NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 31, 2001

• 1531

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, Canadian Alliance)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

Welcome, Admiral, to the meeting of SCONDVA. We are looking forward to hearing your presentation.

Before we start I would like to say that following your presentation I will be stepping down for a few minutes so that I can ask the first question. Mr. O'Reilly will take over the chair.

Gentlemen, you may begin.

Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison (Chief of the Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon. I'm particularly pleased and honoured to be able to address you today on the subject of the operational readiness of your navy.

Joining me today are Commodore Jacques Gauvin, who's the director general of maritime personnel and readiness, and Chief Petty Officer First Class Richard Lupien, who is a senior non-commissioned sailor in the navy.

Permit me to start by saying that your navy today is more combat capable than it was in 1990, when we sent a task group of three ships to the Persian Gulf. It may not be the largest fleet ever, nor does it include the widest array of warship types and equipment. Nonetheless, Canadians enjoy a fleet that is balanced in overall capability and well poised to undertake its many domestic and international tasks.

Our shore-based infrastructure is first rate, thanks to considerable investments made over the past decade. Our training establishments in particular are among the most advanced anywhere.

At sea Canada's fleet has been virtually rebuilt over the past decade. The steam-powered destroyer escorts built during the fifties have all been retired and replaced by the 12 Halifax class frigates, considered among the finest of their kind. The four larger Iroquois class destroyers have been thoroughly modernized and provide a task group commander at sea with a potent air defence and command-and-control capability. Twelve Kingston class maritime coastal defence vessels, manned almost exclusively by the naval reserves, have proven to be both highly effective and cost-efficient in their coastal defence and mine warfare roles. With the introduction over the next couple of years of the four Victoria class submarines together with the acquisition of a replacement for the Sea King helicopters and the planned update of the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, the balance of Canada's maritime forces—air, surface, and subsurface—is well on its way to being restored.

As a result of these investments, Canada has a fleet with robust combat capabilities and renewed international status, the most visible expression of which is the presence today of two Canadian ships in the Arabian Gulf—Her Majesty's Canadian ships Charlottetown and Winnipeg—as fully integrated members of American carrier battle groups working together in support of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. While Winnipeg and Charlottetown remain under clear Canadian command and follow Canadian-approved rules of engagement, working alongside the United States Navy enables us to keep at the forefront of allied tactical, doctrinal, and technical developments; in other words, at the forefront of interoperability and the revolution in military affairs.

• 1535

[Translation]

There are areas, however, where we fall short in comparing ourselves to the Fleet of 1990. Today, Canada has no operational submarines whereas three were operating in 1990. Fortunately, this situation will be addressed soon when the very capable Victoria class enters operational service.

[English]

A second shortfall concerns fleet replenishment. In the early sixties and seventies Canada pioneered the concept of multi-purpose, underway replenishment vessels to fuel and provision warships at sea. These vessels increased sixfold the length of time the fleet could remain at sea for operations. Ten years ago those three vessels, Provider and two Protecteur class, were 20 to 25 years old. Today only the two 30-year-old Protecteur class remain. While they remain very effective in performing their replenishment roles, as seen most recently in East Timor, they are beginning to show their age.

The replacement of the Protecteur class is being proposed through development of what is called the afloat logistics and sealift capability. This project, were it to be approved, would not only replace the at-sea logistics support of the Protecteur class but would also be capable of delivering the lead elements of a Canadian contingency force anywhere in the world accessible by sea. Fully 85% of the world's population will be accessible to the Canadian Forces from the sea as a result of the capabilities proposed for this vessel. Other roles, including aviation support, logistics over the shoreline, humanitarian crisis response, and a joint force headquarters capability, are also under consideration for this vessel, which I hope to see by 2007.

Certainly no discussion of maritime force capability is complete without including mention of the significant part our maritime patrol and helicopter communities play. The Sea Kings are old, and their sensor capabilities and some avionics are now largely obsolete. When they are serviceable, however, they still make a difference. Nonetheless, they do need to be replaced. The other major contributor to maritime operations is the Aurora aircraft, which, as I mentioned earlier, are being upgraded in the near future.

In essence Canada's fleet is becoming more balanced in capability, and it is significantly more combat capable now than it has been for decades.

These points, I believe, are becoming better understood by Canadians, and the proof is in the fact that our ships have been deployed to virtually every navigable corner of the globe in the past few years. Your navy has been involved in nearly every major multilateral peace support operation that Canada has participated in since the end of the Cold War—including Cambodia, the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, East Timor, and the Arabian Gulf—in maritime peacekeeping operations as diverse as the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local populations and the enforcement of UN sanctions through maritime interdiction and embargo operations. Our ships are potent symbols of our national competence. The unique combination of long mission endurance, extensive communications, and hitting power makes them a respected messenger of government policy.

At home the navy has contributed to a number of major domestic operations, including the response to the Swiss Air 111 disaster on the east coast and the Red River floods, in addition to protecting resources and enforcing sovereignty in our maritime approaches. In this latter category falls much of the effort in support of other government departments, including the RCMP, Customs and Immigration, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

In short, the navy has been busier recently than at any time since the Korean conflict. Today, for example, I have just over 2,000 men and women at sea going about their business. That's nearly 50% of the sea-going establishment of 4,400. Just a week ago almost 3,500 people, or nearly three-quarters of the sea-going establishment, were deployed.

This is unlikely to change, in my view. The unique conditions that created the Cold War are unlikely to be replicated in today's broadened security environment, at once both global in outlook and more independent of traditional allegiances and national boundaries.

• 1540

[Translation]

In fact, the type of work your navy is doing today is a better reflection of the full range of military, diplomatic and constabulary tasks that navy has been called upon to perform by the leading maritime powers of the day. Accordingly, my cardinal objective is that the navy will continue to possess a broad range of capabilities to provide our government the widest range of responses possible to the security issues of the day.

[English]

These responses, of course, must be ready when needed. Readiness, in the naval context, is an assessment of the preparedness of a naval platform and its crew to successfully conduct an assigned task, role, or mission. Some operations require merely the presence of a ship at sea performing work safely, and in observance of good seamanship. This, for example, would include routine surveillance work in domestic waters. Other operations would require all sensors and weapons to be manned and available for immediate use. These kinds of operations would be conducted in the presence, or potential presence, of an adversary. Winnipeg and Charlottetown, both of which I mentioned, are in the Arabian Gulf today, and have been prepared for precisely these kinds of contingencies.

Given the multitude of potential missions to which naval units can be assigned, readiness is benchmarked against an ability to operate in a conflict of mid-intensity, like the Persian Gulf War. However, in today's environment it is not necessary, nor even desired, that all units be maintained uniformly at the levels of readiness required for full combat operations. The challenge, of course, is in matching resources to operational commitments.

