NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 3, 2001

• 1530

[English]

The Chair (David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

We have Professor Bland here before us today. As many of you know, Professor Bland is the chair of the Defence Management Studies Program in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. He's been before this committee before. He's the author of a number of distinguished articles and books on the subject of Canada's military.

Professor Bland, as I mentioned to you just a few moments ago, you are the first official witness in connection with our study of the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. Without any further delay, I'm going to give you the floor. I think I speak for all members of the committee when I say we're very much looking forward to getting your comments.

Dr. Douglas Bland (Chair, Defence Management Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University): Thank you, Chairman. I'm pleased—I believe—to be here. It's always a challenge to be the first in the blocks.

What I thought I would try to do is set out a framework of concepts and ideas about operational readiness the way I see it, the way it's been talked about in the literature, make some perhaps bold suggestions about things the committee might be interested in investigating, and then answer any questions, to be helpful in any way I can. I would like to make three points throughout this presentation. I'll make them first off, just in case I run out of time or you run out of patience.

I think any report on readiness needs to develop, first, a clear framework of terms and definitions, in order to understand and explain what the concept “readiness” means, before anyone starts to propose policy changes or policy options. It's a tricky concept sometimes.

Second, I've argued in parliamentary committees before and in public meetings and in print that Canada and the Canadian Forces need a non-partisan defence and security policy. I believe the various party views are actually very close on major points, and efforts such as this kind of committee meeting should be aimed at working for a Canadian, rather than a partisan, set of recommendations. I will address myself to your questions with that assumption.

Third, I believe operational readiness of the Canadian Forces is a political responsibility, not merely a military responsibility. By that I mean that the chief of the defence staff is responsible for preparing the Canadian Forces, but only to the standards directed by Parliament. Without a clear statement of readiness from Parliament, without a clear link between policies and capabilities, all those decisions about readiness made by the CDS may be simply haphazard and random.

From those points of view, I'd like to go on and talk about some terms and definitions. The first point is, what is operational readiness? I refer to and recommend to you the report of the inquiry into the deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. In chapter 23 of that report, there is a detailed study on operational readiness, the terms, mostly in the context of the Somalia deployment. I think it is as good a work of current literature on the topic as you're going to find around town. The commissioners were careful in their assessment of operational readiness and the definitions they used, and drew almost entirely from the Canadian Forces' own definitions of what that term means. They noted that operational readiness is as vital to understanding the health of the Canadian Forces as taking a pulse is to understanding the health of a human being. They went on to define operational readiness, or to restate the Canadian Forces' own definition of readiness, as “the state of preparedness of a unit to perform the missions for which it's organized and designed”—it's the preparedness of the unit.

• 1535

Operational effectiveness, on the other hand, is defined as the degree to which a unit is capable of performing its duties. Readiness is one measure, operational effectiveness is the other measure. But it is important in all considerations such as these that people combine and understand the relationship between readiness and effectiveness, and that they be highlighted in a report.

These definitions highlight two critical considerations in all discussions of operational readiness. First, readiness is only relevant and measurable in terms of a clear mission. If there is no mission, there's nothing against which to measure readiness—or not much anyway. Second, readiness is a clear responsibility of command, and relating these two ideas of mission and command is important in any consideration.

When the Somali inquiry looked into the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces for deployment overseas on that particular mission, or perhaps more precisely, the state of readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, they asked the department for an explanation of their system for measuring operational readiness. But as far as I recall, no coherent system was ever brought forward and the Canadian Forces were at that time operating generally without an agreed system for measuring operational readiness.

I think this committee should focus on that question and assess for itself the worthiness of the present, and perhaps reformed, Canadian Forces system for assessing operational readiness in units. It's a critical measure for Parliament and for the country. Again, not to overwork the inquiry, although I think many parts of it are very fine, on page 673 of the report they set out a normative description of an operationally ready unit, and you might find that worthwhile reviewing.

The first set of questions, therefore, in this field of operational readiness have to do with readiness for what? Readiness for a mission, readiness for deployment, or readiness for employment, or both? The second question has to do with degrees of readiness and the costs associated with changing from one to the other. The third question, as I've mentioned, deals with how Parliament knows the state of readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces and how it can make assessments.

You'll face, in these discussions, many comments about military capabilities or the capabilities of the forces, whether they are what they ought to be, what they really are, and what they should be to meet the objectives of the 1994 white paper. Military capability is another one of those fuzzy concepts that, if you're not careful, can lead to difficulties.

For me, a military capability is not, as it is portrayed in many statements by governments, other people, and some people in the field, a piece of kit. An F-18, for instance, is not a capability, it's only part of a capability. So if you're going to talk about a military capability, you have to talk about the weapon or the piece of equipment, it has to be matched to trained personnel and a sufficient number of personnel, and that has to be matched to supporting equipment and logistics support, such as ammunition. These all have to be matched to command support. You have to have a trained military staff, an officer corps that can employ and deploy these pieces of equipment. You should have a doctrine that matches your capabilities. And finally, you need a sustained logistics backup. Only when a military capability is assessed in those broad terms can you make a reliable report on the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces and their capabilities.

I think people can sometimes be led astray by saying, “Well, we have a new ship, a very fine, brand-new ship, and that shows an improvement in Canadian Forces capabilities.” But if that ship is tied up to the docks in Halifax with no crew, it is no capability whatsoever. That is important to look at.

• 1540

The next questions deal with “Ready for what?” What is it you're going to do?

In my view, the Canadian Forces needs agreement with, and direction from, the government on what it is to do. I don't think of this in terms of rehashing statements such as “defend Canada”, “defend North America”, or “do UN peacekeeping missions”. Those are fairly straightforward. What I'm talking about is decisions from Parliament in terms of capabilities. The government and Parliament have to make choices about which capabilities to buy, build, support, and sustain.

I think it is entirely reasonable to assume that the Canadian people is not willing to finance every possible capability we could think of in the military field. So if you have to make choices based on cost, then you need to choose in a coherent and holistic way. In other words, you should not simply buy a piece of equipment and hope it represents a commitment or a capability—or hope that next year, when the defence department will always have more money, you can build on that piece of kit. I don't think that's the way to go. I think Parliament needs to provide specific direction on capabilities planning.

With respect, let me suggest that the committee consider our readiness from a detailed and sophisticated point of view, under four points: first, by defining readiness and effectiveness very carefully and explicitly; second, by considering capabilities on a broad framework, as I've said, not just as pieces of equipment; third, by demanding a clear explanation from the Canadian Forces as to how it measures operational readiness, how it assesses operational effectiveness, and what steps are built into the policy process to ensure a high level of readiness; and fourth, if there are problems with any of these areas, I think the final report from this committee might set out very explicit standards for measuring readiness—in other words, it should help the Canadian Forces to design a readiness question.

I want to conclude by questioning the assertion made by some senior officers—and by the minister at times, I believe—that the Canadian Forces today is more combat-capable than it has been at any time in the last 10 or 20 years. This is a very important and critical assertion, and it may be true, but I have seen no evidence of it in reports, studies, or recommendations from the headquarters and staff on whom such an assertion is based. I'm sure, or at least I hope, that those kinds of documents are available someplace within the defence establishment. But I think it would be a dangerous idea to make those assertions without a detailed assessment of what our capabilities were ten years ago, how they've changed and improved, and what they are now.

I know this is perhaps difficult for some members, but I bring it up simply because I've heard this remark in different fora in the country. I know of no experienced military officers or experts who can stand by that remark. I think it would be helpful to the committee if the department's background information on this policy area be brought out into the public domain.

Mr. Chairman, that's about all I have to say. I would just like to table an article I wrote for the International Journal in winter 1998-1999. It's entitled “A Sow's Ear From a Silk Purse: Abandoning Canada's Military Capabilities”. It's in English only. I'll leave it here for the clerk. If you wish to read it, it's there for your use.

The Chair: Thank you for your comments, Professor Bland.

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Bland, it's good to see you at the committee again.

• 1545

I have a quote I would like to put to you, taken from the Chronicle-Herald in February of this year: “Our army cannot be deployed, nor fight in a meaningful way alongside our allies. And our air force and navy, which were tiny to begin with, are minuscule.” That was a quote from General Lewis MacKenzie, to the chief of the land forces at a CDA meeting.

General Jeffery also made some very candid comments on the army: he made it clear that there are a lot of problems in fielding and sustaining troops for any length of time in an environment outside this country. Would you basically agree with that?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Yes, I would agree with it. But at the same time, I would want to know what units and armies General MacKenzie is comparing us with. I'd like to know the definitions he's using, the criteria for standards and readiness he's talking about.

Canada has a very small armed force. Is it the force we need for what we do? That's open to discussion, of course. The point that I think needs to be debated is what degree of readiness the armed forces needs to carry out the types of missions the government has asked of it—the missions that Canadians have come to expect our forces will be able to perform, over the years and under different governments.

