forces trained to think out of the box and to think differently from the rank and file of the military, are very important. Personal ties are very important to special operators because that's what they train to do. You have to depend on each other, if nothing else, to get the job done.

So, yes, I would endorse getting out there and cross-training with different special forces as much as possible.

The Chair: Another question that I have relates to the current operations in Afghanistan by the Americans, and perhaps by the British as well. Do you have any forecasts on how long you see those operations taking in terms of neutralizing the Taliban and eliminating al-Qaeda?

Mr. Anthony Forster: Well, that is the question now, isn't it?

The Chair: You're an intelligence and military analyst, Mr. Forster.

Mr. Anthony Forster: I don't think it's going to get done before winter, and I think it would be a tragic mistake to place limits or restrictions upon the amount of time it takes. I don't think Ramadan should be an excuse for pausing military operations at all, although I do understand that the sensibilities of a number of different nations need to be taken into account—and they have been; I think the United States and its allies have done an admirable job of taking those sensibilities into account. But I don't think it's going to get done before the snow falls, which will in essence put a stop to most military activity in that country until the pass is clear.

We're probably looking at a fairly long-term commitment. The only caveat I would give to that would be if, by some stroke of luck, the command structures of al-Qaeda and the Taliban are taken out. And when I say “taken out”, I don't mean arrested, I mean killed, because I don't think there's going to be any other way to do it. They're not men who are going to change their minds about how they feel anytime soon. If those men are removed from power, you may see a very small window of opportunity for a peacekeeping force to go in there and establish itself before the snows hit. Short of that, I don't think we're going to see a quick culmination to this problem.

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The Chair: Are there any further questions from committee members? No? Okay.

Well, Mr. Forster, thank you very much for providing us with your thoughts today. I think it has been an interesting session, especially on the issue of intelligence. To this point, we have not had the benefit of having many witnesses speaking on the intelligence issue and on what sorts of capabilities we need as a country. Thank you very much for your insights. We appreciate having had you here.

Mr. Anthony Forster: It has been my pleasure.

If I may, I have one closing thought. We have a very small window of opportunity here in which public opinion is on the side of intelligence reform and military reform. With every fibre of my body, I urge the members of this committee to please not squander this opportunity.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you.

This meeting is adjourned.