To this end, a tiered approach to readiness is being adopted. Winnipeg and Charlottetown are examples of high-readiness frigates, available in a short timeframe for combat-type operations. Other ships are maintained at a somewhat lower level of readiness called standard readiness. These are capable of performing the vast majority of domestic operations and training. Indeed, both HMCS Athabascan and Montreal, the two ships that conducted the successful boarding of the GTS KATIE off the coast of Newfoundland last August, were standard readiness ships.

Ships placed at extended readiness range from those placed in extended maintenance periods to those placed in a care and custody status, of which we have one, HMCS Huron on the west coast. The resources that would otherwise be required to keep her at sea have been reallocated to better advantage into other ships of the fleet.

The complexity of modern operations and the technical sophistication of our ships dictate a rigorous approach to readiness and its measurement. As a ship progresses from extended readiness to high readiness, she undergoes a progressively more demanding series of trials, evaluations, work-ups, and weapons systems certifications to validate her preparedness, in terms of both technical performance and crew competence for combat operations.

In this regard, we have learned much in the 1990s, in the midst of the transition from the old fleet to the current fleet. The operational capability analysis, or OCA, was born of a desire to measure weapons performance at the overall systems level, through exercise firings, to determine and correct the root cause of any deficiencies discovered, whether technical or training-related.

The results have been a significant improvement in our overall combat effectiveness, and success in tactically realistic and highly demanding exercise scenarios that would have been considered too ambitious just a few years ago. First applied to our anti-air-warfare capabilities, this methodology is now being used to improve our capabilities in other warfare disciplines.

Nevertheless, a fleet is not a static thing. It continually must be renewed, and at significant cost. Yet the challenge of building our future fleet may well be eclipsed by the challenges of preparing our people for the demands of future operations.

[Translation]

Without a doubt, the profession of arms is becoming increasingly complex. Indeed, warfare itself is changing in response to forces at work in virtually every field of human endeavour: that is to say the information revolution. Industrial age warfare, as typified by the Second World War, is giving way to a new pattern of conflict, the outlines of which began to emerge in the Persian Gulf War and more recently in Kosovo.

• 1545

[English]

What we are talking about here, of course, is the ongoing revolution in military affairs, in which, in my view, three major trends are beginning to dominate.

First is the emergence of long-range weapons of unprecedented accuracy and increasing smartness, coupled with a system of increasingly powerful and discriminating sensors, command systems and precise intelligence. Integrated precision engagement will play more of a prominent role in operations at all levels, including those at sea.

Second is the emergence of information technologies. Information is critical to every aspect of military and naval operations. Information technologies have dramatically improved our ability to gather, process, store, and disseminate information in real time. Protecting the effective operation of one's own information systems, and exploiting, degrading, destroying or disrupting those of an opponent will become an important focus of operations at all levels throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.

Third is the increased use and application of space systems, to virtually all aspects of military and naval operations, with the most immediate applications in communications and near-real time wide-area surveillance and warning systems, to enhance our awareness of the battle space.

The ability to locate and identify, with a high degree of confidence, high-value fixed and mobile targets on earth and at sea from space-based systems will fundamentally change how we conduct operations.

These challenges are very real indeed, with profound implications not only for technological reinvestment, but also for professional education and training, and for rapid adaptation of naval doctrine, procedure, and organization.

A further challenge arises from the capital-intensive nature of modern naval forces. They are not only expensive to own, they are also expensive to replace. Accordingly, striking an appropriate balance between sustaining the current fleet and building the next one is not easy. In fact, it has never been easy. However, if the cost of building and sustaining a navy is high, even higher is the price of getting it wrong.

Finally, I would identify one last major challenge that ultimately impacts on the readiness of the navy and the Canadian Forces. That relates to the awareness Canadians have of our role as a national institution. I am confident that there exists a good deal of good will toward the Canadian Forces.

Nonetheless, defence and national security are not high in most people's minds. In the long run, however, a Canadian public that is better informed of defence issues in general, and in my case, naval issues in particular, is truly in the national interest. In this regard, the efforts of your committee, ladies and gentlemen, are really most welcome.

Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)): Thank you very much, Vice-Admiral. That's quite a thorough presentation, and we appreciate your attendance.

For some reason, both the chair and the vice-chair from the government side are away, much to the amazement of everyone here. But being a committee that has existed almost solely on no political interference, we tend to get along very well.

We'll now go for seven minutes to the Canadian Alliance. Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your presentation, Vice-Admiral.

My first question has to do with comments you made recently in a capability plan 2001. You said you will not be able to deliver the mandated level of maritime defence capability without additional resources. You also said that the navy has reached the point where there is no flexibility left in the sustained agenda, and the navy needs additional resources to maintain an acceptable balance between sustained and change requirements in fiscal year 2001, and the same pressures will continue to exist in fiscal years 2002, 2003.

If you were not able to deliver the mandated level of maritime defence capability without additional resources, what have you had to cut, up to this point, and what will have to be cut in the future?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In actual fact, I did get additional resources, as a result of that—somewhere between $8 million and $9 million, which is what I needed, from an operations and maintenance perspective, to continue to allow me to do my missions and tasks.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So what is the total navy budget now, and what kinds of resources do you think are required to better meet your immediate operational requirements and future requirements?

• 1550

VAdm G.R. Maddison: My overall budget is somewhere in the vicinity of $425 million in terms of operations and maintenance. That has strictly been for me to be able to put ships to sea, to be able to maintain those ships, and be able to conduct the sorts of exercises I need to allow my ships to get up to a level of high readiness when they are deployed on high readiness tasks.

There is another $400 million or $500 million that goes strictly towards compensation and pay for people both in the military and the civilian workforce who work in our fleet maintenance facilities.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So you're confident that the additional budget requirements have met that, and have erased that concern you had in your operational capabilities?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I am. I would always like to have more, but those additional resources allow me to do my job.

Mr. Peter Goldring: In regard to the replacement for the Sea King helicopters, what is your opinion of the varying specifications that have been put forward, and how is that going to impact on your readiness and your capabilities to perform with the helicopters?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not sure whether you are aware or not, Mr. Goldring, but I'm one of the architects of the statement of requirement; I'm one of the guys who wrote that requirement.

That requirement meets what I believe are the missions of the day, and what the missions will be for the next 20 to 30 years. We are no longer in the business of having to deal with a massive Soviet threat in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. We are in the business of dealing with the threat that we see in the Arabian Gulf, off the East Timor area, or in the Adriatic Sea, where you don't need to have assets as far forward as we envisaged we needed to have in the eighties. So that statement of requirement, which allows us to have a helicopter with an endurance of anywhere between two hours and twenty minutes, in really hot weather, and two hours and fifty minutes in normal conditions is what I need to have.