I assume that General MacKenzie was quoted on just a snippet of what he actually had to say. But I don't think it's helpful to just come to Parliament or a meeting and say that our standards of readiness are too low, or too high, or anything else—without having a good basis and some good data for those comments.

Mr. Art Hanger: The context from which that quote was taken was on having a sustainable force that would be deployable in short order. You could define what “short order” means, I suppose. But I'm going back to a comparison that often comes up at meetings like this, on the 1994 white paper. And I'm going back to a statement made by one of the base commanders at Fort Lewis, Washington, when we took a trip there to watch the reserves go through some manoeuvres. This commanding officer declared that Canada is basically heading for a two-brigade army—because that's all the people we really have, here and now.

If Canada were called upon by our allies to go into some theatre, the situation would be as the Minister of Defence has declared: “Early in, early out.” It would be a one-shot effort, because we can't really do much beyond that.

Do you see that as a viable option for Canada's military role and for fulfilling commitments to our allies, especially our NATO allies?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think if the army were reduced to two brigades... You have to define what a brigade means, but if it were reduced to two small army combat units, I think we would probably be operating at a level below our national military capabilities. I think Canada can probably afford more than that, in terms of our military role, where we are, and how much wealth there is in the country.

But even if it's only 500 people going in, of course it's another question for us whether those units are operationally ready. Five hundred people can be very operationally ready to go someplace and do a job. But in a sense, I think these are separate questions: what size of armed force Canada can afford, and will the public want it and support it? Then the second question is what degree of readiness should those forces be at?

• 1550

Generally speaking, degrees of readiness in military forces are measured in two ways. One is by the assembly of capabilities, equipment, supplies, troops, trained people, and so on. Some units can be at a high state of readiness. That means they have all their equipment, people, supplies, doctrine, command structure, and so on, all ready to go. That would be a high state of readiness. Then another similar kind of unit might be at a low state of readiness, with only a skeleton staff and only a few people and supplies.

The second way to look at readiness is in terms of timing: how long does it take to get from a low degree of readiness to a high degree of readiness? That's a timing thing. Most states have categories for their units. This unit is at high degree of readiness—it takes a very short time for it to go someplace. This one is at a low degree of readiness—it takes a long time for it to go someplace. In many respects, these are costing questions.

Now, in the Canadian Forces you might say that some of our units—like operational communications units, or the units in Canadian Forces Base Kingston—are at a high degree of readiness. But I think you would be hard-pressed to find any militia unit in the country that's at anything more than a low degree of readiness.

The Chair: We'll move on to Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): I'm on. I think you'll need your translation device.

[Translation]

Mr. Bland, I thank you for your presentation. I have some questions for you because I have read carefully your article entitled Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada, and it seems to me that you are rather blunt with the Canadian Parliament. I would like to examine further several statements that you made in that article.

I am new among members of the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee and I am deeply interested in this issue. In this article, you talk about "Parliament's disheartening record as the civil authority and overseer in matters of national defence". I will ask you later on why you are saying this.

You also made another statement that I entirely agree with. You said that "ministers, officers and officials treat the opposition as though it were an opponent to national defence and shackle information".

Moreover, you stated that "committees of the Commons are generally hostage to ministers' agendas". You will understand that I entirely agree with these statements of yours.

Now, based on your experience, perhaps you could tell me how a member of the opposition, such as myself, should go about to try and obtain information. Should we go in the field, for example, on the theatres of operation, in the military bases, without necessarily be accompanied by the military staff? Certainly, asking a private whether he is a happy camper, in front of the general, will necessarily elicit a positive answer. On the other hand, perhaps the private will have a little piece of paper passed on to you, asking you to call him back when he is off duty.

So, do you think that going in the field, going to the bases to meet with soldiers and officers is the best way for a member of the opposition to obtain clear information? Also, would you be able to tell me how a member of the opposition could, within the present structures, that is the military staff or the department, obtain relevant information that would truly advance the cause of national defence?

• 1555

[English]

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think that's an important set of questions, and I wouldn't propose that I have all the answers. But if I might address the question of what would a soldier say if you asked him a question, I think in my experience that almost every soldier will give you a very blunt and honest answer. They may look at the general who's standing there, but I think you can depend on them to give you an honest answer. The armed forces has made a lot of progress in the last ten years or so in the sense of liberating members of the armed forces to say what they mean.

That article, as some of you may know, is derived from a larger survey that we did at Queen's University on Parliament. It gave us a sense of what is going on. The thing that was important to me in the assessment was that we debunked in some ways the notion that members of Parliament are not interested in the armed forces. I think we've put some of that aside.

The main point, though, as you've brought out, is how is Parliament to be informed of what is happening in the system. I would think that it's a dual responsibility here. I think there is a responsibility for the Chief of the Defence Staff, and for the minister and the deputy minister in the Department of National Defence, to actively solicit information from members of Parliament and to pass information to them. I think, for any number of reasons, that has been a weak link over the last numbers of years, not just in this government, but over a long period of time. I know the department is working to change that around by developing the outreach program as was suggested by that article, some other articles, and by the Canadian Defence Association. I think that's helpful.

The second side of the equation, though, goes to members and senators. It's up to them to outreach to the armed forces, to become involved in the conferences and academic activities in this field, to be well aware of what is happening and to demand information and so on. I was disheartened when I was doing this survey, and I spoke with several senators, including the late Senator Molgat, and others, about the fact that the Senate does not have a defence committee. I'm pleased to learn, in the last few days, that this is going to be redressed. I think it's important for the armed forces and for Parliament, for members, to take an active role. If you don't understand, if you don't know what the defence budget is and how it's being spent, then I think it's incumbent upon Parliament to ask about this.

On the other question of visiting soldiers, I would encourage you, as often and as informally as you can, to get out among the soldiers, sailors, and air people, I guess you call them these days. You should get out with everyone to get a flavour of the life and the situation and the concerns and so on. It's simply a matter of over a period of time building in yourself, and in committees and in Parliament, a deep understanding of what's happening in the armed forces.

On the question of civil-military relations that you asked at the first, I travel around Europe and the new emerging democracies and in Latin America, instructing, I suppose, members of these new governments and new parliaments on their responsibility to keep control of the military, because they're worried about the military. As I say, it's your responsibility. When I say that I'm disheartened when members don't have enough information, I think that's where that comment comes from.

The Chair: Professor Bland, I think I will have to cut you off there and go to our next questioner.

Mr. Price.

• 1600

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Dr. Bland, for being here. It's always interesting to hear your thoughts and read your articles.

I'd like to go a little bit into our training. I know you have some thoughts on this. In fact, you mentioned two brigade groups, which is being bantered around a little bit. And you had an interesting comment on what defines a new type of brigade group. I'd like to hear a little bit more about that, particularly since we see today the missions that we're using tend to be a lot smaller than what we've seen before, and we're not moving brigade groups around. But part of our big problem today is we also don't have any training of troops as a brigade group. That's been amiss for quite a while. We're not really hitting where we should be there and getting our troops to really train together as brigade groups. So maybe you could comment a bit on that fact, plus describe what you're looking at as a smaller brigade group.

Dr. Douglas Bland: Yes. As you all are aware, the military uses various generic terms to describe units: battalions, squadrons, brigades, and so on. Those words don't necessarily say anything about numbers or readiness; they indicate more the design and organization of units. As an example, the brigade group that many of us worked in in Germany in the late 1960s had 10,000 people in it. That was considered an operational brigade, Fourth Brigade in Germany. The brigade groups—and there were three others, and sometimes more in Canada—all were running around 7,000 to 8,000 and 9,000 people. As conditions changed in the seventies and eighties, these numbers tended to fall off, as did the capabilities within these brigade groups: artillery and tanks and so on.

I don't know the number General Jeffery is talking about for the new brigades, but I assume that very few people in the army are very happy with the idea of ending up with two brigades that will be very small and have limited capabilities as an organization.

I think the units' training is concentrated on the missions they have to accomplish, specifically in the Balkans and so on. There is little time left for training with troops in the more sophisticated aspects of army training: combined arms operations, artillery operations, and so on. People do that in staff training exercises and so on, and that's not perhaps as useful. But it comes back to my question in the opening remarks, if we're going to measure operational readiness, it's operational readiness for what?

If someone says the Canadian army should be operationally ready to fight an interstate war in Korea alongside the Americans in a full-out operation, you're talking about a very big operation. If you're talking about the Canadian Forces being able to generate with $10 million or $12 million 500 people to go for a six-month mission to some part of the world, that's another state of readiness and it ought not to be too difficult to achieve.

