| Q-1172 — June 5, 2025 — — With regard to the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat: (a) since January 1, 2022, what is the total number of meetings supported by the Secretariat, and for each meeting, what are the details, including, the (i) date of the meeting, (ii) nature or subject of the meeting, (iii) total cost, broken down by type of expense (e.g., travel, accommodation, personnel, venue rental, etc.); (b) what is the detailed proof of the “significant cost efficiencies and economies of scale” referred to in the Main Estimates, 2025-26, and attributed to the Secretariat; (c) what is the annual budget specifically allocated for salaries at the Secretariat, since January 1, 2022; and (d) what are the details of any consulting or similar service contracts signed by the Secretariat, since January 1, 2022, to maintain and improve its services since its creation, including, for each contract, the (i) date it was signed, (ii) vendor, (iii) value, (iv) description of the goods or services provided, (v) manner in which the contract was awarded (sole-sourced or competitive bid)? |
| Q-1182 — June 5, 2025 — — With regard to the government’s announcement in budget 2024 that they will create a new “capstone research funding organization”: (a) what will be the purpose of this organization; (b) how much money has been allocated to, or is projected to be required by, this organization to date and over each of the next five fiscal years; (c) what specific gaps, deficiencies, or coordination challenges in the current federal research support system is this new capstone organization intending to address; (d) what is expected to be achieved by the organization in the (i) short, (ii) medium, (iii) long, term; (e) how will capstone fit in organizationally with the (i) Canadian Institutes of Health Research, (ii) Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, (iii) Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council; (f) will the new capstone organization have any funding authority or influence over any of the entities in (e), and, if so, what are the details; (g) how will the government avoid duplication between the work of capstone and the other entities in (e); (h) what impact, if any, will the establishment and funding of capstone have on the funding of the other entities in (e); (i) what metrics will be used to assess the impact of the new capstone organization, and whether or not the government is receiving value for its money; (j) how often will the assessments in (i) take place, and how will the results be made public; (k) what will be the composition of the board, or other governing body of the capstone, and how much will they be paid; and (l) on what date is capstone expected to be fully operational? |
| M-8 — June 5, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, and other wastes including electronic wastes, household wastes and plastic wastes, can be a means to avoid proper waste management at the expense of weaker economies, their people and their environment, |
| (ii) the Basel Convention to which Canada is an active Party, has made strides over the years to prevent and control unjust and unsustainable trade in wastes, |
| (iii) so far, Canada has failed to ratify Article 4a of the Basel Convention, also known as the Ban Amendment, which forbids the export of hazardous wastes to developing countries, and Canada is not compelled to abide by the Ban Amendment until it has ratified it, |
| (iv) Canada has not forbidden the export of Basel-controlled plastic wastes to developing countries, unlike counterparts in comparable jurisdictions such as the European Union, |
| (v) Canada has entered an arrangement with the United States meant to circumvent necessary transparency and control on plastic waste trade moving across the US/Canadian border, allowing Canadian operators to use non-Party US operators to avoid Basel controls when exporting plastic waste to developing countries, |
| (vi) the lack of proper transparency, controls, and prohibitions facilitate very linear waste trafficking, externalize real costs and harm to weaker economies, and benefit unscrupulous waste traders at the expense of human health and the environment; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) promote the immediate ratification of the Ban Amendment and include in its national implementation both Annex VIII and Annex II listings, including the plastic waste listing Y48 and the upcoming e-waste listing Y49, |
| (ii) rescind the 2020 Canada-USA Arrangement created to ignore the Basel Plastics Amendments adopted in 2019 for controlling trade in hazardous, mixed and contaminated plastic wastes between the two countries, |
| (iii) negotiate for policies within the new plastics treaty in the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee meeting and beyond, which will effectively reduce the amount of plastic that is produced globally starting with the most hazardous and inappropriate plastics first. |
| M-9 — June 5, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) according to the 2023 Exports of Military Goods and Technology report, in 2023 Canada exported military goods and technology valued at $2.143 billion to destinations other than the United States, |
| (ii) exports of military goods to the United States remain largely unregulated and therefore off the public record, |
| (iii) every year, by value, the vast majority of Canada’s non-US exports of military goods and technology is destined to countries with records of human rights abuses, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, India, and Colombia, |
| (iv) Canadian-made detonators sent to Kyrgyzstan are alleged to have been diverted to Russia for use in the illegal war in Ukraine, |
| (v) the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development recommended, in its 2024 report on Canada’s sanctions regime, that the Government of Canada publish comprehensive data annually on Canadian exports of dual-use goods, as it does for military goods, including the value of those exports, descriptions of the goods, and their authorized end users, and that the Government of Canada, in collaboration with international partners and working closely with other relevant law enforcement agencies, develop a strategy to address sanctions violations, including actors exploiting offshore export havens and engaging in jurisdiction shopping, while increasing the enforcement of existing controls, |
| (vi) Global Affairs Canada continues to use the problematically high bar of “credible evidence” when communicating its findings on the risk associated with individual arms exports, when the Canadian legal standard is “substantial risk”, |
| (vii) Canadians expect a higher standard from their government when it comes to protecting human rights abroad, |
| (viii) there is a need for Canadians, through Parliament, to oversee current and future arms transfers; |
| (b) Standing Order 104(2) be amended by adding, after paragraph (b), the following: “(c) Arms Exports and Brokering Review”; |
| (c) Standing Order 108(3) be amended by adding the following: “(j) Arms Exports and Brokering Review shall include, among other matters, the review of and report on (i) Canada’s arms export permits regime, (ii) proposed international export and brokering authorizations, (iii) annual government reports regarding arms transfers, (iv) the use of these weapons systems and technology and information on their alleged misuse abroad, (v) all matters and broader trends regarding Canada’s current and future arms exports.”; |
| (d) the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs prepare and report to the House within five sitting days of the adoption of this order a list of Members to compose the new standing committee created by this order; and |
| (e) that the Clerk be authorized to make any required editorial and consequential amendments to the Standing Orders. |