Mr. Peter Goldring: This endurance level is less than the Sea King's original specifications, is it?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's interesting to try to compare apples with oranges or apples with apples here between Sea Kings and the maritime helicopter, the replacement of the Sea King. The maritime helicopter has an endurance of two hours and fifty minutes, which includes being able to carry two very heavy torpedos, the full load of sonobuoys in that aircraft, the sonar transducer, and a number of other bits and pieces of equipment to go off, do a mission, be able to hover for over an hour or so, and come back to the mother ship. If I were to put those same two torpedos, the same sonobuoys, the same sonar transducer in the Sea King today, I would probably get an endurance of somewhere between an hour and an hour and a half. So the MHP is actually going to provide us with a capability in terms of endurance much better than what we have with respect to the Sea King.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you.

There's another comment in this report that I'd like you to explain. It had mentioned the strategic capital consistent with strategic capability planning, and it mentions under that division a joint space project. Could you tell us how and at what cost that impacts on your overall budget, and how much appropriation you need to address that particular specific item?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The joint space project is not something that is within my purview, Mr. Goldring. The joint space project, however, in terms of capability, will very much assist us in being able to conduct surveillance of our maritime approaches from space when it becomes operational. But I don't have the information at the moment as to how much that project is going to cost.

Mr. Peter Goldring: You said here that it does impact on your expenses, impact on your capital requirements—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It does impact on our ability to be able to do our job, because it's going to be an additional method of assisting us in terms of helping us determine what is going on in our waters as a responsibility—very much so.

Mr. Peter Goldring: I see. Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Mr. John O'Reilly): We will now go to Mr. Plamondon.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the three witnesses for coming.

An issue I would like to discuss with you is the personnel required to operate these new complex pieces of equipment you mentioned. I am sometimes under the impression that in terms of defence, we say that we are satisfied with one thing or another, but we will need money to buy more modern equipment and even more modern equipment. I am under the impression that the situation is escalating out of control and that it is increasingly complex to train service members for operations.

• 1555

For example, I know that training a single F-18 pilot costs the army between $1 and $1.5 million. I imagine that training people who will work on these destroyers and these new helicopters will be very costly.

Are you seeing a major increase in training costs? I am not referring solely to acquisition costs, but also to the huge increase in the cost of training personnel that results in military budgets continuing to increase, at a time when service members' careers are getting shorter and shorter, I am told. Many people stay in the army or the navy for five or ten years, and then go to the private sector. So you have to continually repeat the training to replace the people who leave.

Have you seen an increase in training costs? Is there a problem with training? I have also heard that there is a Tribal- class destroyer in Western Canada that is docked because you do not have the personnel to operate it. I would like you to talk about this aspect of the complex training for personnel who operate this equipment.

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think the basic answer to your question, sir, is that training is increasing. As we go down the road of enhanced capability from a technological perspective it's becoming more complex, more sophisticated, and we do need to provide increased levels of training for our people.

To give you an example of that, our technicians, our sailors in the navy, over a twenty-year career will be involved in training during 12 years of that period. We are dealing with such sophistication in terms of being able to fuse data from all sorts of different information systems that are providing us the picture, and to be able to make the decisions with the right amount of information being displayed for the officers and the sailors on our ships you need to provide a great deal of training.

Having said that, in the last decade we have put in a number of simulators, a number of trainers that are at the high end of this capability to make sure that before we put our people at sea they have a high level of training to be able to allow them to do their job. But you can't do all that training ashore in those sorts of simulators and in those trainers. You do have to put them to sea. They do need to operate with other ships, with other submarines, with other aircraft to make them get to the point that they are very comfortable with their ability to optimize the use of the weapons systems and the sensor systems onboard our ships.

The simple answer is yes, our training is increasing.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Based on that and other factors, I want to ask you for your point of view. Obviously, you will be looking after your own interests, and I understand that, but in an extremely large country, one that is larger than the United States, we have three forces: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Given the complexity of what you have just said in terms of training and the very high acquisition costs for different pieces of equipment, be it for the Navy, the Air Force or the Army, in your opinion, is it not high time that we reflected on the situation to determine if Canada should specialize in a specific area? I will give you an example. Shouldn't we say that we are only going to have an army that will specialize in peacekeeping missions or medical missions in the world? Other NATO countries could specialize in naval issues and others in defence. That way, we would avoid any duplication or triplication of systems that are extremely costly, but which are not all that effective because the global context is no longer one of wars among countries, but a situation involving terrorism, and ideological wars that do not lead to worldwide conflicts.

• 1600

Everything that is built is not necessarily used, as was the case 25, 30 or 40 years ago. So should we not examine the situation with a view to modernizing and adapting to the new reality of world wars?

Of course, you are not a politician and you cannot take a stand, but I would like to have your opinion as a member of the Canadian Forces.

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As a member of the Canadian Forces, sir, my view is that we want to have as much flexibility as we possibly can. We want to have a capability that allows us to use an air component, that allows us to use a naval component, that allows us to use a land component, so that the government of the day, whatever government it is, has many options upon which to make their decisions as to where they wish to use that capability. The 1994 white paper called for multi-purpose combat-capable forces right across the spectrum of air, navy, and army, and that's what we have. And in my view, we ought to continue to have that multi-purpose, combat-capable situation right across the three components. It gives you much more flexibility than if you were niche-oriented.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Thank you very much, Admiral.

And now we'll move to Mr. Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, welcome.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Welcome to your colleagues, as well.

I want to ask you about the kinds of force scenarios the navy is looking at as it plans its future requirements, because obviously we're aware that as you are looking at the need for replacement of ships and equipment, and obviously the replacement of the Sea King helicopters, you look at the different ways you're going to be using those pieces of equipment. What are the chief scenarios that you foresee, and what implications does this have for what you need?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: To answer your question, one of the things that happened when the current strategic leadership came with General Baril back in October 1997 was that we took a look at what is going to be the strategic environment out there in 20 to 25 years' time, what are the operational imperatives to that environment, and what the force structure ought to be. As a result of that, from a joint perspective we put together what's called Strategy 2020. And in there are the force-planning scenarios in which we envisage we would use military forces, from a fairly benign environment up to and including collective defence.

There are 11 of those force-planning scenarios. They range from search and rescue, to evacuation of Canadians abroad, to peace support operations, such as in the Arabian Gulf, for example, to bilateral defence relations or defence operations with Canada and the United States, to collective defence under the NATO alliance rubric, and so on. In terms of the statement of requirements, the helicopter plays a key role in each one of those 11 force-planning scenarios. They're fairly clearly articulated as to those particular scenarios, and they were the reasons why we ended up with the statement of requirement the way it is.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Let me ask you about something we've seen in the media the last few days in relation to the Sea King and the specifications for new helicopters. There's been a suggestion that in fact the new helicopter meeting those specifications would not perform as well as the Sea King presently can perform. What can you tell us about that?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: First of all, as I said earlier, I was very much part and parcel of writing the statement of requirement. It's based on what we believe and assess will be the sorts of force-planning scenarios we will be involved in 20 to 30 years out, and that is operating in the inshore waters, in the much shallower waters than we had envisaged in the eighties, when the initial statement of requirement was written. That statement of requirement is concluded through a number of operational research studies done by our defence scientists as to what you need to be able to protect and use with a task group of ships and submarines.