Mr. David Price: But I think we're heading towards more of a specializing field right now. Are we looking at maybe being part of a multinational brigade group more and more and doing just a particular job within that brigade group?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Perhaps. The question I would have is why are we heading in that direction? Is that national strategy? Is that a responsible thing for Canada to be doing? Or is it being driven by some other factors, like lack of funds? Or is that what Canadian people want to do?

When people are forced into making decisions about how to employ forces without enough resources, one thing they talk about is that they'll join some larger army on the assumption that the larger army has surplus capabilities we can use. I've never met anybody in any other army who told me they had surplus capabilities that the Canadians can have. In fact, we did this in the NATO days and it was a dangerous planning process. For instance, when we were going to northern Norway in operations in our documents the plan was to use surplus Norwegian medical staff to cover our casualties. NATO reports on Norway said they didn't have any of these things. It's a very dangerous thing to do.

• 1605

The second danger comes in the degree to which you lose national control over your troops when you put them, in packets that are too small, into somebody else's armed forces. In Canadian military history, that's always been a problem as soon as the war starts—not before but after the war starts.

Mr. David Price: And it continues to be a problem. Just in recent times we've had exactly that problem.

How much time do I have left?

The Chair: You have a minute and a half.

Mr. David Price: To go in another direction completely, there's just something I heard at noon today. If we look back at force unification, I guess the government looked on this as a very useful way to go in unifying our forces. We're talking about a ways back. Other governments tend to look at it like that too, whereas the military historically didn't really see it as a very comfortable position, as the forces were divided by three. Yet I heard today, talking to some of the folks from the NATO Defense College, that even some of the military people are talking like that now—that unification is not a bad idea. Is this something new coming out? This is the first time I've heard this, particularly in a military group.

Dr. Douglas Bland: Where's Paul Hellyer when we need him?

In some respects—and I'll take a minute and a half or so for the history—Paul Hellyer was away ahead of his time, and so was Brooke Claxton before him when he appointed a single chief to run the armed forces. But the point is that during the Cold War period the army, navy, and air force in Canada were on very separate missions in different parts of the world—even different parts of the theatre—operating towards different standards with allied commanders, and that forced the armed forces into three or more packages. What Paul Hellyer attempted to do was to have a single, national strategy to bring all the forces into one plan and then to put them under one control system. That failed because Lester Pearson wasn't interested in the mission because it had a lot of foreign relations cost to it.

What we are doing, and what a lot of other nations are doing, is seeing the advantage of civil and parliamentary control of the military and the national command of forces in these somewhat strange missions people are sent on, and of making sure that all their national troops are answering to one boss and one system. There are also economies in this type of structure when you're trying to design forces. I think that's what's driving most other nations to try to work toward a unified system, but perhaps not one with single green uniforms.

The Chair: We're a little over our time here.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Dr. Bland, I thank you very much for being here today.

You mentioned that we have a role to play in making sure that our men and women in the armed forces can carry out the jobs that are put before them, but they have to have the tools and the capability to do the job.

I have major concerns about what is happening in the military today—major concerns. These come from the fact that we have to get more money in the budget—a whole lot more money in the budget—for our military. It really tugs at my heart.

I was made an honorary gunner of the Third Field Regiment. I'm the only one around this table who can shoot a gun, I think. Anyway, I don't even know how to hold it, but they made me an honorary gunner when I was mayor because I was fighting for the military then.

I think it's the best training in the world, and I see so many lost souls who are out there who should be in the military. The training that they would receive would turn their lives around as well.

But for us, I'm telling you right now my opinion is that other countries around the world don't see Canada in the same vein as they used to because we have cut back dramatically on the number of troops that we have and on the number of peacekeepers that we have. We don't have the tools, and I'm sure you're aware of what the Dominion Command president said in the letter that he wrote—and we all got a copy of it—when he sent over that entertainment tour, and he sent his vice-president with them. He said that when he saw that the men didn't even have uniforms any more, they didn't have boots, and they didn't even have the parts to repair what they needed to have, or the tools to do their job...

• 1610

We have a job to do, but somehow... And it bothers me, because our men and women can't come up here on the Hill with placards like everybody else does, and scream and holler like everybody will be doing at the summit in Quebec, screaming and hollering, and God knows how many will be arrested... But the military can't do that, so they rely on you, as well as us, to get their voices heard.

I want to know from you, Dr. Bland, and others who are here today for whom I have great respect, how do you get your message across to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of National Defence about the need to have readiness, to define readiness and capabilities? How do you get your message across?

This is probably the same message that we want to get across as well—that military should be a number one priority. But there's only a little handful of us here around this table that can bring that message. It's not just the opposition that can bring that message; it's everybody around this table, on both sides of the House. How do we do it?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Well, that's another challenging question.

We in the academic community and others who work in the defence community get our thing across by writing learned papers that we hope some people might read.

We get it across, also, because the Department of National Defence sponsors the security and defence forum in many universities across the country, which allows us funds and opportunities to hold conferences to get with other people.

I get my point across by visiting here and taking as many opportunities to work with NGOs and other people as I can, and simply by talking to my friends and relatives about the situation of the Canadian Armed Forces. I get my point across sometimes by talking to the media.

But I think you touch on a very important point. It's critical for the armed forces to know that they are supported by the society they live in—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

Dr. Douglas Bland: —and that they're working for. Again, it's a leadership question on the part not only of Parliament but of opinion-makers across the country. I think that there are signs that things are working in that direction.

I'll just note the example of Mr. Hugh Segal, who some of you may know. He is president of the Institute for Research on Public Policy, has become very active in the defence community, and has opened within his organization a wing that's going to be studying defence and foreign policy matters. I recommend to you the latest copies of Policy Options Magazine, which has several papers in it addressing the points you've brought up.

I think it's an ongoing, continuous job, and a lot of people need to do it in a lot of different directions.

The Chair: You've got another couple of minutes, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I would just say this. I was reading this article today in this magazine, Maritime Affairs, and Maritime Affairs says it has several concerns that it hopes will be high on the next government's agenda. Shipbuilding, helicopters, and ocean management top that list.

I want to say to you that we've brought in a report that says our ships should be built in Canada—we should be using our shipyards here in Canada to do it. I'm still waiting for that report, Mr. Chairman, to come forward from the Minister of Industry.

And certainly, when it comes to helicopters, we agree. I think everyone around this table agrees that, when it comes to replacing the Sea Kings, you get the politics out of it. You do what's right. You give them the best tools to do the job. But we sure need a lot of help, I'm going to tell you, to make that happen.

Dr. Douglas Bland: I can only agree.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton Centre-East, CA): Professor Bland, thank you very much for your appearance here today.

I want to talk a little bit more about military capabilities. But first and foremost, I think I want to speak a little about why there is a problem and try to understand it. I'd like your comments on it.

• 1615

You mentioned in this article that very few senators and MPs do have an understanding of the intricacies of the military and military requirements. It is very difficult, even for some of us who have a little bit of military understanding, unless we have something very detailed laid out for us. When we're talking about military capabilities, by what yardstick? You're saying that there's a problem in trying to define that, too.

Could you explain to us what you feel has happened to our military over the last ten years? We're talking of a two-brigade requirement today. What capabilities did we have ten years ago, and how did this relate in the world of comparisons with other militaries in other countries? In other words, what percentage of the capability have we lost while others have gained and how much more than this two-brigade capability did we have ten years ago?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't have those figures at my fingertips, but I would recommend that the committee ask the department for an explicit diagram showing how many pieces of equipment, how many troops, and how many supplies we had in one period, the next period, and the next period so that you can see the decline. I believe it's fair to say that every NATO nation, for instance, has taken significant cuts in their armed forces, and in most cases the cuts have been reasonable.

The difficulty, though, is that it's not just the present force that's being reduced. It's the commitment to build the future force. Parliament, I think, should be thinking right now about the contract for the next set of frigates. If it takes ten or fifteen years to get a boat in the water, then we had better get at the contracting business now. If we're going to have readiness in the air force with F-18s and surveillance aircraft, we'd better get at the contracting business now.

Defence management is not just dealing with the present force. It's dealing with the future force as well. Sometimes they can be the enemy of each other, as too much money is spent on the future portion and not enough on capital procurement. But I think the habit in Canada in various governments has always been to provide funds that are available for national defence but not funds that are needed for national defence. There's a significant difference.

We need to say to ourselves that if we're going to have 60,000 people in the armed forces and labour costs are always increasing, then we have to have a budget that by some kind of formula funding automatically increases in order to keep the 60,000 people in the armed forces. You can't just say here's $10 billion. Go away and see what you can do with it. That's what we've been doing. What seems to happen over and over again is that the money for capital becomes what's left over after you pay for people, operations, and so on. That's where you lose control of what's going on.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Do you feel that overall there has been a degrading in our capability to maintain our place in the world? We do have a responsibility. It's not just to have a standby military but to do our share of the world peacekeeping duties and to be able to contribute our fair share. It's your opinion, then, that this fair share has been drastically reduced. Should we be building on that to once again partner with the world in a fair share contribution?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I'm a little hesitant about fair share. Burden sharing is another tricky thing. But I think that compared with what Canadians have done in the past, our activities have definitely fallen.