• 1605

Our analysis would indicate that we needed two helicopters up, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to be able to support that task group at sea in the inshore environment. That means that for a particular task group you need to have about seven helicopters embarked to be able to have two to fly.

In normal conditions, the endurance needed in that scenario was just a little under three hours, and the statement of requirement does dictate this. In extreme conditions it's down to two hours and 20 minutes, with the full weight and load of two very heavy torpedoes, all the sonobuoys and all the associated equipment. It's mandatory that we get two hours and 20 minutes in the extreme heat, and two hours and 50 minutes in normal conditions—the conditions we have off our own coasts, where we're going to be using the helicopters the majority of the time.

With the sensor systems and the weapons systems that will be employed in thses new helicopters, they will be far more effective than the Sea Kings we currently have.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Let me visit a favourite of my neighbour's and tread on the issue of Shearwater and ask you—

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Shearwater.

Mr. Geoff Regan: It happened to me earlier today in a committee meeting, you'll be glad to know, so it's your turn. But I said there that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, so you should be very pleased about that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: God bless you, buddy.

Mr. Geoff Regan: I realize this is being assessed, but I'm curious about it. Can you give me any reasons why it would not make sense to have the new helicopters located as close as possible to the base of the ships?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There are obviously advantages to having the helicopters as close to the ships as you possibly can.

On the other hand, if you have helicopters with the same sorts of systems that are embarked in the Aurora aircraft, for example—systems allowing you to pool your maintainer support somewhere else, such as in Greenwood on the east coast—then maybe this is a factor that has to be considered when we determine where we ought to base future helicopters when they arrive.

I don't know what the study is going to conclude or recommend at the end of the day. Intuitively, I feel that the closer the helicopters are to the ships, the more operationally advantageous. Is it so bad, however—or so negative or positive—that you could deploy them elsewhere? I'm not sure yet. Until I see the results of the study that the chief of the air staff is doing, I can't make a conclusion one way or the other.

Mr. Geoff Regan: My time is probably up now, Mr. Chairman, isn't it?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): You have a minute left.

Mr. Geoff Regan: All right.

What is the navy doing to ensure that it is protecting the environment, Vice-Admiral Maddison? One of the things we hear about with ships generally is that sometimes toxic materials are dumped, or oil is spilled during refuelling, and things such as this. Canadians are anxious to know that our government in all forms is behaving responsibly on these issues. I'm anxious to hear about what the navy's program is in this regard.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: We have a very strong program in terms of being very careful about the environment in a number of different areas.

The new system for moving fuel around inside our ships, while it does not eliminate the problem totally, certainly reduces the chances of fuel spillage into the oceans. As for all the hazardous materials on board the ships, we have a garburator for plastics and cardboards and all those sorts of things. The garburator actually reduces all the garbage into what looks like little frisbees when they come out of it. We keep this material on board until we come ashore, when we can dispose of it in the proper hazardous materials disposal sites.

We have reduced our ozone-depleting halon releases by a significant amount in the last three or four years, something like 60% or 70%. We have made a great deal of effort with our new ships in terms of being very much environmental stewards.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Thank you, Vice-Admiral.

Now we'll move on with Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, it's really nice to hear the great voice of Cindy, one of our interpreters, who's now back from maternity leave. They're the unsung heroes of Parliament Hill. Well done.

Vice-Admiral Maddison, I must say that I bring greetings from your colleagues, Dusty Miller and Mr. MacLean, and of course Colonel Brian Akitt of Shearwater, who will be leaving soon. He has done admirable work in terms of promoting Shearwater.

• 1610

I want to thank my colleague from Halifax West for bringing up the question of Shearwater.

As you know, Shearwater represents 1,200 direct and 2,000 indirect jobs. There's a great deal of pressure on the use of that runway, the lands and everything, and if there is anything you can do, sir, to promote and protect Shearwater, I would be forever in your debt.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: You must think I have more power than I really have.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: But on my question to you, sir, you had suggested that the future of combat readiness will be in space, obviously in terms of technological advances in satellites or whatever.

I was at the British High Commission a couple of weeks ago, and a gentleman who advises the British government on military affairs was saying that Britain would have grave concerns about the militarization of space. The other day in the papers our foreign affairs minister expressed concern about the militarization of space.

In respect to what President Bush has been talking about in terms of national missile defence, do you believe—either as a member of the military or personally—that it would be a good idea for Canada to participate in something like the national missile defence, which eventually will lead to the militarization of space? Should we be an active player in that?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is not a military decision.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: That's exactly what General Baril said. For the reference of the committee, General Baril said national missile defence would not be a military decision, it would be a political decision. But you've indicated in here that you seem quite certain space-based systems will eventually happen.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, but I'm referring there, Mr. Stoffer, to the use of space from my perspective, using space technology to assist us in knowing what's going on in our areas of responsibility—i.e., surveillance from space, and being able to have the capability to allow us to increase our knowledge base of who's out, not only on the land masses, but also on our maritime approaches.

Communication is another aspect of the use of space, and we have another project, the military satellite project, which will provide us with an enhanced capability to communicate among ourselves without necessarily having to rely on other nations' satellites. That's what I'm talking about in terms of the use of space.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Wouldn't it be true then that Canada or the United States or whomever would have to protect those satellites from any difficulties they may encounter in order to protect that information?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's all a matter of risk management.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: My other question focuses on the tier system of readiness you talked about. It almost leaves one to believe that if a particular tier requires more resources, although you didn't say this, it appears that you may end up taking those resources from another level, instead of being able to apply to the government for additional funds. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I get the impression it's sort of a “rob Peter to pay Paul” system.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I have an assigned level of resources to allow me to go and execute the missions and tasks I've been assigned. I can't execute those assigned missions and tasks without having every single one of my ships at the highest level of readiness. To keep every ship at the highest level of readiness costs a lot, so my ability or my task is to provide two ships, within ten days' notice, at the highest level of readiness, to go off and execute a mission. That's within ten days. Within 21 days, I must have a task group of ships and submarines and associated air support to go off and execute a mission or task, and I can do that with the resources I have.

For example, I don't need a ship doing a fisheries enforcement patrol off the east coast of Canada to have a full up-and-running anti-submarine, anti-air-warfare combat capability. I don't need this for that particular ship. I can take those resources and reassign them where I really do need them, and that's what reallocating resources means in terms of tiered readiness.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Roy Bailey (Souris—Moose Mountain, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• 1615

Thank you, Vice-Admiral, for your report. I was really quite struck by one of your last sentences: “Nonetheless, defence and national security are not high in most people's minds.” That's a very true statement, and you've recognized that Canada is not the only country where that same scenario exists. You go on to say, “In the long run, however, a Canadian public that is better informed....” I just stop there, because in looking at material coming from our neighbours to the south and even from Australia and Great Britain, it just seems to me they do a better job of public relations and public information.

The press here is not always kind to all of the politicians, and it's not always kind to the military, and yet for some reason the armed forces—not so much the navy, I'll admit—never seem to get the counterattack from the media. I would think, speaking just as a citizen, our defence in general in Canada needs to adopt better public relations than they have at the present time, and the positive things, instead of all the negative things, talked about.

I just pass that out to you because I have noted that, and I've often wondered about it. You don't need all the public relations when you're at war, I recognize that. I'm old enough to remember it well. But I also recognize that this is something our Canadian Forces need very badly now.

I want to go to something you said on your capability plan. It's something I also heard from, I believe, the army. You said that the navy is facing serious personnel shortages in several military occupations in certain rank levels, and that, increasingly, shortages in many occupations continue to impose additional demands on available personnel. Could you explain to me, is this because of the rise in the technical part of the operation, or do you need better-trained people to start with, or both?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In actual fact it's probably a combination of both. At the moment I am in competition with the Nortels and JDS Uniphases and others of this world, because I have people in whom, as I said earlier, over a 20-year career I've put 12 years of training. They are exceptionally qualified and competent. They also have a certain amount of discipline in terms of the way they operate. They also have a certain level of leadership they've learned over that period of time. They are excellent Canadian citizens, and they are a talent base that industry very much likes to use from time to time.

At the moment, I'm about 400 people short of the overall 9,000 folks in the regular navy. Almost all of those are technicians, highly skilled in the technical arena. That is one of the reasons I put one of the ships on the west coast into extended readiness, to be able to take the rest of that ship's company and reallocate throughout the fleet on the west coast.

Perhaps I can go back to your first point about public affairs. I'm geographically challenged, or the navy is geographically challenged, in terms of being able to get Canadians and the inner part of Canada to understand what navies do and the type of people we have. Up to 70% of the Canadian population is along the United States-Canadian border, and 50% is along that 1,000-kilometre corridor between Windsor and Quebec City. So most people are a long way from the sea, and it is a bit of an uphill challenge to continue to go out and tell Canadians and inform Canadians what it is a navy does and the type of people we have serving in that navy.

That said, we have done a lot of work in the last two to three years to try to get that message out, but it is an uphill battle.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman?

The Chair: You have half a minute.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Okay.

If you were designing a ship—and some of yours have to be replaced, since some are 35 years old—what procedures do you follow in drafting up this new vessel? Every year new technology comes in. How do you do this? It's not like designing a new car that is going to be obsolete in five years. How do you do this for a ship?

• 1620

VAdm G.R. Maddison: You start off by determining what capability you need.

Mr. Roy Bailey: What you're looking for.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Exactly—what's the capability. You don't start off by saying, for instance, I'm going to design some type of air-cushion vehicle, or design whatever. The question instead is, what capability is it that I need?

To give you an example of that, our command and control and area air defence destroyers are now pushing 30 years old. Within the next 10 years or so, we're going to have to replace that capability—the local area air defence standard missile capability; the associated sensor systems; and the command and control, communications, and surveillance capabilities that reside in that particular ship.

So how are we going to replace that capability? Can you migrate it to another platform in the navy? Do you need to build something from scratch? Can you acquire something somewhere else that would allow you to have that kind of capability? You start from what it is you need and then work up from there.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Thank you, sir.

The Chair: Thank you, Admiral.

Now we'll move over to Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, a lot of us—three or four of us, anyway—were on the quality of life committee when we toured around the country. I just wonder, with regard to the concerns about quality of life issues and the problems the military has in recruiting and retaining personnel, as you were just saying to Mr. Bailey, can the navy, in your mind, maintain such a tempo of long, six-month deployments a long way from shore?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: This may be one of the top challenges I have at the moment, trying to find that balance between sending folks to sea and their having an appropriate quality of life in terms of being home with their families.

At the moment, ships who are at the high readiness level are at sea for an average of about 120 to 130 days a year. Some ships, like the ones that are in the Arabian Gulf, will be away for about six months. But when they come back, they won't go again for another year and a half to two years. So there is a considerable gap there in terms of not having constant back-to-back deployments.

Having said all that, I would say that when a young person joins the navy today, that old adage of joining the navy and seeing the world was never more true. All sorts of folks want to go out there, want to experience different cultures, want to go off and do a job that is meaningful. They now have the tools to do that job. And my assessment of people's attitudes within the navy is pretty positive.

Mr. Bob Wood: You were just talking to Mr. Bailey about being about 400 people down in your personnel. Of those 400, how many of those would you say didn't want to be...or if they are transferred from one place to another? When we were doing our quality of life hearings, the biggest problem was for people from the east coast going to the west coast—the cost of living, everything—and a lot of these people opted to get out rather than go there and live in poverty or whatever the case may be.

That's a very sad state of affairs, but that's just the way it is. It's nothing any of us are proud of.

Are you still having the problem of losing a lot of people when they get the chance to go to the west coast?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Actually, our attrition rate is down to something like 7%. My colleague in the United States navy, who I talked to about a week or so ago, told me his attrition rate varies between 30% and 41%. I mean, that to me is absolutely staggering.

One of the reasons was the extraordinary work your committee did, which at the end of the day meant having that post living differential allowance, which has made a significant difference for people living out on the west coast. We are getting people who are putting their hands up, saying “I know there's more of a shortage there, and I'm prepared to go west”.

Mr. Bob Wood: The maritime coastal defence vessels, I'm led to believe, are operated a lot by reservists. Is that right?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's correct. Only two people in those ships, of a crew of 35, are from the regular force. The rest are all reserve.

Mr. Bob Wood: Are there significant problems in recruiting and maybe retaining naval reservists? If there is—and I don't know if there is—how does this affect the operation of the vessel and maybe the rest of the fleet?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There are 12 maritime coastal defence vessels. Our concept of operations is basically to have 10 of those operational at any given time. At the moment 10 of them are operating. The crews, of course, are much smaller than the crews of the frigates and the destroyers, which are up to 225 for the frigates and 300 for the destroyers. So we don't necessarily have the same sorts of difficulties manning the MCDVs as we do, in some cases, with the frigates, particularly on the west coast. That said, there are some shortages in the naval reserve. As a result, a number of people who thought they were going to be on a contract of perhaps one year have extended their contracts to two, and sometimes three, years.

• 1625

Mr. Bob Wood: Your submarines will be leased until they're actually purchased in 2007. Is that what you're doing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's a lease-buy arrangement.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's what I was going to ask you about.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Right. They are leased, as I understand it, through the procurement people, which is not my bailiwick. I just want to get the submarines.

Mr. Bob Wood: You'd just like to get your hands on them.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Exactly. I think it goes to 2007 or 2008, and then we give them a dollar, a pound, or whatever.

Mr. Bob Wood: Oh, I see. Good. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll move on to Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, one of the concerns for the people of Atlantic Canada is the shipbuilding policy. I think one of the great success stories of Canada was when they did the frigate program out of Saint John, New Brunswick, which not only built a high quality ship.... The first one was fairly expensive, but the last one was fairly good. They smoothed out the bugs and off they went. Then they stopped it.