Let me, Chairman, if I have a minute—

The Chair: You have several minutes.

Dr. Douglas Bland: —provide you with an image that I think is striking.

In 1956 the British, the French, and the Israelis were fighting against the Egyptians, and the world was about to unravel because the Russians were going to go in and help and the Americans were going to go in and help, and they needed something to put in the centre to stop this crisis from developing. Lester Pearson came up with the modern version of peacekeeping, and Canada won a lot of respect for that.

• 1620

How did he do that? He did that because the Canadian Forces had the capabilities to do that. We went there—not me necessarily, but some people I worked with afterwards. In 1956 Canada sent a large force to the Middle East in its own ships and airplanes with its own commanders, logistics support, and communications and medical supplies. They sent one battalion there. In fact, it was turned around because the Egyptians didn't like the name. It was The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada. It sounded too imperial for them, so they wouldn't let it in the country. So we got another one, and we brought in more forces.

Canada was effective in that situation because we could appear to be neutral and uncommitted to anybody else's agenda. We weren't working for the French, the British, the Americans, the Russians, or anybody else. We had the sense of being a UN force, and that was the high point.

Now you move to 1996, and Canada tries to deploy a force to Zaire. We can't get there because we don't have any airplanes and ships and we don't have enough people and command equipment. Canada is in a very serious and difficult situation, having made a commitment to go to Zaire and help the operation and we can't do anything. That shows you, in my view, what has happened to the armed forces over that period of time.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Also—

The Chair: I'm going to have to cut you off there, Mr. Goldring, and move to Mr. Bachand for five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: First of all, Mr. Bland, I have a short, quick and direct question. Would you have been able, when you were a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, to write an article of the kind that we have here?

[English]

Dr. Douglas Bland: Yes, I did. In fact, I wrote even more difficult things. I told the army that it was time we stopped doing foot drill.

I wrote articles in what was then the Canadian Defence Quarterly on the need for a new white paper and for parliamentary responsibility for operational readiness, now that I think of it. That was about ten years ago. Maybe I'll dig it up for you sometime. I did those kinds of things, and so did several other people. That's not to say that you are always patted on the back after you publish such things, but the degree of openness at that time depended very much on the support of various chiefs of defence staff, other senior officers, and other officers in the community, and I think that worked fairly well.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I will put all my questions to you because I'm afraid I won't have enough time.

I understand that you were not in the army when you wrote this article. You were a distinguished professor at Queen's University. However, I have the feeling that once the policies are set and the minister as well as the chief of defence staff become the champions of these policies, it is automatically reflected throughout the command chain. I believe that from that point on, Members of Parliament don't have much say in the matter.

I would like you to react later on to several statements that I will make.

Could we not say that the state of readiness of the Canadian army, at this time, is quite simply the result of economic imperatives and that, consequently, there is no long-term planning. If there is a budgetary surplus , we are able to do something; if there is none, if the budget is on the short side, the army is quite often the victim.

As well, don't you have the feeling that when the minister, the deputy minister and the chief of defence staff make a decision on a new policy or a new type of training or equipment, this is reflected throughout the hierarchy and that we, poor Members of Parliament sitting around this table, do not have any say in the matter.

[English]

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think that senior officers and public officials have a traditional responsibility to support the policies of the government of the day.

Having said that, I think most military officers would agree that they have a responsibility to represent fairly and in an apolitical way their professional judgment on various issues. I would think that if an officer were asked what he thought of the government's policy on this, then he or she would respond in a formal way. If a senior member of the armed forces were asked which way, in his professional judgment, he would go, given the chance to do this, that, or the other thing, then you would get a different kind of answer, I think. It's important to frame questions in ways that allow people some room to answer. That's the first thing.

• 1625

There is no plan in the armed forces or in the department for the future force. We can look at various statements put out by members, work being done by people on staff. You can look at the Chief of Defence Staff's document called Strategy 20/20, which sets out some parameters for the future force. The difficulty with some of those documents, of course, is that there's no budget line included in them. I think members of Parliament need to know what the budget line might be. They could work at it and they can find it themselves.

I'm not engaged in parliamentary reform these days, but I have always thought this committee and other committees of the House would benefit by having more independent research answering to the chair, to the members, so that you could research some of these questions. Perhaps that's an issue for another day.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Peric.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Bland, how would you describe our forces in Bosnia today?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Given that I haven't been there, though I know many of the officers commanding and so on, I would say the Canadian Forces that are in Bosnia are at a high state of operational efficiency when they're in the field, when they're on the job. They can only get to that state, however, through a great deal of dedicated work by the members of the armed forces and by gathering together—I won't say cannibalizing—as many of the resources they can from all over the armed forces to service that one mission. I think they are effective, and I think also that some of them are tired.

Mr. Janko Peric: Tired of what?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Not tired of, but just tired, in the sense of having too much work, too much time, no time to rethink and rework themselves and to advance their individual and unit training. I think that's a serious problem.

Mr. Janko Peric: So in your opinion, they wouldn't be ready for combat?

Dr. Douglas Bland: From what we are used to in that theatre, the level of combat, usually small arms over a short period of time, I think they are capable, in most instances, of handling those problems. They are not capable as units of going into the field against a formed military force trying to operate in traditional battlefield conditions, and those kinds of units would need to be taken out of the field, retrained, trained with other units, and so on.

Don't forget that in our Bosnia commitment, although it's important, these are very small unit operations. The whole unit operation centres on a small battalion, one commanding officer and his work, in his sector, with allied operations. These are not grand military operations.

Mr. Janko Peric: How would you describe the quality of life of armed forces today?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think the quality of life is a difficulty for members and their families, and much of the difficulty is related to the tempo of operations. I think, not just in the last few years, but over a long period of time, when the armed forces have been forced to make decisions about whether to pay people, fix married quarters, buy new equipment, and so on, the pressure has been on them to go for new equipment, new capabilities, and so on, and in that respect a lot of the infrastructure on bases—houses, schools, and the like—has deteriorated.

Interestingly, when I was a kid growing up in an army camp in Ontario—my father was a sergeant—we moved into one of the brand-new married quarters that Brooke Claxton built for the armed forces. It was built in 1951. I don't think we've done any new building for the armed forces since then for married quarters. We fixed some up. If you go to Camp Borden, for instance, and walk around through the married quarters area, it's almost like a throwback to the 1950s, old houses and so on.

• 1630

Mr. Janko Peric: You are a former member of the Canadian Forces?

Dr. Douglas Bland: That's right

Mr. Janko Peric: Why did you leave?

The Chair: Mr. Peric, that is a rather personal question, and Dr. Bland is free to—

Dr. Douglas Bland: I'm happy to answer it.

I was a member of the armed forces for 30 years. We won the Cold War, so it was a personal time for me to leave to go and work on something different, and I did.

Mr. Janko Peric: What would be the priority, if you had a choice today, quality of life or equipment?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't think we should put ourselves into those kinds of choices. What the armed forces need right now are more people, better quality of life, more support for the families, better equipment, more capability.

Mr. Janko Peric: The whole package.

Dr. Douglas Bland: The whole package.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Peric.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, CA): Thank you very much.

Canada's in a peculiar situation, as far as I understand it, where our reserves are smaller than our regular forces. Most countries operate under the understanding that the reserves are substantially larger than the regular forces. So that way, when they go into situations where they'll be in need of replacement, replenishment, rest, etc., the reserves can go in and replace the regular forces, in a sense, as a cycle. The regulars are sent first and the reserves follow up and support.

What do you think our reserve ratios should be? If our regular forces are 60,000—and I would argue they should be substantially larger than that—how big should our reserves be accordingly?

Dr. Douglas Bland: That's an interesting question. The reason most states have large reserves is that the law allows them to require them. In other words, people are conscripted into the armed forces, they serve a short period in the so-called regular force, and then they go automatically into reserves and have to stay there for a certain period of time, because that's the law. In Canada we have, as you know, a volunteer reserve force. It's a force that tends to be small mainly because you're only attracting people who look at it as an interesting hobby, an interesting thing to do.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Bland, I realize we're having trouble attracting people across the board, and I would argue there are policies that are responsible for that. I'm asking you to comment on what we should aim for, and then let us worry about how generous the package should be to attract them.