There have been suggestions that instead of building a whole bunch of new ships all at once, they build them on a rotational basis. When the ships have rust-out or you need major repairs, you can pick up the new ones fairly soon. Is the military or the navy at all advising the Minister of Industry or the government in regard to the naval defence concerns or issues you have that you can actually assist in a shipbuilding policy in this country by saying, we predict these ships will need to be replaced at this particular time, and these are the types of ships we would like to have? That would move it ahead, instead of all of a sudden saying, boy, we need new ships, now what are we going to do?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Probably this is a good question for Mr. Williams when he comes here next week, as he is the procurement guru for the department. But what's really important to me is having that strategic ship repair capability, a capability that you well know exists in our fleet maintenance facilities on the east coast and on the west coast, where the majority of the workforce is civilian, although there are a fair number of naval folks who are part and parcel of that facility and do an extraordinary job to keep our ships at the various levels of readiness I have assigned to them. That's what important to me, that repair capability.

Our ships have in the past had a life of something close to 35 years, in some cases 40 years. The number of ships we have probably does not dictate that we need to have a ship coming off a shipyard every year or every two years. The important aspect for me is that repair part.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You mentioned the employees at Cape Scott and other areas down there. As you know, a fair number of them were ASDed out of their jobs a while back. I've always objected to alternate service deliveries, because of the fact.... You talked about the morale of the people in the navy you have now. You figure they're fairly upbeat and they're very proud of what they do. You're absolutely correct, but there's another arm of the navy, which, of course, is the civilian work force that's attached to it, who are equally proud. You were there when the Preserver, Protecteur, and Provider were worked on 16 to 18 hours a day for six weeks to get them ready, and not all those people are still working there.

Are you the one who recommends, as a cost cutting measure, that alternate service delivery needs to happen? I guess what I'm saying is, are you trying to protect those jobs as well?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I am, if I can put it this way, in the business of doing my business as smartly as I can. I need to have a certain level of resources, which will include both navy and civilian, to do that, particularly from the repair perspective. If you were there in 1990, before the Gulf War, and saw the absence of a relationship between the civilian workforce and the management there, now you will see the strategic alliance that has grown up between the workforce and management. It is really quite extraordinary. The decisions as to what ought to be the right balance of the workforce were taken in unison with all components of that particular workforce, both the workers and the management recognizing that we needed to do business more smartly than we did before.

• 1630

So I look at it not from an ASD perspective. I ask how I give the best service for the dollars that have been assigned to me.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: One of the concerns is that a lot of these people, for example the Union of National Defence Employees, are very concerned about the future of their careers. You talk about resources and doing things more smartly, but there's also a responsibility. You talk about having trained people, you talk about having people who are ready. That's the navy's slogan, “Ready, aye, ready”. These people are very proud. They do a great job for the military. I believe they have a right to those jobs as well under the conditions they're under now. For the government, through its department, to cut them out and try to find cheaper contractors or cheaper employees I think is a slap in the face to those men and women who serve not only the navy, but our country very well.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: From my perspective, you'll always have a core capability needed on those specific propulsion systems in our ships that only the fleet maintenance facility provide. There will always be a level of workforce required to do that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): Vice-Admiral, thank you for your presentation.

I'm going to follow up on some of the questions that related to crew. You make a statement in your interesting presentation that

Readiness, in the naval context, is an assessment of the preparedness of a naval platform and its crew to successfully conduct an assigned task, role or mission.

Certainly, when we talk about a crew on any naval platform and when we link those considerations to what's happening with the level of sophistication of weaponry and sensor systems, there are a lot of implications to the statement you're making.

Are we having a special problem with recruitment? When you talk about Nortel, you might be inclined to think the problem is confined to competing with the private sector. It seems to me that the more sophisticated the technology becomes, with the changes implied by that sophistication, the more you're looking at recruits and personnel who might need very different aptitudes, skill sets, and educational background. Are we having or do we foresee, sir, any special problems in recruiting those kinds of personnel to fit the new vision or new requirements?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: You're correct, sir, there are some skills that are fairly unique and fairly specialized that we need to have. There are other skills that are far more generic and far more general. Our experience within the navy at least, in respect of the general skills, is that we're doing quite well in the recruiting and retention. I refer to folks like our bosuns, who are the seamen on board our ships who handle the lines, do the boat work, and so on, and who are key members of the boarding parties we use, in the interdiction operations, for example, in the Arabian Gulf.

Our current challenge is in the technical sphere, those unique skills you require for information systems, communication systems, weapons and sensor systems. I also know that both the army and the air force have similar challenges. As a result of that, CDS has directed that there's going to be a very focused and targeted recruiting program. There's a great deal of effort now being directed to putting the right people in our recruiting centres, adding people to our recruiting centres, so that we can streamline that process. There is going to be an advertising and marketing campaign very specifically focused on those areas where we need people, which will be launched, I think, within the next month or so.

• 1635

We are gearing up in the naval context on both coasts, having additional people do the basic recruit training, because we estimate that we're going to be up somewhere around 7,000 or 7,500 recruits in the coming twelve months, in comparison to 2,500 last year. So there's a fair amount of effort and focus on this particular issue.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: In terms of I guess a commitment relating to interoperability...[Technical difficulty—Editor]...and its forces, does that also present some special challenges with respect to recruitment?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not sure I know what you're getting at. If you're talking from a technological perspective, the interoperability issue with the Americans doesn't make any difference from my perspective. I still need those same skills to operate as a Canadian task group, whether I'm operating with the Americans or operating just by myself.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: So commitment to interoperability doesn't bring a whole new set of challenges in terms of the kind of crew you need on any platform.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, not in terms of the recruits you need, because you need the same level of basic skills within that technical background. What you do need to bring to the table is some specific training on specific systems that you would use with your allies. Once you have people, there is some additional training, some additional courses, that would be required for a specific kit.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Thank you, Admiral.

Now we'll return to Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Thank you.

Sir, you mentioned in your report that the navy has a requirement for at least three and preferably four new support ships. You have only two now. You said that the lack of a third underway replenishment ship leaves little flexibility vis-à-vis the maintenance of a mandated replenishment capability in both the national and the contingency task force groups. Could you please elaborate on what you mean? I take it a support ship, if it's used in a troop transport role of the fleet on one coast or the other, has no underway refuelling support. Is that true?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: At the moment, we have two replenishment ships in the navy. One of them is on one coast and the other is on the other coast. So for the task group east, there's an AOR, a replenishment ship, and for the task group west there's an AOR. At the moment, the west coast task group's AOR is in a major refit, and that refit is about 14 months long. While that ship is in that refit, we have to organize our schedule in terms of being able to use other assets to fuel our ships—i.e., Americans or whatever—or be very, very economical in terms of transiting from one place to another until we can get fuel alongside. Having to do that really reduces your flexibility.

The program I'm in the process of trying to propose here is replacing those two ships with a program of three, if not four, vessels that not only will support the task group vis-à-vis replenishing provisions, food, fuel, and ammunition, but will also be able to have a lift capability, for example, to bring up to 300 vehicles for the army vanguard to go off and do a contingency operation anywhere around the world.

So we're going to try to join those two capabilities of support to the task group and a lift capability to support the army, and indeed the air force in terms of an aviation component on board that vessel. Being able to have three or four vessels with those two roles will provide us with the flexibility that I think we need.

Mr. Roy Bailey: How optimistic are you that the support is there? I'm talking dollars and cents, of course. Do you have any figures on what might be necessary to meet the requirements you suggest for the two additional support...?

• 1640

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm pretty confident about this particular project. We've done a lot of work on it. I think we're developing a statement of requirement that is pretty clear, pretty articulate. We hope to be able to do this. I don't have a figure that I can put on the table at the moment, but we will obviously do it as cost efficiently as we can.

Mr. Roy Bailey: So there's never been a cost analysis on the replacement?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There's been some preliminary cost analysis, but it's not to the point where I would be comfortable putting it on the table.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Thank you, sir.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): We'll move to Mr. Grose now.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You've already answered a question that I always ask. No matter what branch of the service is here, I ask them about lift capability. It doesn't matter what you have, if you can't lift and get it somewhere, it's no good to you.

Do you use reservists on any of your foreign adventures? For instance, are there any reservists on board the two frigates you have on duty now?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not 100% certain whether there are, but if there are it would only be a handful. We made a decision a few years ago, which has culminated in the maritime coastal defence vessel, that we would provide the naval reservists with specific roles, not just to augment the regular force but provide specific roles. In this case that is coastal surveillance, coastal sovereignty, with a modest capability in mine warfare and mine hunting, route surveys, bottom mapping, and the like—in fact a capability that we used extensively surrounding the tragedy of the Swissair 111 flight, when we were looking for all sorts of bits and pieces on the bottom. It was the reservists who used the kit on board those ships to great success.

So we have given them a specific role, which is different from the regular force navy. Having said that, from time to time there will be a number of folks, whether they are the combat information operators, some of the communicators, some of the bo'suns, or some of our officers, who will deploy in some of our regular force ships, but not in great numbers.

Mr. Ivan Grose: The reason I ask is in my reserve regiment at home—the army, of course—we almost always have someone deployed overseas, sometimes more than we should have. The reason I ask is it seems to me to be an assist to recruiting, because people don't want a regular forces career but they'll join the militia in the hope that they will become capable enough to go on a mission for six months, a year, whatever. I've spoken with the commanding officer about this and he agrees with me that it is an assist to recruiting.

I can see the sense in what you're doing, though. You're training your reservists to do a specific job, which wouldn't fit in with your overseas fleet at all—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Just to interrupt for a minute, having said that, I have two ships coming back from northern Europe that were very much involved with an operational training role for three months, two of the MCDVs.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Oh. Thank you. You've answered that question.

To show my adaptability, I spent my limited military career in the air force, I relate it to the army, and I'm questioning the navy. It shows how adaptable I am.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: You're very joint.

Mr. Ivan Grose: I'm worried about this lack of technicians. You can probably recruit people who could rise to...I don't know the ranks of the navy, probably to a leading seaman after 20 years or something, but technicians are a different thing altogether. Are there any incentives for a technician? Do you promote him to a rank where he's being paid a reasonable amount of money? Or is he just the technician and he has the same rank as anyone else who's been in the same length of time?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Why don't I ask Commodore Gauvin to answer this.

Commodore J.J. Gauvin (Director General, Maritime Personnel and Readiness, Department of National Defence): Sir, we do in fact have, first of all, different entry plans for our technicians. We recognize that individuals can join us either partly or fully skilled in order to do some of these technician programs. In doing so, when we bring them in, we bring them in at a different rank level from that of our basic sailor or ordinary seaman, if you wish. So if a technician has the proper skills from a technical school, as a leading seaman he can come in with a certain amount of inherent seniority because of his rank, which means he starts off at a higher pay.

In addition to that, there is technicians' pay to technical specialists' pay, which he is eligible for and which will make his salary higher than that of a similar ranked sailor right beside him.

• 1645

Mr. Ivan Grose: You mentioned Nortel taking some of your people. There are a lot of Nortel people running around loose in Ottawa right now if you want to pick them up before you go back.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Roy Bailey: I have a quick question. You've had a lot of questions, Admiral, but you mentioned that the capability of the navy is better than it was ten years ago.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Right.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Let me pose this question. This is 2001, but if you flip the calendar over to 2011, with all of those things we talked about today, the replacements and so on in the year 2011, what would you need besides that to say the same thing ten years years from now?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I would be able to say exactly the same thing, that I would be more combat capable ten years from now than I am today. I would be able to do my job better in ten years than I would today.

Mr. Roy Bailey: If you have all the—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: If those programs that we are proposing come to fruition.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Do you have confidence they will?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I have every confidence they will.

Mr. Roy Bailey: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: How much money do you need to put those programs into place? We're talking about the state of readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces. Mr. Bailey asked you what you needed, and you said well, this, this, and this. What kind of money are we talking about? Because we have to write a report on the state of readiness, and if you need money, this might be a good time to say something.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I always need money. It's difficult to try to put your arms around how much you're really talking about, because in many respects industry will react in terms of being able to provide the best product at the best possible price. For me, we're not talking hundreds of millions of dollars here, we're talking into the billions of dollars over a long period of time.

I don't know how much the joint space project is, because it's not within my purview to know that. But to replace the command and control and area air defence capability, for example, of the 280s is I think somewhere in the vicinity of over $2 billion—$2.5 billion. The ALSC is not going to be anywhere near that, but it's still going to be well over $1 billion. Overall, I could be talking about something between $6 billion and $8 billion.

Mr. Bob Wood: That will bring us to a state of readiness?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That will continue to allow us to evolve to meet the missions and tasks of that future out there 10 to 15 years from now.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's a long way from the $40 million you're going to get for an increase next year, and the $90 million the year after.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: But I think the other aspect to this is that I'm not working in isolation here, nor should I be working in isolation. When we put together our plan, we asked what is it that the Canadian Forces need, not what is it that the navy, the army, or the air force needs. In the process of doing that, we were able to prioritize a number of capital projects for the next coming years.

Number one at the time, before the decision was taken, was in fact to replace the Sea King, but also in there is the replacement of the AOR, the replacement of the command and control and area air defence capability residing in the 280s, the joint space program, the military satellite communications programs, and the Aurora update. Those are six that actually have a direct or indirect benefit to me. But it also includes things like clothe the soldier, the LAV program, etc., and our challenge as the Canadian Forces is going to be to try to determine, given the assets allocated to us, how we are best going to be able to meet those demands that are on us.