Dr. Douglas Bland: I have no answer to that, because I do not understand what we would be mobilizing for or whether we would have a mobilizing system. From my point of view, the concept of reserves as used in Canada over the last numbers of years is questionable. The whole notion of reserve forces and mobilization, I must say, is being questioned in several other countries, because the idea of mass warfare, mass national mobilization, may be passing out of fashion. But these are questions that are still very much in debate here, in the United States, in Germany, and in other countries.

Mr. Rob Anders: How do you feel we're prepared to deal with terrorist attacks? If we aren't properly prepared to deal with terrorist attacks, what do you think should be done in order to prepare us for those potentialities?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think the evidence is that we've dealt with all terrorist attacks fairly well up to now. If the assumption is that terrorist attacks are launched by small groups of people in a confined area, then our police, mostly the civil police and the mounted police, are well equipped to handle that.

• 1635

The problem that I talked about in other places is that it would be beneficial if Canada had a more coherent way of coordinating police and military intelligence operations to watch and to be prepared for such attacks, but I don't think it's a major problem in the armed forces now.

Mr. Rob Anders: With regard to Arctic sovereignty, do you think we're doing enough on that issue, and if not, what do you recommend in terms of things to increase our presence there or maintain some form of sovereignty in the Arctic?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't think there's a problem. I don't see any evidence of a problem. I don't see many challenges at the moment in the Arctic that we haven't dealt with before.

I like to think questions of sovereignty are a justice problem that have to do with police, and so on. The military might back up the justice department, but maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic has to do with the law and doesn't have a whole lot to do with the armed forces. However, the armed forces should have the capability to help departments and to assure the government that we have some idea of what's happening in the Arctic. For the most part, we need to look at aircraft and satellite surveillance, and so on.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. Nothing works out the way you like, and I didn't make it on time.

I apologize, Professor Bland, for not hearing your presentation, although I did read your article.

In skimming it again, first of all, I want to say that my understanding and support for the armed forces is based in history—that is, my father. My late father served in the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders and was a veteran of campaigns in France, the Falaise Gap, through Holland, and so on, in World War II. It instilled in me quite a great deal of respect for the armed forces, and certainly I've always been a big supporter of providing the right tools.

Having said that, we as parliamentarians are engaged in the development of public policy, and hopefully seeing it executed. In my view, in any public policy discussion you need the support of the public.

I apologize if I did not read it, but one of the issues that I think we need to look at is how to develop and promote the needs and objectives that the armed forces clearly have, whether outlined in the 1994 white paper or... We have to evaluate where we are in terms of that paper.

We need to get that public support, because clearly what often happens is that governments react in economic times and may have what I consider to be a cut-and-paste approach. Often they will cut the armed forces, because it's not that difficult to do. Yet we then paste things back together at certain times, and we say we want them to achieve certain objectives, such as peacekeeping. Obviously we have come to a point where we cannot continue at the level we had at one time, because we don't have the ability.

Yet at the same time, we spend $11 billion annually on national defence. The question then is, quite candidly, are our priorities screwed up? What are we spending it on that is not effective?

To the average Canadian, $11 billion would be a lot of money. We talk about quality of life issues, and I know the committee has tried to address that in the past. I know we've talked about the issue of procurement.

The question is, if we're spending 45%, as the Auditor General says, on support servicing, as an example, are the equations correct? How could we enhance them?

If in fact we want to increase the national defence budget beyond $11 billion to whatever magical number that may or may not be, that goes back to my original comment about ensuring and developing long-term support in Canada for the armed forces. As you've said, the Cold War is over, and a lot of people would say, well, why do you need a large standing army, or a large navy, or a large whatever, not setting aside issues of national interest and sovereignty?

The Chair: Mr. Wilfert, you haven't left a lot of time for a reply here.

Professor Bland.

• 1640

Dr. Douglas Bland: One answer to your question is right here. I think it's very important that the SCONDVA committee and other parts of Parliament take a leadership role in bringing to the public's attention issues of national defence—not just what the armed forces wants, but that this is a national institution and that Parliament is responsible for the defence of Canada. The armed forces aren't responsible for the defence of Canada.

I think that's important. The Senate's initiative now to have a committee is very important. There is a great deal of support for the armed forces in the country. We need political leadership to build on that. We need members of Parliament, senators, and other people out there beating the drum among the population, explaining to them why something that they might not be all that enthusiastic about is important for them in the long-term interests of the country.

On matters of finance, a long history of defence spending will show that we've always had these kinds of problems as to which basket we're going to spend in: personnel, operations and maintenance, or new equipment. New equipment almost always gets left off because people are trying to operate inside a fixed budget. Like a pensioner on a fixed budget, if something new comes along, you have to give up something else. That's the situation that defence budgeting has been putting the armed forces into.

I think it's important for members of Parliament to become expert in the defence budget. Where's the money, where does it go, and why does it go in this direction and not that direction? All that information is readily available in the departments, and so on. It just takes some work to get at it. Then you'd be able to go out and explain to the people where the $10 billion goes. It's very easy to show where it goes: almost all of it, or the great part of it, goes to paying for people. If you want to have the right people in the right jobs in the right places, properly equipped, then you're going to have to pay for it.

In my view, national defence is a national institution and needs to be supported by Parliament.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: I find that there is sort of a paradox in the training that is presently being given in the army. It seems to me that there are two schools of thought that are simultaneously applied.

Thus, we continue to train soldiers in combat operations and all the relevant techniques: close quarter battle, arms drill, military strategy on the battle field, and so on. However, in the present reality, that is not what the army is called upon to do anymore; the military is called upon to maintain peace and there is a vast difference between these two functions.

On the battlefield, there is not much sentiment; he who shoots first will probably survive. On the other hand, when you are on a peace mission, you should perhaps avoid firing the first shot, because by doing so, everyone risk being killed.

How, in your view, could we reconcile the two situations? Is it possible, according to you, to bring about a philosophical change in the Canadian army, or at least to bring the military to accept that they can't train the troops for these two different functions? Would it be possible to train people either to fight on the battle field—and here are the techniques that you will have to use—or else to take part in a peace mission with the techniques that are called upon, namely mediation and discussion?

Is it possible for the same individual to master both? Would you rather be in favour of a specific training, depending on the role that would have to be played?

[English]

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think it is possible for people to master both, and the evidence is that they have done so. Over the long period when we were spending most of our time and effort in NATO, the people who trained for NATO combat operations were the people who provided our peacekeepers.

I think it is important to realize that in the present circumstances, in the types of missions our people are involved in, they are quasi-combat operations. I hope some members have been to Bosnia and other places to visit the troops in the field. You'll find that these are very scary places, where people are not like policemen standing in a corner. They're in dangerous situations.

Of course, Parliament can say to the armed forces, we will only provide you with the funds and training so you can train up to the level of boy scout; you can only work in the policeman side of world conflict. That's easy. If something else happens in the world and Canada has no capabilities to contribute, and isn't prepared and is left out of the international community in a difficult situation—say another Korea arrived—that is then of course the responsibility of Parliament, not the armed forces.

• 1645

Most military people I know who have experience in different parts of the world feel uncomfortable with putting all our eggs in one basket down here and saying, that's all we're ever going to do. They have this sense that some day and some place when you least expect it, Parliament or somebody is going to say, oh, by the way, we want you to operate over here in this part of the combat spectrum. They try to encourage people to think that way—to work that way. I think that's a responsible thing to do, given the history of the 20th century and probably the new century.

It is possible to train people to do only one thing, but it's also possible to train people to work in combat operations and then trust them to work in less violent situations.

The Chair: Anything further, Mr. Bachand?

Mr. Claude Bachand: No.

The Chair: Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): Dr. Bland, on page 38 of your article... I'm just quoting you here because I thought it was arguably a very valid observation, where you say:

Opposition members of the defence committee most often wish to hear complaints against the government from witnesses. Government members in committee, on the other hand, often appear interested only in defending their record.

I would say, arguably, that's pretty much the way it is and has been.

The notion that, together, members of Parliament develop a non-partisan defence strategy is an intriguing one, however elusive it might be in reality. I was wondering, Dr. Bland, whether you were able to offer up to the committee any elements of a blueprint that could produce that kind of non-partisan consensus.

Dr. Douglas Bland: First, I don't underestimate or devalue the importance of partisan politics in a parliamentary system. That's at the root of how the system works, and it's important. But I remind us all that in times of great crisis in the United Kingdom and in Canada and other places during war time, governments formed coalition governments to have a national defence strategy to save the country. This was a very important part of Churchill's work and the First World War prime ministers. I'm reminded just this afternoon as this is the war room. This is where Mackenzie King brought in all sorts of people from all sorts of parties to say, how are we going to have a national strategy in this crisis? I think that's part of Canada's parliamentary tradition. When there is some crisis facing the country, parties pull together.