We may very well find that some of those demands we're not going to be able to afford.

Mr. Bob Wood: But you can understand where we're coming from, because we've been asked to task this out and try to put together something that is going to be compatible with the army, navy, and air force to get us into a state of readiness, and that's going to be very difficult, I think. Do you think that, or is it going to be easy?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, I think it's going to be difficult.

Mr. Bob Wood: You said the new missiles that are capable of defending ships against the new generation of anti-ship missiles are going to be delivered between now and 2010. With the speed of technology, Admiral, and technical advances, is it really realistic to be planning for any kind of missile defence system for nine years down the road?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think so.

Mr. Bob Wood: Explain it to me.

• 1650

VAdm G.R. Maddison: First of all, we have three different types of missile currently on our ships. We have the NATO Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile, which is being replaced by the enhanced Sea Sparrow missile for about $500 million over the course of the next five to six years. That meets not only the current threat, but what we assess will be the threat out to about 15 to 20 years.

The next missile system we have is a standard missile Mark 2, Block 2, onboard our 280s—a very, very effective missile that will continue to be used, I'm sure, for 15 to 20 years, given the threat that is out there, the capability that is out there. And it will allow us, I believe, if there are technological advances in the threat out there, to be able to make some changes to the capability residing on our ships in terms of that missile.

The third one is the surface-to-surface missile we have on our frigates, which is called the Harpoon, and that particular capability will be very, very effective for 20 to 25 years.

So I am comfortable that what we have is going to be able, particularly with the enhanced Sea Sparrow, to deal with what we need to do.

Mr. Bob Wood: Great. Thanks a lot.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Having no questions here from the opposition side, I hope I can ask a question now.

The question I have is along the lines of what Mr. Wood was asking about, the state of readiness of the Armed Forces and how that interrelates with the ongoing moving and changing requirements. One of the concerns is, what are we using for a yardstick to measure preparedness?

You mentioned before, for example, the comparison that you have two ships that will be ready on a ten-day notice. How does that compare to ten years ago? How many ships would have been ready on a ten-day notice? And how is this comparable with Australia and other militaries of the world? Are they looking at the more recent requirements and changing and modifying like this themselves?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Ten years ago, we would not have had one single ship ready within ten days. Ten years ago, when the Persian Gulf conflict began to unfold and Canada made the decision that we were going to send three ships, we had an extraordinary amount of work and effort around the clock for about three weeks to put on board those ships a capability that would allow us to operate in that theatre of risk within the Arabian Gulf.

Flash forward to about a year and a half ago, when I had a ship that was operating off the coast of Spain with the NATO immediate reaction force, and on one of the occasions where it looked like we were very, very close to conflict with Iraq again, all I had to do was pick up the phone and tell the captain, “Go starboard 15. You're going that direction.” He was already ready. He went, and did some additional training as he transited through the Suez Canal, into the Red Sea, and into the Arabian Gulf, and he was very, very effective in what he did for about a month and a half.

The Chair: You mentioned in your earlier report that you needed to restore flexibility, and you mentioned that the $8 million to $10 million that has been injected into the military is enough to restore your confidence in your operational capabilities. Does it also provide enough to restore this requirement for future flexibility, or is it just making ends meet for the time being?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That amount of money I was referring to was in terms of being able to continue to do the tasks I have been assigned here for the upcoming year. I suspect it is going to allow me to continue to be able to send the right number of ships at the right level of readiness to continue to do my job. So the simple answer is yes.

The Chair: Now, with your requirement for manpower, for recruiting, could you give us a number of what that requirement would be? What is the impact of that now? What are you not able to do because of that requirement, that lack of manpower? How is it impacting on your operational readiness, on what you would like to do with flexibility, if you had full...?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As I said earlier, I'm about 400 people short out of an establishment just shy of 9,000. That shortage has caused me to put one of my ships on the west coast, HMCS Huron, into extended readiness alongside for a long period of time, and to reallocate the remainder of that ship's company to fill some of those holes that were there. That's what the impact has been.

• 1655

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): So one ship is effectively dry-docked and not serviceable.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, one ship, on the west coast.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): What percentage of your operational fleet would that be? Is that just impacting one ship?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's one ship out of 30.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): One ship out of 30.

Talking about the recruiting and efforts at recruiting, what is happening there? How is the recruiting moving? Is it increasing? I know you have efforts and plans to work on it, but are you seeing some signs that interest in the military is coming back, and maybe, why is there a lack of interest? It can't all be that people working for the electronics industries. What other reasons are affecting or impacting on the interest in recruitment?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Actually we're seeing quite an increase of interest now at every one of our recruiting centres, except, interestingly enough, the one in Calgary. But everywhere else, we've basically tripled within the last two months the number of people who are being processed and who are interested in joining the Canadian Forces.

So by word of mouth, even though we haven't launched that recruiting program officially in terms of the advertising and marketing campaign, people know we really are open for business, and we're seeing quite a number of people come through our centres.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Is it geographically significant in one particular area or another? You mentioned Calgary as a—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I don't know the answer to that. I just think the economy in Alberta is so good that it's not yet to the point where people want to go to the recruiting centre.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Well, no, it would be understandable for Calgary. But you said it has increased significantly across the country. Have there been particular areas where the recruiting interest has really peaked?

Cdr J.J. Gauvin: It's high across the country. The only recruiting centre across the country that is reporting normal recruiting levels is Calgary. Every other recruiting centre in the country is reporting a high level, which is apparently at least 10% more than what they would historically be demonstrating. With the recruiting trends that we have now, they're forecasting at least 6,000 people to come in the door this year.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): That's good.

Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I think my questions have been answered.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I have one.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I just want to clarify. You said the recruiting campaign hadn't started yet. Is that navy-specific? I ask that because there is a recruiting campaign going on. I don't go to the movies, but somebody told me there was an ad in the movies the other night about joining the military.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There is a much larger campaign that is about to be launched here in a month, creating a real blitz.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Is it navy?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, it's Canadian Forces.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay, because there is a campaign, an updated and very good campaign, going on right now. You call that a low profile—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There is, but it's relatively minor compared to what's going to happen.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Oh, okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: I have just one quick question, Admiral. When you were out on manoeuvres with our NATO allies, how did our equipment compared to some of theirs? Are they ahead of us, behind us, or even with us? Where do we fit in?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In some cases, we're at a very high level. I think I said in my remarks that we have a renewed international status, and there's absolutely no question about that. I have people from all over the world coming to me and asking for Canadian assets to be involved in this training exercise or in this particular operation.

We are the only navy in the world that is fully integrated in American carrier battle groups. The reason for that is because we have a capability that is excellent, and they have the trust and confidence in our ability to do the job.

Mr. Bob Wood: Good. Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): Thank you, Mr. Wood.

If there are no further questions, I wish to thank you very much, Admiral.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: My pleasure. Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Peter Goldring): The meeting is adjourned.