As far as the blueprint goes, I would say that on the major points of policy there isn't a great deal of difference between what parties in the past and the present have been saying. What are the objectives? Defend Canada. Defend North America in cooperation with the United States. Voluntarily take part in international security operations. They are the missions. The Canadian Armed Forces should have combat capabilities to operate in the middle of the combat spectrum, if you will, not way out here with nuclear aircraft carriers and bombers and so on, and not down here with policemen, but in the centre.

I think there is a consensus among those people who are interested in national defence in the political community who are in and out of office that 2% to 3% of GDP is probably the range where we can get the kind of capabilities we want. That's the history of this thing. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the people would be very upset if their party platforms had those elements in them.

I think people believe we should have reserves, mobilization plans, some element of the defence industry, and a strong parliamentary supervision of the department and the armed forces. My blueprint would have all those kinds of things in it, and then perhaps maybe the devil is in the details.

The Chair: Any further questions, Mr. Provenzano?

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: No.

The Chair: Mr. Hanger.

• 1650

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chairman, my question to Dr. Bland is along the same lines as Mr. Provenzano's.

I think he asked a very valid question. It's interesting that you would present this paper just prior to this meeting, because I think it is an important paper. Really, I believe it is the issue that we in this committee have to deal with to reach a non-partisan position to bring into focus what our military should be all about.

You talked about readiness and that we should define it. I would assume that that's going to be part and parcel of what we're going to be talking about over the next few months. You talked about a broad framework that's more than just equipment but deals with a series of other factors that are necessary to have a capable military, and the need to seek an explanation from the forces themselves and to look at those standards and measures.

I recall going to a meeting at the Congress Centre where there were military experts as well as... I don't believe there were too many politicians there apart from the Minister of National Defence, who spoke. They were talking about a revolution in military affairs. Britain gave an explanation of what pushed them into that direction, what brought them into... it was almost like an all-party consensus on what kind of a military is best for Britain and its interests outside of Britain.

Basically the crisis for them came into focus on the Falklands issue. From there they seemed to go from that position to a broader consensus in their country.

I was in Australia. In Australia, the foreign affairs committee—or minister, I guess—sought to have the military involved in certain endeavours outside the country. The military said, we're no longer capable of doing that; we're already stretched to the limit. So there was a big debate in their parliament, and through that came a consensus not only on a foreign affairs policy that was very clear, but then what followed right on its heels was strategic policy.

The politicians then went to the military and asked, what is going to be required for us to go out and fulfil these policies; what's going to be needed? I don't think we've ever reached that point in this country. I see that so many of the issues that come up in the military here are in fact on partisan lines.

We might agree, at least on the side of our party here, to seek to have a military with a funding base somewhere around the NATO average of two-point-something percent of GDP—which is almost double what it is right now—to see that we have that combat capability and even readiness. Our terms of readiness may very well differ from those on that side of the House.

What's going to be our point of non-partisan crossover, if you will, even on issues like that? You talked about the framework. Well, that's what we need—a framework. I don't see that happening right at the moment.

Dr. Douglas Bland: Well, the Australian experience was interesting because it was not only a consensus of parties. They went through a white paper process in the last couple of years, but it wasn't just a consensus of political leaders about what is required. They also sat down with their military leaders and came up with a consensus about what they're going to do.

To put it simply, the political leaders said to the military, we want you to do this, this, and this for this many dollars. The military said, it can't be done. Then they said, well, how about this? It was a little bit like buying a car and taking the options.

Eventually, I think, they came to a general understanding of what Australia's defence forces require to do what the government wants them to do. The second stage of that, of course, is for Parliament to hold the military to that bargain. Similarly, I guess, the public holds the politicians to the bargain.

• 1655

In our recent experience, you'll recall the special joint committee of the House and Senate. In my experience there, and in speaking with people and doing some research with them, there was a high degree of understanding about what was required in a good consensus. The report, for the most part—where it dealt with military matters and not other kinds of matters—was very helpful and was a good blueprint for the country. It would be, in my view, useful if SCONDVA could take a leadership role in helping to build that kind of consensus, and I think that appears to be what's going on.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, I apologize that I'll have to run to go chair another meeting.

Just very quickly, Dr. Bland, I would love to see a non-partisan approach, although the very nature of this institution seems to prevent that on many issues, although I think on the issue of national defence, one would assume you'd hopefully get some degree of consensus-building.

But if, in an ideal world, we had a blank piece of paper here, and we were to start from scratch and were to say, what do we want our armed forces to do, and what resources do we need to attain those objectives, then how would we go about procuring the necessary public and financial support, given the fact that, in politics, life is based on priorities? I agree, you might have to take from one area to another or do whatever you have to do. But to have some kind of short-term and long-term strategy that parliamentarians understand, that the armed forces understand, and that the public understands...

I guess my comment is that if we were able to approach it in that regard, without any preconceived notions—which may or may not be easy to do—I think we might be able to build some type of consensus, looking not only at what the needs are for this country but also at our relationship to the world around us. Obviously, the military in 2001 is a lot different from the military in 1960 or 1940. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Dr. Douglas Bland: When I talk to students and other people, it's important for them to realize that the military doesn't have any objectives. The military is neutral. It may not be, in fact, sometimes, but it is essentially neutral. Canada—

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: That's right. But what are our objectives in establishing—

Dr. Douglas Bland: Indeed. But Parliament needs to have a coherent foreign policy and defence policy in order to be able to explain to the military, which may be sitting on this side of the table, what we want them to do. What I think is important is not simply to go back and say, defend Canada, defend North America, and so on, but to say, we want you to be able to fly 2,000 hours a year of surveillance in the Arctic. How much does that cost? We want you to be able to have six ships at sea on each of our coasts all the time. How much does that cost? We want you to be able to send, at any one time, 3,000 combat-trained army people into a medium-combat environment within 25 days. How much does that cost?

I think the staff could come up with answers—and not how much does it cost this afternoon, but how much does it cost over time? Parliament wants to have 60,000 people in the armed forces. How much does that cost today, tomorrow, and 10 years from now? You trace that out. If it costs too much, come up with another set of capabilities. That's the kind of detail that I think would be helpful for the armed forces and for officials and other people. I'm not so sure, from my perhaps naive point of view... are those kinds of standards that difficult to agree on in Parliament?

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: You wouldn't think so. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert. Mr. Goldring.

• 1700

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Bland, I think it seems obvious that there would be far more consensus and far more agreement should the issues be closer to the requirements. There are many issues that have come before us, and where there is agreement is where the parties come together and they do come up with a resolve. In the last government, in my case, it would be with the merchant navy veterans, it would be the Hong Kong veterans. These were long outstanding issues that, yes, we were apart on, but we finally came together and there was agreement and there was consensus.

Now I see the same sort of issue with the military requirements. Basically we are asking about and enunciating concerns of the military that are fairly common, and you yourself are confirming some of these concerns. It's that we are sitting here and there is, in our mind, a resistance to enact a lot of these requirements and a hesitancy to carry it forward.

So I refer back again to your article where you're saying there are few senators and few MPs who have had any military experience. Is this one of the reasons why there is a resistance to accept the military experts, the people, the men and women who are in the military when they say they need something? After all, they are the experts? They are the ones who could clarify for me what we should be having for operational readiness and clarify for me how often they should be cycled through theatres of operation, because it wears on their relationships at home if they're cycled on too many missions, too often going out and going out.

These are issues in which we, by and large, are echoing the military's concerns, but there is a resistance to accept it from this side. Could it be because of the lack of background in the military? Why are these issues being resisted and being fought? Is it simply money or is it simply not wanting to listen to the military's concerns and having other agendas that are more important than the military?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think the question might go to the other side, but first, you're absolutely correct that Parliament, at this very committee, and the Senate at times have worked together to build a non-partisan policy in various areas. Quality of life issues could not have come forward if it hadn't been for the effort of the committee and Parliament, and I think when we're talking about operational readiness the quality of life discussions process is a valuable model to follow.

I think it would be useful for the committee in its discussions about operational readiness and operational efficiency to have in the back of their minds, as I said at the beginning, this notion that they're going to set some standards. What is the standard for repatriation after a mission? Is the standard that nobody will be sent overseas for 18 months after they've been on a six-month mission? That's the standard. But of course that has a cost, and people will have to work around that consensus. I think in many respects you say the military agrees with what you're proposing, and I would think that's right.

Members who are serving, especially very senior people, in policy-making areas with the government have traditional restraints on how they can answer questions, so we have to ask the right question. But there are hundreds, if not thousands, of other people out on the street who have credible, recent military experience in our country and other countries who can answer some of these questions for you. And I suspect that many of these people will be witnesses. I think that's another way to get at the problem.

I don't expect that any government of the day will simply say, we have this big problem, and ask the CDS if he wants to go over to Treasury Board and help himself to the treasury. I wouldn't think that's a wise thing to do in any case. But I think it would be helpful if members from committees like this one and others, and senators, help to build the consensus within their caucuses and so on.

• 1705

Mr. Peter Goldring: On that train of thought, how clearly do you think the risks of future conflicts are coming through? We tend to sit back and think no, there'll never be another World War II, or World War I, but what we're doing today in effect is we're intervening long before these issues can blow out of hand. Had we intervened in Czechoslovakia, Alsace-Lorraine, even in World War II it might have been an entirely different scenario. But still, even with intervention and peacekeeping, we had our Gulf War. We had 500,000 of the allied soldiers and troops over there. You mentioned the Falklands too.

How is this ongoing world risk and status... and what message do we send to the government that our readiness capability should be to address what level and size of conflict?

Dr. Douglas Bland: It goes to the question of ready for what? I think that, again, is a question for which there is no objective answer. It's a question that comes from the consensus of the House and public on what's possible and so on.

But it is possible to make some grand categories, or definable categories, of operations. There are simple police operations at one end and all-out war at the other end. Where on that spectrum are we going to be involved? I think it's possible to come up with a consensus, but again it comes to foreign policy.

If Canada wants to be the champion of human security in various parts of the world, you need something to do that with. It's not just our word. If you want to support the United Nations in operations, then you have to have some capabilities to do that. How much are we willing to put forward?

It saddens me sometimes to think of the Rwanda situation, of General Dallaire's dilemma when he was in the field asking for help and he turned to the United Nations for help and didn't get any. But what bothers me is what would have happened if he had said, “The UN's not going to do me any good; I'm phoning Ottawa to send 5,000 guys here right now.” We wouldn't have got there.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Can I ask another question?

The Chair: I think we'll be able to get back to you, Mr. Goldring, but Mr. Price has been waiting.

Mr. David Price: Actually, I want to carry on from that because I think you've opened up a very good point. As you said, in looking at operational readiness, we're looking at terms and definitions, but terms and definitions of what? I think foreign policy is what we should be looking at too, what foreign policy we have now, or what direction we're going in. What we almost would be saying is maybe we should be looking also at a foreign policy review in order to know what we're going to use as terms and definitions. Would you go that far?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Frankly, I don't think so. I think there's a great deal of benefit if this committee, with the help perhaps even of the Senate committee, can concentrate on the question of operational readiness, because it brings out many of the other considerations and things that need to be examined.

I think the very important issue of operational readiness, which hasn't been addressed very well for years and years and years, would be lost in a general review of all foreign policy and all defence policy and so on, and that would be a shame. It seems that we do incremental policy-making. What I say to students is we don't make policy in Canada, we find policy.

An hon. member: We react.

Dr. Douglas Bland: No, not in the sense of reacting. We test the waters. We talk to the politicians. We talk to these people. This party talks to that party, and we discover what is possible—what is the art of possibility, as someone wrote a long time ago. We're in the process of doing that bit by bit, and I don't think that's bad.

You've tackled quality of life; that's part of defence policy. You need to tackle the important issue of operational readiness, but of course when you have to ask the question if people are ready for what, then you're into the question of what kind of world do we live in, what kind of world are we going to live in, and what kind of foreign policy does Canada have, or does it traditionally have, and how are we going to service that? I think that's the best way of looking at it.

• 1710

Mr. David Price: You talked a bit about the Senate and Senate involvement, and you talked also about the fact that part of the problem with the parliamentary committee is that our lives are sometimes a little short as members here—there's not much of a guarantee—whereas in the Senate there tends to be. Would you prefer seeing SCONDVA as a joint committee with the Senate so that it would have a longevity to it?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think, again, just in my experience in looking at the work that the Senate committee on defence did in the 1980s—they wrote reports on manpower, marine forces, air forces, and air transportability. There were very learned and important studies done by the Senate. I look at the work that the Senate did with the House in the special joint committee and I think it's important.

I think it would be, from my perspective, helpful if people from the other place joined the SCONDVA committee on occasion, either to study an issue that's very critical or to be in the audience somehow to listen to the formal and informal conversations that are going on.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Price?

With the indulgence of the committee, perhaps I could ask a question or two, although I don't plan to make it too much of a habit.

Professor Bland, in your comments earlier you made one reference to industry, and I think industry has a role to play in operational readiness. I'm just not sure what that role is. This is probably not an area you're terribly familiar with, but I would like to get your views on that aspect of the issue of readiness, and, if Canada had to mobilize in a very significant way, how our industry would be engaged.

The other question I'd like to ask you is, in terms of pulling this report together, would you see any benefit whatsoever in doing any sort of a brief historical survey of the issue of readiness? Obviously, we had some pretty interesting experiences going back to the First World War and the Second World War in terms of how prepared we were for those conflicts. This is not to say we're going to be faced with anything similar in the future. However, we do have this concept of the come-as-you-are conflict, that these days things operate at such a speed that we aren't going to have the lead time we may have had in the past in terms of the Second World War, as an example, with mobilizing, and training in England, etc. Do you have any comments on those two issues?

Dr. Douglas Bland: On the background, I think it would be quite useful not only for perhaps the committee itself but particularly for explaining to people, the public, why what's happened in the past is important and to set the issue in a broader context, not simply to make everyone feel worried that if we're not operationally ready the country is going to fall apart or something, but to show the cost accrued to the country when we're not ready and some critical incident occurs and we have problems. That's not too difficult to do.

Defence industrial mobilization was a big topic a few years ago. In fact, there were many conferences on the defence industrial base, the continental base, Canada-U.S., where ways of bringing industry on line quickly were discussed, and ways of building into contracts for new equipment a requirement that the companies have a surge capability to produce everything from boots to ammunition in a crisis. Ways whereby this would be built into contracts, into defence policy, and into negotiations with industry were discussed. A lot of that work fell aside at the end of the Cold War; it seemed that it wasn't important. But as we saw in the Kosovo operations, it became important again when, as I understand, we started to run out of ammunition for aircraft. People went to industry and said, “Give us some more, please”, and they didn't have some more.

• 1715

It's a critical part of the equation, and it needs to be thought of in a broad alliance context. I think—and you could check, I'm sure—there is still a staff working in National Defence headquarters that deals with defence industrial base business, and they could bring you up to date on what the plans are and how it's working.

The Chair: Okay. I wanted to ask one other quick question of you. Some time ago I read—and this is going back a few years—that Canadian soldiers in the Second World War had among the highest casualty rates of any of the allied soldiers. I think some military historians have pointed out that one of the reasons was that perhaps we didn't have the level of trained officer cadre some of the other countries had and that some of these casualties were experienced as a result of leadership problems. I think it's fair to say that some people have put that forward as a thesis. Do you agree with that?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think that's true, but you have to recall that in 1939, on the very eve of the war, we had about 25,000 or 30,000 regular force people in all the services. Then we went to a million, and the trained officers who were kicking around at that time were a handful. They were spread out to run these big organizations and big commands in difficult situations. They depended on the militia in some respects, because, you will recall, it was only about 20 years between the First and Second World Wars, so there was still some experience out there. But it was a big difficulty. And in the matter of capabilities, again to bring it back to operation readiness and focusing on capabilities, trained senior people are a critical element of any capability. You can have all the new ships you want, but if you don't have any admirals who know how to make ships sail around together, you're going to have a great deal of difficulty.

As our armed forces shrink and the officer corps shrinks with it, the pool from which you can select talent, finding enough time for people to train, to gain experience with bigger organizations, and so on, shrinks as well. That's a national asset we often don't think about, but it's critical to mobilizing armed forces and so on.

The Chair: Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: You make mention in your paper, on page 40, of comments that would be forthcoming from the Chief of Defence Staff and Deputy Minister of DND to politicians and, probably more appropriately, to members of this committee, so that politicians can begin to fulfil their constitutional responsibilities. Would you like to talk about that? What are you referring to right there?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I'm sorry. I lost the quote and I don't have a copy.

Mr. Art Hanger: It says:

Given time and well-organized information, and the honest nonpartisan assistance of the CDS and the Deputy Minister of DND, politicians can begin to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities.

Dr. Douglas Bland: Yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Is that not happening now?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think there have been periods of weakness in oversight of the armed forces. Let me turn to Somalia, where I was involved, as some may know, as an adviser and worker with the inquiry for the full period that it was functioning. My view is that we should have had that inquiry before the troops went overseas, not after they came back. I think at least SCONDVA or someone should have called the designated commander in here to sit down and ask rather simple questions: Do you have rules of engagement? Do you have a plan? Do you know where you're going? Do you have the logistics support you need? Do you have all the stuff you want? Do your soldiers understand what they're going to do? That kind of detailed examination by Parliament would only take a couple of days, at the most, I would think, and might have prevented some of the difficulties they had in the theatre. Before that officer came here to talk with members of Parliament, they would obviously have anticipated all these kinds of questions and thought them through.

• 1720

That's what I mean by an active parliamentary system concerned about fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to defend Canada. The defence of Canada is not the responsibility of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Armed Forces. It's the responsibility of Parliament, which provides those institutions with the resources to do the job as they see fit. Parliament takes a risk and lives with the consequences of success or failure.

Mr. Art Hanger: I see a major problem for this committee, and that's going to be defining our terms—operational readiness, for instance. When we ask all those witnesses who sit in front of us to explain operational readiness, particularly militarily, how will we define it? What will the consensus be?

One of your points was to seek explanations from the forces themselves. So what are we going to hear? Are we going to hear the revised version from the political masters, or some very blunt military officer telling us what the score is?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't know, and I'll be very curious to follow the proceedings.

But the useful technique is not for me or anyone else to invent a definition of operational readiness, but to go and ask the armed forces what their definition is—as the Somali inquiry did in chapter 23. You ask them: Show me the measurement system. How does it go? Show me the criteria used for measuring this unit. How does it work?

Of course, that puts the onus on the institution to explain what it means by operational readiness, and how that all functions and fits together.

I come back to the comments made by the minister, the CDS, and others, that the Canadian Forces is now more combat-capable than it's been in years. Well, perhaps. But I don't know by what standards they're measuring to make that remark.

So I would suggest that you find the staff paper to support that, and then you'll either be convinced or not. That's my way of investigating these kinds of things. I think it's a normal audit procedure to go to a company and ask to see the books.

The Chair: Mr. Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Sir, in your paper you talk about the need for members of Parliament—particularly members who are new to the committee, as I am—to become more expert in military matters. I wonder if you'd like to comment on what members can do to become more expert, and in what areas particularly? I know you do it to some degree in your paper, but would you like to expand on that?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think it's important, obviously, for members to try to be aware of the journals and articles—issues that are written and spoken about, and so on. But here again, the connection between the Department of National Defence and Parliament is critical.

The outreach program some of us have talked about for the last 18 months or two years is not just about taking members and senators to visit units—important though that is. It's also about having ready access to important documents about the revolution in military affairs strategy, budgeting, and so on. The information is there. Sometimes it's not asked for, and sometimes it doesn't come over as readily as you want. But I think it's a course of study in the field, to try to become aware of what's going on.

The other approach I've suggested before to some senators, members, and others is to try to interest the academic community, retired military officers, the Conference of Defence Associations, and others, in coming to the House for lunch. Any members who are interested can talk to them about the issues. Do that on a regular basis.

• 1725

That article came from The Canadian Military Journal. One of the things the editor there has done, at the prompting of the journal's board, is to make sure that every MP and senator gets a copy. I hope that's been happening.

If you have time to read through some of those journals, in a short time you can gain a great deal of understanding about what's going on in the Canadian Forces.

I think the way to do it is outreach—from Parliament into the community, and from the community into the House.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Let me ask you about the officer corps. You expressed a concern about the declining numbers of officers. From people on the street, I often hear a sense that we have too many officers—that there are too many generals for the number of ordinary military lower ranks we have. You would argue that's not the case. Am I right?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I would say that sometimes it has been the case. It's not that you have too many officers; it's that sometimes you have too many people doing things that don't seem to contribute to operational effectiveness and readiness. It's a bigger argument.

But I think for a viable armed force that's capable of adjusting to ongoing changes in the world, you need to have a highly educated officer corps. And you need to have some spares built into the organization, so that people can get away for sabbaticals—for one year out of thirty, maybe—to upgrade their training, to think about things, and to work on projects.

When you cut everything to the bone and you have just enough officers for the office spaces, then nobody has any time to think about anything.

I think it is the CDS's responsibility to build the Canadian Forces officer corps, but I think it's an issue Parliament ought to be interested in too.

In 1994 we closed the National Defence College in Kingston—a very unfortunate decision. That's something that should be addressed. You may be interested to know, they're rebuilding it under a new name.

But those issues have been addressed in the last few years: How educated is the officer corps? Are there proper opportunities? What's the health and state of the Royal Military College? These are important issues that Parliament should be involved in.

Mr. Geoff Regan: You suggested that some activities don't contribute to operational readiness. Can you describe some of the things officers are involved in that don't contribute, in your view?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think that because of regulations, the way the government works, the way the Treasury Board works, and so on, a lot of officers spend a great deal of time dealing with administrative matters. The politics of national defence are sometimes a heavy burden on senior leaders. I think a lot of people spend time on jobs in areas such as administration, pay and allowances, base maintenance, and so on, that are peripheral to combat operations.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Regan.

I think we have time for one more very quick question, Mr. Goldring, before we wind up.

Mr. Peter Goldring: My question concerns procurement and who listens to whom—where the request actually comes from. I have difficulty imagining that the military, being the experts, would not have been making these recommendations all along—and they just have not been listened to.

There was the case in the Gulf War where the frigate stopped on the way to be up-gunned with Phalanx anti-aircraft weaponry. We had our CF-18s that were used in other duties, but not the front line. Now they are, of course, and now our frigates do have the Phalanx gun.

In situations like this, it's very hard for me to believe that those requests would not have come through from the military. It's just that something happened and they were not acted on—the equipment was not procured. Something happened because it was common knowledge in the military that these things were available. Unless somebody seriously thinks that a frigate is only for offshore patrolling of fisheries, you have to have it equipped for these types of things.

• 1730

So with that in mind, maybe I'd like to have your opinion on this. It seems that helicopters are the question of the day. What helicopter do you think would be best for the military?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't know. I haven't followed the technical specifications of that issue. In fact... well, let me leave it at that point of view.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But is there someone listening?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Sure, everybody's listening. Everybody's listening to the project, the background, and the theatre that's around it at times. Before 1993, the Chief of Defence Staff in the Campbell government made a recommendation to government about what helicopter to buy. The Conservatives changed that requirement, and the Chief of Defence Staff, John Anderson at the time, said, okay, it's the government's decision to do that. Then he carried that recommendation into the next government, when the Liberal government was in place. And the government has been deciding about that advice since that time.

I think the broader question is, what are the dynamics for making decisions on capital procurement? Again, one of the most important dynamics is that the funds seem only to be residuals of other spending. People talk about getting to 26% or 23%—at one time it was that 30% of the budget would be spent on capital. Well, we don't ever get there because the money is chewed up on pay and allowances, and so on. This is what happens when you fund for what's available and not for what's needed. If you need 30% spending in the capital budget every year for national defence, then budget for 30%. Don't say, spend on troops, and whatever you have left over from troops, spend on this.

Again, procurement is conditioned by technical responses. Things change. You buy one thing; you need to change; you need to move over.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But you just made the comment that they ran out of ammunition on their recent mission, and I find it very incomprehensible that a military would be that poor at planning and budgeting. They're the experts. They wouldn't run out of ammunition. Something else happened that made them run out of the ammunition—procurement, again.

Dr. Douglas Bland: Why they ran out of ammunition is because... I only have so much money to spend. Am I going to take my scarce dollars and buy a whole bunch of ammunition, put it in a building, and close the door? Or am I going to take that scarce money and spend it on something I need right now because I don't think anything's going to happen next week?

Mr. Peter Goldring: So you're cleaving your expectations, then.

Dr. Douglas Bland: You're hanging out there. And when I say that the present force can be the enemy of the future force, that's what I mean. The present force needs money to pay soldiers. So we'll take the money out of the equipment budget and we'll pay the soldiers. Then we hope that next year, when we have more money—because Parliament's going to give us more money next year, and there's always next year—then we'll buy these things that we haven't bought. All right?

Now, let's say we do it the other way around. We won't pay the soldiers, and we won't fix the married quarters, and we won't take care of quality of life because we're going to buy very expensive missile systems—each one, when you fire it down range, costs about the cost of a Chevrolet or something—and we're going to put all that in the barn. And then next year, when we have more money, we'll fix the PMQs. Well, gee, guess what, it's 20 years down the road, and we still haven't fixed the married quarters. And that's the kind of dilemma that people are forced into when the department and the armed forces have to make choices about whether to buy this or buy that.

You're never going to get it perfectly right, but you're always going to face these problems of where to spend, unless you have a budgeting process in which you go to government every year and you say, these are the standards you set for the armed forces; this is the capability that you demand of the armed forces; and here's the bill this year, and here's the bill next year. But to tell me here's $10 billion, go away and see what you can do with it is typical over many governments. It's not very helpful.

• 1735

The Chair: That is probably as good a point as any to wind up the discussion here today.

Professor Bland, thank you very much for your comments today. I think you've provoked a pretty wide-ranging discussion on the issues we're facing. We thank you for your participation here, and perhaps at some point in the not-too-distant future we'll have you back again. Thank you very much for your comments.

The meeting is adjourned.